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Placed in the open hands of believers,
my mother and father.
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abstract
Process thought offers vital developments in speculative metaphysics, yet endures
unjust neglect due to the technical intricacies of Alfred North Whitehead's contribution
and to the theological component of Charles Hartshorne's writings. Whitehead's keen
mathematical and scientific orientations preceded his mature metaphysical outlook, and
the resultant metaphysical system is burdened by overwhelming complexity. This
discourages many from ever investigating his expansive speculative endeavours while
encouraging exclusive discourse among the few Whiteheadian insiders. Hartshorne
distinguishes process philosophy and theology from unrelated classical doctrines, yet
with theism as such in the foreground of his work, many dismiss it as outmoded or
irrelevant to contemporary concerns; while others, finding reformulated theistic
principles untenable, reject process thinking in its entirety. The present study extends its
appeal by establishing a case for psychical realism - the view that reality is made up of
experiential events - and by showing that to replace Whitehead's complexity and
Hartshorne's deity with psychical realism in the foreground of process philosophy
allows such events to play a crucial part in a more universally acceptable process vision.
The work is divided into two parts consisting of two chapters each, bordered by an
introduction defending metaphysical endeavours at large and an epilogue of process
pointers for speculating large. The first chapter on becoming and being considers the
problem of process, the inadequacy of historically influential substantive accounts, and
the potential of an event ontology to ground being in a complementary becoming. The
second chapter relates being and becoming to the likewise complementary pairs of first
empirical and rational and second objective and subjective. The warranted stress on
becoming over being is repeated - the rational emphasised over the empirical, the
subjective over the objective - to counteract an analogous bias to the contrary. Psychical
subjectivity is then less enigmatic philosophically and more capable of grounding the
objective physical world scientifically, once given the proper metaphysical backing. The
third chapter defines and distinguishes psychical realism from related doctrines, and
defends it independently of its place in process philosophy. Intuition and perception
indicate a related synthesis of realism and idealism, and the analogic and genetic
arguments are examined and objections addressed. The fourth chapter explicates
process metaphysics by situating it historically, by highlighting its essential creativity,
organicity, and temporality, and by marking the psychical realist component they each
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At the heart of the wonder and written work that constitutes a first considerable
undertaking in philosophy are a great many influences. Much that is here has emerged
little by little from formal studies at first, but then more and more from reflection and
conversation about my own private thoughts and feelings on the nature of all things
great and small. I hope that something of the latter informed the former when the time
arrived for wonder to turn to writing. To lose sight of the problems of people and the
problems of the world on occasion, to take up concerns only a philosopher would
choose to invent, is somewhat inevitable in doing metaphysics. But I have also chosen to
follow my supervisors in trying to avoid excessive commentary on the countless
controversies that tend to pepper journal publications, many impinging at most at the
margin of the bigger issues and unlikely to be of lasting interest. Overly technical and
professional jargon may plague recent philosophy, but to leave it wholly to one side
while retaining what is vital is not so simple, and I have not always succeeded. But if I
come across as less than current in my considerations, it is partly due to an attempt at a
frank unfolding of my own opinions in light of the many great ideas already out there,
while trying to address the basic objections readily raised against any humble efforts at
thinking things through. Such is philosophical endeavour at its most engaging as I see it.
A few remarks on style are in order. For the most part I work around gender biases
inherent in English by employing first and third person plural and impersonal pronouns
whenever possible, but I avoid the awkward 'he and she' or the affected 'she' or any
other curious new constructions to that effect. The concern is heartfelt and the effort
earnest, but one wonders if we accordingly take adversaries along for a ride in calling
them one of us on occasion. At any rate, employing gender correctives when context
makes clear the irrelevance of a hypothetical individual's sex introduces a certain
emphasis (perhaps distorts a certain meaning) and is itself far from being gender
neutral. I too await the imminent arrival of lasting solutions here. I also relinquish
speaking in the first person at the close of the prologue, the better to abate my own
meddlesome presence, and I open each chapter with an epigram out of Whitehead, the
better to highlight the many redolent turns plentiful in his prose that are all too often
taken as just more cryptic intricacy by the careless critic. Finally, the computer made it
easy enough to employ something of a novel format for reference and discussion notes.
Whether interested in mere browsing or full scrutiny, the reader has all the relevant
information here on each page, but without intrusions into the flow of text, nor book
abbreviations and publication dates to retain, nor pages to flip in hunting things down.
An undertaking of such scope carries with it a number of professional and personal
debts. There is the gratitude owed to those eminent thinkers - Plato and his 'footnotes' in
Whitehead foremost among them - whose work and influence have so clearly inspired
and directed my own. Hardly ever managing to 'stand on their shoulders' I nonetheless
have felt the 'shock of a great philosopher' now and again. There are also the many
thanks owed to the enthusiastic if faceless philosophers from near and far increasingly
coming across on the internet, in correspondence that goes over and then beyond the
work of great thinkers. More gratitude by far is due to those who supervised my work,
and in so doing became both my mentors and my good friends. 'Supervisors' is modest
indeed since without their support nothing at all like this essay would exist. A certain
chant-like quality to Stephen Priest's incessantly expressed conviction that 'philosophy is
the solving of philosophical problems, philosophy is the solving of philosophical
problems' kept me going early on when no solutions were forthcoming. Either he taught
me not to mind dismal failure in learning the philosophy basics or he showed me
something like honest means for denying it. I am still not sure which, but am forever
grateful. For the kind teachings and generous effort of Timothy Sprigge, a true and
accomplished philosopher in his own right, I am deeply appreciative and forever in debt.
By deed more than by word he revealed which philosophical problems were worth the
work, and by word alone made it plain that the best' was not to be the enemy of
'the not bad' in going about solving them. I count it my great good fortune to have spent
so many evenings deep in discussion before his fireplace and his cats and his clear
example. Any pretensions to insightful thinking on my own part in what follows ought
always to be measured against the often unspoken but obvious debts owed to all these
philosopher friends, both past and present. I am thankful as well for the blend of
professional and personal assistance from my one-time readers and lifelong friends,
Ariel Meirav and Pete Campbell, and for Sarah Gavron's ample support early on and
Maya Gratier's kind-hearted help in seeing the thing through. Finally, I owe a debt of
gratitude to my mother and father who, though so far afield, seemed never to lose sight




Metaphysics: A User's Manual
"There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny, and imperfect are
efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things. In philosophical
discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement
is an exhibition of folly."
The earliest known musings as to the way things are strike me as sound ones:
that reality is made up entirely of experiencing entities of some sort and that
there are gods of all sorts. Much can be said by way of vindicating the former
idea and enough said of the latter at least to warrant taking it seriously. Our
ancestors at the dawn of recorded history had good luck or bad in sorting
through their metaphysical opinions, and there was certainly little more than
guesswork and good luck to go on. Intuitions were surely at a premium, as
neither systematic reasoning nor scientific investigation amounted to much, and
the relation of each to speculative philosophy was far from clear. For Plato there
was nothing terribly unsystematic about writing the Republic, on the one hand,
and contending that everything we do wrong was the fault of our parents on the
other; and Aristotle was not biologist enough to look into the mouths of women
before claiming they had less teeth than men. Yet speculate they did, in brave if
unbridled attempts to grasp the essence of reality and thereby to gain a good bit
of wisdom. Such has been the philosopher's calling throughout history, and
metaphysical pondering the outcome of those interests. The philosophers of
antiquity were either dead wrong as to the nature of reality and its
underpinnings, and all of us since (at least those interested) have had to ignore
such notions and start from scratch, or they got it basically right to begin with
and we, the interested, do well to spend our efforts sharpening up their good
guesses. I submit that the latter is the more sensible view. But the spirit of the
times is not one for meandering in ancient ruminations, and the critic sallies
forth with the standard ridicule for any such irregular metaphysical reasoning.
On the face of it then, in a dimly lit speculative present, the work to come
explores the means to vindicate the admittedly far-fetched. Yet I shall argue that
there are novel ways to consider these early musings, ways not nearly as odd as
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all that, and ways that reflect and clarify the most expansive metaphysical system
erected in our time.
There are fine and fruitful ways in which to agree or disagree with a
metaphysical line; it is another matter entirely to simply ignore such thinking. In
philosophy neglect is the worst of all possible fates and we seem in our time not
to bother much with the metaphysician. I once overheard an art teacher, and
rather distinguished painter, telling a student that if he could choose to live in
any age at any place as an artist he would choose to live in Chicago right now.
Being a native Chicagoan interested in art I was eager to challenge what seemed
a ludicrous idea, but his reasoning baffled me. "In Chicago," he said, "everything
is ugly and nobody likes art. No circumstances could be more inspirational for
the pursuit of beauty." Perhaps metaphysicians in the West presently endure
similar circumstances, for the major philosophical movements of the
century - Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, Linguistic Analysis, Existentialism,
Phenomenology, Marxism, Structuralism and Deconstruction ~ are all in the
main against metaphysics. What is worse, venture out of academic circles, and
philosophy in general (if given a passing thought) comes across as, "therapy for
those afflicted with a rather refined kind of intellectual disorder in their control
over their native tongues," as my supervisor's apt depiction has it, and
metaphysics in particular when defended at all, "must be as being a kind of
poetry,"1 perhaps aesthetically and emotionally appealing, but far from having
to do with truth. Has it really come to this: philosophy coming to an end,
metaphysics becoming impossible? In the aftermath of such movements these
begin to seem something like rhetorical questions.
I rather think, along with that supervisor, that the possibility of metaphysics
and the fulfilment of philosophy ought to be made plain more in the showing
and less in the telling, and whether metaphysics is worthwhile a better question
accordingly, with answers in fact the hostage to experiential fortune. It is well to
wonder with Wittgenstein what the use of philosophy is if it leads to, "talk with
some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., and if it does not
improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life."2
Granted, some experience has aesthetic and emotional appeal, some is
intellectually therapeutic, but metaphysical experience is profoundly involved in
1 T.L.S. Sprigge, "The Importance of Subjectivity." in Inquiry., 25, 1982 pp.144.
2 L. Wittgenstein, In a letter to N. Malcolm quoted in Malcolm's, Ludwig Wittgenstein:
A Memoir. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958, p.39.
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revealing the reasoning that makes it just that way. Deep down we all believe in
certain metaphysical truths, notwithstanding the movements that mark the
contemporary spirit, for we all necessarily think and feel and act in terms of
these deep beliefs regardless of any conscious, explicit opinions to the contrary.
Whether we think ourselves free or fated, we deliberate for all big decisions;
whether we believe in both bodies and minds, we feel upon awaking from
dreams that the mind has been places the body has not; whether we regard
others as important (or indeed others as even 'out there' at all) we delight in
their pleasure and wince at their pain. Integrity is at stake when the concepts
and categories, the vision and symbols, of conscious thought are inadequate to
these deep, preconscious beliefs. For being flagrantly anti-metaphysical often
opens one up to affirming self-contradictory notions that could never be
altogether meant nor fully lived. Perhaps the half-lived opinions of the nihilist,
the atheist, the absolutist about determinism, about relativism, about being
selfish - these ideas, like the outright denial of metaphysics, may in the end be
inconsistent as so only insincerely held, but in the meantime they may
nonetheless be quite destructive, and experience accordingly quite confused and
disagreeable. The metaphysician begins then by recognising that we cannot
confine such thoughts to their scant status as playthings for philosophers, for
ultimately the motivation for even the most abstract speculation is deeply
personal, and conveys a passion to express a faith by which the philosopher may
live. Ideas are not just toys, and one use for metaphysics is to help develop a
coherent account for what lies at the heart of what actually happens to us in
everyday living.
In the opening pages of Process and Reality., Alfred North Whitehead's
magnum opus in metaphysics, it is announced that the work is best understood as
repudiating a number of prevalent habits of thought influential in philosophy,
and at the top of the list is the distrust in speculative philosophy.3 Many consider
metaphysics not only superfluous to scientific endeavour, but also utterly
incapable of the kind of progress science enjoys. Simply put, there is neither need
nor reward for such speculation. But even within each of the sciences, and more
so between them, when the current crop of results comes in, puzzling new
problems arise. The scientific stance might as well follow the fashion of
Columbus' map-maker by placing 'terrors' over all its unknowns, should science
3 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.xiii.
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not act at all on its (perhaps unacknowledged) speculative bent. For it is
metaphysical thinking that makes sense of the menagerie of scientific facts, and
the consequent comprehensive viewpoints are then used in the march toward
further scientific discovery. This march may begin in particular hypotheses and
new research proposals, but soon precedes beyond the specific sciences to studies
all the more profound: to that of first causes, of being as such, of the
transcendental conditions of experience, of the basis of reason and knowledge, of
the meaning of freedom and the direction of destiny, of the systematic structure
of the cosmos, and of the nature of the sacred and of the divine. Thus speculative
thought comes prior to and then follows upon scientific enterprise. And though
no ranking of what follows upon science is intended, I am inclined to feel that in
the end the metaphysics that informs science cannot help but reflect the
indispensable question that goes beyond the details, the habits, the laws of reality
and on to how that structure ensures reality's ultimate meaning. We may note a
shift in metaphysical methods from historical to natural theology, from natural
theology to evolutionary cosmology, we may profess an appraisal of the question
that discounts faith in any of its answers, but the human hope and need for
sounding the depths of the mystery of existence persist all the same. Small
wonder that once a metaphysician as great as Mr. Whitehead does away with
manifold incidental details, 'the best rendering of integral experience' is often
found in This wealth of expression of ultimate feeling' delivered in The
utterances of religious aspiration'.4
The metaphysician (in us all) is therefore out to articulate a set of ideas that
render the essence of reality and our place within that reality intelligible. It is
not the making of a framework out to compete with common knowledge and
scientific understanding, but rather to supplement and encompass them in an
overarching harmonious outlook. And it is manifest that metaphysical progress
has been made, but not the sort of progress that measures piecemeal scientific
advances. The questions loom large, declare deep difficulties, and any answers
must fit into or reform a good many others due to the systematic character of the
speculations. But blind alleys continue to be sealed off, crackpot theories thrown
out, the problems sharpened and the theories made more subtle and
sophisticated. It is ludicrous to suppose that the metaphysician, unlike the
scientist, is involved in a vain enterprise because all the possibilities have been
4 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.208.
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adequately explored, those actualised have been utterly used up, and mostly by
Greek thinkers in antiquity at that. If speculative philosophy is scorned as useless
nowadays, it is the fault of those ignorant of its uses and its triumphs who choose
not to speculate. For speculations have been and continue to be made indeed, and
anti-speculative thinkers ought to think again about the contributions of a Peirce
or a James or a Whitehead to current philosophical discussion. After all, the
history of philosophy, Charles Hartshorne reminds us, provides something more
than Grandpa Parmenides, Father Aristotle, Honest Old Uncle Kant, and Bad
Brother Derrida.5
I consider Whitehead on the mark in suggesting that it is not so much the
cogency of anti-metaphysical arguments, but the 'thinness of so much modern
metaphysics' that has led to the demise of the discipline in our time. Gone are the
days of the armchair metaphysician who knew nothing of the specific fields of
study under categorical scrutiny. But in an era when information is described as
'exploding' few other than Whitehead can lay claim to a grasp of the material
relevant to the task. Since that material has continued to grow exponentially, we
do well to follow the lead of a qualified and comprehensive philosopher of
Whitehead's calibre, and to see that following his lead at this point in time means
using his process philosophy to take further metaphysical steps.
For Whitehead's own metaphysics is something of a solid gold shovel with a
rope handle. It has not been taken up and used, but alas for all the wrong
reasons. Keen mathematical and scientific orientations preceded Whitehead's
mature metaphysical outlook, and so his system is burdened by a style marked
with demanding technical intricacies. This has discouraged many from ever
investigating one of the great speculative endeavours of our time while
encouraging exclusive discourse among the few Whiteheadian insiders. Charles
Hartshorne moreover, by far the most esteemed advocate and notable elaborator
of Whiteheadian thought, has made those aspects of it having to do with deity the
focus of his philosophical contribution. Hartshorne clearly distinguishes process
philosophy and theology from unrelated classical doctrines, yet with theism as
such in the foreground of his work, many have dismissed process thought
without a hearing as outmoded or irrelevant to contemporary concerns; while
others, finding reformulated theistic principles untenable, have proceeded to
reject process thinking in its entirety. What is more, despite traces of process
5 C.N. Hartshorne, forthcoming in Points of View. Chicago: Open Court, 1996.
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thought deep in antiquity and adherents among eminent thinkers throughout
history, to date no study has yet appeared that addresses this vision of reality as
one coherent, evolving whole, from which an increasing set of universal insights
can be distilled, that are clear of esoteric wording and are far more telling than
any particular thinker's account.
The present study attempts to extend the appeal of process philosophy by
establishing a case for psychical realism - the view that reality is made up of
experiential events - and by showing the central role such events can play in a
more universally acceptable process vision. Throughout the history of ideas
psychical realism has commanded rich and varied metaphysical treatments in its
own right, but here the notion is forged as support for the crucial feature of
process philosophy, namely the essence of the creative, organic, temporal events
that constitute a process. Replacing Whitehead's complexity and Hartshorne's
deity with psychical realism in the foreground affords the opportunity to
streamline the process perspective. The salient features of process philosophy
that a range of process thinkers expound are thereby cleared of specialised
phrasing and explained concisely, while the metaphysical progress these views
represent are thus emphasised and expanded.
Another reason process philosophy has not had its due is for what some take to
be the unusual preliminary notions it is founded upon. Although imbedded in
the primary writings, important arguments for establishing the reality of the
process realm and the reality of the psychical realm have often gone unnoticed,
and the exceptional ontological treatment required once the fact of either realm
has been established has often been neglected. Thus the present study is divided
into two halves of two chapters each, the first half setting up the second. Book
One opens with metaphysical preliminaries on being and becoming. In the first
chapter the problem of the nature of a process is considered, various substantive
philosophical accounts while historically influential are found inadequate, and
an event ontological perspective that grounds being in a complementary
becoming is introduced to provide new means for addressing the principal
difficulties. Then a second chapter of preliminaries relates being and becoming
to the likewise complementary pairs of first empirical experience and rational
reflection, and then objectivity and subjectivity. The warranted stress of
becoming over being finds analogous expression in the suggested emphasis on
rational over empirical and subjective over objective to counteract a similar bias
shown wanting in the initial analysis of being. In this way subjectivity is shown
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not to be as enigmatic nor as inconsistent with scientific knowledge as is
commonly believed, but capable of grounding objective science provided that
coherent and adequate metaphysical backing is at hand.
The metaphysics of experience begins in Book Two with a third chapter
presenting the case for psychical realism. The thesis is defined and distinguished
from related doctrines, and defended independently of the role it plays in process
thinking. Common sense, intuitions, and perception are shown to indicate a
novel synthesis of realism and idealism, and the analogic and genetic arguments
are investigated and objections addressed. The fourth chapter explicates the
metaphysics of process thought by highlighting creativity, organicity and
temporality as its three essential features, and by marking the psychical realist
component implied in each of them. By coupling these fundamental features with
psychical realist support we can sustain a process orientation while doing away
with superfluous technical intricacies and theological commitments. In the
epilogue variants from within a process outlook on final cosmological
completions of a creative, organic and temporal model of reality are then
considered.
To highlight the psychical realist component in process philosophy is
undoubtedly to go beyond mere interpretation, but I hope I have done so in the
spirit of using metaphysics to go some way toward constructive criticism,
coherent development, and systematic application, which in themselves may aid
in explicating and furthering the case for process metaphysics. If the system is
thereby revised at times so be it, for Whitehead was the first to suggest that
speculative systems stand in perpetual need of revision. By my lights, the essay is
perhaps at best another point of departure for the reader's own metaphysical use
in interpreting, criticising, developing, and employing process thought. Bear in
mind however, as I have tried to do, that the pursuit of truth by the great
philosophers is likely to have produced some revealing insights, clear and
indispensable concepts, more or less adequate theories, and true judgements.
(Some philosophers seem to be seeking the truth but never expecting to find it in
another's work.) Originality for its own sake is a vice in philosophy, one that
runs counter to that pursuit of truth, even if the attempt to understand and
appreciate a vast thinker's views may require that one interprets, modifies,
develops, and supersedes those ideas. I suppose there is a progression from less to
greater disparity from the original to a derivative statement of the essence of the
view in such cases, and that the outcome has much to do with how profound the
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initial insights happen to be. The lesser the disparity in the end, the greater the
truth of the original ideas. I should hope that it is to Whitehead's credit that
what follows are remarks made entirely in light of the process metaphysic that he
put forth. As to the earliest known musings as to the way things are, we owe it
entirely to Whitehead for recognising and then articulating how reality might
plausibly be made up entirely of experiencing entities of some sort. And I owe it
entirely to you for even entertaining my own 'shallow, puny, and imperfect'
speculations in the closing remarks that there might be gods of all sorts. Little
more than an 'exhibition of folly' to be sure, but an old Scottish saying has it that
angels can fly because they take themselves lightly.
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Process Ponderings
"How an entity becomes constitutes what that entity is... Its 'being'
is constituted by its 'becoming'. This is the principle of process."
PART ONE
The Patron Saints of Change
The Buddha in the East and Heraclitus in the West are the earliest known
proponents of a philosophy of change. They both taught some twenty-five
centuries ago, and given the isolation of the former and the obscurity of the
latter, nowadays their teachings are but voices in the wilderness. Philosophically
much has happened to the notion of change since their times, though precious
little thought prior to process thinking in the present century has taken the idea
of change in a manner as fundamental as theirs.
§ The Buddha
Consider the doctrine of anicca espoused by the Buddha. The word translates
most directly as 'changing' or as the process of 'arising and passing away', that is
as an abstract noun taking the gerund form to underscore the universal nature of
the impermanence it represents. Anicca on Buddhist reckoning is so utterly
pervasive that even the doctrine itself exemplifies the idea of changing or
becoming and perishing. It too relies on no being, on no substantive backing
whatsoever, and to achieve a full understanding of anicca one must attempt
literally to become an instance of it. The doctrine is one of the three core
doctrines of all Buddhist philosophy, arguably the most basic one from which the
remaining core doctrines of dukkha (suffering) and anatta (selflessness) are
easily derived. From the Buddhist point of view, without the insight of the
universality of changing, without the understanding that all is in process,1 we
succumb to a world of self-preoccupations out of which universal suffering
1 The terms 'change' and 'process' as employed here are more or less synonymous.
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arises. With the insight of anicca, with the constant and thorough understanding
of impermanence achieved experientially, comes liberation from suffering and
full enlightenment.
All conditioned things are impermanent, their nature is to arise and pass.
When one sees this in wisdom, then one becomes dispassionate toward the
painful. This is the Path to Purity.2
Followers of the Buddha produced a great literature highlighting the insight
that process, change, becoming are the universal forms of reality, carrying this
view through with admirable thoroughness, and outlining a way of life designed
to uphold and incorporate the reality of becoming into a practical lifestyle in
harmony with spiritual development. In addition to rejecting the notion of an
abiding substratum or unchanging substance as the grounds for being, the
Buddhists likewise rejected the reality of permanent grounding for soul or ego.
These permanent grounds of reality were replaced by a thoroughly changing
nature (aniccd) established via the processes of the dependent co-origination of
momentary experiences as the primary realities, experiences that do not change,
but simply become in an arising that passes away.s The early Buddhists were the
first to view change as the successive becoming of events having certain
relationships to their predecessors. Soul or self-identical ego is merely the
relatedness of certain experiences to their predecessors through memory and the
persistence of various qualities or personality traits. In the teachings of the
Buddha, to achieve experiential knowledge and the profound understanding of
change as the fundamental aspect of all reality, including the reality of one's own
experiential being, is the way that leads to ultimate spiritual deliverance and
enlightenment.
Observing the impermanence, the changing nature, the fading and the
ending of body, feelings, perceptions, mental activities and consciousness,
one knows that... body, feelings, perceptions, mental activities and
consciousness are impermanent, unsatisfactory and subject to change. So,
seeing in this way - as it really is, by perfect realisation - one abandons
sorrow, grief, suffering, distress and despair/
2 I. Babbitt, trans., The Dhamapada. Oxford: Univ. Press, 1936, p.43.
3 In Buddhism dependent co-origination refers to the genetic analysis of causal inheritance of
momentary experience. This ancient doctrine and Whitehead's notion of prehending the
'stubborn past' have much in common. The latter is examined in Chapters Three and Four.
4 S. Radhakrishnan trans., TheDhammapada. Madras: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950, pp.146-147.
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§ Heraclitus
Unlike the Buddha, who is said to have taught daily for forty-five years,
leaving for his followers the task of gathering and making sense of upwards of
eighty thousand recorded sermons and commentaries, Heraclitus left behind a
legacy collected in the fragmentary form of a small number of obscure and
riddling oracular aphorisms. Dubbed Hhe Obscure' even in antiquity," we have
only these so-called cosmic fragments and the reports of Plato, Aristotle and the
Stoics to go on in uncovering the precise meaning of what Heraclitus had to say.
Clearly Heraclitus did assemble a following who adhered to the doctrine of
change as fundamental, and this principal aspect of his thought was taken up
again by the Stoics after being largely dismissed by Plato and Aristotle. (Cratylus
of Athens, a known follower of Heraclitus, had inspired Plato to write the
Cratylus examining the doctrine that 'everything flows'. Though the later
dialogues show self-moved soul as the source of all change, and occasionally
suggest all things are ensouled, Plato failed to generalise the insight which might
have entailed the truth of Heraclitus' pronouncement.)6 Beyond the doctrine of
change as fundamental in Heraclitean philosophy there is much room for
interpretation. As in the teachings of the Buddha however, three key ideas
emerge from the fragments, and the first one - a kind of Heraclitean version of
Buddha's anicca - provides the grounds for the others. Two well-known sayings
from the Cosmic Fragments adequately outline this first principle, "It is not
possible to step twice into the same river," because "all things are in flux."7 The
suggestion is that reality is comparable to a river in that in flowing, reality
changes, and in the process of changing, reality continually loses its being and
becomes another. Thus everything is forever in process. The second principle
develops the dynamic character of reality by suggesting that the flux consists in a
unity of opposites, not in a settled harmony but rather in a dynamic equilibrium
in process made possible by mutual opposition. "That which differs with itself is
in agreement: harmony consists of opposing tension, like that of the bow and the
lyre," for "...everything comes about by way of strife and necessity." Finally,
Heraclitus clarifies his view of reality as the harmony of opposites in conflict
5 A. Fairbanks, The First Philosophers ofGreece. London: Kegan Paul, 1898. p.23.
6 Plato's lack of sympathy is shown when in the Cratylus Socrates adds 'like leaky pots'. He
continues, "Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a doctrine; for you are
young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the truth, come and share it with
me." Alas, the case remains undecided. See Plato's "Cratylus" 440c~d, in The Dialogues of
Plato, Vol.111, B. Jowett trans. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953. p.106.
7 K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. Oxford: Blackwell, 1948, p.31.
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with the claim that it is an ever-living fire. "The world was ever and is and shall
be ever-living fire..."' Here he emphasises the conception of reality as flux, since
fire is constantly changing; he underscores the centrality of conflict in the flux,
since fire is a symbol of conflict and opposition; and he highlights the unity of
opposites, since fire exists at the point of a process of one thing becoming
another.
The philosophies of change espoused by both the Buddha and by Heraclitus
now come across as Voices in the wilderness' because the more commonplace
philosophies of being tend to treat the process of change in one of two ways:
either as altogether unreal and as delusory as time in an eternally fixed static
world, or as in principle merely the substitution of one set of properties for
another in an abiding substratum, substance, or subject of change. In both of
these philosophical persuasions reality consists essentially of beings, not of
becomings or events, but in the main the present treatment concerns only the
second of the two viewpoints.
It was Plato and Aristotle, not Heraclitus, who principally influenced the
subsequent speculative traditions in the West, and they both rejected the notion
of change, of flux, of process as fundamental. Plato restricted the Heraclitean
doctrine of flux to the world of changing sensible particulars, while positing
above this world another one of immutable intelligible universals. Aristotle
rejected a philosophy of process conceived as the unity of opposites verging on
identity as violating his principle of non-contradiction, which showed that a
subject cannot be said to have and not to have the same predicate in the same
respect at the same time. He did not go as far as Plato did regarding universal
forms, but held that the forms of natural kinds were the specific essences that
exist in the particular organisms. For Aristotle the immutable intelligible world
above nature was populated with those pure acts or intelligible forms called the
separate and unmoved movers. It was a thoroughly Greek idea that a being in
process or undergoing change is not of the highest kind, while for a being of the
highest kind any change could only be for the worse. Hence the highest being is
permanent and all other lower beings keep changing in the vain effort, that is
vain in principle, to make up for their imperfections. Clearly there is an implicit
ranking of being over becoming, of substance over events in such thinking.
8 K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. Oxford: Blackwell, 1948, PP-28, 30, 26.
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The Greek idea of a separation between a higher realm of changeless
perfection and lower changing realm of imperfections had a counterpart in the
separation of eternal divine insight and human temporal and therefore
fragmentary knowledge. Thus the problem of relating being to becoming has led
to an analogous difficulty of relating God's certainty to our uncertain world, a
difficulty often resolved only at the high cost of opting for predestination and
denying any real freedom. Along with the vast majority of subsequent
philosophers in the West, these views were likewise adopted by the Church
Fathers, they came to dominate Judaic, Christian, and Islamic theology, and have
been prominent ever since. In the East on the other hand, although the idea of
the highest being as changeless also arose, it has encountered persistent and
subtle resistance from Buddhist philosophical quarters and related spiritual
teachings throughout history, and so the consequent dominance of substantive
philosophies over philosophies of change or process has not been nearly as
pronounced. Even so, the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence cannot in principle
manage to dominate philosophical discourse and practical affairs in the manner
of substantive philosophy. We turn now to examine the reasons why the nature
of change, the essence of process, makes that so.
§ The Problem of Process
The Buddha spoke of arising and passing away and Heraclitus used the image
of fire to express the universal dynamic character of reality. They took these
images as emblems of the way things really are, but upon reflection there
appears to be something missing in such accounts, and the emblems seem
altogether problematic. Any philosophy of process, ancient or otherwise, must
come to terms with a fundamental difficulty that pervades most of the problems
encountered in developing such views. In its most basic form the problem is how
to conceive of process, a problem first laid out formally in Zeno's well-known
paradoxes. But in practice thinkers have struggled with it in any number of
derivative forms, including the already mentioned relations between permanence
and process, and between God's necessity and our contingency. There are also the
relations of process to time, to duration and to succession, as well as the relations
of continuity and discontinuity within process. In Pre-Socratic times the
Parmenidean One and the Heraclitean Flux represented the two principal
responses to the difficulty, the latter denying the reality of permanence as we
have seen, while the former denied the reality of process. These responses were
extreme measures taken due to the failure of finding reasonable means for
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combining both features, yet such measures mark many of the attempts to deal
with process throughout the history of thought. Since philosophies of being have
generally held sway over those of becoming, in our treatment we shall pursue the
problem through a version that isolates a notorious difficulty for substantive
philosophical perspectives.
Imagine a seagull diving into the sea. At a certain point the bird hits the water
and is thus no longer flying, while earlier it is in the air and thus not yet
plunging the depths. For the sake of clarity, if we allow that when any part of the
seagull touches the water it is no longer quite fully in flight, and so no longer
flying at all, then exactly when is it undergoing the process ofchange from being
in flight to being in the sea, when is the bird ever landing? Not at the first point
of contact with the water, for then it is already in the sea and no such process is
then occurring, and seemingly not at any earlier point, for it is then flying and
yet to undergo the process. It appears that we are stuck with two forms of being,
one in flight and one in the sea, and no realm of becoming between the two, and
the consequent troubles identifying the two seagulls as one and the same.
We ordinarily assume that leaving the sky and diving in is, like every process,
a move from a pre-process state to a post-process state; and that anything that is
undergoing a process is in a kind of 'neither here nor there' situation between
them. We might suppose that there is always a series of states intermediate
between the flying bird and the one in the water such that it can only get into
the sea by traversing each of these states which occur between the two initial
ones. But even allowing for the room such implausible intermediate states would
require, the problem arises nonetheless. Simply to be in any one of these
intermediate states in no way establishes the fact of being in a process of landing.
Indeed the seagull can be in such a state without undergoing any process at all.
All we have done in going from the initial to the enriched state description is go
from the bigger process of a seagull diving in to a mysterious smaller one
claimed to occur within it. The problem of what it is to undergo the bigger
process re-emerges as problems about what it is to undergo the smaller ones.
This essentially is the problem of process.
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§ Generalising the Problem
If we are to accept the ideas and images presented by the Buddha and by
Heraclitus as emblematic of all reality, we must not only locate, but clarify the
dynamic character of process. The first step in that direction is to note that the
essential problem to be developed here is easily generalised: it is but one form of
a difficulty that also arises as the problem of being and becoming or as the
problem of substance and events. If we begin with being or substance as the
basic building blocks of reality, we face the analogously troubling question of
how to explain the events that take place involving being or substance, or
involving the coming to be of being or substance. To adhere to the notion that
being alone makes up the world, it appears that we either must deny the reality
of becoming or allow an exception to the idea that there is nothing but being in
order to get the becomings or the events started so to speak. Being or substance as
static can no more accommodate becomings or events as dynamic than flying or
floating seagulls can encompass the seagulls diving in.9
The problem of process is therefore a particular instance of a question about
how reality is to be generally understood. With regard to this topic, earlier we
noted an implicit bias in philosophy that began in antiquity toward that which is
permanent, based on the imperfection implied by the fact of the impermanence
of undergoing process for beings striving toward that which is permanent, this
latter state deemed to be the highest form of being. How influential that
philosophical inheritance is today is still an issue of some debate. Indeed a good
many thinkers continue to debate the related problem of how to conceive process
as utterly unreal and make sense of the largely delusory appearances that
constitute our experience of reality. On the other hand, a far more ubiquitous
emphasis on substance or being over events or becoming is provided by the very
structure of the way we think and speak. In general, there are features of the
laws of thought and features of natural language that seem to emphasise the
former view of reality over the latter. It is one thing to cast off philosophical
ideas from antiquity, but quite another to shed perspectives reinforced in our
everyday thought and speech patterns. These features underlying the logic of the
laws of thought and natural language provide the setting from beginnings in the
classical era and remain as recalcitrant influences throughout the philosophical
9 A more detailed account of the relations between the problem of process and being and
becoming is offered in the treatment of Aristotle's views on the subject (and those of other
historically influential thinkers) in the third part of the present chapter.
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treatment of the problem of process through history. Our next step in analysing
the dynamic character of process is to fill out our account by outlining the key
elements of that history.
PART TWO
A Brief History of Being
§ Being as Substance in Aristotle
The bias toward substance and away from events is never more apparent than
in the substantive philosophy of Aristotle. We have already mentioned that
Aristotle rejected Heraclitean perpetual process chiefly because it appeared to
violate the laws of thought as outlined in Aristotelian Logic. In discussing these
laws (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle) Heraclitus' maxim
'everything is in flux' is used as an example of holding contradictory views,
because the doctrine itself, to be true, must not be in flux, "for it is impossible
for anyone to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus
says."10 Aristotle likewise rejected the opposing view of Parmenides that since
process was logically impossible there was no such thing. His position is one
between these extremes: recognising that process is fundamental to reality, but
also that process without some aspect of permanence is unintelligible. He
identifies and consequently grapples with the problem and offers a
characteristically detailed account of process in his analysis, an analysis based on
the question inherited from the Pre-Socratic philosophers, namely, 'What must
being be, in order for process to be intelligible'?
We cannot provide a clear account of his answer without explicitly
introducing the Aristotelian concept of substance. The reason is that to be,
according to Aristotle, is to be a substance, as distinguished from mere properties
or parts of a substance. The properties of course do possess a sort of being, but
only derivatively so by supervening on the pertinent substance whereas,
"substance in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word is that
which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject."" And
speculations on the nature of substance in his philosophy inextricably tie
10 The Works of Aristotle, Vol.VIII, "Metaphysica" 1005a-1006a, W.D. Ross trans. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1954.
11 Aristotle. "Categoriae" 2all, in The Works ofAristotle, Vol.I, W.D. Ross trans. Oxford: Univ.
Press, 1928. Aristotle's views on substance are thoroughly examined in A. Edel's, Aristotle and
his Philosophy. North Carolina: Univ. Press, 1982, pp. 39-136; for a brief summary see, J.L.
Ackrill's, Aristotle the Philosopher. Oxford: Univ. Press, 1981, pp.24-33 and J. Barnes'
Aristotle. Oxford: Univ. Press, 1982 pp.46-51.
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together the problem of being (permanence) and process (impermanence).
Aristotle of course has much to say both about substance and about process, and
a full account of the many facets of Aristotle's position is beyond the scope of the
present study. In the main he does argue that for process to be intelligible there
must be both continuity and discontinuity in nature, for in order to make sense
of process we must recognise that something is in process relative to something
that is not, that every process is from one state of something to another state of
something. And that something in Aristotle's philosophy is substance. More
specifically, that something called substance is the composite of the matter (stuff)
and the form (structure) of the things that undergo change. In this idea of
substance as matter and form we have a clear case of presupposing a substratum
in nature for process. "The most distinctive mark of substance," Aristotle claims,
is that "while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting
contrary qualities.""
But Aristotle's account of substance, though the most influential in history, is
marred by obscurity and inconsistency. Examining the evidence for the various
notions put forth regarding substance, found in the Physics, the Metaphysics, the
Categories and elsewhere, lies outside our immediate interests, but it will be
useful to simply mention the six basic ideas that emerge. Substance is treated as a
core of essential properties, as a concrete individual, as that which can exist
independently, as a centre of change, as a substratum for properties, and as a
logical subject for predication.13 Although Aristotle varies the importance of each
idea depending on the purpose he sets himself in particular discussions, the first
concept, substance as essence, seems to be the preferred sense of the term, an
idea which the second and third concepts work to fill out. The last three concepts
also seem to form a natural group however, and it is this group that relates
directly to the sense of a presupposed permanence underlying process. We shall
first examine this latter group.
Aristotle clearly posits a substantive continuity underlying change in three of
the four types of change he outlines: the qualitative, the quantitative, and the
locomotive. There are always in these cases the three basic elements: the state of
the subject prior to the process of change, the subject in process, and the state of
12 Aristotle. "Categoriae" 4al0, in The Works ofAristotle, Vol.1, W.D. Ross trans. Oxford: Univ.
Press, 1928.
12 D.J. O'Conner, "Substance and Attribute," in The Encyclopaedia ofPhilosophy, P. Edwards ed.
NY: The Free Press, 1967, Vol.8, pp.36-37.
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the subject after the process of change. This fact provides the grounds for
Aristotle's defence of our ordinary talk of process as being indicative of how
process ought to be conceived. Perhaps the historical accident of the supreme
reign of the conception of substance and being over events and becoming in the
West is due primarily to the subject-predicate structure of Greek and most other
languages, and only secondarily to the dominance of Aristotelian logic. For
Aristotle was committed to the view that events or becomings happened to things
or beings in the manner emphasised by natural language, a view he defends in
the first book of the Physics in an attempt to vindicate our ordinary talk of
process."
Here his discussion focuses on the proper logical form of sentences expressing
process, or to use Aristotle's phrase, sentences expressing 'coming to be'. The task
he sets himself is to show how our ordinary way of speaking of process does not
result in paradoxical expressions; that is, expressions directly related to the sort
of paradox we saw earlier leading to there being two distinct seagulls, one in
flight and one in the sea, and a problematic identity between them, given the
mysterious absence of any change in the manner of landing or diving in. After
pointing out that the paradigmatic expression of a 'coming to be' will have the
form of 'X comes to be Y' as for example 'The man comes to be musical', Aristotle
tells us that coming to be is a predication in the making or a predication enroute
to obtaining. With the substantive backing of 'the man' on both sides of the
expression, the paradox of suggesting that the 'unmusical' is 'musical' once the
predicate obtains is avoided. There is a man both before and after the description
is applied, so that the 'unmusical' need not come to be 'musical', that is, we avoid
the paradoxical description of the 'unmusical' as being 'musical' because the
substance 'man' at an earlier and then at a later time takes on both predicates
instead. For Aristotle then, substances exist in the fullest sense while other
entities such as predicable properties like 'musical' derive their existence from
their dependence on substantial being.
It is plain that in this case and others of qualitative, quantitative or locomotive
processes, there must be a subject that persists through the process. It is likewise
true that Aristotle avoids the paradox by positing a substance, and true that this
is demonstrated in the way natural language works. Yet Aristotle side-steps the
14 Michael Loux analyses that defence in his forthcoming "Understanding Process: Reflections
on 'Physics' 111.1" delivered at Edinburgh University, 1994.
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analysis of the concept of process and the essential problem in this treatment by
simply presupposing An understanding of 'coming to be'. We learn how it is that
we speak of man becoming musical or of seagulls leaving the air, but here we
find no explanation of the being ofbecoming as such. Moreover the failure of the
account on its own terms is obvious when we look at the fourth type of process
in Aristotle's thought, namely the substantive processes of generation and
destruction. The pre-process state of the former and the post-process state of the
latter appear to be non-existent. But it is absurd to suggest that before birth and
after death a substance persists as non-existing.
At this point we must return to the first group of basic ideas of substance
mentioned earlier to understand Aristotle's attempt to supplement his account.
The principal point emerging from these ideas is that of substance as essence
comprised of the essential properties of matter and form. What persists in
substantive process is the matter: for a statue that comes to be it is the marble, for
a tree it is the seed, after a living creature's death it is the dead body, and so on.
Thus far the account perhaps loses ground with this addition. While not yet
addressing the nature of becoming as such, Aristotle has introduced a severe
limitation on the nature of creation. To qualify substantive process in this way
disallows any act of creating something out of nothing, a point we shall see
criticised in the otherwise sympathetic writings of Thomas Aquinas for its
theological implications.
Yet there are further developments in Aristotle's account of process. There is a
type of substantive process best referred to as activation - the coming to actuality
of a potentiality. This type of process emphasises the distinction between things
that are potentially this or that and things that are actually this or that. Aristotle
points out that the sort of actuality that is involved in a process of change is the
sort that maintains its potentiality once reaching its actuality, while there are
other actualities that are incompatible with their correlative potentialities.
Building materials have the potentiality of being 'house-buildable' but a house,
once built and thereby actual, does not. On the other hand, a running woman
while actually running still maintains the potentiality to run, for if not she would
be unable to continue doing so. Seen this way we can interpret Aristotle's
notoriously obscure pronouncement that change is, "the actuality of that which
is potentially as such," as saying, "change is the actuality of the changeable qua
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changeable.'"" In so doing we focus attention on the aspect of process, a focus
required in any adequate account of change. Later we shall see Thomas Aquinas
take it up and develop the suggestion that the activity of a continually actualising
potential is an important variable for comprehending being and change. Another
type of substantive process as activation in Aristotle, incidentally, involves
processes divisible in terms of the emphasis placed on the persistence of a
fundamental formal nature through stages of growth and development. The
irreversible change of children actualising their potential of becoming adults
clearly differs from the reversible change of their actualising the potential of
getting a tan, only to become pale again.
But once again, in this the final aspect of Aristotle's account of process here
considered, we are given another set of distinctions that merely leave the
essential problem of process to one side. Just as in our initial sketch of the
problem, when for the sake of argument we allowed a realm of smaller processes
taking place within the confines of the problematic bigger process, and found the
same problem arising in this posited smaller realm, so also in this classification
and the many others that Aristotle makes in his analysis we seem to bypass the
essential conceptual difficulty. Calling change the 'actuality of the changeable as
changeable' is only to say that when something is in the process of changing it
possesses and is exercising a capacity to change - a true statement, but trivially so
and unilluminating. To return to our seagull, we can apply the potentiality-
actuality distinction quite easily to see how unsatisfactory this addition is to the
Aristotelian analysis. On the one hand, a bird in the sea has the potential for
flight, and once flying continues to have that potential, though it is actualised.
Thus far by maintaining its potentiality the activity of the flying bird appears to
fit into the group of actualities involving change. But our honing in on the
problem in such manner is on a par with the posited smaller processes taking
place within a bigger process which is the leaving the sea (or vice versa). On
Aristotle's reckoning we know that there is a process taking place here for it fits
into a change-involving classification, but again we presuppose an
understanding of the nature of process within the group of actualities in which it
is involved. The seemingly intractable difficulty in offering an account of process
in substantive philosophical terms that addresses our essential problem as
outlined remains.
15 Aristotle, "Physics III" 201all, in The Works of Aristotle, Vol.11, W.D. Ross trans. Oxford:
Univ. Press, 1928.
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§ Medieval Being as Active and Related
The medieval thinkers, most notably Thomas Aquinas (c.1224-c.1274), whose
extensive metaphysical writings helped consolidate Christian Theology and
Aristotelian Philosophy, and who was one of Aristotle's most sympathetic critics,
found aspects of Aristotelian substance less than satisfactory. Aquinas retrieved
and expanded upon the most tenable of the Aristotelian doctrines regarding
being as substance, while exposing the problem that substance as initially
conceived by Aristotle rules out the possibility of a process of creation." Aquinas
held that substance has two essential characteristics: in-itself interiority and self-
transcending relatedness. Substance is active, a centre of acting and being acted
upon, and thereby it is communicative and generative of relations.
As to the first characteristic, the individual existent as an enduring centre of
its own characteristic actions is the primary exemplar of being.17 It is the
ultimate subject of which properties are predicated, 'ultimate' in that no other
subject can take it on as a property or a part; that is, no other being can take on
the substance of another as an attribute of itself. Like Aristotle, Aquinas thought
that to be is to be a substance, yet more specifically, to be a substance (from the
Latin sub-stans. that which stands under) is to exist in itself as an ultimate
subject of action and attribution and not as a part of any other being. We can
isolate three basic points regarding this characterisation of substance: 1) it exists
of itself and not as a part of any other being, 2) it is the unifying centre of all the
various properties that belong to it at any one moment, and 3) if a being persists
as the same individual undergoing a process of change, it is the substance which
is the enduring, unifying centre of the being over time.
Hence, there is being if and only if there is substance, or being in a substantial
mode, either within being itself or grounding it as its ultimate subject of
inherence. The argument is that it is impossible for every instance of being to be
a part of some other being which in turn is also a part of another and so on, as
this would lead to an infinite regress entailing the endless deferral of the
conditions necessary for any being to exist. If this were so, nothing would ever
16 N. Clarke redeems these Classical notions in, "To Be Is To Be Substance-in-Relation," in
Metaphysics as Foundation, P.A. Bogaard and G. Treash eds. NY: Suny Press, 1993.
Whiteheadians often reject substantive philosophy simply on the grounds that it lacks any
basis for activity whatsoever, but as Clarke's essay demonstrates, the issue is far more subtle.
17 'Enduring' as so employed spans the momentary and the prolonged, varying according to the
length of act, type of underlying substance, and magnitude of change. The key feature is that
the centre abides in reference to the relevant changing activity.
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get going whatsoever. The point is important for we have already noted similar
troubles a substantive outlook encounters in grounding dynamic ontological
entities. Thus, there must always be substance somewhere in being to ground
whatever else there is; it is substance as an in-itself interiority that makes a being
come to be a unity, to be an identity.
We can easily recognise Aristotle's substantive being in this first
characterisation of substance by Aquinas. And with that recognition comes the
corresponding failure to finally explain process that had plagued Aristotle's
attempts. Both thinkers presuppose an understanding of process in claiming that
the substantial backing of discontinuities in properties is sufficient as an account
of what happens. The in~itself interiority that Aquinas outlines is simply a
formalised rendition of Aristotle's notion of being as core of essential properties,
existing independently and 'neither predicable of a subject, nor present in a
subject'.
Turning to the second characteristic feature of substance, here too we can
isolate three main points: Aquinas contends that a being is essentially self-
transcending in that 1) it has an intrinsically active aspect, 2) that is orientated
toward self-expressive and self-communicative action, and 3) it is through action
that an existing substance manifests its inner being, its interiority, both its
existence and its essence. As to the first point, Aquinas writes, "Each and every
thing shows forth that it exists for the sake of its operation. Indeed operation is
the ultimate perfection of each thing." In developing the second point Aquinas
reasons that, "It is the nature of every actuality to communicate itself insofar as it
is possible. Hence every agent acts according as it exists in actuality," and that is
because, "....Communication follows upon the very intelligibility of actuality."
And Aquinas outlines the third point in saying, "The operation of a thing
manifests both its substance and its existence," and again, "The operation of a
thing shows forth its power, which in turn manifests it essence."18
Clearly, Aquinas understood substance to be highly dynamic, for with every
process of changing properties the substance itself changes. The point of its being
is to express itself, to fulfil itself through action appropriate to its mode of being
or essence. Accordingly, the substance of a being is its enduring autonomous self-
18 T. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1924, Vol.1, p.102,
Vol.111, p.93, Vol.11, pp.220, 286.
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identity, as manifested and fulfilled through activity. In a process of changing
properties the substance itself changes, but not substantially - that is, it does not
become another being, essentially different from what it was previously.
The significant point for our purposes is that for Aquinas being substantially
self-identical does not imply a lack of process or change. Rather self-identity is
dynamic and accommodates a wide range of processes within it, but always
within limits, for given a process of extreme change the essential self-identity
may fail to maintain itself and dissolve into another thing. This development of
substantive philosophy is the outcome of Aquinas' idea that the core of every real
being consists in its 'esse' or act of existence, construed not as a form or essence
but as active presence.18 It is due to this dynamic interiority that beings by their
nature as existing beings, as beings in act, tend naturally to flow over into action
according to their essence. And since for Aquinas action is not merely self-
expression but also self-communication, every being is thus oriented toward all
other beings, presenting itself and reciprocally receiving self-expressions of
other real existents in its own being. Every substance as active consequently
becomes the centre of a web of relations to other active beings, with the actions
of beings the principal generators of real relations between them. An existing
substance, from the standpoint of Aquinas' metaphysics, cannot be without being
related in some fashion; to be a substance and to be related are distinct but
complementary and inseparable aspects of every being. All being, in addition to
its in~itself interiority, is comprised of self-transcending relatedness.
Aquinas' account of substance seems to be a step in the right direction when
viewed from the standpoint of having recognised the neglect in substantive
philosophy to adequately address the problem of process. He retrieves from
Aristotle the only prima facie version of substance that appears tenable, that is,
the notion of the dynamic nature of an abiding centre of action. He generalises
this insight for all being, making it a requirement necessary for existence, and
thereby rejecting the Aristotelian distinction that restricted change to the realm
of The changeable qua changeable'. Perhaps implicit in this move toward
generalisation is the notion that an account of process must begin with the
pervasive dynamic quality of being; and to this corrective Aquinas adds an
19 E. Pols discusses this notion as developed in contemporary metaphysics in, The Acts of Our
Being. Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1982; and briefly in, "The Nonspeculative Basis
of Metaphysics," Process Studies, Vol.15, Summer 1986.
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important emphasis on relations. Both these characteristics will occupy pivotal
positions in philosophical accounts of process much later.
Finally, Aquinas raises a significant objection when he claims that Aristotle's
position does not allow for creating something out of nothing. He is primarily
concerned with deity and argues that the creation story is impossible on
Aristotle's account. Here Aquinas is focusing on one type of substantive process
examined in Aristotle's notion of actualisation of potentiality, that which obtains
in a curiously excitable boy for instance when the potential to come to be a
philosopher is actualised as the boy grows up to be Socrates. The emphasis in
these processes is placed on the fundamental persistence of a formal nature
through stages of development, a feature marked by its irreversibility. For unlike
say a confused Socrates who may come to be clearheaded and still maintain the
potential for further confusion, the fully grown Socrates, once actual, loses the
potential for excitable boyhood. It is this latter sort of process that represents the
paradigm of all being for Aquinas.
The core of being is not its essence but its active presence, a presence with a
drive toward its appropriate form of perfection. There is an implicit sense of
generative process at work in Aquinas' thought which helps to explain his
insistence on 'somethings' coming from 'nothings', an idea that foreshadows
insights into the directional nature of time and the pre-eminence of creation and
becoming, as grasped by the many recent process philosophers examined in
subsequent chapters. We shall see this medieval insight, though neglected
throughout early modern philosophy, come to play a key role in contemporary
metaphysical conceptions of process. As for the treatment of being in early
modern philosophy, here a more pronounced brevity marks our brief history as
we discover, despite inheriting Aquinas' classical 'near-miss', just how far wide
of the mark the accounts of these thinkers were to become.
§ Substance as Self-Enclosed in Descartes
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) significantly shifted the change in meaning of
substance, a change that would prove to extinguish any hope that Classical ideas
of being could with some revision fully account for the essential nature of
process. He accepted some aspects of Aristotle's position, defending for instance
the idea of substance as a logical or formal subject and as a substratum by
arguing,
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...that it is a thing in which this something that we perceive or which is
present objectively in some of our ideas, exists formally and eminently. For
by means of our natural light we know that a real attribute cannot be an
attribute of nothing.20
Descartes also believed that we are only directly aware of the attributes of
substances, not of the substances themselves, knowing the latter only by
inference from the former.
Everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means
of which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e. any property, quality,
or attribute of which we have a real idea is called a substance.21
And along with the inferred substances underlying these attributes, Descartes
likewise posits an essence to being, in this case via the essential traits of
extension and thought for material and thinking substances respectively.
In the main, however, Descartes' modifications do away with those elements of
being suggestive of a dynamic principle, with the result that his account only
widens the gulf between substance and change, between permanence and
process. Unlike Aquinas who stressed relational features of being, Descartes
insisted that substance was, "a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing
in order to exist."22 In order to side-step the blasphemous implications of
postulating being as existing independent of God, he allowed that of the three
types of substance - matter substance, mind substance, and God - only the last
one strictly meets the definition, while the others do rely on God for their being.
Yet substance so conceived is self-enclosed and essentially unrelated to other
being, existing by-itself and isolated in contrast with the Classical idea of
existing in-itself and relationally. Given the high degree of autonomy for
substance, relations only come in at a distinctly lower, more adventitious level,
and even the 'clear and distinct' knowledge of the rest of the world is derivable
in principle from the innate ideas of thinking substances.
As for offering an account of process, Descartes' position fails first by taking
up the troublesome notion inherited from Aristotle of substance as the logical
subject of attributes, and second by emphasising the independent existence and
essential isolation of substance. In trying to graft change onto substance as an
20 R. Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol.11. E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross eds.
Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1912, p.53.
21 R. Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol.11. E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross eds.
Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1912, p.53.
22 R. Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol.1. E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross eds.
Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1912, p.239.
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attribute, we run into the difficulty of the incommensurability of being and
becoming mentioned earlier in conjunction with Aristotle's account. No matter
how minutely one isolates a state of a substance for analysis, its substantial
processes of actualising potentiality and all other derivative processes it may
undergo seem to slip from the description. Moreover, many changes, such as
changes in the weather or in the situation, do not seem attributable to an
underlying substance in any straightforward manner, a point we shall consider
in more depth in the final part of the present chapter.
The independent existence and essential unrelatedness of substance in
Descartes implies that in the case of matter substance, it is the substances that are
material, rather than that matter is substantial as Aristotle believed. That is, for
Descartes matter itself is a substance, and is defined solely as that which occupies
space; it is defined by but the one positive trait of being extended, and by the
many negative ones of being passive, inert, devoid of any self-movement or
activity. There is no improving of a bit of matter as so construed, and thus both
Aristotle's notion of potentiality and Aquinas' idea of active presence are absent.
Every substantial process, along with quantitative and qualitative process, is
thereby reduced to changes of motion. In Descartes definition of motion there is
no reference to potentiality. Rather it is, "the transference of one part of matter
or one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with
it... into the vicinity of others." Following on from this, motion is, "the
transportation and not either the force or the action which transports," and, "the
motion is always in the mobile thing, not in that which moves."" Here Descartes
is reducing the question of what produces change in bodies to the question of
what produces motion in them. And since, unlike Aquinas, he contends that
something cannot come from nothing, "Now it is manifest by the natural light
that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its
effect."24 Then any account of process accordingly shifts its focus toward the
remote activity of a first mover beginning the causal order as a sequence of
events or of bodies in motion.2" Hence, Descartes follows his predecessors in
23 R. Descartes, "The Principles of Philosophy" in The Philosophical Works ofDescartes, Vol.1.
E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross eds. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1912, p.266.
24 R. Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in The Philosophical Works of Descartes,
Vol.1. E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross eds. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1912, p. 162.
25 Note our focus here is on the causal nexus of bodies. In respect to the voluntary operations of
the mind, Descartes is a leading spokesman for indeterminism. Even so, his dualistic emphasis
led to difficulties such as an implausible conception of free will not determined by anything
else at all, or of animals, by lacking a cogito, conceived as purely mechanical systems.
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embracing a substantive philosophical outlook which helps to foster the problem
of process, yet while failing to provide needed improvements to inadequate
answers, Descartes' account loses ground in terms of any specification of the
problem achieved by earlier Classical efforts.
§ Substance as Inert and Unknowable in Locke
John Locke (1632-1704) presented another variation on the concept of
substance, one that continues the reductive trend initiated by Descartes, and
likewise fails to address the problem of process. He criticised the Aristotelian
concept of a substratum of properties because such an ontological support was
nowhere to be found empirically. Yet in more rationalist moments he seems to
hesitate from committing himself to a full rejection of a substratum.
Consequently, there is an unresolved tension in his account, with substance an
awkward counter-example to his theory of knowledge based solely on
meaningful concepts all originating in experience.
Locke makes a confessedly inadequate attempt to escape the problem through
his focus on a distinction between specific substances and the general idea of
substance. From an empirical standpoint he notes that experience acquaints us
with many simple ideas, many of which are constantly presented together. The
mind then gives such groupings one name and thereby arrives at a complex idea.
But a substance so defined only offers a nominal definition. We merely come to
use one word when we refer to a group of conjoined properties which, "are
nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as
united in one thing."26 So specific substances are but synonyms for these
properties. Regarding the support for the properties of simple ideas, that is, the
general idea of substance, Locke admits that the notion of a substratum, despite
being mysterious, is posited as an expediency.
because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in
another, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common
subject; which support we denote by the name substance, though it be
certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a
support.27
Substance then is not a positive concept but merely an 'obscure and relative'
notion of, "the supposed but unknown support of those qualities we find
26 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894, Vol.1.,
Bk.II, 23, 14, p.405.
27 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894, Vol.1.,
Bk.II, 23,4, p.395.
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existing, which we imagine cannot exist sine re substante without something to
support them."24 By stipulating that substance is an inert, unknowable
substratum of the properties which alone are known to us, Locke admits that,
"our idea of substance is equally obscure, or none at all, it is but a supposed I
know not what."29
Needless to say, the unknowable substantial substratum on Locke's reckoning
is passive in principle, for any influence detected empirically is by definition a
property of properties. Substance is essentially inert, unchanging in its being,
without dynamic, self-communicating relations to its properties nor through
them to the world beyond; and like Newton's atoms not active but only moved
from without. All the significant characteristics of Cartesian substance are
recognisable in this account, bringing in their train a similarly inadequate
account of process, and there is an additional emphasis on the epistemic
difficulties both accounts imply. Again the impossibility of developing an account
is clear when beginning from an orientation of unchanging substance, and now
with Locke's contribution the substantial stumbling blocks become far more
mysterious.
§ Substance as Separable and Unintelligible in Hume
When considering substance, David Hume (1711-1776) exploited the
inconsistencies that led Locke to hesitate, and in so doing carried the empiricist
project to logical conclusions, which in characteristic fashion undermined much
of the previous philosophical work in the field. Given Hume's rigorous
application of a more consistent empiricism that based all knowledge on ideas
derived from impressions, he noted two key facts regarding substance: that we
have no impression of a thinking substance save as an assemblage or 'bundle' of
particular ideas and impressions, and that we have no impression of a physical
substance distinct from our impressions of particular physical objects. To speak
of either 'spiritual substances' or 'corporeal substances' is therefore to speak in
meaningless metaphysical jargon, for substance according to Hume was simply
an 'unintelligible chimaera'.
28 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, Vol.1.
Bk.II, 23,2, p.392.
29 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, Vol.1.
Bk.II, 23,13, p.406.
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Hume's analysis relies on a fundamental principle of his philosophical
reasoning: the idea that distinction implies separability. That is, if something has
distinct being then it is separable ~ at least in principle or imagination - from all
other being, and that no necessary connections hold separable beings together.
The qualities of a thing such as its, "solidity, extension, motion... are all complete
in themselves, and never point out any other event which might result from
them."30 In searching for empirical grounding for the notion of substance, Hume
assumed that it would have to be separate (or separable) from its properties,
existing in some sort of bare indeterminate state. Since he rightly found such an
idea incoherent - for all experience comes by way of determinate
impressions ~ he concluded that no such substance exists.
However, the principle that distinction implies separability is a metaphysical
doctrine simply assumed by Hume with little justification, whereas from the
standpoint of Aristotle's actualising potentiality and Aquinas' active relating,
there are grounds for arguing against it. Both of these thinkers held that
substance is distinct from any of its particular properties, but yet was inseparable
from some such properties. That is to say that substance, defined as either a
source of actualising potentiality for Aristotle or as activity and relations for
Aquinas, necessarily possesses some properties, though no necessity dictates any
in particular. Substance is immanent in particular properties and expresses itself
through them, but transcends them all. To see an application of the point
regarding Aristotle's gloss on the nature of substance, consider a wooden log: it
necessarily has a shape, but only contingently has the shape say of a rocking
horse once it has been crafted thus to actualise that potential. Applying the point
with Aquinas' view in mind, think of a human personality: some character traits
or other are necessary to be an active and relating person, but any specific ones
that obtain could have been otherwise.
The force of the counter to Hume's principle and a host of applications of that
counter will be the focus of discussion in subsequent chapters, but what is
notable for now is that in finding separable substance unintelligible, Hume
unwittingly emphasises the inability of substantive philosophy to account for the
nature of change. This is done in two ways. First, by adopting Cartesian and
Lockean notions of substance in his influential critique, historically Hume
30 D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of
Morals, L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. Oxford: Univ. Press, 1955, p.63.
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reinforces the neglect of the Classical ideas which had at least achieved a
valuable isolation of the realm of change so to speak, an isolation that may
otherwise have led to further constructive developments.
Second, since no immanent substantial principle whereby process could be
initiated from within being is allowed in Hume's analysis, all process is reduced
to simple succession. Hume appears on the face of it to be quite the philosopher
of process in his appeal to reject the substantial grounding for the properties that
compose our experience. There just are certain experiential events taking place
at particular places at particular times without necessary connections providing
influence between their separate existences. We must be careful however to
distinguish the appearance of process from an account of it in reviewing Hume's
position. In a sense Hume applies an unjustified metaphysical principle to justify
the reduction of much of our philosophical work to anti-metaphysical concerns
with epistemology. He contends that just as the particular contingent regularities
that obtain in the temporal sequence of events provides the grounds for our
recognition of a causal order in nature, so also the manner in which experience
stacks up is such that we derive the idea of process solely from their succession.
Thus along with exposing the unintelligibility of the notion of separable
substance (and with it the idea of a substantial source for initiating process from
within), Hume clears away any need for a mover to initiate (from without) what
from our perspective seems to be causal influences in the form of process being
passed on through time. Hence any accounting for the nature of process has
seemingly lost metaphysical ground in this philosophy, while the all too
characteristic failure to face the problem of process by explaining it away is
implicit in the epistemic reduction of simply labelling it as succession throughout
the analysis.31
§ Substance as a Category of the Understanding in Kant
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) extended the epistemic emphasis in his
treatment of the idea of substance by reasoning that substance does not refer to a
feature of the objective world independent of human thinking. According to Kant
we think of substance as unified and permanent; and when comparing it to the
unity of the self he claimed that it was, "an equally necessary unity of the
synthesis of all appearances according to concepts,"32and added that, "in all
31 In the third chapter Hume's position is dealt with in greater detail.
32 I. Kant, Critique ofPure Reason. N. Kemp Smith trans. London: Macmillan, 1950. p.136.
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change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither
increased nor diminished."" Kant believed the unity and permanence to be
features contributed by the human understanding to the world of phenomena.
Therefore we cannot help but classify our experience in terms of the category of
substance. While for Hume substance is rendered unintelligible and thus non¬
existent, with Kant's radical revision, substance is likewise removed from being a
fundamental feature of the objective world, but in this case it becomes an aspect
under which we are subjectively confined when classifying experience, due not
to the world but to the nature of our cognition.
His view of substantial permanence has direct bearing on his position
regarding process. Like his early modern predecessors he thought that all change
was merely transformation: things could not come into existence from nothing,
nor could things go completely out of existence. He argued that without this
metaphysical presupposition there could be no unitary temporal system and
therewith no unified substantial being. That is, the intelligibility of co-existence
and succession depend on an enduring backdrop, and because time itself cannot
be perceived, that backdrop must be one of permanent substantial things. Thus
Kant rejects the idea of all things in process in an absence of any permanence as
logically impossible.
In broad outline the argument is reminiscent of the Classical notion of distinct
yet logically inseparable substance. But the focus here is to provide further
logical support for a concept wholly like a Lockean substratum. Yet Kant
overlooks the fact that he could have established a substantial backdrop to
ground our sense of a unitary temporal system without positing any absolute
permanence to that grounding. Stipulating a relatively enduring backdrop, that
is one that abides longer than the change that it contrasts, would have served the
same purpose. We shall not pursue the idea at this point, other than simply to
note that he then would have kept open the possibility of beginning with some
measure or other of process as a fundamental concept instead of substance. This
in turn would have allowed possible options for escaping the difficulties
confounding substantive accounts time and again in their attempts at embracing
change when starting from the point of view of being.
33 I. Kant, Critique ofPure Reason. N. Kemp Smith trans. London: Macmillan, 1950, p.212.
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Kant's formidably influential writings brought on generations of
transcendental idealistic debate, and fostered a proliferation of offshoot doctrines
(both for and against his basic ideas) and the attendant schools of thought to
follow the various consequent developments through. Nowadays an impressive
array of ideas essentially inspired by Kant are still defended quite passionately. A
range of thinkers from as far afield as phenomenologists are from linguistic
analysts have accepted a basic Kantian turn away from ontology and toward
epistemology. In many instances the result has been a subtle, often
unacknowledged, inheritance of a permanent Kantian substantial backdrop to
serve as grounds (however inadequate) for the nature of phenomena in process.
It is well beyond our present concerns to catalogue the differing yet significant
opinions on substance put forth in the present century, and even determining
those of lasting interest is no easy task.3' Our brief history will conclude then, by
examining one key figure from a movement recognised as eminent throughout
English-speaking philosophical quarters.
§ Substance as the Basis of Identity in Strawson
The contemporary philosopher Peter Strawson (1919- ), working within the
linguistic analytic tradition, follows Kant in holding that the intelligibility of the
world requires an enduring backdrop. Accordingly, in developing what he refers
to as 'descriptive metaphysics', he provides one in arguing for a substance
ontology. Individuals are conceived as the basic particulars that satisfy the
essential conditions for linguistic reference. In order to use language intelligibly
we must be able to identify and re-identify the basic particulars in the world
successfully, and Strawson argues that such identification requires a common
conceptual framework upon which common language users may rely.
We can make it clear to each other what or which particular things our
discourse is about because we can fit together each others' reports and
stories into a single picture of the world;33
We maintain the particularity of individuals on Strawson's reckoning by locating
them in an agreed upon world and aligning all reference to them in terms of that
world. On subsequent occasions we have to recognise the individuals that we
34 N. Rescher notes an unjustified trend against process in contemporary philosophy, supported
by examining the views of Quine, Goodman, and Strawson in his, "The Revolt Against
Process"JournalofPhilosophy. Vol.59, 1962, pp.410-417.
35 P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: University
Paperbacks, 1964, p.38.
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have referred to earlier, a fact calling for a shared space-time coherence to
things. Strawson continues,
...particular-identification in general rests ultimately on the possibility of
locating the particular things we speak of in a single unified
spatio-temporal system.36
Developing a substance ontology of individuals, as required by the successful
operation of reference, commits Strawson to viewing all else in the ontology as
derived from these basic individuals. We observe enduring spatial-temporal
substantial individuals and build up all other categories of being from them.
Processes in the form of events and becomings therefore depend on the
substantial beings involved; we come to understand process through the
perceptual input from the being of individuals. Our ideas of the unobservable
entities that scientists or psychologists speak of, for example, rely on inferences
from basic observable individuals. There is no relativity theory without the
empirical confirmation of bent light, no anger without the mark of a tantrum.
As mentioned above, Strawson calls this technique of deriving a metaphysical
view by analysing the conceptual scheme embodied in natural language and the
laws of thought 'descriptive metaphysics'. Clearly the so-called descriptive
metaphysician accepts an epistemic bias in developing an explanation of reality,
whereby the ways and means of our knowing become the measure of all things,
and descriptions of the structure of our thought about the world become the
extent of a feasible metaphysics. Going back to the beginning of our brief history,
recall that one of the principal reasons Aristotle suggested the priority of
substance was likewise based on the intractably substantial features of natural
language and the laws of thought. For language reinforces the notion of changes,
processes, events as having a kind of existence dependent on particular
substantial things. Grammatical subjects name the individual substances, and
predicates in the form of verbs and adverbs describe the processes that the
grammatical subjects undergo. In thought and in language individual substances
are primary and enduring while the processes are what is undergone by such
substances over time. It is this feature of natural language and a comparable
feature underlying the logic of the laws of thought that has influenced many a
36 P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: University
Paperbacks, 1964, p.38.
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metaphysician. Hence the widespread extension in metaphysics of those features
to cover all of reality as such.
But Strawson, along with his many substantive-philosophical forebears
sanctioning such extrapolation, can be challenged in two ways. First, descriptive
metaphysics is based on the assumption that ordinary thought and language can
and does adequately embrace the nature of reality. This assumption need not be
accepted. We saw for instance how empiricist projects as thoroughgoing as
Hume's failed to unearth any substance as that which upholds what we do
experience. This appears as strong evidence against such an assumption. Second,
for descriptive metaphysics to make claims adequate to all reality entails the
constancy of our conceptual schemes over time and between different thought
and language patterns. This seems implausible when considering evidence of
evolution and anthropology. Primitive, ancient eastern, and contemporary
western civilisations may not have all that much in common conceptually.
Compare the devout and universal reverence for the Pharaohs of old with the
widespread and frank atheism of today. Even present-day cross-cultural
differences outline profound conceptual distinctions between simple-minded and
sophisticated peoples. Hopi Indians make do with fewer verb tenses than New
Yorkers. Evolutionary thinking, incidentally, is both troublesome to incorporate
and awkward to omit in a chronicle of the philosophical treatment of being and
becoming, and in the next part a mere sampling of the relevant ideas are
presented.
We are now at the end of our chronicle of the treatment of being in the
history of thought, and with Strawson's descriptive metaphysics we have in many
ways come full circle. Obviously the problem of process remains as insuperable a
difficulty as it was in Aristotle's day and for the very same reasons. To begin with
substantial individuals, as Strawson does, confines analysis to these enduring
beings and what happens to them. But with the descriptive metaphysical method
those happenings are likewise construed in terms of individuals or derived from
them. Events, processes, becomings - changes of any sort - are reduced to some
combination or chain of states of observable individuals from which they are
derived, each description being built up from observable being in one form or
another. The links of derivation may include a good bit of complexity, but
process itself finally falls out of such description. Far from being merely
inadequate, ordinary language in the end offers no account of process at all,
given that it embodies the substantive bias that we have seen confound any such
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attempt. Since language divides reality up into subjects (Strawson's 'individuals')
and predicates, it tends to reinforce our habit of seeing the world consisting of
unchanging individuals and their properties.
FART THREE
Evolutionary Intimations
In one very important sense, the theory of evolution has rendered reality into a
changing, dynamic, temporal affair in process once and for all. Philosophers,
scientists, indeed all those of average education, can no longer enjoy the
unquestioning convenience of stopping everything there is in order to get a
better look and to take more precise pictures of reality's finer points. Evolution
has it that all is indeed in flux, and however fine a picture one is after dictates
just how inaccurate any static renderings invariably turn out to be.
(Yet a qualification is required, for Einstein of course did not prevent the physics
of Newton from serving accurately on marketplace scales, and just so Darwin did
not supplant the basic scheme of Aristotle for dividing up the amphibians.) The
attraction however, of the theory of evolution for our metaphysical purposes is
that, more than any of the substantive views catalogued thus far, we should
expect evolutionary thinking to emphasise the fundamental importance of the
idea of process, and so locate the conceptual difficulties it involves wholly in the
foreground of analysis.
§ Early Inhibitions
Yet evolution theory in both its Darwinian and its most accepted
Neo~Darwinian forms has all but neglected the philosophical problem of process.
This in part was the result of historical accidents: the theory was first conceived
and refined by scientists working well within a mechanistic, materialistic
paradigm that assumed an enduring substantial backing for dynamic process. All
becoming, despite a new emphasis on the outcome of natural phenomena over
time, was simply viewed as incremental over movements of otherwise static
being. This view gained support from the fact that the sciences of the day enjoyed
continually sharpening success at fixing the flights of stars and marking the
forms of molecules in light of the blind clashing of substantive atoms. Ironically
what in essence was a theory about dynamic evolving process in a sense helped
further a naturalistic reduction of the appearance of process to the reality of
substance. The Laplacian scientific ideal of perfect predictability held even
greater sway once the formerly uncharted organic frontier was also subjected to
reason, once its temporal patterns were thereby suggested, once the ticking of
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Newton's cosmic clock was heard right within the workings of organic
phenomena, our own species among them.
But the loud and clear application of evolutionary thinking at the outset
proved to be too close indeed to the human community. Another historical
accident involved the initially premature extensions of the theory into the realm
of human social structures. Upholders of the official biological line attacked
extensions such as the shocking Social Darwinism espoused by Herbert Spencer
(1820-1903), which amounted to a characteristic blend of early speculative
departures from Darwin's ideas. Like so many others, after creating a popular
stir, it was finally refuted for its unbridled, pseudo-scientific meanderings in and
around the known scientific facts. But ultimately the more significant reaction
was the consequent suspicion of all such speculative ventures. Hence the theory
was strictly confined to biological facts; attempts to broaden its applicability or to
provide the speculative completions its universality urged were largely
abandoned or simply ignored.
§ Evolution Evolves
Nevertheless, Darwin's ideas have developed a great deal even under the
confines of positivistic methods in science." Theorists and researchers claim to
have generalised the theory to account for known facts in every conceivable
domain of investigation. What began as a set of intriguing insights regarding the
origin of biological species,38 has since become an elaborate explanatory
principle for all existence great and small. The concept of natural selection has
been recognised as applying universally to the animate and the inanimate world,
and universally to the physical and psychical world alike. Everything from snakes
to snowflakes, from subatomic particles to star clusters, from semantics to
spiritual practices, all such entities and endeavours are interpretable in the basic
terms of evolutionary thought. The existence of an entity of whatever sort
depends on its particular constitution in relation to its environment.
Moreover, the philosophical distinction between becoming and being, and the
intractable troubles with process in substance thinking, are more clearly in focus
with the acceptance of the more generalised theory. First, because its universal
37 See especially, P. Bowler, Evolution: The History ofan Idea. Berkeley, CA: Univ. Press, 1984.
38 Strictly speaking, as yet the theory has said little as to the origins of species, let alone to all
existences. Unembellished, mechanistic natural selection rather concerns the modifying and
preserving of species over time. Darwin's own gradual adaptive divergence scenario, despite
its intrigue, continues to be challenged for its inconsistencies with scientific data.
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applicability suggests that microscopic as well as macroscopic phenomena
become a significant focus of study, and second because the theory thus
generalised constitutes a corrective in outlook, naturally inducing considerations
of process as fundamental. This second point, incidentally, reveals just how
entrenched a substantive outlook can be, by exposing the widespread
philosophical tendency to ignore the obvious in the attempt to maintain
conceptual tidiness. For accepting the basic idea that evolution has and continues
to occur ought to entail a revolutionary shift in the ontological status of the
theory's subject matter, a shift away from substance or any other hypothetical
entities held to endure. Evolution eliminates any permanence, even as applied to
universals. Although logic textbooks nearly always have it that 'all swans are
white', the theory turns animals, groups of animals, biological species, groups of
species, indeed in its generalised form all existence whatsoever, into unique
individuals, into links of a genealogical nexus. Accepting evolutionary thinking
leads to there being no absolutely rigid laws even for evolution, for such laws
concern universals while evolution rather implies that everything is one
individual system pervaded by process.
Unfortunately, what seem to be promising developments in theory end up
being little more than provocative pointers in practice. To view reality
evolutionarily, that is as inherently temporal and dynamic, has not in itself
advanced the case against substantive philosophy or resolved the problems
regarding the nature of process all that much. Even as applied at atomic and
cosmologic levels, the solutions on offer typically take the form of how processes
'stack up' so to speak, and ignore the more basic ontological issues. Owing
perhaps to the early conceptions and revisions based solely along biological lines,
which were cast in terms of entities perceived to work as mechanical cogs in
biological machinery (the genes and chromosomes of RNA and DNA molecules),
the assumption of substantive backing and the question of a process as such were
easy to overlook, and continue to be neglected. Owing as well to the metaphysical
conception of the problem of process, no pivotal difference appears to bear
directly on the issue, whether evolution theory implies that reality is simply
cyclical and repetitive in its dynamic character or essentially creative and
genuinely evolving in novel ways. Thus the theory, for all its extensive
applicability, is not so much an exhaustive reform of substantive thinking, but
merely a suggestive tangent to the difficulties, and thus far from complete.
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§ Darwin's Deficient Idea
The incompleteness is evident even prior to extending the biological thesis.
Just as in the generalised theory, the emphasis in its narrower form is on natural
selection. In short, offspring struggle for limited environmental resources, they
vary in their usefulness when faced with shifting environmental processes, and
those inheriting the more useful variations are naturally selected.39 Five separate
issues have been prominent in debate over this orthodox view. The first one, now
resolved for the most part, concerns the 'modern synthesis' achieved between
natural selection and mutation theories which were initially thought
incompatible (but later fostered population genetics). But a second one, partly
arising with the resolved synthesis, concerns explaining why acquired
characteristics are not passed on to offspring. Genetic mutation research helped
uphold Darwin's ideas (over Lamarck's) by showing the prohibitive mechanisms
involved, but a pertinent philosophical question has been largely ignored. Since
mutations allowing the inheritance of learned traits would clearly mean a
selective survival advantage, and since there is nothing of a physical sort to
prohibit such a scheme in principle, we should expect organisms to have evolved
in this manner, which makes the lack of evidence indicating any whatsoever
quite inexplicable. It could be that there is something in the nature of change
itself that needs to be unpacked prior to achieving an adequate explanation.
A third issue, less convincingly worked out than the first but less neglected
than the second, concerns gaps in the fossil records, which appear to imply an
absence of the long line of graded and gradual modifications the theory requires.
Darwin had declared that, "Natural selection... can produce no great or sudden
modifications; it can act only by short and slow steps."40 But fossil evidence
consistently reveals discontinuities unaccountable by Darwinian natural selection
alone. Although a theory proposing a rapid process of species creation has made
some headway,41 that very modification helps shift emphasis toward the more
generalised theory, by identifying significant evolutionary moves as acting on
species and populations rather than on the individual reproducers. In the very
39 Note that the stress ought to be on natural selection. What survives is merely what the
environmental factors do not destroy. The natural counterpart of differential survival is
differential destruction, for nothing is either selected or destroyed for any purpose.
40 C. Darwin, The Origin of the Species. NY: Modern Library, 1952, p.443.
41 This theory was first advanced by J. Gould and N. Eldredge. See especially, "Punctuated
Equilibria: the Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered," in Paleobiology, Vol.3, 1977.
This thesis and generalised evolution recently defended in R.Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker.
London: Longman, 1986, and D. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea. NY: Penguin, 1995.
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least, the shift affords a clear model for how the small scale individual processes
(on the order of developing live individuals) can combine productively to
engender large scale ones (on the order of developing organic types). This shift is
of interest for investigating the nature of process in that it also re-directs the
subject of study away from microscopic parts seeming to function
mechanistically in individual organisms, and toward a fundamental and
pervasive process phenomena working on macroscopic wholes as well. If the
early conceptions of evolution could overlook embedded ontological questions
involving process, the later ones at least unearth a lot more that is then to be
overlooked.
Another inadequacy which likewise puts the ontological question of process in
the foreground is the lack of explanation for the fact of evolving complexity as
such. Simpler organisms and - to address the generalised thesis - non-organistic
entities, appear to display greater natural selectivity features. Moreover, the
theory has no mechanism at its disposal to provide an aim toward greater
complexity, for being complex is not a prerequisite for survival endurance, and
is often a hindrance. In terms of organic life, the simpler something is, the easier
it is for it to grow, to feed, to maintain normal functioning; and typically the
greater its proliferation and abundance in nature. And obviously small, hard,
simple stones tend to persist longer than big, soft, complex creatures. The
predicted outcome from the operating of natural selection is not complexity, but
hardiness. In fact the theory of evolution appears consistent with an opposite aim
toward simplicity. For present purposes, highlighting how the view is lacking in
this particular is enough to suggest that something fundamental and pervasive
might be amiss.
Finally, there is the issue of the missing explanation for the fact of
consciousness, a double-barrelled difficulty given that consciousness does not
seem altogether selectively valuable nor explainable via emergence. Although
sentient experience has evolved throughout the biological realm
(and evolutionary cosmologists cite statistics suggesting its probable evolution
throughout the heavens), it is not clear that conscious beings display either an
adaptive edge or hindrance over non-conscious ones fitted for their
environmental niche solely in terms of appropriately responsive behaviours. In
addition, if we confine the theory to an assumed, unchanging, substantial
backdrop, revision may take it some way toward explaining the appearance of
organic life from inorganic material, but the theory is still hard-pressed to
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explain an altogether abrupt emergence of consciousness from organic life. For
"consciousness, however little," as William James insisted, "is an illegitimate
birth in any philosophy that starts without it, and yet professes to explain all
facts by continuous evolution."" But bear in mind the distinction between
consciousness and intelligence. Knowing what goes on and how best to fit into
one's environmental niche are aspects of intelligent cognitive accommodation,
and are obviously advantageous for survival. The rationale for cognitive
resources is fundamentally Darwinian. In fact the conception of intelligence as a
tool for survival - cognitive Darwinism - is as old as biological Darwinism, for
Darwin himself considered the human capacity for reasoning and theorising to
be features of biological endowment." Yet any consequent frustration arising
from a lack of knowledge need not entail consciousness. Note that its absence is
fully compatible with James' further assertion that,
The utility of this emotional effect of expectation is perfectly obvious;
'natural selection,' in fact, was bound to bring it about sooner or later. It is
of the utmost practical importance to an animal that he should have
prevision of the qualities of the objects that surround him."
Delving into the expansive philosophical literature pertaining to these final
points would lead us too far astray, but the problem of consciousness does turn
out to be more than a mere exemplar of the complexity issue above. Later, in the
third chapter, it is argued that conscious experience is highly indicative of the
nature of process, and of the nature of reality itself. And the phenomenon of
evolution is easily shown to bring sentient experience in its train, when the
integral relation of process and experience is coupled with a proper model for
how novelty and innovation are injected into nature's self-perpetuating scheme
of things.
§ The Plight of Purpose
One final feature of cognitive evolutionary thinking is noteworthy. While
biological evolution is undoubtedly Darwinian, with blind natural selection
operating with respect to purposeless random mutations, intelligence has
fostered an evolution of culture which is generally governed by rationallyguided
selection among purposefully devised mutation variance. Of course human
cognitive capacities are part of the natural endowment resulting from biological
42 W.James, The Principles ofPsychology, Vol.1. London: Macmillan, 1891, pp.148-149.
43 Darwin elaborates on this theme in The DescentofMan. NY: A.L. Bunt, 1874.
44 W. James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular
Philosophy. NY: Longmans Green, 1897, p.78.
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selection, but the cognitive methods, standards, and procedures are resources
that develop and evolve through rational selection in the process of cultural
transmission over successive generations.40 In place of one's offspring are those
that one influences, in place of biological mutation is procedural variation, in
place of reproductive elimination from absence of traits passed on to offspring is
reproductive elimination via lapses in the conveying of discoveries.
In the cultural domain a rigorously eliminative evolutionary model is
untenable because what is at issue is historical survival, based in the main on
communal behaviours transmitted through teaching and example. Here the
lessons of experience dictate the preferential selections being made, here
intelligence and knowledge are the fruits of collective and cumulative
endeavours. Although rational selection is basically the same sort of process as
natural selection, the former can also effect changes from across genealogical
lines as well as within the boundaries of a single generation. But by far the
crucial difference is that rational decision brings in purpose whereas orthodox
Darwinian selection is in a sense a way of removing purpose, explaining its
appearance by deploying the natural mechanisms of blind elimination cast in
purpose-free terms. Darwin and Spencer's own ideas on the topic, and
subsequent developments in C.S. Peirce and Konrad Lorenz, try to keep to the
biological thesis by contending that the human mind has certain genetically
determined innate dispositions evolving because they are conducive to survival.
But the suggestions above, advanced by Karl Popper and Stephen Toulmin, and
more recently by Anthony O'Hear,46 represent an alternative vision incorporating
a cultural development that involves an evolutionary approach, whereby ideas
battle for selection by the adoption and perpetuation in society through a process
in which the fittest are likely to prevail.47 However implausible a rationally
purposive approach may be in strictly biological evolution, it is eminently and
unproblematically tenable in matters pertaining to the modus operandi of
intelligent and rational beings.
45 Most commentators argue that cultural evolution is not merely analogous to biological
evolution, but rather that both are variant forms of one structurally uniform process. See
R.Byrd and P.J. Richardson, Culture and the EvolutionaryProcess. Chicago: Univ. Press, 1985.
46 A. O'Hear delivered his forthcoming, "Knowledge from an Evolutionary Standpoint" at
Edinburgh University, 1995.
47 Not to be confused with the blind purposeless memes discussed in, R. Dawkins, The Selfish
Gene. London: Paladin, 1978.
41
It might be added, incidentally, that the commonplace (post-Spencerian)
philosophical inference of regarding that which appears to be purposive, even in
the scaled-down biological thesis, as merely a 'cosmic accident' cast in
purpose-free terms, hinges on accepting 'random' to mean 'determined by
chance among a large number of equally probable possibilities'. The scientifically
analysed constraints pressing in on randomness are much more stringent than is
usually assumed, and no logical entailment points out the manner of interpreting
the meaning of these internal constraints operating on chance. The scientific
facts allow an interpretative range extending from purposive life and intentional
minds as cosmic accidents to cosmic imperatives, something often overlooked by
proponents of less purposive biological interpretations.
At any rate, acknowledging a purposive cultural evolution of this sort
(an essentially Lamarckian story) ensuing upon a purposeless biological
evolutionary development of intelligent beings (an essentially Darwinian story)
does not in itself address the issue of how or why consciousness evolved. But it
does advance the generalised evolutionary perspective to some degree by
embracing and resolving related and problematic aspects of life and mind.
Additionally, it helps extend the applicability of evolution theory by introducing
another line of investigation to pursue for resolving the anomaly of complexity
that arises with the limited biological doctrine. As noted above, although changes
can issue in decay as much as development, degeneration as much as growth, the
macro-processes characterised as Darwinian evolution are typically envisioned as
a course of temporal development. Thus something akin to value (conceived in
the abstract) tends to facilitate survival, so that the complex arrangements which
do establish and perpetuate themselves manage in general because they represent
actual improvements of some kind. As we shall see, these notions of abstract
value and improvement, often left undefined or simply rejected by the more
eliminative theorists, set off one group of non-substantive thinkers apart as their
decidedly optimistic, philosophic counterparts. Likewise it separates them from
other evolution-inspired philosophers whose views deny progress and tend to be
pessimistic. (Consider for example Nietzsche and his doctrine of eternal
recurrence.) Purposive cultural evolution offers an account of at least one side of
that increasing complexity, namely the cultural features that pervade reality and
often go unnoticed.
To be sure, as pervasive and neglected as they are, an account of developing
cultural features hardly explains the far-reaching presence of all complexity
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throughout the natural world. Yet, in a world that increasingly comes under
evolutionary description, doctrines that help to complete a set of insights already
so vast and applicable should be in the foreground of investigation. Evolutionary
thinking highlights the dynamic character of reality, and proceeds to show how
utterly expansive it is. It is shown largely to neglect the ontological issues that
impinge on the problem of process conceived from a substantive orientation. And
it is then shown to operate in the clearly purposive cultural realm of conscious
experience. We end the present analysis of evolution with the suggestion - and
merely a suggestion at this juncture - that in putting the pieces of the puzzle as
presented together with an adequate account of process and conscious
experience, we may begin to get the picture.
But then arises the doubt: can the mind of man, which has, as I fully
believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest
animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?18
PART FOUR
The Rebirth of Becoming
We opened this chapter by noting how the Buddha in the East and Heraclitus
in the West taught that change was the fundamental nature of reality. Having
marked the repeated failures of various ontologies of being throughout the
subsequent history of ideas to accommodate the reality of process, it is now time
to ask whether ontologies based on becoming, that is on the changes between
beings, can better accommodate the existence of process and still provide an
adequate account of being. Since we appear to live in a world populated by both
things and events, common sense dictates that we ought not relinquish the reality
of either in developing an adequate and accurate ontological model. Yet if a
substance orientation is unable to explain the reality of process, we can turn to a
process outlook and attempt to explain the reality (or apparent reality) of
substances.
We also noted in opening this chapter that certain practical aspects of living
prohibit complete adherence to an absolute doctrine of flux. Some may find the
Buddha and Heraclitus intriguing, but none can do away with the
substance-property, thing-event, subject-predicate character pervasive in our
interpretations and articulations of experience and still get along in the world. At
any rate, qualification is in order regarding the phrase 'an absolute doctrine of
48 C. Darwin, Notebooks, 1836-1844: Geology, Transmutation of Species, Metaphysical
Enquiries, P.H. Barrett, et aleds. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, p.539.
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flux' as depicting the viewpoints of both Heraclitus and the Buddha. As to the
latter, there is some ambiguity in the teachings as to whether achieving a
complete understanding of universal impermanence ultimately leads to a
transcendent realm beyond impermanent process (and therefore unchanging) or
to complete annihilation of all being and becoming whatsoever; while the former
spoke of 'the logos' as the final truth or law dictating the changing nature of all
things, a law that, like the universal dhamma of the buddhists, presumably
abides through the changing flux. So if substantive philosophy seems extreme in
its neglect of process, a counter proposal that neglects endurance is equally
extreme in an opposite direction. After all, whatever aspect of living one chooses
to consider already implies a degree of endurance, because an abiding adherent
is presupposed as the would-be follower of the flux doctrine. The speculative
proposal that is called for then is one that can follow a middle way between the
two, and one such proposal is to begin with experience and attempt to derive
from experience both an account of change and an account of endurance.
§ Beginning with Experience
If we begin with our experience of the world rather than with the formal
requirements of the logic and the natural language used to interpret the world,
we find that we never actually experience substances. Experience consists of
durations or transitions in time that involve changes of properties; that is, what
we actually experience is simply a flow of activity or the passing of nature, an
idea signified by William James' notion of the 'stream of consciousness' or Henri
Bergson's 'inner duration'. The flow may be of uncertain and fragmentary
experience as in the confused combination of dream oblivion and partially
subconscious sensory input encountered upon waking from a deep sleep in the
early morning, or it may be of certain and complete experience as in the stirring,
fully conscious sensory input endured in a cold shower on a hot afternoon.
Experience may be dominated by perceptions of either sharp or dull calibre on
the one hand, or it may be dominated by memories, either distant and vague or
recent and piercing on the other. But in every case, of no matter what variety or
combination, experience comes to us in the form of a flow. If we probe it in
depth we discover that we live through experiential events consisting of
processes of transition, of later experience continually superseding earlier, in a
thoroughly dynamic breadth of ceaselessly changing qualities.
Here we may have a clue. Of the many theorists we have examined all
presented accounts of process that were based unsatisfactorily on the superseding
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of one state of substantial being by another. If experience as lived through
partially fits that description in that experiences do supersede one another, then
retaining that element of an account of process seems reasonable. Now replacing
the superseding substantial being element of those accounts with a superseding
experiential event element becomes a viable alternative. Could the flowing,
durational quality of experience be a candidate for what the world is actually
like in its essence? Even to begin to formulate a response to this rather broad,
overarching suggestion requires a good deal of metaphysical reasoning, many
aspects of which will occupy us in the third and fourth chapters to come. Indeed
reality as so conceived is the fundamental insight of process philosophy as
espoused by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, and it represents a
radical departure from substantive philosophy in this century. As Whitehead
notes, "In place of the Aristotelian notion of the procession of forms, [an event
framework] has substituted the notion of the forms of process."'9 Demonstrating
the meaning and importance and application of that insight represents one of the
principal purposes of the present work in its entirety. Therefore, although at
present we are focusing on the more modest suggestion of taking experiential
events as a plausible alternative to substance in developing an adequate account
of process, we cannot help but sketch some aspects of a metaphysical position in
broad outline in doing so along the way.
For instance, from the temporal character that we intuit in every experiential
event, we can deduce a necessary component of difference, for if an intuition of
difference were not presupposed we would not experience temporally unfolding
differences. And we can confidently extend this epistemological point to a
metaphysical one: a world without temporally unfolding differences would for
all purposes be a world which stood absolutely still, and so would be no world,
or at least no knowable one. But we do know a world, however imperfectly, and
we know it through our experiential events, a key factor of which is their
changing nature or process flow. Our experiential intuitions therefore provide
ontological suggestions along with epistemological ones, and invoke questions of
what sort of differences there are, and of differences between what sort of
entities. Let us leave the suggested metaphysical models aside for the time being
and turn to these later questions.
49 A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought. NY: Free Press, 1968, p.192.
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Since our intuition of difference is a direct result of the ongoing nature of
events, we may start by viewing events as the basic particulars of the world,
sequences of which form the temporal process as experienced. In order to
substitute events for substances as the basis for being, we must break substances
down into their constituent parts to see that just as an individual is more
determinate than the species to which it belongs, so also is the event more
determinate than the individual. Hartshorne has suggested that,
The logic which drives us from genus to species to individual is the very
logic which should drive us still further, to the event, or momentary state,
of the individual process in question.50
We commonly consider a thing or a person on one occasion as being the very
same as on another. But this sameness is never literally true: we never encounter
an absolute identity between two entities experienced over time. Physics speaks
of the ceaseless dance of subatomic activity in things and psychology records the
countless influences forever impinging on personal identity; yet we have little
difficulty noting the changes undergone by such apparentlyenduring individuals
and we may refer with little or no effort to these individuals as *the same' for
practical purposes. This is because, perhaps unwittingly, we are able to construct
the various levels of being out of the becomings of events as our basic
particulars, in the manner by which events are united in sequences by their more
special or general characteristics. Individuals can be defined consistently in
terms of certain dominant characteristics or recognised sameness of pattern that
is passed through event sequences. We need not postulate anything that stands in
as the wholly same individual over time, because all the being required for
ordinary identification purposes is available in the unique lines of inheritance
obtaining in series of events. Hartshorne adds that,
the most analytically complete way of speaking is event-speaking, not
thing- or substance-speaking. The latter is a simplification or shorthand.51
Indeed, if it were not for certain recurrent features of process, identification
and re-identification would be impossible. It is a dominance of inherited
characteristics in the unending procession of events that is recognised. The
elements of experience are not the basic particulars however, these experiential
elements are rather the ingredients, the 'whats' of the events. They provide
structure to the sequences, but the events themselves provide the grounds for
50 C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. IL: Open Court, 1970, pp.174-75.
Note that this outlook points toward the generalised evolutionary scenario discussed earlier.
51 C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis andPhilosophicMethod. IL: Open Court, 1970, p.175.
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their being. Whitehead draws the conclusion, "Thus nature is a structure of
evolving processes. The reality is the process. ...The realities of nature are the
events in nature," from which it follows that, "Biology is the study of the larger
organisms, whereas physics is the study of the smaller organisms."82
One objection that warrants mention here concerns the fact that thus far the
focus has been on the perceptions that are being made. To consider, to note, to
recognise, or to identify already implies a degree of endurance. Whether the
activities finally unearth momentary events, sequences of events, or something
substantial, an enduring observer is presupposed in all such cases. For nature to
be a 'structure of evolving processes' the observer too must be shown to be of
that same nature. To meet this objection the process philosopher relies on an
analysis of relations based specifically on temporal features that relate
experienced entities internally at one end and externally at the other. The
objection is addressed in some detail in subsequent discussion, but in brief the
idea is that the present state of a perceiver, a percipient event if you will, is all
there is ontologically, though that present percipient event is informed by its
internal relations to a particular past experiential sequence, and that relation
makes the present event capable of the kind of perceptions outlined above.
One final word on the priority of events is in order. Although science could
never hope to prove the truth of a metaphysical position, it can and often does
expose the falsity of a poor one, and we would expect it to offer growing support
for more feasible accounts. It seems that conceiving events as the basic
particulars is more compatible with relativity physics than previous substantive
positions have been. Because the elements of experience merely provide structure
to the more fundamental events themselves, as in relativity theory, "space and
time are merely ways of expressing certain truths about the relations between
events."83 As Whitehead makes this distinct feature of his ideas plain,
My own view is a belief in the relational theory both of space and time, and
of disbelief in the current form of the relational theory of space which
exhibits bits of matter as the relata for spatial relations. The true relata are
events.84
From this standpoint things are not basic particulars embedded in a framework
of spatial and temporal relations; they are constructs of event particulars that, in
52 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, PP-72, 239.
53 A.N. Whitehead, Concept ofNature. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1920, p.168.
54 A.N. Whitehead, Concept ofNature. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1920, p.24.
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becoming, create their own fragments of space and time. By coming to be, each
event carries with it its own definite quantum of extended space-time, which
discloses a unique causal background from which it came. "You may observe
another event of analogous character, but the actual chunk of the life of nature is
inseparable from its unique occurrence.We shall return to the unique quality
of events in subsequent chapters, in the main to take up Whitehead's proposal
above that physics, like biology, merely studies smaller organisms. But here the
point is raised not only to mark an event perspective's common ground with
relativity theory, but also to highlight what we have seen to be a recalcitrant
problem in substantive methods for solving the problem of process. The wrong
idea has been taken up, time and again, as the unit of reality's measure.
Philosophers need not deny that substances exist so much as simply
reconceptualise them as manifolds of process, as stabilities obtaining in the
dynamic activity that pervades all reality. In a way Heraclitus can be understood
as saying only half the truth: we do not step twice into the same waters, while we
do step twice into the same river.
§ Basic Instinct and Final Analysis
Thus for all that has been argued, the bottom line between the conflicting
approaches of substance and process metaphysics cannot be resolved decisively
through theoretical argument alone. Like many philosophical disputes, there is
small chance of settling things once and for all by 'knock-down, drag-out'
argumentation. Our basic instincts will not simply disappear for conceptual
convenience, and we basically conceive a world populated by many 'things'. In
essence the taking up of processes as more fundamental than substance is not so
much the propounding of a theory as it is an urging of a point of view, not a
doctrine but an approach. We can and have outlined certain theoretical
advantages, and we do well to stress the basic insight of viewing substantial
things as subordinate to processes both ontologically (in the order of being) and
conceptually (in the order of understanding). In a world of change the supposed
predominance and permanence of 'things' in nature is but a fiction, useful at
times and delusory at others.
Other advantages that follow on from this main insight include the possibility
of a cogent account of things from a process viewpoint. Again, the process
metaphysician need not dispense with the notion of 'things', it would in fact be
55 A.N. Whitehead, Concept ofNature. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1920, p. 169.
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all but impossible to articulate the alternative viewpoint without using the idea.
The question is not over concepts as such but rather over their significance.
Another advantage is the consistency and constancy derived from a process
perspective with the views of nature articulated in contemporary physical
science (as evident in dynamic subatomic discoveries), in biological science
(as evident in Darwinian evolution), and in social science (as evident in cultural
evolution). Finally, a focus on reality's processes, activities, events, and
occurrences - in a word, on change in all its worldly manifestations - allows us
to appreciate that our experience, and our consequent understanding is of a
similar structure, that the world around us is not a foreign and frozen museum,
but like life as lived, a vibrant and lively flow.
So ends our discussion of becoming and being, having established the priority
of the former as providing the groundwork for the latter, in this the first of our
two preliminary discussions to a metaphysics of experience. We shall endeavour
to apply these and related insights presently in the analysis of empirical




"You may polish up common sense, you may contradict it in detail,
you may surprise it. But ultimately your whole task is to satisfy it."
PART ONE
The Components of Knowing
In what has come to pass we set out to establish an alternative analysis of
being, achieved by way of its complement of becoming, in response to the
problem of process. In what is now to come we set out to establish an alternative
analysis of objectivity, achieved by way of its analogous complement of
subjectivity, in response to the problem of knowledge. The concept of
complements is examined as it arises in the workings of the empirical and
rational components of knowing, and the importance of psychical subjectivity is
then clarified and the way it complements physical objectivity is outlined. As an
emphasis on process was warranted due to the marked bias in favour of things,
an emphasis on the rational and on the subjective is suggested to counteract
similar biases on the empirical and the objective. Our metaphysical preliminaries
close with an introduction to the coherent and comprehensive vision of reality
the process thinker pursues in adopting these reformed notions of becoming and
subjectivity.
Whitehead was one philosopher acutely aware of the concept of
complementarity. He was sharply critical of mistaken attempts by early
thoroughgoing rationalists such as Leibniz to subsume sensory experience under
concepts of the understanding, and similarly mistaken attempts by later
thoroughgoing empiricists such as Hume to construe concepts of the
understanding solely on the model of sensory experience. Whitehead's system
represents a unique departure from the one-sided stress of piecemeal empirical
projects in contemporary thought under the influence of Hume, and a return
toward rationalist doctrines, albeit revised by empirical input. Though the
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emergence and creativity of contingent particulars are in sharp focus, they are
located within an elaborate rational model guided by universal necessities.
Ultimately, understanding comes from insights into the interplay between them.
Whitehead noted an important and neglected semblance in social structuring of
the conceptual pairs rational and empirical, universal and particular, necessity
and contingency, but also of substance and change, atomicity and continuity, the
potential and the actual. In all these cases each side depends on the other in a
complementary relation to reach a coherent completion, a point examined in the
rational-empirical interplay example below.
One of Whitehead's fundamental insights was to see that by developing the
notion of process, an overarching descriptive generalisation emerges adequate to
all six of these pairs. Process is acknowledged as the supremely pervasive
Heraclitean trait in all existence. But again, Whitehead also saw that there is
something more to reality that complements the flux: the enduring forms of
potential that are present in every instantiated process, and that render process
relatively concrete compared to the complementary realm of abstract potential
that it evokes. Throughout reality then, there is a complementary conceptual
interplay pervading the Heraclitean flux. Whitehead's other fundamental insight
concerns a seventh such complementary pairing, namely the psychical subjective
and the physical objective, and how by inverting the commonly held supposition
that the objective world is the more substantial and real, and by viewing them
both as complementary concepts, Whitehead placed the changing nature of
experience in the centre of investigation, from which he derived and to which in
turn he applied his elaborate analysis of process.
§ Empirical Experience over Rational Reflection
But prior to delving into how the subjective and objective complements
circumscribe process, it is profitable to ponder the complementary pairing of
empirical experience and rational reflection. In the first place, the question of
how these particular paired concepts relate represents an area of ongoing and
influential debate, one bearing directly on any philosopher's take on the notion
of knowledge, a problem as perennial as the problem of change. In philosophical
circles it has been cast as any number of questions: What is knowledge? Is
knowledge possible? How do we know? What is the relation of knowledge to the
world? To beliefs about the world? To truth, to wisdom, to God? But central to
most forms of the problem is this age-old distinction between the empirical and
the rational, and the consequences drawn therein for the relation of particulars
to universals. These distinctions often separate otherwise like-minded
philosophers into disparate groups bound by an allegiance to one or the other
orientation, and to the varied influences that play upon the development of other
paired and complementary concepts. A reliance on either empirical or rational
grounds likewise results in a certain metaphysical furnishing of the universe,
and those furnishings are no small part of a comprehensive rendition of reality.
In the second place, it is fitting to unravel the concept of complements by
probing a problem along the lines of empirical and rational ebb and flow
because, as already mentioned, process philosophy is in fact empirical rationalist
in essence. It places great emphasis on subjective experience and relies on the
findings of empirical science, while it likewise holds to rationalist criteria of
coherence and consistency for all parts of a vast metaphysical model initially
derived from a small number of (somewhat) axiomatic principles.
Thus it is well to look carefully at what is at issue in either persuasion in
pursuing an alternative set of metaphysical preliminaries, but a qualification at
the outset is in order. The philosophical literature pertaining to the development
of these conceptual pairs is vast to be sure, and the following treatment by no
means attempts anything approaching an exhaustive survey.1 In truth, under the
rubric of 'thoroughgoing empiricist' and 'thoroughgoing rationalist' something
of a caricature is allowed in simply associating rational with universal, empirical
with particular. This is done by way of brevity and the better to avoid any unfair
renderings of particular philosophers' views. Even so, a certain intuitive pull is
thereby acknowledged and addressed, the modest end of outlining the way
complementary concepts typically fit together is thereby achieved, and the
subsequent setting up of a worthwhile analogy to subjectivity is thereby begun.
The thoroughgoing empiricist pictures the world as composed exclusively of
particulars. It is merely an aggregate or assemblage of facts which simply happen
to be what they are, following contingent laws of co-existence with one another
in which all the relations governing them are reducible to contingent
propositions. Universals are finally reducible to sets of resembling particular
sensory experiences, any necessary judgements reducible to contingent ones,
necessity itself reducible to contingency as no intrinsic necessity, neither causal
1 Nor am I professing to have formulated my own views satisfactorily. If we hereby tend toward
the philosopher's folly of delving less and less into more and more until seeming to know
nothing about everything, rest assured we stand clear of the scientist's folly of delving more
and more into less and less until seeming to know everything about nothing.
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nor logical, obtains in the relations and sequences of entities in existence. On this
view all knowledge is derived from empirical experience.
The thoroughgoing rationalist on the other hand contends that the world is
made up solely of universals, that the seeming assemblage of contingent facts,
supposedly derived entirely from particular sensory experiences according to the
empiricist, is but a complex of universals, in an ideal world in which universals
are not only real but are in fact the only reality. In such a world all the relations
that govern such universals, though they may appear to be contingent, are finally
reducible to necessary propositions. Likewise all the alleged particulars involved
in sensory experience are reducible to universals, contingent judgements
reducible to necessary ones, all contingency finally reducible to necessity. On this
view all knowledge is derived at least in principle from rational understanding
alone. In drawing the distinction, incidentally, Francis Bacon once observed that
empiricists are like ants in that they collect and put to use while rationalists are
like spiders spinning threads out of themselves.
To begin with the argument from inadequacy. The empiricist may challenge
the rationalist outlook on grounds of inadequacy, because a world in which all
particulars are made up solely of bundles of universals does not seem to provide
a rich enough picture of reality. To view a particular river for instance as
nothing but a complex of universals would fail to locate that river in space and
time, would fail to provide the particular territory the universalising map
allegedly covers. Arguably the one factor that distinguishes particulars from
universals is spatio-temporal position and the (largely causal) implications
thereby entailed. For while the rationalist is right to insist that other candidates
for particularity may just as easily be classed as universals, albeit rare ones in
some cases (the unique shape say of an especially unusual river being but the one
instantiation of that very specific yet universal shape), the empiricist rightly
insists that position in space and time differentiates any particular river from all
its attendant universals, by endowing it with the capacity to interact with the
world outside of itself and to change accordingly. For the empiricist sees the
world of particulars as a dynamic system that stands in sharp contrast to the vast
enveloping realm of changeless ideals and eternal necessary truths, should any
such exist at all.
The empiricist may add that existence as defined along space-time lines is not
simply another quality, one that when added to the many other qualities of a
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possible object, render it actual. The inclination is rather to suggest that
existence consists in an object's spatio-temporal interactions with the totality of
other existent objects. So that no universal could, by definition, be appropriately
applied to the object as one among many in a complex of universals, for those
particular relations are not in any straightforward way qualities of the object at
all. The difference between the Muddy Mississippi and the River Styx need not
turn up in a list of their qualities, because the ideal Styx can be conceived as
carrying all the same sort of mud as the real Miss. The differences that do turn
up however are relational or extrinsic, not qualitative or intrinsic. The actual
Mississippi may take one down to New Orleans by raft or drown one enroute,
while the imaginary Styx no matter how vivid the imagining could not.
Whitehead, a thinker whose work defies classification as either principally
empiricist or rationalist,2 has pointed out that our primary ground for judging
dreams and fictions non-existent is not their internal inconsistency or fantasy
quality, but rather their inability to fit into the space and time of the larger
totality of what does exist in waking reality.3 The study, however involved, of a
perceived object's internal nature never reveals whether it really exists. In
themselves illusions may seem as real as any true perceptions, but ascertaining
an object's external relations establishes its interactions with the surrounding
totality (or as much of it required to make a confident judgement) and a genuine
position in the space-time system of reality. While a universal by being an ideal
object only influences the mind of whoever is doing the thinking, particulars by
being actually existent objects influence not only the mind conscious of them but
all other things as well.
The thoroughgoing rationalist may reject the distinction based on space-time
location, by claiming that it merely underscores the point that experience may
sometimes lead us astray. First, it appears the argument assumes that various
complexes of universals pervade the world of particular existence. If so, then the
fact that such universals transcend that world of particular existence only
highlights the point that empirical knowledge is incomplete. Therefore it is
unwise to rely on distinctions made on the basis of degrees of perceived
interactions between objects. For using spatio-temporal criteria to distinguish
particularity from universality, would mean allowing the less definite (or at least
2 Prior to Harvard, Whitehead sharpened both rationalist and empiricist sensibilities as a
mathematician and theoretical scientist at Cambridge and London respectively.
3 This issue is discussed at length in A.N. Whitehead's, "Uniformity and Contingency," in Essays
in Science andPhilosophy. London: Rider, 1948, pp.100-111.
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incomplete) to discern and define the more definite. Since the rationalist
contends that the world of concrete particulars is itself a part of the ideal world
of universals, the blundering through distinctions based on inadequate
knowledge sources is in large part irrelevant to the rationalist necessary model of
reality.
Second, even accepting the distinction, it would appear that the rationalist has
recourse to the same logical point that the empiricist relies upon. Existence, that
is, may be defined along space-time lines, and all interaction and consequent
change explained in terms of that existence, and yet arguably this only outlines
first and second order necessities that obtain in a world fashioned from various
complexes of universals. Just as the empiricist establishes a separate realm of
particulars stipulatively, by definition, the rationalist can claim in like manner to
be establishing the very same separation between levels of universal realms.
As to the first counter, one can accept the limitations of empirical knowledge
as grounds for questioning the certainty of the distinctions, while rejecting the
proposed outcome of those limitations. Since for the empiricist universals are
finally reducible to sets of resembling particular sensory experiences, and vice
versa for the rationalist, the negative point regarding knowledge does not seem to
support either side as against the other. The only justifiable conclusion is that
either model must make do with imperfect knowledge. Moreover, although the
empiricist assumes pervading universals, this need not imply their
transcendence. The empiricist account as put forth thus far does not call for
either the reliance on a transcendental element of properties or on the element of
certainty presupposed in the rationalist critique.
As to the second counter, it is illegitimate to suggest that establishing
particularity by designation in space and time is analogous to establishing a
second, say more down-to-earth, set of universals. It is true that the logical point
may work either way, but also true that whatever an entity in space-time is
labelled is incidental. The important point, and one favouring the empiricist
view, is that if we allow this secondary realm of universals, then the concept of a
particular does not seem to make sense. The rationalist must somehow construe
those worldly items claimed reducible to complexes of universals, and if not by
space-time designation, by what then? For if universals by definition can likewise
undergo interactions with the world, influencing and being influenced by other
such universals, then their characterisation as universal seems merely verbal.
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These are in fact the particular items in the world involved in particular
changes, and undergoing a complementary interplay with the universals beyond
them. So the rationalist account seems inadequate in its dismissal of particular
spatio-temporal changes, and insignificant in its merely verbal departure from
the empiricist point of view. The presence of a complementary relation between
the two realms.
To turn now to the argument from the nature of relations. The nature of
space-time designation provides another counter to the rationalist view.
Examining the conjunction of universal traits in existent entities often reveals
diverse and ambiguous relations between them. No entailment holds of colour
from shape, of size from texture, of length from breadth, and so on. Bicycles,
barndoors, and beaches vary in these properties quite independently. Typically it
is only those entities construed analytically to possess such traits in specified
combination, such as the black-and-beaked quality partly defining a raven, that
do not vary universal properties contingently, and of course the way the world is
carved up conceptually is likewise a contingent matter. That is to say many, if not
most, universals do not determine nor preclude the presence of their
accompaniments. Furthermore, many of the propositions derived from and used
in support of a rationalist ideal of the world as a completely necessary system
that we but partly discern, are not reversible. The necessities are asymmetric,
working only in one direction. Every child (excepting Adam and Eve) necessarily
has or has had a grandfather but need not in turn ever be one, triangles
necessarily have three angles but a figure with three angles need not be
triangular. Now if these relations do not demonstrate any fixed entailments or
any fully symmetrical necessities, it seems apparent that in the domain of space
and time we are far from attaining a necessary rationalist ideal.
The rationalist may argue that a failure to see any such necessary relations is
due to a present state of ignorance. But the failure to meet the rationalist ideal is
not the outcome of a lack of knowledge. The points arise precisely from the
actual understanding of diverse and ambiguous relations between many
universals. It is just the case that not every abstract quality stands in a
determinate or necessary relation to every other, at least as regards the manner
in which they co-inhere in an event or thing in space and time. To encompass a
plurality of ultimately independent variables, the rationalist would have to
supplement the ordinary logic of analysis with a synthetic logic based on some
overarching principle, as in Hegel's logic, in the hope of disclosing hidden
56
entailments of seemingly independent variables. But success at putting forth any
such attempts must be measured in terms of how convincing the rationalist
alternative appears, as against overwhelming experiential evidence to the
contrary. No universally accepted alternative accounts readily come to mind.
The empiricist may extend the argument by considering even those relations
involving universals that are obviously associated with necessity. For insofar as
any such relations apply to existence, they are obviously hypothetical because the
entities involved need not have existed. Even when not applied to existence, they
are indirectly hypothetical, in that they depend upon certain stipulated and thus
revisable notions. No judgements regarding either particulars or universals imply
the existence of their terms. We may stipulate that birds are creatures that can
fly, and judge an animal to be one according to this ability. But whether all birds
or even any particular bird actually exists and flies remains an open question.
And since existence on most views is not necessary but contingent, the empiricist
may insist on the hypothetical character of all so-called necessary truths. But
despite that such truths are expressible in terms of hypothetical propositions
involving existence, every such proposition derives its truth from a categorical or
unconditional proposition involving universals. If the complex of universals
referred to by 'bird' did not imply the quality of being a member of the animal
kingdom, there would be no truth that if a bird exists, that bird is an animal.
To say that adding one apple to another results in two apples presupposes the
proposition '1 + 1 = 2'. So the contingency of existence does not prove that
necessary relations between universals are merely contingent.
The empiricist may try to salvage the point by applying it to the necessary and
universal categorical propositions themselves, by bringing into focus certain
aspects of pure rational mathematics. In the present century, empiricists have
generally focused on contingency as found in empirical truths, and have tended
to treat necessity as confined to mathematical and logical truths. But taking
mathematics as an exemplar of purely rational endeavour may appear to limit
the scope of investigation unnecessarily, for there have been many attempts to
ground rational understanding elsewhere. Teleological principles such as the
Good' in Plato or 'Spiritual Perfection' in Spinoza, or in dialectical principles
such as 'the Logic' in Hegel seem quite distinct from the numerical rational
systems of either Pythagoras or Euclid. However the empiricist critique as
presented seems to hold with little revision for teleological and dialectical
outlooks as well. Clearly Plato and Spinoza were influenced by mathematical
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ideals, and their work may be similarly challenged from those standpoints. One
can also challenge Hegel's uniting of everything into one vast system, with a
spirit of paradox animating every conceivable aspect of existence and experience,
for the lack of mathematical precision in the dialectical method upon which the
logic depends, especially when considering ideas and qualities that do not appear
to be at extremes in any straightforward way.4 At any rate, in the past
mathematicians regarded the principles upon which geometry and algebra were
founded as objectively true and self-evident laws of nature. Nowadays they
commonly see their field as a science of necessary truth, possessing a validity
independent of the existence of any of the objects involved, and believe that it
has no categorical say about what actually exists. Mathematics can point out
what does not exist, say for instance an odd multiple of two, but not what does
exist, say an odd number of twins struggling through their math lessons. Axioms
are simply postulated rules in a mathematical game instead of ultimate truths to
which existence must conform. Hence the empiricist can insist that since rules
are made, unmade, and changed according to the gamesmanship of the players,
mathematical validity depends on hypothetical or contingent acceptance of
postulates which in themselves have no truth value beyond the game.
Here the rationalist has recourse to the same counter regarding the
contingency of existence above, but a glance at how mathematics has evolved
displays the full weight of the application. Intuition grants a degree of
pre-philosophical validity to Euclidean Geometry and to Pythagorean Algebra, in
that a good deal of the workings of reality seem to abide by these structures: the
space of our experience matches Euclidean spatial description, the properties of
our numbers follow Pythagorean algebraic formulas. But when Lobatchewsky
and Riemann developed alternative yet self-consistent forms of geometry, and
when Hamilton and Boole, amongst others, likewise developed alternative self-
consistent algebras, limitless developmental possibilities were recognised on the
one hand, and on the other the relative pragmatism, rather than absolute truth,
that underlies the age-old practice of employing Euclidean and Pythagorean
frameworks.5 In geometry the new point of view came about with the failed
attempts to deduce from Euclid's other axioms the truth that through any point
only one parallel to a given separate line can be drawn. In analysing the failure
4 No dialectical opposition readily arises, though required by Hegelian rational principles, for
ideas like those of apple cart or computer, or for qualities such as lukewarm or grey.
B The significant possibilities are discussed in A.N. Whitehead's, "Mathematics," in Essays in
Science andPhilosophy. London: Rider, 1948, pp.195-208.
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two new and perfectly consistent geometries were developed that did not assume
the axiom of parallels, the Lobatchewskian substituting an infinite number of
parallels and the Riemannian substituting not even one such parallel, to a given
line through a given point. The advent in algebra of imaginative and thoroughly
developed ideal constructions that deviate from standard numerical system
operations ushered in the new perspective. For the familiar (A x B) = (B x A) for
example, Hamilton managed to substitute the peculiar (A x B) = — (B x A) in a
self-consistent system of theorems, and Boole by substituting A x A = A for the
familiar A x A = A2 did the same.6
In opening new ways for the evolution of mathematical thought, these
counter-intuitive developments naturally led to the divestment of hampering and
irrelevant references to existence.7 But even in these imaginative departures
from mathematical allegiance to reality as experienced, the presupposition of a
categorical necessity remains. For the hypothetical proposition 'if certain
propositions are taken as axioms, certain other propositions follow necessarily as
theorems' presupposes the categorical proposition 'together these axioms
necessarily imply these theorems'. And this truth is objective and valid regardless
of whether the particular axioms are selected. Mathematicians are not in fact
free to create systems of algebra and geometry but merely free to select them,
because apprehending the consequences of putting axioms together does not
constitute the making of a new truth. In like manner, attending to one attribute
of a perceived object, thinking of it in isolation, abstracted from its embodiment
in existence, does not create a universal but merely happens upon one already
there. The truths regarding universals are no more created than those involving
particulars; in both instances they are found, albeit typically in large part by the
senses with the latter, and in large part by the intellect with the former.
Non-Euclidean and Non-Pythagorean mathematical systems are simply among
the many systems of implication in a realm of universals that is in no sense
arbitrary or indeterminate or even flexible. Though existences can be both
created and discovered, the rationalist is right in pointing out that their
meanings and that upon which they subsist can only be discovered.
6 For summaries of these developments see D.J. Struik, A Concise History ofMathematics. NY:
Dover, 1962, pp.139-82; for these specified theorists consult chapters on each in E.T. Bell,
Men ofMathematics. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1937.
7 That is 'counter-intuitive' only in as much as one assumes an earlier perspective based on
relations to existence. From that standpoint one of course cannot imagine an infinite number
of parallels traversing the same point, nor 1 x 2 as not equivalent to 2 x 1.
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It is true nonetheless that the possibility of alternative mathematical systems
does confirm the empiricist plurality of independent variables even in the realm
of abstract universals. Note for instance that different and mutually inconsistent
systems can share certain axioms, thus demonstrating the independence and
non-implicative contingency of those axioms. Even so, this only goes to show that
the necessity that obtains in mathematical systems is not horizontal so to speak
but only vertical: it holds between the entire group of axioms and the theorems
deduced from the group, not between the axioms themselves or between any one
axiom and the theorems derived from the whole group of axioms. Just as a
complex of universals cannot imply its exemplification in the world of existence
in space and time, any one axiom standing alone cannot imply a theorem.
Nevertheless, it is plain that an interplay of rational and empirical components
takes place both in concepts that indicate existences and in those referring to
mathematical and logical reasoning.
§ Rational Reflection over Empirical Experience
Just as a thoroughgoing empiricist world consisting solely of particulars in the
last analysis needs some degree of backing from universals, a thoroughgoing
rationalist world made up exclusively of universals requires some support from
particulars. Traditionally, metaphysicians have separated universals into two
categories. Universals referring to the manifest image encompass those which
interact with conscious beings, such as in the qualities of all sensory input;
whereas universals referring to what is commonly called the scientific image
encompass those universal patterns of interaction between existences themselves
'in the world anyway' independent of consciousness. The rival theories of
universals vary widely, from entirely mind-independent realist notions
(either substantial or causal), through compromise conceptualist measures of
universals generated by mind-world interaction, to entirely mind-dependent
conventionalist views (either nominalist or resemblance). The rationalist scenario
collapses if both scientific and manifest image universals are shown to work in
the same manner. For clearly both conceptualist and conventionalist frameworks,
by bringing in a degree of mind-dependency, fix spatial and temporal
designations, and in so doing assume a level of particularity in interaction with
universals, the very interplay made plain above. What arguments might the
rationalist put forward then for a world consisting solely of unattached
universals as it were, of the scientific image variety?
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First, the rationalist has little trouble in establishing the fact of universals by
two related arguments, one involving meaning in universal reference, and one
involving logical priority. Analysing the meaningful use of language indicates
that there is an implied and presupposed consideration of universals involved.
When we ask if something exists, say a collection of a poet's love letters, we
designate a certain complex of qualities that has an ontological status in and for
itself. Those collected letters may not exist: characteristically passionate,
confessional, endearing qualities may nowhere be exemplified in the poet's
correspondence. But the mere fact that the complex is a possibility, one from
which the meaningfulness of the question obtains, shows the interplay of
(at least manifest image) universals with particulars, whatever the answer to the
question may be. Furthermore, in any given particular there is a complex of
qualities and a spatio-temporal location which constitutes its connotation and
denotation respectively. These are parts that together become the whole that is
that particular, and parts are prior to the whole which they constitute. In
describing one particular planet we may mention the elipticality of its orbit, the
ruggedness of its surface, its roundness, its colour, and so on. But that planet
could not have these qualities unless they were there to be had. The actuality of
something presupposes its possibility, its existence assumes its essence, and this
holds for the manifest and the scientific image alike.
To ward off an immediate objection open to the empiricist, that of
unnecessarily populating the world with a veritable jungle of universals, a
qualification must be made. Universal qualities, as used in reference and as
coming as prior, do not commit the rationalist to the existence of another sort of
particular. There need not be a realm of abstract universal qualities and
disembodied possibilities haunting the world like spirits, out of our perceptual
reach but grasped perhaps as particulars by extraordinarily endowed minds, by
disembodied souls, the gods, the absolute, or what have you. To be independent
of specific exemplifications need not imply any such thing. The suggestion is
rather that every particular participates in or exemplifies a universal, not that
every universal is exemplified in a given particular. The rationalist merely denies
that a lack of particular exemplification implies the non-existence of universals.
Yet it is not the case that universals are then utterly mind-dependent, existing
merely in the conscious minds of those attending to them, and incapable of any
meaning or reality apart from their detected universal status in consciousness.
Placing the logically prior part of a particular whole in the mind explains
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nothing. For the universal aspects present in particular objects could not be
conceived unless they were there to be conceived. As sketched in terms of
mathematics above, the mind does not create but rather discovers universals
through discriminative attending or through abstraction. If the mathematical
analysis is cogent, universals relating to the scientific image do not reduce to
those of the manifest image, but rather the opposite is the case. Moreover, it is
inconceivable to suppose that universals could be real only in the mind, while
the particulars that possess them as attributes were really out there in the world.
A warm furry object could not be objectively real if the attributes of warmth and
furriness were merely subjective. The only way of taking up the idea that
universals are mind-dependent is to contend that the existent particulars that
possess them are likewise mind-dependent, that whatever is perceived is real
only in the mind of the perceiver. And the same logic applies even if one believed
that universal attributes of things as existing are merely states of an absolute
mind. Here too one must allow that the particulars are real only in that absolute
consciousness. In truth, the universal entities that we acquire knowledge of by
attending to the connotative aspects of sensory objects are just as objective as
those objects. Granted, no one of them exists as a whole on its own in space and
time, but they can pass through space and time, thereby constituting the
qualified particulars in existence via those intersections, and constituting
another instance of complementary interplay.
We now examine how excluding particulars outright results in losing all
reason. Having established the reality of universals, however qualified, it is easy
to uncover the conceptual confusion involved in the claim that all knowledge is
derived from the purely rational understanding of them. First, it is simply beyond
reason for there to be a domain populated solely by universals related to the
scientific image. To see why this is so recall the points raised on behalf of the
empiricist regarding space-time specifications. We stressed how experiential
beings necessarily occupy particular places in the spatio-temporal scheme of
things, for that allows a point of view, and a point of view allows knowledge to
get started so to speak. A world consisting only of universals would remove the
means to distinguish between separate things yet exactly alike. The idea of two
things exemplifying absolutely identical traits would make no sense, if no
conceptual interplay were at hand and particularity excluded outright, for
nothing save a particular spatio-temporal designation could conceivably stand in
to keep the things apart. The small change in every thoughtful rationalist's
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pocket would collapse into one and only one small coin of each size, shape, and
colour - an incoherent (and perhaps costly) outcome. Hence the countless
instances of empirical triggers at work even in areas of characteristically rational
endeavour, as in studying necessary truths found in logic and mathematics. To
learn the theorems one must use the logic and mathematics, and this usage
involves practice with particular instances, often to a 'particularly' numbing
degree as every schoolboy knows. The usage grounds otherwise over-elevated
material in particular spatial and temporal applications, and allows the
universality to take shape and make sense in contrast to these particulars. Thus
the interplay of the two concepts working as complements is of vital importance.
As regards universals pertaining to the manifest image, it just seems
impossible to conceive of anything as rational knowledge on grounds that make
no appeal whatever to the empirical domain. Without particular experiences
occurring over time (including rational thinking) we would have no conception
of change, as outlined in the previous chapter. All attending to processes of
reasoning requires the temporally changing activity of experiential selves. And
since the external physical world, be it conceived along empiricist or rationalist
lines, has straightforward spatial and temporal features while internal psychical
worlds as typically conceived have only straightforward temporal ones,8 any
sense of one's own self would also be lost on the thoroughgoing rationalist
conception of a changeless, timeless realm of world-detached universals.
Likewise, there is no way to give meaning to anything empirical as fact if it fails
to appeal to factors belonging to the rational domain in one way or another. Such
facts do not count as knowledge until they are linked into some rational scheme
in which concepts convey either some logical entailments or some metaphysical
framework or both. Utterly isolated facts (should any exist) are in themselves of
no significance. The standing of facts in space-time relations decides the degree
of significance they possess.
The fallacy involved in the commonplace claim that all knowledge is derived
entirely from empirical experience has been exposed, and also the less common
though reciprocally mistaken notion that all knowledge is derived solely through
rational reflection has been laid out. Rational understanding and empirical
experience and the universals and particulars in which they deal are neither
8 Straightforward in as much as one's internal spatial features can defy natural laws describing
external spatial ones: visual images of Paris need not extend spatially any further than visual
images of a French beret. Also, Peirce, James, and Whitehead, among others part with more
typical views here by arguing that mind (and thus selves) as such are spatially extended.
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mere accidents or aspects of the other nor independent or contrary to the other,
but rather equally fundamental and real and mutually dependent aspects of one
reality, each requiring the other for coherence and completion as inherent
complements, fully understood only in light of collective reference. By way of
summary, exemplary instances of working within a complementary ebb and flow
are altogether apparent when looking to the standard practices of geographers
and geometers and to the conceptual integrations of process philosophers. On the
face of it geography appears as support for an empirical bias while geometry
seems to suggest a more rational standpoint. Yet these fields represent
comparable forms of knowledge. Geographers make a lot of empirical
measurements: checking the weather, sounding flood waters, sampling soils,
noting erosion, and the like. While their subject matter exists in a state of
continual and particular flux, they rely on (relatively) fixed and universal
mathematical laws to make sense of it. In reciprocal fashion geometers make a
number of hunches as to what the fixed mathematical laws might be: running
proofs on paper, fluctuating variables randomly, turning points, lines, planes,
and shapes over in their minds to tease them out. The hunches come in a
similarly particular flux, depending on the experience of the mathematical
theorist, who hopes to achieve a comprehensive and universal rendering of the
facts by sifting through the flux. The empirical particulars become significant in
light of relevant rational universals complementing them. It has been said that
the true scientist has an empirical conscience and a rationalist imagination, and
the same should hold for recent philosophers who sometimes overlook
(Is it neglect to procure needed laboratory facilities?) the interplay between these
two components of knowing.
The fact that Whitehead is a recent philosopher who did not overlook
conceptual interplay was mentioned early in the chapter.9 His process
metaphysics incorporates a detailed analysis of contingent particulars with a
complex rational scheme infused with universal necessities. Processes are
conceived as dynamic and concrete actualities but complemented by static and
abstract forms of potentiality, from which a rejection follows of extreme
nominalism or conventionalism concerning universals. This is because processes
are understood as ontologically fundamental, so that at least some of them display
a unity, structure, and identity not wholly or exclusively dependent on the
9 Philosophers since Descartes are here referred to as 'modern', those since the turn of the
century referred to as 'recent', and those writing now as 'contemporary'.
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operations of mind. The existence and identity of particular processes
(like all other particulars) is bound to their status in a matrix of space-time
interactions. Thus process identification involves both type specifications as in a
mood swing, and spatio-temporal designation as in Socrates' mood swing prior to
dying in Athens. From a process perspective, particular instances of a universal
share a lawful or habitual and hence straightforward modus operandi to bolster
the perhaps conceptually problematic common properties of some sort. Here
natural kinds, indeed all scientifically stipulated universals, are constituted by
the common grounds of what they do instead of by what they are, following the
descriptive rules of physics, traffic, grammar, what have you. The gross national
product for example refers to similar sorts of figures in two country's
calculations due to the law-abiding function such numbers convey in the context
of just that communication process. Indeed all processes of a given type
constitute a realm for that process type, just as all economic processes constitute
the economic realm and all biological ones the biological realm. The advantage of
this process conception is that realms are composed of their members by way of
straightforward inclusion, whereas universals commonly conceived as specifying
properties are not and cannot be composed of the properties that constitute them.
Realms are best thought of as overarching processes, ones that need not be
continuous in space and time. All tooth brushings for instance are considered as
not only constituting a process kind by matching functional description, but also
one immense process distributed throughout space and time. Via the evolving of
process, universality is constantly supervening upon and complementing the
particularity of each novel process. Finally, we drew attention previously to
Bacon's labelling of empiricists as ants and rationalists as spiders. But quite aptly
he adds that the true business of philosophy is like the work of bees, taking a
middle path first of gathering materials from garden flowers, then of digesting
and transforming them by a power all their own.
PART TWO
Becoming Subjects and Being Objects
§ The Means of World Making
In our analysis of empirical experience and rational understanding, and of
universals and particulars, we noted the characteristic grounding of concepts in
the space and time of the so-called 'real' world. Investigating the complementary
pairs of subjectivity and objectivity includes the coming to understand just why
that is the case and just what it entails. There are essentially two approaches to
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reality: the objective, external, physical and the subjective, internal, psychical.10
For the sake of independent argument the previous discussion assumed the
existence of a real world conceived along the lines of the former approach. But to
arrive at an adequate conception of a world of that sort requires more than the
mere claim that an objective, external, physical world is actual, is existent, is
real, is out there, for these ideas in themselves require elucidation. Reflecting on
the relation between experience and the two approaches to reality indicates one
reasonable option: to begin with a subjective, internal, psychical orientation, and
try to derive whatever justification for substantiating an objective, external,
physical one it allows.
The full significance behind the reason one ought to begin with the subjective
approach is often overlooked. Simply put, from the point of view of human
beings, experience in an important sense constitutes everything in the world, in
that experience is necessary for there to be any world, any reality, for any
particular person. All acquaintance with the world is either by reason of its
being the object of such experience, filtered through such experience, or derived
from such experience; and the whole significance of the world is to be found in
or through it. The shift from empirical experience to rational reflection may be
complicated, but it remains a fact that experience is basic to all knowledge
because knowledge requires experiential perception and experiential reasoning.
Perhaps, as some philosophers believe, truths are sometimes a priori without any
involvement of perception or reasoning, and perhaps truths are sometimes
accepted on the authority of others without perceiving them or justifying them
with one's own reasoning. Still, they cannot count as knowledge unless and until
they are experienced via the conception and assessment of reasoning. Now, one
may choose the strong, more idealistic implication that there just is no reality
beyond the flow of experience in the world (even here there are stronger and
weaker versions regarding the amount and possession of conscious flow), and
consider experience as not only basic to knowledge but the constructor of the
known world. Note the suggestion in Whitehead,
This process builds a common world of conceptions out of fragmentary
worlds of experience. The material pyramids of Egypt are a conception,
what is actual are the fragmentary experiences of the races who have gazed
on them.... fragmentary individual experiences are all that we know, and
10 'Subjective' meaning the contents of experience as against the reality lying beyond it; not
particular opinions about that content as in 'coffee is nice' as against accepted facts about
reality detected through senses and science as in 'coffee contains caffeine'.
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that all speculation must start from these disjecta membra as its sole
datum.11
Or one may hold that there are events that are never reflected in any subjective
experience, implying that aspects of the world are not only different from
experience, but also beyond reflection in experience. But on either
interpretation, "The various streams of consciousness that flow on within the
total world process," the idealist Timothy Sprigge insists, "are what matters most
about the whole affair, either because really they are the whole affair, as idealists
maintain, or because they are all that matters."12
It may be reasonable to begin with subjective experience, but the manner in
which one derives a real world from that standpoint is then the more pressing
question. Given the above considerations, it seems that there is nothing to
distinguish the reality of a world from the subjective attending to appearances
alone. The only evidence available in subjective experience is of course the
content of that subjectivity, and we are right to question any assumption that
something beyond present subjective experience might be responsible for it.
Assumptions to that effect would be idle ideas, not nearly as suited to the
subjective facts as would be denying that further something, because any
knowledge of it could only be a duplication of knowledge more confidently
asserted of present subjective states themselves. Here we face the age-old
problem of scepticism, usually either ignored on pragmatic grounds
(being a pseudo-problem of no consequence) or dismissed on grounds of
incoherence (established via a questionable private language argument).13
Upon reflection however three different sorts of access to reality can be
distinguished within experience: that which makes up one's own subjective
psychical states, that which is taken to indicate subjective psychical states of
others, and that which is taken to indicate a physical world beyond subjective
states of either sort. Many philosophers, and indeed much in the way of
comparative psychology and common sense, accept that the first move beyond
one's own subjective bonds is via that part of it taken to indicate a physical world
beyond either sort of subjective experience. First the presence of other bodies is
noted for instance, and only then from bodily behaviour is the presence of other
11 A.N. Whitehead, The Aims ofEducation. London: Benn Limited, 1959, p.243.
12 T.L.S. Sprigge, "The Importance of Subjectivity." in Inquiry,, 25,1982 pp.143-163.
13 See G. Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith. NY: Dover, 1955; and T.L.S. Sprigge,
Santayana: An Examination ofhis Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1985, for an analysis and
critique of the analysis on 'solipsism of the present moment'.
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minds deduced. But this begs the question by ignoring the full significance of the
pervasive nature of subjective experience and simply assuming that the noted
bodies belong to a physical world beyond subjective constraints.
An alternative first step, focusing initially on that portion of subjective
experience that is taken as indicative of subjective states of others, respects the
limits of subjectivity while still providing a degree of means for world making.
We cannot help but take some experience as evidence, however unwarranted, for
the presence of other subjective psychical states that are not ours. In bracing
ourselves against the weather we look around and note what appear as our
fellows bracing themselves in like fashion. The comparison leads us to see that
our experiences are not entirely isolated and independent. We share
characteristics with these other purported subjective states, we brave what
appear to be the same storms in similar ways. Consider then that what the notion
of an objective external physical world may minimally suggest, and knowledge of
it minimally require, is merely something that can be experienced from a point
of view other than one's own. For the established fact of a spread of experience
alone, ranging from its altogether unique to its shared dimensions, can account
for an adequate conception of an objective, external, physical world, one
interpreted as entirely derivative from the alleged existence of these other
differing subjective experiences. After all, objectivity is commonly thought of as
applying to objects that can be experienced from more than one viewpoint. The
overlapping features in experience on this view are analysed and described in
the hope of ultimately uncovering the patterns and laws that pertain to how they
are modified in their subjective, psychical appearances in one instance of
subjectivity rather than in another. The outcome is an objective, external,
physical world comprised of these features found in common and the categories
devised to integrate them. This common ground cannot be located in any one
instance of subjectivity, but is set out in the neutral categorical ground that lies
collectively between them all. The objective, external, physical world thus
conceived entails a mutual co-ordination amongst the many instances of
subjective experience for ordering the content of appearances into a world,
creating a synthesis of appearances from all possible points of view. The
pervasiveness of subjective experience is therefore retained while arguably a
world as real as need be is made from within it.
True, the important issue of how to establish other points of view beyond one's
own for experiencing a world remains within the firm grip of subjective
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scepticism. The evidence is still wholly the content of subjectivity, which without
establishing other points of view does not afford the suspicion that the content
refers to anything external to it. We are once again at a sceptical impasse, and
the version of objectivity hereby established may seem fraudulently subjective by
comparison to any common sense notion of the same. But surely we have made
some headway: first although the starting point has been subjective experience
the force of the sceptical challenge has been acknowledged, second the by-pass
allows a version of objectivity consistent with our normal understanding of it,
and third while keeping indefensible assumptions about an external world to a
minimum no contrary assumptions excluding it have been entailed.14
The concepts of existence, actuality, and reality from this standpoint merely
mean that any purportedly real entity generally follows the rules established in
obtaining the features common to all experience, as separated from the solely
individual features in specific subjective, psychical experience. Perceptual errors
and conceptual confusions are then ruled out in a process of synthesis.
Hallucinations and superstitions do not command our allegiance precisely
because they locate in the shared space of the objective, external, physical world
features of experience that do not belong there, for although our conceptions
may not be entirely free from error, they tend to hold more of the truth
regarding what is that shared dimension of experience. (Interestingly, on this
view if something approaching universal agreement should arise suggesting say
that the moon dramatically effects human moods, then that effect would indeed
become an objective fact pertaining to the posited, external, physical world.)
Despite attempts to put a gloss on the notion of existence that would mean that it
refers to some additional characteristic beyond experience, there simply is no
further metaphysical function to existence thus construed, no further property to
enhance existent entities already entrenched in an objective, external, physical
world via the synthesis from experience as outlined. In order to establish a reality
and direct investigation at learning its ways and means, it is enough that a real
world is that which confronts us in common experience. Even the scientific
community, upon examination, is shown to make do on no more than this.
§ Science and its Subjects
In the main, science accepts this analysis in arriving at its adopted versions of
the world, even if several points of view achieved through technological prowess
14 An ontology solely of subjective centres of experience is presented in the next chapter.
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seem strange to the uninitiated. On the face of it, the world as known to science
is an immense system of objective, external, physical, hence publicly available
facts, as opposed to the world as lived through of subjective, internal, psychical,
and thus private ones. But as science progresses these facts become more and
more refined, and often the resulting view seems at odds with our ordinary
experience and conception of things. Not in the habit of peering into microscopes
or through telescopes, the wonders of science might make the world seem more
'blooming, buzzing, and confused' rather than more comprehensible. We
question whether changing the perspective from that of the human organism
either to that of the micro-organism or to the cosmos at large actually takes us
nearer to the truth. We puzzle over our own place and purpose before the
intricately detailed infinitesimals of elementary particles and the galactic
immensities of space and time that the scientist comes across. This public real
world as construed by science seems both peculiar up close, and consuming in its
colossally distant reaches.
There is in fact an inherent bias toward the micro-organism and away from
the human organism in science despite its professed principles (particularly since
Einstein) to treat all points of view impartially. This is largely due to its methods.
Despite that science explores how smaller entities combine into larger ones, it
typically devotes more energy into ascertaining the nature of the small, because it
is commonly believed that truths about the large-scale world are implied by
truths about the small-scale world. Scientific results as applied to activity at the
macroscopic level may be useful for technical and practical progress, but as to
what is actually happening, the truth is viewed as contained in activity at the
microscopic level. This bias is supported by the opinion that the properties
unassisted human organisms experience such as shape, colour, extension,
impenetrability, can be derived with little trouble from small-scale scientific
investigation, but this is typically not the case the other way around. Simply
looking at a tree fails to display its cellular activity, listening to a symphony does
not convey the vibratory frequencies involved; but those same cells and
frequencies, when coupled with the relevant scientific equations, do lead back to
the tree and to the symphony.
Hence the precision and capability involved in the technical advance of
science at probing minute specimens of reality appears to address the objective,
external, physical world in its entirety, but in doing so often leaves human-scale
common sense lagging behind. This initial bias inadvertently conceals a further
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more fundamental one employed in the methods and subject matter of science,
having to do with what it leaves out of its accounts. Notwithstanding the
increasingly subtle and sophisticated strivings toward a comprehensive
understanding of reality, science fails to offer an adequate account of the
subjective, internal, psychical world of experience. Symptomatic of this situation
are conceptual conflicts intractable to accepted scientific procedures and
outcomes. The facts of science are always undergoing revision, and the way
theoretical constructs and the experiential data recorded in their support are
interpreted must finally bridge a gap that separates the scientist from the
layperson. The revisions must be justified on grounds that appeal to a view of
reality broad enough to span factors extending from normal daily experience to
the evidence underlying extraordinary scientific theories. The conflict arises
when science is so exacting that it far surpasses the reach of the
non-practitioner, for in these cases it is easy to overlook the fact that science is
merely a technically proficient subdivision of a more inclusive reality of common
intersubjective experience shared by practitioners and non-practitioners alike.
An entirely objectivist outlook may have a hold on physical scientists, on social
scientists, on philosophers, and on the general public, but there is no such thing
as an utterly detached objectivity. Science cannot ever hope to become an
absolutely closed and complete system, because leaving the scientist's own
subjective experience out of the account turns science into nonsense. Scientific
ideals betray the fallacy of trying to combine complete explanation with
positivistic scepticism. Under this guise, psychologists are to look to the biology
that human beings supervene upon to complete explanation, biologists in turn
are to look to the chemistry that it supervenes upon to do the same, and chemists
in turn are to look to the physics. The scientific ideal remains the Laplacian
replacement of human knowledge with a more complete understanding of atoms
in motion: to know at one moment of time the exact positions, the velocities, and
the forces acting between every last elementary particle, so as to deduce the
positions and velocities of the same particles at any other place in the universe at
any other time in the past or the future. But this sort of understanding in the end
offers little that we are interested in. The forces acting between elementary
particles cannot approach a comprehensive understanding involving experiential
beings of human calibre, because Laplacian representation ignores our normal
experience and answers very few questions about it of any general relevance, due
to a misunderstanding of the very nature of experimental science.
"The generality, determinism, objectivity, materialism, and mathematisation of
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science," as Stephen Priest has surmised, "cannot explain the individuality,
freedom, subjectivity, consciousness and unquantifiability of the subject."15
Science is not a completed and closed system, but simply an elaborate mapping
of experience. A map cannot get anywhere reading itself, nor can an elaborate
theory on map-reading get anywhere reading a map. To be of any use, actual
positions in the landscape must be identified with the mapped co-ordinates. The
same is true of the equations and formulas of science since the numbers do not
themselves point to a world of real events. The closed scientific system of
objective, external, physical facts is put to use by opening it up through
identifying how the subjective, internal, psychical landscape relates
experientially to scientific findings. We must have what Michael Polanyi refers to
as 'personal knowledge' acquired through skilful, tacit engagement as
map-readers to make sense of science. Students of medicine - one of Polanyi's
many examples - are mainly training their eyes, their ears, and their sense of
touch to develop an expertise in recognising the things referred to in their
textbooks and theories, thereby bridging the gap between the data in books and
the facts of experience.16 In the halls of every prestigious institute of higher
learning are countless scholars and scientists actively engaged one way or
another in doing likewise. No science can predict unfolding facts except by
relying upon an art, based on conceptual connoisseurs who note the
correspondence between explicit scientific predictions and actual sensory
experience to which these predictions are meant to apply. There may in fact be
(indeed there usually are) long logical and causal chains that stretch from the
scientific readings taken by advanced observational equipment to their cashing
out in experiential terms, but the length and complexity of the links ought never
to undermine the implicit relation of map to territory, if we mean to keep from
losing our way.
Nevertheless, in their day to day practical affairs scientists are basically able to
bracket off subjective, internal, psychical considerations, or treat them as small
anomalies in an otherwise perfectly regular system of physical relations and
leave it at that. After all, they enjoy great success and admiration for advances
made in comprehending objective, external, physical reality. Vigorous
exploration has led to factual understanding of the molecular, atomic, and
15 S. Priest, "Newton and Hegel: Can Science Explain the Scientist?" in Hegel andNewtonianism,
M.J. Petry ed. Netherlands: Kluwer, 1993, p.117.
16 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. London: Routledge, 1962; the thesis also summarised in,
M. Polanyi, "Personal Knowledge" in Meaning, H. Prosch ed. Chicago: Univ. Press, 1975.
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subatomic levels of the microscopic world on the one hand, and the structure,
dynamics, and evolution of the galaxies that make up the history of the universe
on the other. The form and functioning of biological organisms and the
mechanism and development of natural species have also been discovered. These
and countless other marvels of modern science have fostered dramatic
technological advances in industry, agriculture, transportation, communications,
medicine, and so on. Science manages as much with strict adherence to an
objectivity it arrives at via intersubjectively testable and verifiable material. The
rendering of that material to a publicly accessible, yet scientifically precise form
requires operating solely in the framework of mathematical categories
descriptive of objective structural properties, while leaving subjective qualitative
ones either out of the account entirely or merely utilised as markers for
thresholds of difference then designated by mathematics. Whitehead and Russell
point out that, "physics is not mathematical because we know so much about the
physical world, but rather because we know so little, merely discovering its
mathematical properties."17 It is a limitation to be sure, but a limitation justified
on the grounds that a particularly reliable certainty is maintained in keeping to
abstractions within the confines of communicable theoretical postulates that are
universally understood. Thus science thoroughly investigates the functioning of
the physical world without much regard for the features of psychical reality.
Again, it need not be assumed that all reality is accessible to objective
investigation or that reality cannot be studied by other means. But it would be
peculiar indeed, given the impressive array of tangible advances through
unimpeded exploration of reality's objective, external, physical components, to
insist on a scientific preoccupation with the natural perceptual endowments and
emotive tone for example of the lab technicians running the scientific
experiments.18 To formulate the general scientific world view is to look to the
system of basic concepts about reality it has developed, and the consequent
treatment of problems intimately connected to the basic questions about reality.
It so happens that the main orientations thus implied range from the
epiphenomenal dualistic to the scientific materialistic, with an emergent
naturalistic outlook falling somewhere between. It should come as no surprise
that they are all somewhat reductive as a result of corresponding to an objective
scientific agenda. Psychical phenomena are of little ontological interest due to
17 Quoted in U. Uus, Blindness ofModern Science. Estonia: Tartu Observatory, 1995, p.29.
18 Although R. Sheldrake, in a public lecture at Edinburgh University, has recently proposed that
very idea as a corrective for limitations arising from scientific biases.
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their assumed causal inertness, and little epistemological interest due to
technological advances surpassing normal perceptual abilities. These are both
reasons that steer the course of scientific endeavour more toward the objective,
external, physical domain, but its reliability there in no way implies a
comparably successful undertaking in the other.
§ The Reality Behind the Metre-Readings
Presupposed in this analysis of the common features of normal experience and
analogous operations in scientific exploration is the taking of subjective
experience as primary. Knowledge of the world is viewed as derivative from this
initial standpoint, given the directness and relative certainty of subjective
experience. The motivation for adopting this strategy was mainly one of
parsimony, following something akin to (but far less absolute in foundation than)
a Cartesian sceptical hesitation regarding any unwarranted positing of entities
beyond experience. We have been playing the positivist to the utmost, with a
result traditionally shunned by that school and its scientific adherents. Needless
to say, this is not the only approach available. Time and again philosophers have
joined scientists in trying to take knowledge of the objective, external, physical
world as basic, and then relate or reduce the subjective counterparts to that
knowledge.
But philosophers and psychologists alike can hardly focus solely on what
humans and other animals are composed of and how they behave, and leave the
subjective experiential dimension to one side, believing it to be of no importance
or simply not there at all. It is simply absurd to suppose that, aside from the
structural material studied by mathematical means, experiential beings are not
aware of any qualitative component in experience; and nearly as strange to
suppose that what we seem to be aware of is really something quite different,
and so fair game for an objective approach. Psychical experience cannot be
different from what it seems to be, because it always just is what it seems to be,
the subjective, internal, psychical component as such just is the seeming itself
and nothing more. This is not an altogether easy idea to grasp if restricted to the
confines of a publicly tested and verified science which leaves out the essential
insight. But psychical experience is a certain sort of reality that simply is,
"a reality whose being is one with its own non-discursive knowing of itself."19
That is to say, the being of what is subjective, internal, and psychical consists in
19 T.L.S. Sprigge, "The Importance of Subjectivity." in Inquiry, 25, 1982, p.147.
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its knowing of itself, in knowing its own character. Charles Hartshorne, Timothy
Sprigge, and Thomas Nagel have all intimated the being of subjective experience
by suggesting that it is present in an individual at a certain time if there is an
answer to the question what it was like being that individual at that time.
Sprigge in particular has written extensively on the issue.
In a sense there is always a being who knows what it is like being that
individual, namely the individual itself. Yet no one need know of the
existence of such consciousness in a discursive or conceptual manner, and
from the outside, for it to be a reality.20
Note the attention drawn to the special circumstances surrounding knowledge
claims about such realities. To every experiential being there is a way in which
the world and that being itself appears in experience. It is the reality from the
inside most intimately known. But from the outside a problem immediately
arises. To know another's subjective experience is to know just what it is like to
be that being, 'a living act of imaginative participation' only ever partially
realised. "Such knowledge cannot be nailed down in a cut and dried linguistic
statement intelligible to all who know the language,"21 and attempts to evoke the
requisite sentiment may not always work. Of course the rendering of the
knowledge into an intelligible statement implies a transfer of it into the objective,
external world, but this cannot help but reduce it to a nominal essence consisting
merely of the indicators by which it is recognised. Nagel agrees that something
inevitably is lost in a shift toward the realm of objectivity.
Certainly it appears unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of
human experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point
of view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that
could not imagine what it was like to be us. If the subjective character of
experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any
shift to greater objectivity - that is, less attachment to a specific
viewpoint - does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon; it
takes us further away from it.22
Despite that we cannot deny the qualitative component that constitutes the
being of experience, and despite that we cannot account for it on objective
scientific terms, the present century does chronicle numerous futile attempts at
an outright reduction based on explaining subjective psychical entities in
objectivist physical terms, the doing away with internal subjects by reducing
them to external objects. Skinner's behaviourism, Wittgenstein's private language
20 T.L.S. Sprigge, "The Importance of Subjectivity." in Inquiry, 25, 1982, p.146.
21 T.L.S. Sprigge, "The Importance of Subjectivity." in Inquiry, 25,1982, p.147.
22 T. Nagel, "Subjectivity," in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1979, p.174.
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argument, Ryle's analytic behaviourism, Armstrong and Smart's mind-brain
identity theories, Putnam and Fodor's functionalism, Dennett's eliminative
materialism all come to mind, as at the very least inconclusive if not abandoned
attempts.23 The motivation for such projects is easy to see. The absence of
subjective considerations in the objective, external, physical picture thwarts the
goal of universal scientific explanation. In the midst of scientific rigour this
unexplained centre of everyone's universe threatens to reassert itself and
challenge the unacknowledged metaphysical stance of a scientific realism that
relies on an implicit physicalism.
More recent theories to be examined presently have attempted to show that an
irreducible subjectivity is compatible with physicalism. The appeal of these
arguments is that, unlike the other physicalist programmes that either try to
reduce the psychical into the physical or to deny its existence outright, these
arguments respect basic intuitions about our experiential core, while taking
them on as the great challenge to completing an objective outlook. To contend
that these psychical experiences exist is to candidly allow that subjective states
such as tasting wine and feeling happy are instances of psychical properties.
But a physicalist, in holding that everything that exists is either physical or a
property of something physical, cannot of course allow ontological status to
psychical properties all their own, and must find some other way of treating
them. The suggestion is that if one refrains from reifying the objects of
experience, then subjectivity poses no problem. For if objects of psychical
experience are allowed but without the appropriately corresponding objects in
the physical brain, then clearly the psychical and the physical are not identical.
So these attempts to do away with subjective, internal, psychical experience turn
on analysing experience in a manner that differs from the experiential-act
experiential-object model; more specifically, they consider there to be acts of
experience which somehow point to the things which they are the experiencing
of, yet without any mediation from anything immanent within the experience.
Three strategies are commonly employed: the treating of objects of experience
adverbially, functionally, or by direct realism. Briefly, in adverbial accounts such
as those of Sellars and Chisholm, the object of experience becomes a feature of
the act of experiencing, giving the act the property of being 'of-something' as in
23 This sweeping dismissal of wholesale reduction and the swift sketch of less extreme yet
similar measures that follows merely accent the objectivist motives and subsequent
limitations. Further discussion is beyond the scope of these metaphysical preliminaries.
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'seeing redly' or 'hearing loudly'. This phenomenalistic approach is the belief
that the existence of physical objects (as opposed to the corresponding
experiential ones the move replaces) consists entirely in the possibility of
appropriate chains of perceptual and conceptual experience. Functional or
instrumental accounts are cast in many forms such as those of Fodor and the
early Putnam, but essentially the line taken is that any states that exhibit
intentionality can be analysed into corresponding functional or instrumental
(hence physical) states somewhere along the line. Objects of experience may not
be intentional in themselves - it is hard to see how a pain for example could be
about something - but they are embedded in complexes of intentional states and
as such are detectable in their physical domain if probed sufficiently. Direct
realist strategies such as Austin's and Armstrong's maintain that because
perception is veridical, it follows that the only objects of experience are public
and physical anyhow, and therefore present no challenge to physicalism.24
This contention of the direct realist, however, that there are independent
objects out there to which one's experience mysteriously points cannot remove
the objects of consciousness without running into difficulties. In addition to
problems arising from the mystery of the relation, this position commits the
realist to one of two unacceptable outcomes: either insights into this independent
reality are not available through reflection on characteristics often present in
experience, though clearly they are available, or if the acquisition of insight is
granted, then there is indeed an entity as its source, one at least analogous to
experience. In short, we once again have the presence of an experiential object.
As to the variety of contentions held by particular adverbial and functional
theorists, there are any number of subtle arguments, the literature in each case
extensive and finally inconclusive. Delving into the subtleties of these debates
however, is not only too far removed from the present discussion, but also
unnecessary if we bear in mind at the outset that the target in each case is merely
the reality of objects of experience. Such strategies simply disregard the
all-important psychical 'feel' of an act ofexperiencing. The 'what-it's-likeness' of
subjective experience is left out of the equation when the focus is limited to ways
24 For representative statements of their views see R.M. Chisholm, Perceiving. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell Univ. Press, 1942; W. Sellars, Science andMetaphysics. London: Routledge, 1968; H.
Putnam, Representation and Reality. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988; J. Fodor, A Theory of
Content and Other Essays. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990; J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers.
Oxford: Univ. Press, 1979; D.M. Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World. London:
Routledge, 1961.
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of getting around the internal objects of experience. Even if these objects could
be caught - convincingly or otherwise - in the web of scientific theory, the
experiencing of them seems to slip through. It is one thing to call into question
the existence of objects of experience, but quite another to isolate an act of such
experiencing at the same time from its object under question, and contend that
alone the act has no existence either.
It is true that taken together in such manner the act and object appear to have
no specifiable nor objectively real features: the latter has features but no reality
while the former is real but without specifiable features. And on this reckoning it
would follow that acts and objects of experience could not be known by
introspection to exhibit features incompatible with physicalism. But the
physicalist cannot have it both ways: either the object is viewed as real and
likewise its features are real, or the object is de-reified and the act then takes on
adverbial features. In drinking scotch there really is an object attended to in
experience with its real single-malt features, or there is no such object but the
inebriating experience of 'feeling scotchly' is real enough, whether its qualitative
feel is ever specified, or even remembered. If the physicalist is allowed both a
de-reified experiential object and a featureless experiencing act, it follows that
from the viewpoint of the subject there would be no real difference whatever
between having and not having an experience. This amounts to the absurd denial
dealt with previously of the reality of experience altogether. A less incredible line
might be that from the subject's viewpoint having and not having an experience
are distinguishable, as are one experience from another, but that the subject
cannot make out what that difference may consist in. But this is to forget that
when we are aware of experiencing it is precisely because we are attending to an
object of experience, regardless of how its ontological status is construed, and
that from such attending to objects we discern the nature of the experience,
regardless of how much scotch is involved. To have something as an object of
experience is to have the subjective, internal, psychical element of experience,
again the 'what-it's-likeness' of experience. Physicalism cannot fully
accommodate such experience in an objective, external, physical framework.
§ Complements Reconsidered
The objectivist view, so fertile in science, is fraught with difficulties when it is
aimed at attacking non-reductionist standpoints, for the former merely asserts
that there is no objective evidence for the latter. Yet the existence of a psychical
domain is quite compatible with an objective approach that provides no reason
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for believing in such things. Subjective experience need not entail the strong
thesis that it clashes with the objectivist view, and that no rational means resolve
the clash, due to the omission of qualitative components in such accounts.
A weaker version has it that the two perspectives are actually compatible and
complementary. Once it is allowed that something can be the case even though
the objective approach cannot show it to be the case, the fact that the objective
account is inherently incomplete and in need of supplementation by a
qualitatively inclusive perspective presents no insuperable difficulties.25
It would take us too far afield to examine all the many issues relevant to
establishing how the objective and subjective approaches may complement each
other without conflict. In the final analysis the topic would encompass the whole
of mind-body relations. The principal issues in sum revolve around the workings
of free agency and personal identity in an otherwise causally lawful physical
world. Strong intuitions mark out our sense of freedom and non-reductive
features mark out our sense of personal identity, and both appear to clash with
the claims of a world construed as entirely objective. One overarching, top-down
strategy that goes some distance in resolving the disputes has been implied in our
equating of the construction of an external world in everyday experience with
the constructing of scientific understanding. We partially amend the break
between scientific knowledge and personal understanding of psychical selves as
free and real beings, by keeping in mind a reformed complementary conception
of scientific knowledge that concedes the part experiential selves necessarily
contribute to the shaping of such knowledge. We have seen how an external
world is derived in both instances through subjective and intersubjective sources,
and we have noted the reliability of keeping exclusively to appropriately
objective methods in dealing with problems unique to that world. But this is not
the whole story. Science is unscientific if its basic claims conflict with certain
fundamental facts that are found empirically through subjective investigation.
The two sorts of claims need rather to work as conceptual complements.
One primary requirement for a comprehensive world picture is that it should not
contradict any evidence about reality, whether it be objective or subjective
evidence. It is unscientific to envision a comprehensive picture that denies the
art of experience-directed diagnosis, the tacit handling of scientific instruments,
25 For a critique of objectivist views in science and a development of complementary subjectivist
ones see, U. Uus, Blindness ofModern Science. Estonia: Tartu Observatory, 1995.
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the pivotal flair for data interpretation, the importance of the conceptual
connoisseur.
A more piecemeal strategy from the bottom up concerns the actual clashes that
appear to arise between the two approaches. For there are two ways of dealing
with such situations that respect their complementary nature. First, the objective
account may not really establish what it claims to establish, and subsequent
research may be directed toward a resolution based on the acquisition and
interpretation of further data to that effect. Second, when it seems reasonable to
accept the conflicting findings from the objective account, then the subjective
account - notwithstanding a natural inclination to believe it - may be found not
to have established what it claims to establish. This tactic of course has its limits,
based on what can and cannot reasonably be given up from experience, as we
have seen in foregoing discussion of reductive and eliminative strategies. We can
contend however that when claims made from subjective viewpoints clash with
objective facts, then in general the former claims have been shown to be
wanting, as in instances of hypnosis unwittingly constraining one's freedom.
The truths obtained from a subjective standpoint are then taken as veridical in
instances when they do not clash with objective facts, and possibly so in all
others. There is always a complementary ebb and flow: putative facts about one's
subjective experience relinquished at times in light of relevant objective ones,
and putative facts about the objective world (initially derived from subjective
experience) likewise discounted occasionally in instances of clarified experience.
Just as in the objective realm, where scientific theories rise and fall in relation to
results of empirical testing, there is always an element of faith or conjecture
involved, and the corresponding hypotheses and tests.
Finally, one may wonder if this strategy would not entirely do away with any
subjective, internal, psychical features eventually. Psychologists and physiologists
(among others) point out that as the causally lawful factors of the objective,
external, physical side of reality are gradually exposed, countless aspects of
character and free agency can be cited as being determined externally.26 But this
is once again to neglect the view from the subjective inside in light of its
objective outsider counterpart. The two separate sorts of investigation must be
kept distinct, and their blend, if achieved to any notable degree, recognised as an
26 The philosophical literature on folk psychology concerns ongoing revisions of psychological
concepts in light of scientific advances. For an overview see, The Philosophy of Mind. J.
Glover ed. Oxford: Univ. Press, 1976.
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utterly unusual one. "If the consciousness were to be identified with anything
physical at all," Sprigge makes it clear that,
the identification would be unique in that one could know the complete
inherent character of a state of consciousness without knowing its physical
basis in the brain, and one could increase one's knowledge of the physical
goings-on in the brain, at every level of description, while lacking the
ability to have that empathy with the creature in question which would be
required if one were to know what its state of consciousness is like.27
Although personal identity itself may seem to disappear solely under the scrutiny
of outside analysis, with all acts of agency slipping into events, and all persons
slipping into things, this is precisely one of those basic facts of experience that
from the inside cannot be eliminated outright. A category mistake is committed
when one considers such a possibility, for although the subjective and objective
components complement each other, the origin of each remains in differing
ontological domains.
We have now come full circle in our considerations, first of the nature of
complementary ebb and flow by examining the empirical and rational
components of knowing, and then of complementary structure as applied to
physical objectivity and psychical subjectivity. In the first chapter we noted how
an emphasis on process was warranted due to the marked bias in favour of things
in the prevalent substantive philosophies. An emphasis on both the rational and
on the subjective has here been suggested to counteract similar biases on the
empirical and the objective. Neither the thoroughgoing empiricist nor the
thoroughgoing objectivist can make do without their corresponding
counterparts, for in all these cases each side depends on the other in a
complementary relation to reach a coherent completion. In particular, these
psychical ponderings echo the process ponderings in that both process events
and psychical entities in a sense uphold their respective conceptual pairs.
Coherent notions of substance and objectivity were derived unproblematically
from process and subjectivity, but the same was not so in the opposite direction.
These suggestions invert the commonly held suppositions that the objective world
is the more substantial than the subjective, and that enduring substances are
more so than changing processes. As the singular prerequisites for the psychical
realist, process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, they also pave the way to
placing the changing nature of experience in the centre of philosophical
27 T.L.S. Sprigge, "The Importance of Subjectivity." in Inquiry, 25, 1982, p.147.
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"God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in
far-off empty space... And these actual entities are drops of experience,
complex and interdependent."
PART ONE
The Idea of Psychical Realism
Psychical realism is the view that the world is real and everything in it
essentially psychical - that there is a plurality of existences all of which are
composed exclusively of sentient entities, of subjects of experience, marked by
the presence of some degree of such mind-related or experiential functions as
feeling, perception, memory, volition, thought. Yet to describe reality
as composed of sentient entities that are essentially psychical and functioning
experientially calls for some elaboration. Let us take a closer look at how these
terms are being used.
'Sentience' and 'experience' as presently employed designate a broad
generalised instance of their ordinary usage. That usage is of course originally
derived from our everyday experiential reality as lived through. We understand
the notion of sentient beings having experiences first and foremost by being
sentient beings having them ourselves. We understand what it is like being us.
A sentient experiential reality suggests a world in which all that is consists of
experience analogous to that which is so understood, or in arrangements of that
which is so understood. That is to say, that aspect of ourselves making it true that
there is something it is like to be us is likewise true of all of reality, or at least of
all of reality's basic constituents.
Now the analogy to our own experience may be undeniably direct or it may be
dim, experience for instance ranging from the seductions and torments
particular to human beings to the rudimentary attractions and aversions that
mark subatomic existence. That the basic constituents of reality are not devoid of
experience by no means implies the presence of conscious thoughts or sensory
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perceptions. Yet all reality however great or small is conceived relative to our
experience, conceived to be something analogous to what we know as feeling,
perception, memory, volition, and thought in ourselves. The idea is that since
these basic psychical qualities are capable of having infinite scope both above
and below their human forms, the experiential essence of all reality is not
absolutely different in kind from that which we possess. While we do commonly
grasp some sort of experience by analogy to our own in those around us
(and many among us sense it there in animals), the psychical realist extends the
analogy all the way up and all the way down so to speak, conceiving an
experiential component in the tiniest known entities and in the universe in its
entirety, and in all between. Hence it is in this manner that the world is
considered psychical in essence.
The term 'entities' as presently employed likewise designates in a broad
generalised manner the nature of the ontological commitments psychical realism
requires. Although a number of ontologies are conceivably consistent with a
world fashioned out of elements that function experientially - events, atoms,
minds, persons, the absolute, to name a few - the psychical realist specifies
experience as clarified through one's own instance of it as fundamental to this
theory of existence. In choosing the phrase 'sentient entities' the reality of these
subjective centres of experience - part action and part thing, pervasive and
precise in turns, both like whatever we live through and very much unlike
it - these real existences alone are indicated and highlighted. As shown in the
opening chapter, language defies accuracy in the attempt to indicate existences
with terminology impartial between substances (things) and events (processes),
and so in a sense 'sentient entities' (and the 'experiential events' to come) are
phrases settled for as at least moderately nondescript.1
The doctrine thus stated at this point and acquaintance with the relevant
terms thus established, note that although the idea borders on the absurd at first
blush, it has had its adherents among eminent thinkers through history, and has
been adopted in various forms by many of the great minds of our time. The more
speculative works of Plato and Aristotle possess some affinity to and the working
out of psychical realist suggestions already present in Pre-Socratic philosophy.
Amongst medieval scholars Paracelsus, Telesio, and Bruno put forth something
like psychical realist positions. Leibniz produced the first clearly stated form in
1 The 'sentient entities' of this chapter and the 'experiential events' of the next are more or less
synonymous, the first phrase stressing the psychical and the second the process quality.
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modern philosophy, but in Spinoza's 'pantheism', in Schopenhauer's 'will' and in
Schelling's 'pure activity' we find other highly developed interpretations, as well
as in the philosophies of Lotze, Royce and Montague, and the psychologies of
Wundt, Fechner, and James. In the present century traces of the doctrine appear
in the philosophical works of Peirce, James, Bergson, Alexander, Whitehead, and
Hartshorne; in the biological works of Chardin, Agar, Wright, Waddington, and
Rensch; in Troland's work in psychology, in Burgers' work in physiology, in
Prigogine's work in chemistry and in Bohm's work in physics.2 Since psychical
realism and a variety of natural philosophies have considerable overlap as well as
distinguishing features, the emphasis here is of course on the various forms. All
things considered, the common ground the positions share seems the more
significant attribute and sufficient support for the point being made. To be sure,
there is little point in cataloguing those who endorse psychicalist views beyond
backing the hunch that there must be something worthy of reckoning in ideas
that captivate so many profound thinkers, and that much despite the admittedly
vague and open-ended nature of the class compiled here. It so happens that
inferences from authority, though never valid, do often lead in the right
direction.
To return to elucidating our particular doctrine. The manner of composition
of the world's sentience is of vital significance in understanding psychical
realism. How sentient entities are arranged dictates whether any individual thing
or act is sentient itself or merely made up of sentient entities, whether it is an
individual singular experience or a collective group of experiences. For whatever
lacks aspects of mind is held to be but appearances or abstractions from what
does so at some level. Thus while the country cobbler experiences as a whole, as
do each of his sentient cellular parts, the cobblestone he cuts does not, though
made up of sentient molecular parts. That the mountain lion feels is clear from
its activity and its unity of purpose, that the mountain he prowls does not is
revealed by the greater degree of activity and unity the constituent atoms of the
mountain display in comparison to the whole mountain which, even if volcanic
and erupting, still fails to display a comparable unity.
2 The most extensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources on psychicalist writers is in
P. Edward's, "Panpsychism" in The Encyclopaedia ofPhilosophy, NY: Free Press, 1967, Vol.6,
pp.30-31. For references on recent scientists and philosophers, consult C. Hartshorne's,
"Panpsychism: Mind as Sole Reality," in Ultimate Reality andMeaning 1978, pp.115-129.
85
The question of how one discovers such arrangements and decides which are
sentient wholes and which merely aggregates of sentient parts is more an
empirical matter than a theoretical one, turning on our changing abilities to note
the presence of purposive unitary activity. At some distance for example a swarm
of bees may seem to act as one, in some circumstances an iguana comes across as
just another jagged rock. At present among known existences, the psychical
realist contends that particles, atoms, molecules, cells, animals, and persons
answer to these criteria uncontroversially, while plants, crystals, and energy
fields represent problematic applications, and the smallest and greatest known
entities in existence, that is the subatomic particles and the universe itself,
represent both problematic and speculative applications. Specific problems and
speculations are addressed in defending the thesis in later sections of the present
chapter, while further more speculative suggestions are also taken up in the final
chapter. In any case, reality according to the psychical realist consists entirely of
actual cases, forms, aspects, types and degrees of experiencing, however varied
their arrangements in terms of singulars and collectives may be.
One final aspect of the idea of psychical realism involves the nature of
endurance. Just as experience is categorised according to its status as either an
active singular of sentience such as a molecule of water or as an aggregate of
sentient parts such as a cloud of water molecules, experience also divides into
momentary occurrences or throbs of experience on the one hand and series or
patterns of experience on the other. Along with Throb' incidentally, the terms
'pulse', 'moment', 'centre', and 'drop' have all been employed by philosophers to
convey the temporal atomicity conceived in experience. Despite an array of
opinions regarding the actual span involved and the espistemic availability of the
various forms of experience present in reality, process thinkers all but
universally agree that some framework or other is required that divides or
portions off experience incrementally. Perhaps Peirce and Whitehead represent
conceptions of experience within a process orientation that are continuous and
atomic to their utmost degree respectively. Take the feeling a human presently
experiences as a paradigm example of a momentary occurrence of experience
while that human's experiential history or complete account of personality as an
example of a series or pattern of experience. According to the psychical realist,
selves are commonly granted unwarranted ontological privileges. Enduring
persons are abstractions derivative from personalities and personalities are
abstractions derivative from traits or patterns of activity which in turn are
abstractions derivative from individual sentient activities or quantums of
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experiential process. Activity alone is fundamental to all these abstractions,
specifically the active becoming of the momentary sentient entities. On this view
all so-called enduring entities are held actually to be abstractions from
momentary experiences based on certain stabilities in the flux of events.
Everything that endures - be it an electron, an atom, a cell, or a psyche - is a
temporal unity composed of a series of momentary sentient activities, each of
which incorporating previous activity in a manner suggesting an enduring
individual. Even in examining a stone or a statue the appearance of an utterly
inert and inanimate object is due to the (nearly) absolute regularity in the
patterns of the molecular activity under observation. What we have in such cases
are merely instances of what Peirce referred to as 'habit ridden mind', where the
regularity of the molecular events can suggest the illusion of an enduring thing.
Clearly the nature of the way a temporal series of sentient entities are aligned
may foster varying levels of complexity of experience ranging for instance from
unified activity at a profoundly human level to momentary erratic agitations of a
basic subatomic degree. Note that the psychical realist is in no way committed to
a world of only one level or only one duration of experiential ingredients despite
adhering to an ontology of sentient entities in an atomistic psychical realist
framework.
§ Psychical Consorts
A comparison with a host of related ideas will also serve to develop and clarify
the doctrine. Bear in mind however, that we necessarily adopt a degree of
stipulation when cataloguing the doctrines that follow, some originating in
antiquity, and more than a few taking on meanings in subsequent applications
inconsistent with earlier formulations. There are no entirely fixed and clear
references for the various labels used and misunderstandings abound.
Panpsychism (from the Greek for all and soul) also refers to a view that all things
are ensouled, that everything that is experiences, that the world is made up of
sentient subjects. But it is often used rather more broadly to mean that
everything is psychic or at least possesses a psychic aspect, thereby allowing
interpretations inconsistent with psychical realism as here defined. First, the
panpsychist position may be construed as one form or another of a double-aspect
theory in which everything is both physical and psychical, whereas psychical
realism removes the physical component outright as normally understood and
installs in its place an ontological idealistic alternative, namely an ontology of
sentient entities or events. Second, the panpsychist may fail to distinguish
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between sentient individuals and groups of such individuals that as a group are
not sentient. This distinction proves pivotal in exposing a fair number of
misinterpretations and addressing the consequent misdirected criticisms that
arise. Finally the term 'panpsychism' may suggest unwarranted associations with
various renditions of 'psyche' or 'soul' as understood in the philosophies and
mythologies of antiquity and in contemporary psychological and religious
thinking. These associations are inappropriate and the phrase 'psychical realism'
is used in part to avoid them. No one theory of the human soul is specifically
entailed by psychical realistic metaphysics and many such theories are clearly at
odds with it.
Animism and hylozoism are doctrines that due to superficial similarities have
contributed to the confusion and misunderstanding that persists in philosophical
treatments of psychical realism. Ancient animists (from the Greek anima
meaning soul) such as the Aristotle of the body-soul relation theory (especially in
De Anima and De Generatione)3 believed that everything that exists is ensouled,
animated, possesses an active principle that keeps it in motion. Ionian hylozoists
(from the Greek hyle for matter and zoe for life) such as Thales and Anaximenes,
and later the Stoics in their crude attempts at a philosophy of nature, believed
that life pervades all of nature which they conceived by predicating life to all
matter. In some respects the latter term is treated as the more philosophically
refined equivalent of the former - a mere working out of animist detail - but this
overlooks the key distinction that for the animists souls are attached to material
bodies and work through them as an immaterial inner principle of activity, while
for the hylozoists all things are alive by virtue of life being an inherent and
inseparable property of matter itself. Many of the early animists and hylozoists
not only regarded all existence as animated or alive, but also considered it to be
informed by an animated cosmic substance that pervades the universe and
renders all things into a microcosm-macrocosm relation with it. Thus in the
account of Sextus Empiricus we find that the followers of Pythagoras and
Empedocles held that,
3 Employing the Aristotle oP indicates this is but one of many aspects of his thought. Depicting
Aristotle as 'animist' is hardly adequate, but then, what would be? The volume of writing
even considered his is a matter of no small debate: scholarly editions of the complete works
divide them into works known to be Aristotle's, works of unknown or uncertain authorship,
and (surely unexpected) works known not to be Aristotle's.
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There is a certain community uniting us not only with each other and with
the gods but even with the brute creation. There is in fact one breath
pervading the whole cosmos like soul and uniting us with them.4
True, at the present stage of defining and defending a psychicalist outlook,
this further claim seems little more than unbridled speculation, but it is also true
that the initial ideas as outlined may claim a degree of plausibility nowadays that
was unavailable to their pre-scientific originators. Hylozoist notions in particular
have been suggested in part by the physical sciences, especially when one bears
in mind the incessant activity discovered by physics on the one hand and the
increasing ambiguity involved in defining life by biology on the other. But for all
that, neither view stipulates the manner of arrangement of activity or life, nor
articulates and emphasises the presence of a generalised sentience understood
analogously to our own. The absence of these key concepts upon which psychical
realism is developed often represent the force of the refutations aimed at these
early precursors to the doctrine.
Vitalism is another metaphysical doctrine that tries to explain the presence of
life by postulating an irreducible substantial entity that imparts a life principle to
otherwise inanimate material. Vitalists believe that living organisms are not
sufficiently explained in physical or chemical terms, specifically the terms of
mechanistic activity innate to matter and ordered merely in accord to material
structure. Such activity can be fully explained only by introducing something
beyond that structure, something that would ensure the uniqueness of life. In the
simpler renditions the presence of a further thing such as soul does the trick: life
conceived as a kind of force, a current, a fluid added to inanimate matter. This
position is clearly at odds with psychical realism. More sophisticated vitalists
posit the emergence of special relations or principles of organisation that obtain
along with the complexity of biological organisms. As nature attains greater
complexity, to some extent the behaviour of an organism becomes a radically
new, 'emergent' characteristic not entirely predictable nor deducible from
nature's simpler sub-biological laws. Again, in Aristotle's animism we find the
first formalised attempt at the sophisticated thesis, wherein an organism's life
consists in the inherent composition of psyche or soul through which the
achievement and guidance of organic form comes about via a principle of
teleological or final causation.
4 Sextus Empiricus, Selections from the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man, and God, S.G.
Etheridge trans. Cambridge: Avatar Books, 1985, p.203.
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The general heading of Vitalist' includes these and other interpretations, all
involving this central tenet of life as irreducible. One might think vitalism
'the mere working out of hylozoist detail' but in modern philosophy the scientific
and theological Zeitgeist plays a more prominent role and affects those details
substantially. The fact of irreducibility allows an overlap between vitalist
thinking and psychical realism. At first glance a world pervaded by psychical
entities seems consistent with a world pervaded by an irreducible life principle,
at least the pervasive character of life force in some forms of vitalism that is,
notably those entailing an evolutionary cosmology. But vitalism in any rendering
plainly commands more pre~philosophical credibility due to its being embedded
in and supported by the structure of our ordinary speech and by many of our
common maxims. We speak of losing our lives and becoming lifeless corpses, we
ponder the possibility of life made in test tubes. On the other hand, the
philosophical credit paid to vitalism fluctuates widely. Since the view in certain
recent versions has been a revealing and influential antecedent to psychical
realism specifically and to the process metaphysical tradition generally, we do
well to compare vitalism and psychical realism with care to avoid the customary
confusions over the former and the disingenuous criticisms that then target the
latter.
Breakthrough support, outright demise, and qualified resurgence for vitalism
permeate the history of modern science and philosophy, in many ways
culminating in developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Here two main advocates of modern vitalist theories, 'emergent
evolution' theories to be specific, the biologist Hans Driesch and the philosopher
Henri Bergson, enter the strangely persistent atmosphere of controversy
surrounding evolutionary thought and its bearing on speculative work in
cosmology and metaphysics. Although the particulars of the relevant disputes are
beyond our present concerns,5 note that evolutionary cosmology and the
resultant metaphysical intrigue encircling modern vitalist thought precedes and
in some ways follows on from ongoing Darwinian debate. It is no mere whim in
the history of ideas. From roots in Romantic reactions to Newtonian science found
in Lamarck and Goethe, through questionable conjectures in Spencer, the later
Darwin, and Thomas Huxley, and prior to contemporary quantum cosmological
musings, we locate the contributions of Driesch and Bergson, identifiable as
5 For an overview of modern vitalism, see H. Driesch, The History and Theory of Vitalism,
London: Macmillan, 1914; as related to Darwin, see L. Eisley, Darwin's Century: Evolution
and theMen Who Discovered It. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958.
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exemplary statements of later day vitalism. Let it suffice to say that in the
troubled history of evolutionary cosmologies - troubled in the main by hinging
ardent metaphysical claims to continually evolving scientific data and
theory - we find the most bothersome ambiguities and contentious claims arising
in the romanticised and fanciful interpretations of science and nature. Such
notions infuse the works of Driesch and Bergson. The former generally erred by
deducing too much from scientific data, and so became the hostage to fortune
with his ideas eclipsed in the end by advances in molecular genetics and
elsewhere that offered comprehensive accounts of organic growth and rendered
a vital principle superfluous.6 The latter generally erred in turn by deducing too
little from science and distrusting its ability to provide meaningful explanation,
and therewith fell prey finally to criticism from the point of view of any and all
beneficial scientific advancement.
As for the relevance of psychical realism, both Driesch and Bergson, and
evolutionary cosmologists by and large, maintained an orientation that could be
characterised as 'top-down' in their analyses of nature's fundamental
constituents. A recognised plurality of individual existences, although real
enough, was subordinate to the ultimate directedness and final convergence of
the evolutionary process itself. A principle of pervasive force in the universe was
believed to possess some degree of aim and organisation vital to the world's
evolution. Thus these vitalists inherited and transformed animist ideas of
immaterial souls and hylozoist speculations concerning a world soul, and put a
Cartesian gloss on the former and applied an evolutionary interpretation to the
latter. This emphasis on an underlying unity tended toward ontological monism,
and required a perhaps unwarranted faith in the progress and convergence of
evolution and in dubious teleological constructs. The psychical realist in contrast
maintains a 'bottom-up' perspective for the most part,7 subordinating any
notions of the uppermost experiential entities of the universe to the actual reality
of nature's fundamental constituents. The activity of these entities is regarded as
open-ended, entirely contingent, and indeterminate regarding outcome, and the
emphasis rather tends toward ontological pluralism.
6 Interesting for their neglect in the debate, problems do remain in understanding the relations
of differing levels of description and explanation of organisms, such as those of psychology
to those of biology, or those of biology to those of chemistry.
7 Exceptions occur when dominating centres of experience, such as in animal minds, partly
operate in top-down fashion, by influencing lower-level bodily sentience.
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In the next chapter psychical realism is shown to lend credence to a
re-introduction of teleological explanation, but not the trivial external sort
according to which the principle of organisation of a 'world soul' is conceived as
outside the world system itself, the final cause for order and development being
the promotion of either human or divine well-being in its entirety. A modified
internal teleology is suggested instead, derived from heuristic applications of
teleology in contemporary physics and biology, with final purposes scaled down
and consistent with a pluralism of finite experiential entities involved in their
own contingent creative activity.
§ Insider Variants
Even within the general outline of the position hereby characterised as
psychical realism a number of alternative labels have been employed, a good
many in the literature specific to process philosophy alone. Whitehead was
careful to disassociate his metaphysics from the phrase 'panpsychism' as
commonly understood in his day (a term he never used) and was notoriously
vague even in suggestions as to how pervasive a subjective element was required
by his system.8 As a result the occasional use by Whiteheadians of the phrase
'pan-subjectivity' to represent psychical realism is a problematic alternative due
to the ambiguity that turns on the question of whether Whitehead's earlier
formulations constitute a genuine case of an ontology of sentient entities or
merely an emphasis on and development of the somewhat overlooked truth that
all events have a point of view. 'Pan-subjectivity', along with 'pan-valuism' and
'pan-aestheticism', has been employed in reference to both of these positions in
the relevant literature.9
'Psychicalism' is Hartshorne's preferred term for the doctrine, having arrived
at it after enduring several misunderstandings when using 'panpsychism' in his
early writings. Undoubtedly Hartshorne is the most tenacious expounder of
psychical realism, putting forth dozens of arguments in numerous treatments,
claiming it to be the most certain aspect of his philosophy.10 The change in
terminology to 'psychicalism' has proved difficult to get across because
8 A notoriety exemplified in Whitehead's response of 'yes and no' when the question was once
put to him plainly. See A.H. Johnson, "Whitehead as Teacher and Philosopher," in Philosophy
andPhenomenologicalResearch, 29,1968-69, pp.362-63.
9 The nature and development of Whitehead's indisputably psychical realist philosophy is
discussed by L. Ford and L. McHenry, forthcoming in Process Studies (1996).
10 See especially, "Panpsychism: Mind as Sole Reality," in Ultimate Reality and Meaning 1,2,
1978, pp.115-129; "Physics and Psychics: The Place of Mind in Nature" in Mind andNature.
DC: Univ. Press of America, 1977, pp.89-96; "Panpsychism" in A History of Philosophical
Systems, V. Ferm ed. NY: Riddell, 1950, p.442-453.
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'panpsychism' has proved difficult to distance from his own related views. In his
most recent manuscript for example, as yet unpublished, we still find
Hartshorne's insistent tone when referring to an eminent scientist as,
"another psychicalist - a term I prefer to panpsychism, since the latter term tends
to suggest that anything you please, say a chair, is a sentient individual, which is
nonsense."11 In so doing Hartshorne does manage to put some distance between
his philosophy and panpsychism as ordinarily conceived, but in opting for
'psychicalism' he fails to entirely avoid the associations with psyche and soul
already mentioned, a point Hartshorne concedes in a sympathetic response to one
critic's suggested 'pan-experientialism',12 a suggestion never taken up, perhaps
for obvious reasons. (The association-with-psyche objection holds equally for the
phrase 'psychical realism' of course, but there are other reasons in favour of our
chosen wording.)
Interestingly Hartshorne himself, in drafting his position in 1940 as the only
tenable panpsychism worthy of consideration, had concluded, "Thus
panpsychism is psychical realism."13 But he may have dismissed that latter
formulation as confusing in the context of the still quite live debate between the
various realists and idealists writing at the time. In addition, Hartshorne proceeds
to derive an account of the givenness and the conceptual reworking of deity
directly from his analysis of psychicalism, indeed arguing that the two ideas as
he sees them stand or fall as one. The term 'psychical realism' frees the doctrine
from association with those perhaps more contentious commitments of
Hartshornian psychicalism. Finally, by adopting 'psychical realism' emphasis is
placed not only on the psychical qualities but also on the realism envisioned in
this metaphysical picture, a prominent feature readily accentuated by Hartshorne
who agrees that, "Panpsychism may thus be a wholly 'realistic' doctrine."14
As we shall see, both aspects play fundamental roles in achieving a more
universally acceptable process perspective.
11 C. Hartshorne, Points of View, forthcoming Chicago: Open Court, 1996.
12 See D.R. Griffin, Founders ofConstructive Postmodern Philosophy. Albany: Suny, 1993, p.10.
13 C. Hartshorne, "Panpsychism" in A History ofPhilosophical Systems, V. Perm ed. NY: Riddell,
1950, pp.442-450.
14 C. Hartshorne, "The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism" Theoria 15, 1949, pp.90-107.
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PART TWO
Perception and Psychical Realism
Intuition leads us to believe that the world is made out of a sort of stuff, some
substance or another, something we might vaguely refer to as matter. For with
our sense organs in good working order, taking account of reality under normal
observational conditions, the world appears to be insentient and inert at rock
bottom. True our ordinary reckoning of reality includes people and plant life and
powers supposedly put out by invisible entities as told by the physical sciences.
But by and large these are seen as fancy complications of what intuition tells us
is something quite simple at the base of things. Backing all life and behind every
force is a material base remaining the same throughout all change. We come
across sticks and stones and the breaking of bones and naturally name them all
insentient entities made up of smaller insentient entities. Thus we maintain an
overarching belief in inanimate, inactive, basic ingredients that lie behind the
more complicated entities and events we encounter, and our conscious and
unconscious dealings in the world tend to contribute to the strength of that
intuitive view.
Thus the case for psychical realism must begin by asking whether those
intuitions and their basis in experience should be trusted to settle the matter.
Our opening task then is to present arguments for the psychical nature of reality
that challenge the intuitive basis of this common sense view. The strategies
employed will come in three initial stages. Under the present heading,
'Perception and Psychical Realism', the first stage offers a closer look and an
accurate reconception of the experiential foundation upon which intuition rests.
Under the second, 'Reason and Psychical Realism', this sort of inquiry is shown to
be as much a logical and metaphysical issue as it is an empirical one, through
which a reasoned case can thereby be established, and against which counters
that hinge solely on empirical evidence generally have little force. A sensible
metaphysical synthesis of realism and idealism is then introduced that provides a
framework aptly encompassing both the psychical and the realist aspects of the
doctrine. These initial tasks accomplished, we proceed subsequently to more
in-depth considerations of the principle forms of psychicalist debate in the final
part entitled 'Argument Along Genetic and Analogic Lines'. Having secured a
revised logical and metaphysical standpoint we then find that the typically
dismissed analogic argument is more compelling and that the empirical evidence
tends to complement the logical in support of the genetic one.
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§ Base Intuitions and Basic Ingredients
In the previous chapter we established grounds for taking human subjective
experience as the ultimate clue to the nature of reality. From accepting base
intuitions that suggest nature's basic ingredients are essentially inanimate, to
reasoning around intuition to a standpoint suggesting they are essentially
experiential is a revolutionary shift in perspective. One must go from identifying
experience as a clue to the truth to identifying it as the truth itself. But if we
examine the foundations of our base intuitions, we can identify three separate
components and in so doing go some way in qualifying that shift. We intuitively
believe first that many ordinary objects are inanimate, second that ordinary
objects are built up from a number of smaller ones, and finally that these smaller
ones are likewise inanimate. The first two of these components present no
problem for they are completely consistent with psychical realism. In addition we
must recognise that these base intuitions rely primarily on the idea of atomism,
and that psychical realism does not challenge atomism as such but merely what
comprises the atoms themselves. Therefore the intuitive shift is not nearly as
extensive as first appeared.
It is true that in ordinary experience we do derive a crude notion of atomism
when we note for instance that all things can in principle be divided repeatedly
into smaller parts. But to achieve a degree of certainty in this matter our
everyday experience does little good without the assistance of science.
And physics and biology have confirmed the supposition of atomism through
their discoveries of atoms and cells. Still, science says very little regarding the
essence of atomic reality, a point rarely seen in its full significance.15 We have
details concerning the few basic relational properties of atomic particles: energy,
velocity, charge, spin, spatio-temporal location. But these are external properties,
and as such are entirely compatible with the presence of internal psychical ones.
There is no evidence - indeed there could be none - showing that the atomic and
subatomic reality physics explores must be inanimate or insentient. Having
defined psychical realism as embracing an infinite variety of forms and degrees
of sentience, demonstrating a lack of any sentience whatever is theoretically
impossible. Hartshorne recognises that,
1S A singularly important (if overlooked) fact for the psychical realist, its full significance to be
spelled out in subsequent discussion of the argument from analogy.
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It is impossible to mention, and no one has mentioned, any fact which
physics now asserts about the pattern of individual occurrences which
contradicts the supposition that individuals as such are sentient creatures.16
To assume that science has revealed a universe composed of dead, inert
stuff - mere matter - following purely mechanical laws of motion applied from
the outside is completely unwarranted and gratuitous. In actual fact the notion of
mere matter is a totally opaque concept, something Whitehead referred to as
Vacuous actuality' and rightly treated as nothing more than an abstraction.
Science just does not say anything about it at all. Whitehead never lost sight of
the incompleteness implied in a scientific materialism.
On this theory, all that there is to be known is that inexplicable bits of
matter are hurrying about with their motions correlated by inexplicable
laws expressible in terms of their spatial relations to each other.17
These considerations begin to diminish the intuitive pull leading away from
psychical realism. We manage to maintain the common sense notion that
many - though by no means all - of the macroscopic objects around us are
insentient, but recognise that at bottom this view relies on an atomism which
upon scrutiny leaves open the possibility of sentient entities at the microscopic
and momentary levels. Having removed the necessity of insentience from the
commonly held atomistic outlook, we turn now to other contributions perception
makes in the development of anti-psychical intuitions.
§ Illusory Unities and Individual Ingredients
Our senses furnish us with information that we rely on in making countless
perceptual judgements. It would be absurd for a person to report that after
having carefully examined a chair, the fact of whether someone was sitting on it
during the examination remained uncertain. We would immediately wonder if
the conditions of the examination were such as to allow for some less than
obvious discrepancies between the sense perceptions on the one hand and the
facts of the matter on the other. For one, the perceptions might have been
confounded by point of view. Duchamp's Dadaist chair for example was only
seen from underneath having been glued to the ceiling. Or the perceptions might
have been mislabelled due to inappropriate scientific acumen. Perhaps the
chemical make-up of the chair (and its occupant) were probed precisely, in
microscopic detail, but in exclusion of the obvious. As to the facts of the matter,
16 C. Hartshorne, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation. Chicago, Univ. Press, 1934,
pp.268-269.
17 A.N. Whitehead, The Function ofReason. NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1929, p.50.
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the chair may have been the size of Idaho or the person the size of a fly, or the
examination may have been carried out with binoculars from a helicopter. The
point is that common sense assumptions are left unquestioned in all such cases
and faith in perceptually grounded intuitions and judgements left unshaken. We
immediately look to peculiar circumstances for an account of any peculiarity.
Perception plays a most influential role in the logical and metaphysical
colouring of our intuitions. Yet ordinary sense perception, the source of so many
intuitions, is largely an indistinct affair from which we habitually simplify the
given data. A spinning wheel blurs into a motionless disk at high speed, a dive
into ice water jolts with but one overwhelming chill, a symphony orchestra
performs a simple melody. All this occurs while the sense doors and brain take in
all the twirling spokes, each freezing droplet, every instrument played. When
reading we attend to meanings more than their vehicles the words, still less the
countless characters comprising the words. And endless introspection would not
uncover the half of it in any of these examples. All perception simplifies sensory
events enormously, even to the point of prohibiting introspective retrieval.
If perception and introspection cannot keep hold of the real spokes, drops, tones,
and words, we ought not assume clear-cut success when trying to grasp reality's
finer parts by these same means. Hence we are right to at least question
interpretations naturally made from these sources of intuition about the world's
basic ingredients.
From the foregoing it follows plausibly that we are not normally acquainted
with the real individuals of which the world is comprised even when perceptions
seem to approach the veridical. This fact is likewise substantiated by the way in
which science supplements ordinary sense perception. We see rooms full of
furniture and gardens of flowers for example, not the billions of molecules and
cells that comprise them. Modern science has greatly improved human
perceptual potential through technological advancement, and those
improvements have clearly shown the inert quality of the microscopic world
underlying the macroscopic to be illusory. We now know that even the unities
encountered uncontroversially by our ordinary senses - the furniture, the flowers
and all the rest - are simply products of blurred perception. By penetrating these
illusory unities, the absolute exclusion of sentience from entire portions of the
world is again shown to be groundless. A moment's reflection reveals that if the
world of ordinary perception were at all like the world revealed by our more
precise scientific observations - if we were forever confronting its active,
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dynamic, richness - the content of our intuitions about reality would change a
great deal indeed. Never mind that philosophical speculations about how an
ordinary object appears in perception are often cause for wonder, Russell
reminds us that, "sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast
collection of electric charges in violent motion."18
Furthermore, these same and related advances in science have clearly
challenged the common opinion that things in the world divide naturally into the
scholastic categories of animal, vegetable, and mineral ingredients. Fixed lines of
demarcation between the so-called animal kingdom and vegetative life seem to
disappear with increased perceptual probing. Focus on the lower stages of
development and nature does not appear to leap from the one to the other, but
rather shows a gradual increase in degree of complexity. Similar suggestions
have likewise been put forth that question presupposed dividing lines between
vegetative and mineral existence, a point taken up in detail in the final section of
the present chapter. Hence the scientific and the philosophical realms of
investigation, along with our ordinary sense perception, all play their part in the
challenging of base intuition.
One implication is that the relation between ordinary perception and
scientific observation is not nearly as clear-cut as many theorists would insist.
We subjectively enjoy watching sunsets, tasting wines, listening to operas while
we objectively acknowledge corresponding light wave patterns, chemical
constitutions, vibratory frequencies. It is not simply the case that a rich world of
lived experience is the real one and a deprived world of science but empty
abstractions. But neither is it the case, as we have already seen in the last
chapter, that scientific data are the realities and their sensory appearances but
subjective indicators of them, and only real in as much as experiences are real.
As we have seen, both ordinary perception and scientific observation impoverish
and abstract from features of reality. In addition, they both also enrich and
concretise those features. We feel Hamlet's plight and a mountain's majesty
though neither as such are given in experience. We appreciate the marvels of
modern medicine and concern ourselves with threats of nuclear sabotage all on
account of the relevant theoretical constructs that science too endows on its
observational data.
18 B. Russell, The Problems ofPhilosophy. NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980, p.6.
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Hartshorne has surmised that perception involves a certain 'abstract
concreteness' and science involves a certain 'concrete abstractness'.19 Philosophy
we can infer ought to involve a degree of both. Perception is in essence concrete
because it embraces all the basic categories of reality (including experiential
qualitative ones), yet abstracts in its neglect of most of the true individuals
within these categories. The essence of science is abstract by virtue of its
methodological exclusion of those categories (the same experiential qualitative
ones) that are not intersubjectively available for measurement, yet is concrete in
its ability to uncover what would be hidden individual instances of the categories
that it does utilise. Hartshorne's suggested philosophical response is to hold that
in cases when ordinary perception displays experiential qualities then those
qualities do exist, and in cases when perception does not display individuals as
bearers of experiential qualities but science uncovers evidence of them, then
those further qualities as revealed scientifically do exist as well. For once we
transcend our perceptual powers all we have left to go on are scientific
inferences from those powers. The relevance for present purposes is again that
the senses, the sciences, and the reasoning applied to both, all seem to challenge
the authority of base intuitions regarding the psychical side of reality.
Just how much is in the argument that our intuitions wax and wane in
accordance with philosophical conjecture and fluctuating perceptual powers?
It seems clear that the blurring of ordinary sense perception and the lack of
evidence of inert matter in scientifically assisted perception does not by itself
show that reality is psychical as we have defined the term. At most it reveals that
reality - the small sample under investigation - is in a state of ceaseless motion.
What is more, in attempting to isolate the logical treatment our perceptions
undergo in the forming of intuitions, it is not clear how a move that replaces the
source of that intuitive basis with another helps at all. It offers no account of that
basis but merely another example of when it occurs, and at any rate insight so
obtained would be undercut by the regress this move would allow. Scientific
progress will not cease in order to facilitate intuitive accuracy. What is really at
issue here is that furniture and flowers and so on do not ordinarily appear to
think or to feel, while entities like persons clearly do. Any perceptual insight into
the molecules and cells that they are composed of may challenge our intuitions
about molecules and cells but still leave intuitions about the inert nature of the
19 For a developed discussion of the ideas expressed in this and the previous paragraph see,
C. Hartshorne, "Perception and the 'Concrete Abstractness' of Science." forthcoming in Points
of View. Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996.
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things we perceive unhindered. It is the logic behind the intuitions we hold
about these entities for which the psychical realist must provide an account.
We can turn for help to Leibniz who suggested that macroscopic inanimate
objects may be analogous to crowds, and that the distinction between crowds of
individuals and compounds of individuals is an important one. Although the
difference between that which is sentient and insentient appears to be an
absolute difference and not merely one of degree, this difference is easily
explained by demonstrating how individuals can be combined in two distinct
ways. In a compound individual such as a living animal or a living cell there is a
dominating level of experience which turns the subordinate level experience, of
which it is comprised, into a single sentient individual possessing a degree of
unity that allows it to take account of and respond to its environment as a unified
whole. In a crowd of individuals such as a pebble or a planet there is no such
dominating experience. The highest level of experience in these cases is just that
of the molecules of which they are comprised. Without a dominating sentient
centre the various movements cancel each other out, so that as a statistical effect
pebbles and planets on the whole appear to behave passively and predictably.
In this manner psychical realism is compatible with that particular intuitive basis
of our perceptions. That seemingly inert and insentient class of objects we
perceive is made up of crowds while the apparently psychical element is for the
most part composed of compounds of individuals.
It may be that this development of the psychical realist account of reality does
not amount to much if no further development is offered explaining just how
high-level centres of experience arise and come to dominate lower ones.
Analysing this topic is quite an involved undertaking and comprises a substantial
portion of the process metaphysics to be introduced in the next chapter.
At present however our emphasis is on the Leibnizian principles of nature being
composed of active individuals, and of our perceptions of mere masses of inactive
continuous stuff as really perceptions of compounds of active individuals far too
similar and insignificant, taken one by one, to register distinctly on our senses.
With the making of this distinction we end our analysis of the influence ordinary
perception puts on our psychical intuitions. The importance of the distinction is
brought in to bear on two additional principles deduced from it that serve as
inspiration for subsequent discussion of analogic and genetic arguments. For one,
Leibniz believed that our own active subjectivity or present experiencing is the
only genuine individual we experience directly and distinctly, and secondly that
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our only hope of comprehending nature is thus by conceiving it as a vast society
of active individuals, each having some analogy with ourselves as sentient
entities. These further principles as we shall see pave the way for envisaging a
full fledged psychical realist understanding of reality. From the standpoint of
these revisions we now turn for further support of psychical realism to other
more fundamental perceptual considerations.
§ The Radical Perceptual Realm
This final section merely introduces a set of ideas that pertain directly to
process thought and are more fully developed in the next chapter.
Notwithstanding the manner in which they are incorporated elsewhere, these
ideas tend to back the psychical point of view independently, and so a passing
mention of them here is warranted. Owing in part to structural restraints of the
work as a whole, much of our discussion thus far and to come divides the idea of
process from the case for psychical realism somewhat artificially. Be that as it
may, we proceed to the radical perceptual realm.20
Although ordinary sensory perception directly acquaints us only with
appearances, we naturally maintain a belief in the existence of an external
world. But if sensory perception, refined by science or otherwise, is our only
source of perception, then it follows that such a belief is unjustified. No valid
inference can be made from the one to the other, from appearance to reality,
without some additional means to back up our belief in something beyond that
sensory input. So there must be another basis supplementing ordinary perception
to account for it and to ward off the resultant dilemma of extreme scepticism.
Whitehead and Hartshorne have emphasised that the general principles by
which we live our lives in a world and interpret our experience of that world are
derived from a form of perception more basic than sensory perception.21
Arguably this radical perceptual realm can also supply additional evidence for
the psychical nature of reality.
This primordial form of perception is based on the crucial fact that in
experience we intuit or grasp or feel something or other as pre-cognitive given
influence, objectified relative to that particular subjective experience. We take in
20 'Radical perceptual' used to echo James' not unrelated doctrine of radical empiricism.
21 For overviews of this central tenet of their philosophical projects see, A.N. Whitehead, Process
and Reality. NY: Free Press, 1978 (several citings listed in index), Adventures of Ideas.
London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1933, pp.225-228, and Symbolism: ItsMeaning and Effect.
NY: Capricorn, 1927, pp.30-49; see also C. Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Revolutionary Concept
of Prehension" Creativity in American Philosophy. Albany, NY: Suny, 1984, pp.103-113.
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something of our surroundings in a non-conceptual and subconscious way, in a
manner of grasping without consciously thinking or knowing that we are doing
so. Whitehead aptly coined the term 'prehension' to describe such influence, for
he saw that it was a form of apprehension, but without comprehension - an
apprehension minus any 'ap' so to speak. "By this term, blind physical
perceptivity is meant... The physical world exhibits itself as a system of organisms
arising out of concretions of blind intuitions. "zz In addition, because influence
felt in present experience must originate prior to that very experiencing of it,23
this experiencing-experienced relation also has a crucial if often slight temporal
dimension. There is thus a one-way, asymmetrical dependence that holds for
experiencing relative to whatever intuited given influence is being experienced.
If that which is experienced exists prior to the experiencing, then it effects the
experiencing, whereas the experiencing by being later does not effect it.
The temporal spread in experience and the sort of dependency relations it
entails have much to do with our ability to recognise the radical perceptual
influence of prehension. Recall Whitehead's insistence, in the examination of
subjectivity in the last chapter, that evidence relating to every variety of
experience must be considered in an adequate account of it: experience drunk
and sober, sleeping and waking, intellectual and physical, experience
anticipatory and retrospective, dominated by emotion and under self-restraint,
normal and abnormal, and so on. With some scrutiny one can uncover the
common prehensive input characteristic of radical perception among all these
forms and ranges of experience. It is there as intuited given influence in these
varied experiential modes, always present and forever informing the
experiencing subject, a universal variable exemplified to some degree in all of
them. For human subjects the most telling instance is our knowledge of our own
immediate past experience as registered in our 'total bodily event', with
immediacy identified not by past days or hours or even minutes as memory
would have it, but by the directly preceding moments. Here we find a wealth of
influence commonly unacknowledged by thinkers commonly failing to
acknowledge how the body feels in experience. Not to be confused with the
feelings registered by inspecting bodily detail, prehension in its basic form refers
22 A.N. Whitehead, "Time" in The Interpretation of Science, A.H. Johnson ed. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, p.241.
23 A vast and persistent literature pertains to this point, from the puzzling 'pure thinking of
thinking' in Aristotle's God to the puzzling 'immanent awareness' in Husserl's
phenomenology, with the many takes on Descartes' cogito coming somewhere between.
Further argument is presented in discussing process temporality in the next chapter.
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to the vague, inarticulate feelings that mark the entire experience with a sense of
having emerged from a particular immediate past. For it is here - in the
immediate bodily feeling of the immediate moment before - that we discover
ourselves connected to a world around us, discover a way around our solipsistic
selves, and from there we may go on to discover that the surrounding world is
psychical in essence.
It is befitting to consider sexual pleasure. It answers to every side of the
varieties of experience listed, and then some. And although we are after a form of
nonsensuous perception, sex presents an ocean of feeling overflowing in obvious
prehensive depth. Present sexual experience is endowed with a fusion of the
immediacy of prior moments which enter into it without any perceptible medium
to intervene between previous feeling and present experience. The sexual
excitement here right now is embedded in that which lingers on from then just
there, adjusting it to other upcoming influence, deflecting it to further purpose,
modifying it to moving new value. The influence is manifold and detail not to the
point. We engage that half second or so of past pleasure as it were by carrying it
into and energising present arousal with its charge. We re-feel to some degree
the previous feelings involved.
The present moment is constituted by the influx of the other into that
self-identity which is the continued life of the immediate past within the
immediacy of the present.24
One may object that the example is unclear, that the abundance of sensory
input in sex makes a mess of however prominent the prehended portion
underlying the experience might be. Consider then the feelings that accompany
us when first we enter and sense a hostile environment. To be sure, we do well to
pay attention to possible warnings in the way of sensory perceptual cues. Yet
there is always another dimension of information available, derived in part from
the pervasive affective tone of the place and in part from our bodily reactions to
that tone. As before, the prehensions embrace an unlimited amount of influence,
and how far the subject can consciously detect the prehended material depends
among other things on the level of consciousness the experience attains.
The grasp of a prehension is a feeling of previous feeling and only in special
cases is it also a thinking of or knowing of that feeling (or that thinking).
Intuited influence is felt, whether or not known, explicitly judged, theoretically
situated.
24 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1935, p.226.
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The accumulative build up of underlying emotional material testifies to this
fact in the hostile environment case. When anger is in the offing, first comes a
spark and then a fire; if despair is at hand, first the lightning and then thunder
and rain. As present experience registers (via sensory data and cognitive
response) an ambience that is growing in aggression, the immediate past bodily
input may gain in directed momentum, should its blend with the tone of present
feeling be quite close and foreboding. Under such circumstances there is a literal
truth to describing the atmosphere as so tense that it has one quaking.
Hartshorne considers the simplest explanation to be that what one inherits from
this type of prehensive input is previous feeling, but much of it is at a level
below that of complex human feeling.
I hold that bodily feelings, and this in a sense includes all sensations, are
directly given to us, not as simply our feelings but as subhuman feelings
(perhaps cellular, molecular, or something in between) in which we
directly but indistinctly participate. And I hold that this participation is the
primary contact with physical reality... The realities may be inside our
skins, but physical nonetheless.28
Note that Hartshorne retains the notion of the physical in this passage despite
the claim that the realities are feelings and therefore psychical. On his view there
is no contradiction entailed in the combination. This much granted, the positing
of a further insentient level of being 'out there' in the physical world begins to
appear superfluous. If what affects us directly can by and large be the result of
psychical entities, then the move from this established experiential subject that
now stretches at least as far as previous feelings and toward a further insentient
world beyond it requires more argument. Without that argumentation the
simplest hypothesis suggests we stay with the psychical as known through
experience, especially if it proves to serve. On this point Whitehead is quick to
concur.
...on that hypothesis the direct evidence as to the connectedness of one's
immediate present occasion of experience with one's immediately past
occasions, can be validly used to suggest categories applying to the
connectedness of all occasions in nature.26
Hartshorne also makes a point of including sensations in this level of bodily
prehensive given. Indeed sensory input likewise presupposes a direct prehensive
relation to the body just as with the introspective feelings of sexual excitement
and fear. This is evident if one keeps hold of the temporal dependencies involved
25 C. Hartshorne, Insights and Oversights ofGreat Thinkers. NY: Suny, 1983, p.273.
26 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1935, p.221.
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in experience. At times we note the slipped incision from a kitchen knife just
prior to suffering the pain, we register the taste of a chilly pepper a moment
before enduring the heat. Even in the least phenomenologically available case of
visual perception no experienced influence is ever simultaneous with the
experiencing of it. Although we never feel what amounts to being an extremely
minute temporal spread, the seeing of a sunrise presupposes that the set of
dominant experiences that constitutes the perceiving subject first prehends those
brain cells that have at a slightly earlier time received the visual data from the
eye, which the eye in turn previously received from the relevant light rays. As for
the 'connectedness of all occasions in nature' that Whitehead alludes to, this is
brought out most clearly when perceived objects are far away. Consider the
stretch of time between the sound of thunder one hears after the flash of
lightning seen, or the visual experience of what the sun had in fact shone forth
some eight minutes earlier. The same immediate memory factor is always present,
and as experiencing individuals ourselves we are located at the end of a
continuum. "Memory is a perception," Whitehead explains, "relating to the data
from some historic route of ultimate percipient subjects Ml, M2, MS, etc.,
leading up to M which is the memorising percipient."27 Both sensory and
introspective experience are but forms of perception whose antecedent
influences are in the more immediate past than those of memory as ordinarily
conceived. Hartshorne has termed these 'impersonal memory experiences' as
opposed to the personal memory experiences we carry with us of say our
childhood playground days. It follows that in ordinary personal memory we have
another clear example of the prehensive character of experience. In the act of
remembering, our present experience prehends by way of re-feeling some
previous occasion of experience that is brought to mind. The given influence
intuited is here made up of past experience distinct from the present
remembering one, yet this constitutes another factor incidentally taking us some
way toward grounding belief in an external world.
Naturally we are inclined to seeing memory as a present experience that
requires previous experiences as its subject matter. Likewise it is natural to
recognise that the previous experiences did not require the present one, nor at
the time they occurred were they in any way related to it. Here again we notice
what Peirce, Whitehead, and Hartshorne all consider to be the one-way
27 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.120.
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dependencies pervasive in reality.28 To see in our examples that prehensive input
from memory, from sensory experience, and from feeling tone work in the same
temporally dependent manner is an initial step toward envisaging a world which
in its entirety consists in these one-way relations between wholly psychical
entities.
One qualification is in order, first put forth clearly by Leibniz. Given his
analysis of crowds of individuals and compound individuals, Leibniz insisted that
the only true individual we ever encounter distinctly is that of our own present
selves. We have seen however that due to the fact of prehensive influence we
encounter other occasions of previous experience, whether our own or - to take
up the now more defensible inference - those occasions constituting an external
world. True, it is entirely from the experiential input of this one individual alone
that we must come to justify our believing in something outside of that
individual. But since it now seems plausible, given radical perception, to view
that something as constituted by past experiences as grasped in prehensions, the
only valid conclusion so far that we can make as to the external world is that our
experience of it is solely of psychical aspects. To repeat, any further inference
such as the scientific one from this experiential level to a realm of insentient
stuff beyond it standing in wholly external relations requires more support.
Whitehead sums his position.
In this sketch of an analysis more concrete than that of the scientific
scheme of thought, I have started from our own psychological field, as it
stands for our cognition. I take it for what it claims to be: self-knowledge of
our bodily event. ...This self-knowledge discloses a prehensive unification of
modal presences of entities beyond itself. I generalise by the use of the
principle that this total bodily event is on the same level as all other events,
except for an unusual complexity and stability of inherent pattern.29
Be clear nevertheless as to what forward move we hereby make in advancing
the case for psychical realism. As compound individuals ourselves, we do not
have direct access only to human feeling through prehension. Of course in
introspection (which is really retrospection) the given influence is previous
human feeling, but in present human feelings we re-feel for the most part
feelings of subhuman bodily constituents. Though following Leibniz, this is done
without distinctness as to the individual constituents. "All individuals apparent
28 For an overview of their positions consult chapters on Peirce and Whitehead in
C. Hartshorne, Insights and Oversights ofGreat Thinkers. Albany, NY: Suny Press, 1983.
29 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p.73.
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to the senses are compounded of numerous much smaller individuals."30 Human
sensation is human awareness of such subhuman feelings. The psychical aspects
of our world, the presence of sentience as known through experience, are of
these two distinct types. Whitehead's concept of prehension furnishes novel and
forceful insights that bear witness to at least a broader margin of psychical
reality as directly experienced, if not to advancing the cogency of the idea that
reality is psychical through and through. With these opinions we complete our
treatment of perception and psychical realism.
PART THREE
Reason and Psychical Realism
We now proceed to the logical underpinnings of commonly held beliefs that
tend to prevent the taking on of a psychical realist perspective. By way of
building on remarks about intuitions and perceptual influence put forth in the
previous section, careful reasoning is here applied to some of our most basic
assumptions to bolster the case for envisioning a psychical world.
§ The Extended Nature of Mind
One such view embedded in our ordinary notions of the physical and the
psychical, of matter and mind, is that we place them prima facie at odds with
each other, having distinct sorts of existences, occupying separate logical spaces.
This view, maintaining an all but transparent influence on our intuitions,
originated in the Cartesian doctrine (derived from Augustine) of inextension as a
criterion for the psychical. This lack of spatiality in psychical entities then
requires something additional, namely the wholly physical entities of matter to
account for the fact that there is spatial extension. Hence extension in contrast
becomes the criterion for the physical. Yet, strictly speaking, to be inextended
means to be nowhere in the spatial system of things, whereas extended entities
are always somewhere (or everywhere) throughout one or more spatial regions,
located more or less where their causal conditions and consequences are located.
Since space however in the opinion of most thinkers today is not a thing in itself
but is only relational, to be in a region can only mean to be directly influencing
and directly undergoing influences in that region, to be playing some part in its
causal nexus. An extended entity is spatio-temporally closest to those things
which most immediately influence or are influenced by it. Now the point
regarding the relational essence of space requires more argument of course,
30 C. Hartshorne, "The Compound Individual," in Philosophical Essays for A.N. Whitehead,
F.S.C. Northrop ed. NY: Russell and Russell, 1936, p.193.
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given only indirectly in the comparative influences of minds over spaces
considered next. It was Leibniz who amongst others argued that the concept of
space was relational. Is the difference between two books in the first or the
second book, or is it in the space between? If one book is taken to Australia has
the difference grown or just the space? We get a hold of space through relations
of things in it, for without things there would be no such space. Perhaps the
point stirs us most in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondences in which the question
is posed, "What would happen if the entire universe were moved over one
foot?"31
At any rate, if psychical entities on the other hand were inextended, they
would have to be nowhere at all, which is quite strange. Human minds for
instance are evidently not nowhere because if they were, there would be no need
to go to a particular region or communicate with a particular region in order to
influence or to be influenced by them. There is no practical difference between
being capable of exerting or receiving influence in a certain region and being in
that region. This is clearly shown when one considers regions remote from the
person giving and receiving influence. Philosophers in Britain have little to do
with Munich, but even less with Mongolia and far less with Mars. For human
thought to produce a result upon the world the chain of influence must begin
somewhere in the region of the human thinker; for the world to influence the
thinker the chain must likewise terminate in that same region. Thus minds in
humans are somewhere in the region of the body, our experiences somewhere in
our bodies. As Hartshorne points out,
We explain the body itself, as just the privileged field of reaction for
a mind... for a mind needs a privileged field of reaction upon other minds,
a steady social environment, if it is to have any steadiness of character
itself.32
A chain of influence is a useful image for demonstrating the relevant spatial
character. Perceptions for example are the result of what is perceived, and the
more nearly immediate the perceived is in time perception, the closer spatially is
the perceived to the act of perceiving. We can conceive the objective content of
what is perceived, that is to say the given, as previous experience (one's own and
others') influencing present experience (one's own). Remote memories on this
view log spatially more distant experience arriving to influence us via countless
links in a causal chain while present perceptions log experience influencing us
31 See Leibniz, Philosophical Writings. London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1973, pp.205-238.
32 C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method. IL: Open Court, 1970, p.107.
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that is comparatively close at hand. Note, incidentally, the similitude of this view
to the pragmatist writings of William James who, in grounding his theory of
meaning, posited analogous chains of influence, a position James characterised
light-heartedly by insisting that in a sense one does not know the meaning of
'tiger' till one actually gets over to India and bags one.33 Our inability to assign
precise shapes and sizes to spatial experience merely reflects the fact that
experiences are brief and ever-changing. It is wrong to conclude that an entity,
by not being obviously and clearly spatial, must be absolutely nonspatial; we
make no such inference when it comes to aromas or X-rays. Again, because
subjective centres of experience are in part constituted by the objects they are
aware of, comprised partly of what is objectively given, experience is essentially
of other experience, essentially social, and cannot but define a network of
influences made up of spatio-temporal causal relations. Accordingly Hartshorne
adds,
To deny space to minds is to deny mutuality, sociality, and reciprocal
independence to them. But why? In the era of relativity physics the concept
of inextended mental events is peculiarly inappropriate.34
The rejection of mind as inextended then is our first logical corrective in
laying the foundation for psychical realism. If mind is inextended, then the
truism something is extendedentails that there is something besides mind. But if
mind is extended, then the truism does not entail that there is anything besides
mind. It would be manifestly absurd not to grant the reality of extension, but
doing so and demonstrating mind to be extended leaves open the logical
possibility that there may yet be nothing butmind. The psychical need not be the
non-physical, but only the not merely physical. We can accept as true the
obvious idea that being extended in a certain way is a truth about something,
while maintaining that this does not entail saying that it is ever the whole truth
about something. We see that an accurate depiction of experience encompasses
matter as the structure of its influence, but leaves open the question of there
being other sorts of matter. So we have not as yet established the case for reality
as psychical though revising our picture of experience in this manner is a step in
that direction.
33 See W. James, "The Tigers of India" in The Meaning of Truth. Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1975, pp.33-36.
34 C. Hartshorne, "Panpsychism: Mind as Sole Reality," in Ultimate Reality and Meaning 1,2,
1978, pp.118-119.
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§ The Psychical as a Metaphysical Category
Another manner of reasoning for the psychical involves the notion and use of
metaphysical categories. In doing metaphysics one attempts to express what all
possibilities of existence have in common. If there be such supposed aspects
common to all existence, metaphysical categories are what designate them. While
empirical statements are true contingently, metaphysical ones are true
necessarily, for a metaphysical truth does not itself stand for a fact but for a
principle, one which obtains for all facts actual and possible. "Metaphysical
truths," according to Hartshorne, "may be described as such that no experience
can contradict them, but also such that any experience must illustrate them."35
Following on from the point that mind is extended as argued in the last
section, a case can be made for holding that experience as such is a metaphysical
category, therefore opening further the possibility that everything extended in
fact experiences. Now experience cannot be a metaphysical category if we limit it
to human or even to all animal experiences. These are not a priori but empirical
ideas for which we could easily find examples of phenomena that failed to
illustrate such experience and some that even contradicted it. Hartshorne insists
that,
We must ask if there are not dimensions or variables within our experience
whose range of possible values in principle infinitely exceed the range of
these values found in our, or even in animal, experience.36
Restricting experience to that possessed by humans and animals is arbitrary
because even within our experience we can uncover dimensions that have a
range that in principle could exceed that of the values of experience as we know
them. Evidence for our experiential range is found among other places in the
many differences between deep sleep and alert wakeful experience.
(Recall Whitehead's cataloguing the infinitely various components of experience
above) It is logically possible to apply the dimension of experiencing to all
extended entities that are truly individuals. There are no observations that we
have made or could possibly make that could prove the complete absence in a
cell or a molecule or even in an atom of that which we mean by 'experiencing'
when we refer to human beings. We can generalise the term - both the concept
and the behavioural criteria identifying it - without generating any obvious
absurdities, and there is no apparent advantage to restricting its range of
35 C. Hartshorne, The Philosophy ofCharles Hartshorne. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, p.570
36 C. Hartshorne, "Panpsychism: Mind as Sole Reality," in Ultimate Reality and Meaning 1,2,
1978, pp.119.
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application in such a way that some actual or possible being would fall outside
its dimensions. As alluded to when defining the doctrine, the generalised criteria
might include self-initiated activity, the unity of that activity, influence of the
past and the environment, or something expressive of anticipation, desire,
purpose, and satisfaction.
Again, the fact that we can generalise experience in this fashion supports but
does not prove the speculative possibility that psychical realism is true. But it
does succeed in shifting the onus of proof somewhat by once again nudging our
intuitions. Since this sort of generalisation is possible, the notion of wholly
insentient or inert entities or processes loses some intuitive pull, for sentience as
a metaphysical category offers an appealingly universal picture compatible with
our treatment above of mind as extended. The psychical on this interpretation is
not a special kind of reality but is reality itself or as such. To absolutely exclude
sentience from any part of reality, insists the psychical realist, is to convert the
not easily knowable into the known not to be - to mistake low intensities of
experiencing for no experiencing at all. This leap requires argument, especially
in light of the fact that a tenable metaphysical category of sentience is in the
offing. It is easy to know that atoms do not experience as human beings do, but
then neither do monkeys nor even our new-born babies experience as we do.
If we extend the term in these cases, on what grounds do we refrain in others?37
Having now shown that universal sentience is possible, we move directly on to
the notion of insentience to see if it in turn may be impossible.
§ The Notion of Negative Facts
A third way of reasoning for psychical realism that offers an answer to the
question just posed is based on the problematic notion of negative facts.
To contend that an object is inanimate and inert is not to say what it is but to say
what it is not. We say that it is not feeling, not living, not thinking nor
remembering, not enjoying nor suffering, and so on. As noted in the previous
chapter, although experience is difficult to define, we do know it directly. We
undergo experience and we are acquainted with a wide variety of its forms. We
could only know of its absence through the type of negative facts suggested
above. But a negative fact can never be completely negative - a vacuum in reality
- but always implies or involves a comparison with certain positive facts from
which we become aware of the negative ones. To understand why this is so,
37 This line of reasoning is developed further in the final part of the present chapter.
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imagine a black box the contents of which are unknown. No amount of negative
information, that is facts about what is not in the box, would provide certainty as
to what is in the box. There is no positive evidence however for the absence of
experience in physical objects.
The force of this argument hinges on the truth of there not being any positive
facts to substantiate the claim that insentient entities exist. Two candidates,
extension and predictability, arise as obvious objections. But extension serves
only if we accept the Cartesian doctrine that the extendedness of an entity, being
incompatible with experiencing, is a positive fact whose presence proves that
experiencing is absent. We have already argued that since experience has social
influence, those relations give it a regional spread and hence a spatial
dimensionality or extension. And as for predictability, there is no reason to
suppose that experience cannot exist in a form so elementary that prediction may
approach absolute success. At any rate, the reciprocal point is pivotal here, that
the universal predictability of nature is no longer accepted as a truism of
contemporary science anyhow. Neither extension nor predictability seem capable
of providing the needed positive fact to show that an individual entity can be
known to be insentient.
Yet there must be some entity that does not experience, otherwise the concept
would be generalised out of all sense in that by excluding nothing positive, it
would not be genuinely affirming anything. The principle of contrast must be
honoured somehow in order for the term to refer. This objection will be dealt
with in some detail in discussing the analogic and genetic arguments, but to put
it briefly, the contrast could come about with the variance of behaviour that
groups of sentient entities may display in accordance with the different ways
their sentient members might be organised. The positive attribute of
experiencing then meets the need for a contrast and thereby maintains its ability
to refer, while no positive facts present themselves to flesh out the absolute
negations implied by the notion of inert, inanimate entities, an utter absence of
experiencing. Hence a psychical component of reality is a fact in some
cases - those that clearly demonstrate the presence of experiencing - and it
cannot be known to be false as a fundamental interpretation in any case.
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§ The Capture of Natural Causality
The psychical realist has something worthwhile to say on two separate
causality scores: the Ilumean, all too Humean, predicament contemporary debate
has inherited, and the fact and nature of causally emergent properties. The two
issues are not unrelated, and the psychical realist resolution of the first suggests
the finally dubious explanatory potential of the second. In both cases the
outcome lends further support to the psychical standpoint.
The doctrine of psychical realism offers a vital solution to a philosophical
enigma regarding causality. First introduced by David Hume in his well-known
reflections on the topic, the problem has remained prominent thereafter in
contemporary discourse in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. In a word
Hume denied any basis for commonly held intuitions concerning causal
influence. Ever since he pointed out that all we ever observe is one thing
(the cause) followed by another (the effect)38 but never even a glimpse of
causality itself, philosophers have puzzled over the question as to whether there
is any basis at all for attributing causality to natural entities. Hume claimed that
our idea of causal necessity is but an illusion resulting from observed regularities
and correlations in nature. We never actually detect any necessary connections of
cause and effect.
In human experience however, our responsiveness to that which appears as
memory or perception surely indicates a degree of causal influence,39 for
memory (and perception as shown above) just is influence of the past on the
present. To be fair, the point Hume overlooked about a memory component in
present experience is far more subtle than first appears when stated in such
elementary terms. It rather marks the main difference in empirical grounds
between those who do and do not recognise radical perceptual influence. Hume
makes much of the fact that a present memory impression is not the memory of
an impression in the past, but is simply another present impression. True
enough, as far as it goes, but what is missing is the recognition from a careful
introspective analysis of experience that a present impression is the sum of an
experienced process of taking up and sorting through past prehensive influence
38 The philosophical literature on causality is extensive and our treatment here confined to
analysis of the commonly held assumption that causes precede their effects in time.
89 As alluded to earlier, that which appears are really past experiences for us, though most often
experiences in the very near past.
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objectified in present experiential response. And Whitehead sees that Hume
himself presupposes as much.
Hume's 'faint copy' is the image in the present, but its equally present
character of being a copy arises from its comparison with the objectification
of the past which is the true memory.40
Taking the nature of our experiential givens then into account allows us to
transcend the abstract 'this, then that' of causality to see that our present
experience is shaped in part by retrospection of past events. In this way we gain
an experiential basis of the causal structure connecting the asymmetrical feeling
of other (past) feeling to our present experiencing. That one subtlety regarding
the memory component of present experience makes all the difference in this
case. On the one hand, since in personal memory we have givenness itself as a
given, or in other words the givenness of past cases of givenness, we thereby
provide an impression of causality in the form of impressions of past impressions.
On the other hand, in the impersonal memory that constitutes sensory and
radical perception, we have no reason not to extend the analysis and recognise
similar causal impression components at a more basic level.
This notion of basic levels introduces a psychical realist aspect to the analysis.
We have seen how the relations between past and present experience, relations
that exemplify causal connection, require the persistence of the past somehow
into the present, in a form and to a degree that would allow the past to effect the
present. If the causal influence that we detect in experience is extended to the
fundamental constituents of reality, that is if all reality were seen as
experiencing some causal influence, we would then have a clear account of
causality consistent with the attendant intuitions that Hume's account transforms
into enigmas. The move to assume a pervasive presence of experience in
something akin to a form of memory affords an explanation of our intuitions
about the equally pervasive and persistent presence of causality found in all of
nature. Again, by extending the experience of causal influence down to reality's
fundamental constituents we do not mean to imply the full-fledged influence felt
by humans, only far more generalised forms of perception and memory. But
without something of the sort we have no guarantee of the causal order in nature
and are left with either a Humean psychological approach inadequate to
phenomenological fact or with a positivistic denial of causality outright.
40 A.N. Whitehead, "Time" in The Interpretation of Science, A.H. Johnson ed. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, p.242.
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Nevertheless, the available causal explanation should not be taken as the effort
to show necessities. From the relational structure detailed above, we should
deduce that causal explanation is instead the attempt to reveal the relevant
possibilities and impossibilities. The account provides necessary though not
sufficient conditions for experience, unless by 'sufficient' we mean only sufficing
for the possibility of the experience. No particular necessities need be entailed in
this arrangement, a fact that in no way implies the lack of detected necessity as
such, in the form of some such influence or another. The Berkeleyan dictum,
revised by Hartshorne, 'To be is to be (destined to be) perceived', best captures
the illusive essence of causal necessity as here outlined. So to put the principal
insight another way, if the givenness in prehensive relations is our only
instantiation of necessary causal connection, and if some such connections are
necessary to hold a world together by virtue of allowing some features in it to
imply other features, then any insentient entities not taking part in such relations
are incapable of serving as the universal explanatory principle of that world.
Hume's failed attempt to find ontological necessities is plainly the result of
neglecting these one-way dependencies found in memory and perception. It has
led to numerous attempts at characterising givenness in terms of some causal
principle, instead of using the natural realistic conception of givenness that is
readily available to characterise causality. In choosing the latter we acquire both
an answer to Hume and a truly universal conception of reality.
Another advantage of the psychical realist account is that it warrants a wider
range of logical possibilities for causal explanation. Modern science has
dismissed the notion of final causality in trying to apply the concept of efficient
causality unilaterally to explain all natural phenomena. This has led to an
inexplicable divide between features of reality that easily meet the criterion and
those that clearly seem to demonstrate final purposes. Whitehead, somewhat
amused by the rift, makes the following observation, "Scientists animated by the
purpose of proving that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject of
study."41 The psychical realist in contrast maintains the important efficient
causality concept without relinquishing the possibility of teleological
explanation. The problem is how to incorporate the two concepts under one
larger paradigm. From careful considerations of the relational nature of
experience we come to see efficient causality as what appears in the impact of
past physical influence on present experiences. We uncover the fact of efficient
41 A.N. Whitehead, The Function ofReasonNJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1929, p.15-16.
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causality in the form of impersonal memory or blind prehensive intuition of the
immediate past bodily influence. "Thus physical memory is causation. ...Thus
Hume, when he asks for direct consciousness of causation, should be directed to
memory."42 However final causality is what occurs in the internal movement of
an experience's creative activity in arranging the various elements of experience
into a unity under the guidance of its own subjective purposes. Within a present
experience, "the feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim," noted
Whitehead, "and this end is the feeler. The feelings aim at the feeler as their final
cause."43 From the foregoing we can deduce that crowds of individuals of
low-level sentience provide ideal instances of efficient causality to ground the
predictions of mechanistic science. While compound individuals of high-level
sentience display originality toward the fulfilment of uniquely defined, clearly
entertained goals, a kind of scaled-down final causality, and as such are
intractable to explanation by an appeal to efficient causality alone.
The second issue in the psychical realist handling of causality concerns
causally emergent properties. Here the psychical standpoint can be set out in
brief because it follows on directly from the rejection of the Humean treatment of
causality above. Given what has been said thus far, we can understand uniform
correlations in natural entities, what Hume called 'constant conjunctions', as
good frank evidence indicating underlying causal necessities. Water freezes
when cooled, oil burns when ignited, branches bend when its windy. Detail the
specific conditions completely and things could not go otherwise. Even at the
level of elementary particles such necessities are easily recognised. The mass and
the charge of an atom directly entail the manner of its interactions with the
environment. And the physical sciences command a degree of explanatory
success regarding macroscopic entities by relying on the necessary consequences,
whether phrased in probabilities or otherwise, of the characteristics and
interactions of constituent microscopic entities.
What Thomas Nagel has spelled out from such causally indicative phenomena
are the separate consequences that hold for the weaker constant connection and
the stronger necessity undergirded interpretations of causality.44 If causal
connections were merely the presence of observed yet contingent regularities and
42 A.N. Whitehead, "Time" in The Interpretation of Science, A.H. Johnson ed. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, p.242.
43 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.197.
44 T. Nagel, "Panpsychism" in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1979, pp.186-187.
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correlations, then the claim that sentience could be caused, emerging as an effect
of the properties and combinations of insentient ingredients, is possible without
controversy. At some point there is no sentience and at a later point there is, in
any given case concerning whatever ingredients, conditions, combinations one
names. Should correlations obtain, there is then a causal account in the offing
and emergence is indeed possible, albeit the explanation hardly adequate in the
case of sentience. But on the stronger interpretation, the fundamentally
insentient material must somehow necessitate any derivative sentience. Just as
some hidden necessity causes a tightening guitar string to snap at some
threshold, so too does complex sentience necessarily entail something more than
a mere framework of uniform correlations. In short, to respect the stronger
causal story established above, we must consider the emergence of higher-level
sentience as indicative of yet unknown proto-psychical properties in the
constituents of sentient entities, properties intrinsic to the constituents that do
necessitate sentience.
§ Spatial Sensibility and Timely Experience
It is easy to apply aspects of the argument for psychical realism that account
for natural causality to the experience of space and time as well. First we need to
sketch the problem of space and time that parallels the absence of natural
causality above. Succinctly stated, we tend to view space and time as composed of
points and of instants, but upon reflection realise that neither concept holds up
to experiential scrutiny. Points and instants possess the puzzling ontological
status of being accepted as volumeless and durationless entities, despite the fact
that space and time have volume and duration as their respective conceptual
trademarks. We could not possibly encounter points and instants in experience,
and such purely conceptual entities should thus be defined as systematic
abstractions from the relevant empirical facts lived through experientially.
But without a psychical realist generalising of the lived world to extend to all
natural entities, the concepts of space and time are riddled with difficulties
characteristic of the causality account detailed above.
This is clearly seen with attention focused on the phenomenon of time itself.
We discover that we only experience the unity of the past, the present, and the
future as a result of memory and anticipation being components of present
experience. Temporal succession is understood solely by virtue of befores
contrasted to afters, and the only means for getting a hold of these notions is by
an experiential bridge bringing the two together. A present experience owes its
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temporality in part to the necessary contrast with some backdrop of pastness, and
yet this very contrast effect must be intrinsic to the present experience. This goes
for conceived time as well as for experienced time, given the straightforward fact
that we cannot conceive of time without imagining it as experienced. To clarify
the point, think of the difference between still photographs and motion pictures.
They are much the same, for the latter merely compiles the former in a
particularly organised way. But the motion as experienced is due to a linking
effect reliant on memory. Otherwise the stills would be all there is in experience,
the one after another, with no hint of movement ever obtained. The same of
course holds for music, "In an analogous way, a note of music is nothing at an
instant, but it also requires its whole period in which to manifest itself."45
In conceiving the temporal element of the natural world the same reasoning
applies. "This phrase, 'the actual world', means the past, present, and future
occasions as defined from the standpoint of some present occasion."46 If the
world were not altogether psychical, then its insentient entities would neither
remember nor anticipate even to an undetectable degree. The advance of present
over past would cease, succession would collapse into strict identity, with the
absence of a transition toward emergent novelty marked somehow by the entities
involved. But if all of nature's basic ingredients - if particles, atoms, molecules,
and living cells - have something akin to memory (however minimal) of a settled
past and anticipation (however short-range) of a partly open future, then two
things follow. The distinctions of time into past, present, and future, would hold
for all such entities, making the objective temporal order in nature as intelligible
as the causal one. Time's irreversibility would also hold for all such entities,
a point serving to explain the fact of evolution prior to the advent of
uncontroversially experiential entities. Peirce, Bergson, James, and Whitehead all
recognised the need to 'naturalise mind and mentalise nature' in order to bolster
the validity of evolutionary thinking. With the metaphysical backing of
a psychical realist persuasion, the question for the would-be mechanistic and
materialistic thesis of how something sentient could evolve from inert insentient
matter standing in entirely external relations is given a tenable answer. Recalling
James' remark from the opening chapter, we can legitimise the birth of,
"consciousness, however little... in any philosophy that starts without it, and yet
45 A.N. Whitehead, The Principles ofNatural Knowledge, Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1925, p.54.
46 A.N. Whitehead, "Time" in The Interpretation of Science, A.H. Johnson ed. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, p.242.
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professes to explain all facts by continuous evolution."47 Alongside the
Darwinian emphasis on the adapting to an environment, comes the creativity
characteristic of nature's sentience employed in the modifying of the
environment. Individual entities, by co-operating with other individuals, are able
to alter their environments the better to meet their own survival concerns.48
Thus the social structure of experience, the asymmetrical feeling of other past
feelings, provides the basis of both the causal and temporal structure. "The leaf
resting on the ground has fallen there, but this 'having-fallen', where is it, as a
property of the leaf?" Hartshorne wonders, on the view positing insentient
entities.49 Since possessing past influence could by definition have no place in
insentient entities, that property would have to be nowhere. In a psychical world,
on the other hand, the natural world takes account of antecedent nature through
the present sentience of its pervasive psychical properties.
The same temporal analysis could be extended to spatiality. Whitehead spoke
against theories that posited concrete ultimacy - and with it foundational
explanatory value - to 'simply located' entities seen as interpretable, "apart from
any essential reference... to other regions of space and to other durations of
time."50 Today most theorists approach the issue with a degree of complexity that
embraces the ramifications of the relativity physics perspective on space-time.
To be sure, it would take us too far afield even to catalogue discussion that
relates to the ways the concept of space has been fused with that of
time in contemporary philosophy and science.51 Let it suffice to point out
that by revising three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time into
four-dimensional space-time does not in itself resolve the standard issue that
opened this section, namely how one gets from points in space and instants in
time to full-bodied, phenomenal facts. If space-time shows anything
uncontroversially, it reveals how temporality must be brought into
considerations of spatial location, and that perspectival reference is required to
make sense of either concept. Whitehead contends that space-time is not a fact
prior to the active processes in nature, but an abstract system of perspectives, and
47 W.James, The Principles ofPsychology, Vol.1. London: Macmillan, 1891, pp.148-149.
48 See A.N. Whitehead, The Function ofReason N]: Princeton Univ. Press, 1929, pp.1-10.
49 C.Hartshorne, Reality as SocialProcess. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953, p.84.
50 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p.84.
51 For an overview, see M. Capek, "Relativity and the Status of Space," in Review ofMetaphysics
9, 1955, pp.169-199, and temporal Order and Spatial Order: Their Differences and
Relations," in Mind in Nature. Wash, DC: Univ. Press of America, 1977, pp.51-59.
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that nature is made up of entities.52 Without perspective, attempts at purely
instantaneous or purely spatial divisions are fraught with difficulties. Hence the
pervasive point-of-view feature the psychical account expounds throughout
nature readily arises once again.
In the preceding two sections we have outlined advantages the psychical
realist has to offer for explaining otherwise troublesome conceptions of space,
time, and causality. The case gains momentum with these points but that force
may in the end be checked by how two further questions are treated. First, are
there in fact no other preferable alternatives, and secondly, does the truth of
a proposition hinge solely on the attractiveness of its explanatory potential? As to
the second question, clearly the answer is no. Nonetheless, explanatory potential
is not to be entirely neglected as a result of logical considerations. To begin with,
all logic dictates in this instance is that explanatory potential represents
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the truth of the propositions on
offer. This by no means excludes the possibility of their truth. Furthermore, given
the growing stock of explanatory items in our treatment, we ought to carefully
weigh the fact that they may combine together into an elaborate metaphysical
system to form a coherent and consistent framework applicable and adequate to
the facts, namely the process metaphysics introduced in the next chapter. But as
for preferable alternatives, if it is the case that none other than unacceptable
denials of the evidence for causality and the reality of space and time are
presently available, that fact in itself does not exclude the logical possibility of
such alternatives. We discuss some aspects of alternative conceptions in the next
part of the present chapter.
We have reached the end of our remarks regarding reason and psychical
realism. The force of the points presented in these sections appears in the main to
rely on the reasoning that helps create a sensible way of working experiential
insights into the fabric of theory. Admittedly the case remains less than logically
compelling outright, that is to say the conclusions drawn are not the irrevocable
rational outcome of an analysis, as was the force of many of the points raised in
earlier sections. But these considerations, following on from prior perceptual
analysis, do offer additional means by which psychical realism may challenge the
authority of intuitions and arguments that counter the doctrine.




To expand on the theme of furthering the case by reasoning out a sensible
theoretical stand, another important measure introduced in order to motivate the
shuffling of our initial intuitions regarding psychical realism trades on the lack
of tenable alternatives. Providing detailed refutations of even each of the
principal alternatives is of course beyond our present scope, nor can we prove
that there are no other significantly different alternatives available. But we can
put forth a short statement of the essential difficulties to supplement the
criticisms given in passing throughout our discussion.
§ Addressing Alternatives
Merely by way of sketching an outline then, the following are the most
commonly pursued metaphysical possibilities on offer. One can opt for
materialism and try to construe mind as a special case of matter, or opt for
idealism and try to treat matter as a special case of mind or experience. One can
try to maintain an ultimate dualism made up of both mind and matter, or try to
conceive a neutral monism of primordial entities of which both mind and matter
are special cases. The problem with this last move is that it is readily reducible to
one of the others. Mind is by definition something that at least in some minimal
form feels, intuits, enjoys, suffers - in a word, experiences. So either the so-called
neutral entities feel or they do not: if so they are instances of mind, if not they
are - again, by definition - surely a kind of matter.
The nature of the problems with the remaining three traditional classes of
alternatives are these. Dualism addresses our common sense intuitions by saying
that mind and matter are both actual, but leaves us in the dark about how they
interact, or at least seem to interact. Moreover, dualism is itself reducible if one
focuses on the combining of mind and matter. That relation has itself to be
characterised one way or another, and the concept that effects the relation
encompasses both terms rendering the whole in the end as either material,
mental, or neutral. Summed up by Hartshorne, "Thus dualism labels the problem,
not the solution."53
Materialism, by reducing mind to matter, forces us to deny that our own
experience - the thing we know best in the world - is efficacious or even real
Bs C. Hartshorne, "Panpsychism: Mind as Sole Reality," in Ultimate Reality and Meaning 1,2,
1978, pp.115-129.
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at all. To avoid this pitfall an emergence scenario is often offered to attenuate the
reduction whereby mind is deemed a special form of matter arising on earth and
perhaps scattered about the universe. But here dualism merely enters through
the backdoor because once mind has emerged it essentially feels, intuits, enjoys,
suffers, and so on, rather than simply suggesting as much through behavioural
cues. And this sort of emergence only adds a temporal gloss (and thus another
problem) to the already problematic dualism mentioned above. In the first
instance, the materialist is limited by the straightforward assumption that in the
idea of mere matter and its behaviour there is only the space and time and shape
and size that is occupied, and the combinations and movements of these. Now the
would-be materialist faces the problem of understanding how at some point, out
of the mere behaviour of matter, qualities of a distinct logical type come about,
qualities left out of the bare structural account expressed in the concepts of
physical science. Add to these troubles either accepting the paradoxes of
epiphenomenalism or explaining how mind influences mere non-psychical stuff,
and it appears again as Hartshorne notes that the materialist remedy of,
"emergence, like dualism, is a label for some problems, a solution of none."54
To side-step these and other difficulties many materialists attempt to do away
with dualism entirely by positing a strict identity between mind and matter,
between psychical functions on the one hand and material processes on the
other. Sensations for instance are understood as simply being certain neural
goings on. And it is here, in light of this move and with some irony, that the
psychical realist alternative enjoys initial illumination. This is because while
idealism of the subjective variety Berkeley proposed, by reducing matter to mind,
commits the reciprocal mistake of denying that our own bodies are efficacious or
even real at all, psychical realism presents an altogether different rendition of
the idealist thesis whereby the identity of mind and matter suggested by the
materialist is taken as a clue to the nature of things, but in this case with the
implication that matter in general is really mind in general.
Psychical realism then allows us to understand our common sense assumptions
that our experiences are real, that our bodies are real, and that the two actually
interact. Implicit in the ways we live is the assumption that our real bodies
influence our real experiences and that our real experiences influence our bodies
in return. Psychical realism provides a plausible account of how these
54 C. Hartshorne, "Panpsychism: Mind as Sole Reality," in Ultimate Reality and Meaning 1,2,
1978, pp.115-129.
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assumptions could be true without either being dualistic or reductionistic. It does
so rather by proposing what amounts to an ontological form of idealism. Take
painful sensory experience. In such cases we in effect feel the feelings of our
bodily constituents. The influence in some circumstances may build up until the
effect on our high-level experiential participation in those low-level feelings is
finally manifest. Should we stand in the rain too long for example, the suffering
that the bodily cells in our feet endure may finally effect our mood and we too
will then suffer. Doctors, though not all philosophers, are well aware that
evidence of damage to bodily tissue correlates with poor health and discomfort.
The same holds likewise in the other direction. We can often detect how
dominant, high-level, human experience takes its toll on subservient, low-level,
bodily feelings. When we are exhausted our physical resistances also diminish
and allow in a greater chance of falling ill, when depressed our bodies are also
plagued with aches and pains. To be sure, there is much yet to say on this score,
but for present purposes it is enough simply to recognise the structural
framework the psychicalist has on offer to embrace our commonly held beliefs
about mind and body and the fact of interaction between them.
§ Agnostic Options
On its own this summary of the picture would not have much in it, but taking
the summary as given, Timothy Sprigge has proposed a way of looking at the
matter from a logical point of view in abstraction to establish further grounds for
accepting a psychical form of reality.55 Briefly, the proposal goes as follows.
If faced with a question which one knows is meaningful and has an answer, and
say if the three alternatives to one's own unchecked though far from proven
answer seemed implausible if not incoherent, there are then only two
possibilities: accepting one's answer as true or accepting agnosticism. As to the
latter possibility, there seem to be three types of agnosticism. A simple
'don't know' of people who either lack interest in the question or doubt their
personal capacity to deal with it, a considered belief that the answer is beyond
the scope of our understanding, or an acceptance that we could understand the
answer but could not identify it if it were in our possession. The first type is not
truly an agnostic answer but an absence of one and the second is irrational if one
admits the logical possibility that a certain answer that one can in fact
understand may be the true one. So we must therefore choose between insisting
on the third type of agnosticism or accepting our answer.
55 T.L.S. Sprigge, The Vindication ofAbsolute Idealism. Edinburgh: Univ. Press, 1983, pp.87-90.
123
If the question is the metaphysical one here under investigation, and the
unrefuted though unproven answer is a psychical realist form of idealism, surely
adopting that hypothesis is preferable to holding that the answer must remain
hidden to us. We either take the basic units of reality to be made up of
experiencing entities of some sort, presumably of many sorts for the most part
widely different from those of humans, or we simply do not know what most of
them are. Our reaching out to independent entities is either social and
sympathetic, in Whitehead's phrasing 'a feeling of feelings', or it is a leap in the
dark. The possible truth of such an answer and the lack of any plausible
alternative are sufficient conditions for rejecting agnosticism. There is the
chance, even allowing for error, that by accepting the answer we are seeing
reality as it really is. And if this answer also helped to shape a general view of
reality, as we have seen that it does, which grouped and solved other puzzles it
would be sensible to stick with it to see just how many issues could be clarified
through it. If we hold materialism, dualism, and subjective idealism to be the
three alternatives referred to above, a psychical realist form of idealism is in the
very least a more complete account.
§ Epistemic Realism & Ontic Idealism
In light of the above analysis of alternatives, we now turn to erecting the
required rational backdrop to envisioning idealism as compatible and
harmonious with realism. If these overarching views can be reasonably fused to
form a coherent framework broadly embedding psychical realism,56 that option
may further outweigh the agnostic as outlined. For this we once more look to
Hartshorne who has sketched and clarified a reasonable and consistent synthesis
of these two formerly disparate points of view.57
Hartshorne holds that two theses constitute epistemic realism: that whatever
a subject experiences does not depend on that subject (objective independence),
and that a subject does depend to some degree on whatever it experiences
(subjective dependence). The first supplies subjects with something to experience
and the second claims that this experiencing conforms to the object experienced.
The theses are consistent with each other and by and large stand to reason as
depicting a candid if not fully developed realism. Ontic idealism58 is next
56 The present emphasis is on broadly outlining a framework that supports psychical realism.
The next chapter articulates the view as specific to process metaphysics.
57 See C. Hartshorne, "The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism," in Theoria 15, 1949, pp.90-107.
58 The phrase ontic idealism coined here delineates the sharpened idealist focus being set out.
Hartshorne neglects to offer a terminological distinction from related doctrines.
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defined according to the following two additional theses: that any entity must be
object for some subject (universal objectivity), and that any concrete entity is
itself a subject or set of subjects (universal subjectivity). It follows that the
experience of all subjects is in actual fact the experience of other subjects as
objects. This second pair of theses are stipulated definitionally and serve to
distinguish ontic idealism from a host of other idealistic theories.
Now the term 'idealism' like many an 'ism' carries distinctly varied
connotations. Subjective idealists like the Berkeleyans mentioned earlier contend
that all physical objects are ideas in minds, and the only possible knowledge is
the knowledge of one's own mental states. But then ontic idealists as depicted
thus far tend toward epistemic realism. For some idealists all relations are
internal and everything depends on everything else, while for others relations
are external and everything is independent. Ontic idealists develop both types of
relations with dependency and independency the outcome. There are religious
idealists, but there are also atheists; there are the agnostic ones and then the
Gnostic ones. Some are dialectical, some anti-dialectical; some rationalists, some
empiricists. There are idealists with primarily artistic concerns and idealists
whose focus is largely scientific. Ontic idealists can and have maintained varied
glosses on these many issues. Finally, there are idealists that either believe or
disbelieve that substance, that causality, or that space and time are real or even
possible.39 In these cases ontic idealists do commit themselves to particular views
as opposed to others, some of which we have already detailed in part and which
are to be presented and examined further as tenets of the process metaphysics in
the chapter that follows.
Given such an array of positions, there is some question as to whether an
ontic-idealist epistemic-realist view embraces the central affirmations of
idealism. But grouping all the radically differing positions under one set of ideas
is none too easy in the first place, despite the fact that idealist theories clearly
represent a common and distinct departure from other theoretical standpoints.
Unfortunately the oft suggested heading of 'views incorporating spiritual
explanation' does not necessarily include ontic idealists, nor does it fully respect
the conceptual distance that may separate the various traditional forms of
idealism. Consider the contrast for instance between Bradley's impersonal and
immanent Absolute and Berkeley's personal and transcendent God. Indeed
69 For selected writings by prominent idealists most associated with this catalogue of viewpoints
see, The Idealist Tradition, A.C. Ewing ed. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957.
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despite that historically characteristic and influential forms of idealism have
attempted to philosophically prove the doctrines of religion, idealist thought has
developed as much outside of as within that tradition.
A preferable phrasing that keeps to one framework, but also renders the
definition universal enough to embrace the ontic idealist doctrine being
developed here, is to say that idealism in short is the attempt to interpret reality
in terms of mind. The term 'mind' is then open to a general interpretation
meaning psychical in contrast to the merely physical. In so doing we exclude
elements of some idealist positions outright, yet represent all of them at least
partially and retain the common thread - one perhaps encompassing them
all ~ namely the notion that the idea of physical things which exist apart from all
experience is incoherent. The main reason for clearly delineating these terms is
first to address the resolute scepticism that remains for any and all forms of
idealism as a result of a history of neglecting these very distinctions, and second,
to put an end to persistent discussion over whether Whitehead and process
thinkers generally ought then to be depicted as idealists. Both muddles weaken
the case for the psychical real position circuitously. So with the qualifications
specified thus, we return to the synthesis of epistemic realism and ontic idealism.
Hartshorne believes that realism and idealism as so defined are not in conflict,
and he sets out to show this by scrutinising the ways the stated principles
describing them combine.60 Are the first two realist notions of objective
independence and subjective dependence compatible with the common thread of
all idealism, their universal objectivity? The realist principles simply put mean
that when a specific subject knows something, the content of that knowledge
is extrinsically related to the knowing of it, but that in so knowing, the subject is
intrinsically related to the content known. The reader depends on the present
writing in order to continue reading it, but the writing is independent of that
particular reading of it. While written words are taken up in the minds of
readers, minds are not taken down by the written words, for we adjust to them
not they to us. The relation is asymmetrical and goes in one direction. It is plain
that knowing and (extending the logic) that all other experiencing is dependent
whereas the contents of knowledge and all other objects of experience are not.
60 C. Hartshorne, "The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism," in Theoria 15, 1949, PP.90-107.
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Nonetheless universal objectivity, the core of idealism, simply means that
subjects are related intrinsically to subjectivity in general. That is to say every
experiencing subject must become an object of another experience, a subject as
object, taken up somewhere at sometime in the subjectivity that pervades the
world. This relation is easily spelled out with an analogy to universals. It may be
that there are no universal forms without instantiated particulars: no love if no
lovers, no philosophy if no philosophers, no comedy if no comics, and so on.
But we would still have love without Don Juan, philosophy without Socrates,
comedy without Groucho Marx. Just as it may be that these universals depend
on some particular or other to come into being (but none specifically), so too
with subjects who without being taken up in some further experience or other
(again, none specifically), would on this view have no being. Note that this
principle combines unproblematically with the two realist principles and
perhaps appears less incredible when the fourth, universal subjectivity, is added
to the outlook.
It is manifest that universal subjectivity is compatible with all three previous
principles. It assumes realism by placing a real world out there to be experienced
and upholds universal objectivity by positing nothing but subjects experiencing.
Just because what a subject experiences is another subject in no way undermines
the dependency relations explained above. Again, the experiencing subject
depends on the experience even if that experience be of a subject as object, while
that object is independent of any such experiencing. Historians of antiquity know
their Pericles. That knowledge may ennoble them to some degree but obviously it
has no effect on the ancient and already noble statesman.
Universal subjectivity and hence psychical realism can be wholly realistic
given the suggested version of realism, in addition to supporting the idealists
otherwise contentious rendition of universal objectivity.61 The logic behind the
position is all but the opposite of that traditionally considered idealistic. Where
the realist argues for the independence of the known and the dependence
(relativity) of the knower, the idealist typically argues for dependence of the
known and the independence (absoluteness) of some knower. On Hartshorne's
reckoning it is rather the relativity of the subject that should incline us to opt for
idealism. Attempts to find a non-relative absolute ground for explaining the
G1 Contentious in that subjective idealists of Berkeleyan bent, without the psychical realist move,
finally view the existence of one's friends, one's favourite philosophers, even the God one
worships, as dependent on one's own experiencing of them.
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world's relatedness have proved ineffectual time and again, while the world's
genuinely relative subjects easily explain (as well as instantiate) such intrinsic
relatedness. And there are other advantages to a revised ontic idealism. In sum
Hartshorne arrives at the following outlook.
Realistic idealism bases itself, not upon an 'ego-centric predicament' - there
is no theoretical escape from the self - but upon the principle (which is no
predicament) - the escape from the self, theoretical as well as practical, is
into that larger community of selves or subjects the ultimate reaches of
which coincide with reality. The remedy for the narrowness of experience
is the sense for the vast 'ocean of feelings' of which it is a part.62
Finally, though Hartshorne casts his treatment specifically in terms of subjects
and knowledge claims, the analysis holds equally well for the implicit general
sentience he aims to justify. Early on subjects are construed to be, "anything that
can be said to be aware of (know or feel or intuit) anything."63 Regarding
subjects and sentience in general the conclusions drawn from the achieved ontic
idealist synthesis work to further the psychical realist case. Despite that many
have already been discussed or will be anticipated in subsequent discussion, it is
appropriate to mention two that follow in particular from the synthesis at this
point.
As presently described a subject offers an account of how an experience can
come about as an actual individual unity - a many becoming a one - that is
'not the unity of an ineffable bare identity' but one possessing a host of
components, qualities, relations. There is an aesthetic coherence involved as
experience, any experience, because of the variety it unifies, is able to relate
itself to the rich and diverse world of its surroundings. We have examined how
points in space and instants in time result in an impoverished account of being,
one which results in the paradox of change and which offers no explanation of
this phenomenally apparent many-in-one character of experience. Points and
instants at best complete the picture by presupposing the actual units that
substitute for the empty geometrical constructs they represent. Yet what actual
entities are there available for the substitution? The elementary particles won't
do, for they plainly represent, "a class of units whose principle of unity is not in
the least furnished by the physical measurements that indicate some of the
relationships in which whatever the unit may be is known to stand."64
Since microscopic investigation always reaches a threshold beyond which
62 C. Hartshorne, "The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism," in Theoria 15, 1949, p.106.
63 C. Hartshorne, "The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism," in Theoria 15, 1949, p.90.
64 C. Hartshorne, "The Synthesis of Idealism and Realism," in Theoria 15, 1949, p.101.
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certainty comes to an end, the subjects as conceived in an ontic idealist picture
are advantageous here if only for the coherence they bring to the unified
wholeness aspect of experience.
To close on a related point, because subjects have purposes which contrast
with what actually is achieved, they offer a contrast of actual and potential and
of particular and universal. Without subjects as fundamental, there does not
seem to be anything available in these insentient building materials to furnish
such contrasts. A somewhat drastic measure is to maintain that in nature's basic
ingredients no such contrasts do obtain. But in a nominalism so extreme, in
which all of nature was made up solely of particulars, the notion of a particular
itself would fail to refer for want of any polar contrast. The abstractions science
deals in at the elementary levels do not determine particulars but classes of them.
Hence the so-called primary qualities do not convey particularity (that is, specific
particulars) but universal characteristics that an entity might take on. All that we
have are patterns of events. But human experience is no mere pattern, no mere
set of rules to govern how it appears under observation. There is as well an
undeniable quality of feeling. We might ask if this were not true for the lower
animals, for the micro-organisms, for physical reality in the entirety of its events.
For we otherwise come up against another required yet inexplicable line of
demarcation somewhere along the way. On one side there is a system of singular
events reduced to patterns of appearance and devoid of inside qualities.
While we are stranded on the other experiential side, surrounded by a
mysterious world of abstractions and ideas alone, one lacking any concreteness
whatsoever, and one far more idealistic than most realists would have us go.
§ Experience and Idealism
Having delineated the ontic idealist from various other idealistic standpoints
and examined the relations of ontic idealism and epistemic realism, we may now
close our conceptual considerations by taking a closer look at the nature of the
'ocean of feelings' the view entails. The principal argument is found in several
idealist philosophers, most notably in the revisions of Berkeley's subjective
idealism put forth by F.H. Bradley and William James, and more recently by
Timothy Sprigge.65 The argument derives from reflections on the nature of
perceptual and conceptual experience, which led in its original Berkeleyan form
65 For the relevant passages and summary of the view from Bradley and James see,
T.L.S. Spriggds, James andBradley. Chicago: Open Court, 1993; for Sprigge's own treatment
see his, The Vindication ofAbsolute Idealism. Edinburgh: Univ. Press, 1983, pp.110-140.
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to an ontology solely of human or divine minds and their ideas. Yet in a more
general form it serves to establish a world of experience as common ground prior
to the specific conclusions drawn either by Berkeley or by other recent idealist
philosophers. These thinkers differ in terminology and emphasis, and ultimately
in application of the analysis, none holding entirely to the psychical realist line
propounded above. But this common form of reasoning runs counter to another
perhaps more dominant strand of idealism originating in Kantian philosophy,
whereby all that exists is limited to what can be grasped by human thought.
Nothing on this view could be forever beyond the concept-forming attributes of
our own understanding, which results in the world constrained only to the
coherent conceptions of humans. Since our conceptual categories are formed and
developed through linguistic practices, it is this Kantian form of idealism (if any)
and not Berkeley's, that has played the more significant part in today's
predominantly analytic philosophy. Be that as it may, revising the Berkeleyan
argument, as sanctioned in recent revisionary treatments, is directly relevant to
psychical realism and warrants our attention.
The first stage of the argument begins with the realisation that integral to
anything experienced or even conceived are mind-dependent qualities. This is
evident in the perspectival, aesthetic, and gestalt-structured 'being-experienced'
features that bear on the nature of that experience or conception. Whether it be
a physical object such as a candle, a mental process such as a calculation, or an
abstract universal such as a category, we cannot avoid imparting these sort of
features to the objects of experience or conception. A gestalt isolates the
particular object from all else for identity purposes, that is from all other
operations and experiences in the mind; an aesthetic estimate puts it under some
evaluative guise or another, whether specified or left general, good or bad,
neutral or evaluatively irrelevant or otherwise; a perspective is held from which
the object of experience or conception is taken in. Note that these specific
features are not required necessarily, but are employed as likely candidates to
making plain the necessary mind-dependency quality objects of experience and
concept possess. Whether the indicators are obviously present, the principal
insight remains, as Sprigge lays it out,
Whenever you really bring home to yourself the character you conceive
a physical thing as having, you find that this includes characteristics it can
only have within an experience... you cannot form a, so to speak, positive
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conception of what a physical thing would be like denuded of all qualities
which reflect a mind's awareness of it.66
Reflection then reveals that this realisation applies in turn to all components
of any experienced or conceived entities. For whatever object we care to conceive
of or to experience, any part of that object (should it lend itself to such division)
would also display these same mind-dependent features, it too would amount
to something as being-experienced. Therefore every object of experience
or conception is made up entirely of components of mind-dependent,
being-experienced qualities; and for an object of experience or conception not to
be made up of them is inconceivable, for try as we might, the being-experienced
qualities always and completely pervade whatever objects we encounter or
conjure up.
The second stage of the argument opens with the idea that any instance of
being-experienced implies a corresponding instance of experiencing.
Here 'corresponding' is ambiguous in that it could imply an equal number of
independent but paired experiencing subjects, one deity or absolute awareness,
or something in between. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that experiencing
and being-experienced are two aspects of one and the same activity or entity.
The positing of an identity between experiencing and being-experienced is
proved coherent in our own case, that is in those experiences we ourselves
live through, most of which include an experiencing (subjective side) and
a being-experienced (objective side) but some, such as aesthetic and mystical
experience, that include a collapsing of the relation into one experiential
identity. At any rate, in either case we do have a straightforward instance of
experience and, to follow both Hume and the phenomenology school, there does
not seem to be a further experiential substratum, either empirically sensed or
logically required. Therefore we can adopt the plausible idealistic explanation
that the world is completely made up of experiences, where 'experience' refers
either to the experiencing/being-experienced relation or to a collapsing of that
relation into an identity. Again, we understand both cases from our own
exemplary experience, and upon analysis we find that any existent that is not an
experience as so outlined is inconceivable. "Thus your belief," Sprigge continues,
"that there may be a physical thing denuded of such qualities is merely a verbal
belief in something of which you have no real conception."67
66 T.L.S. Sprigge, Theories ofExistence. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, p.64.
67 T.L.S. Sprigge, Theories ofExistence. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, p.64.
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In essence this second stage concerns the shift from an epistemological insight
into the mind-dependency aspect of our own experience of the world, and
toward an ontological insight into what must be the case for existences
independent of our experience. The shift can be justified on two further grounds:
consider first Descartes' notion that metaphysics is the pursuit of clear and
distinct ideas about the nature of reality. Clearly we are not succeeding
metaphysically when we posit inconceivables such as a 'not-being-experienced'
reality at the centre of our theoretical constructs to do the major metaphysical
explanatory work. Worse than unclear and indistinct, the notion as we have seen
is utterly inconceivable. Although one perhaps could identify a degree of logical
difference between inconceivable and logically impossible, the point is
sufficiently forceful as it stands, for metaphysics is far from satisfactory when
mysteries are posited in the place of tenable explanations. Second, note that it is
good evidence that our epistemological situation rightly suggests the relevant
ontological one when the better we come to understand the concepts involved,
the less we are able to conceive the situation to be otherwise. If we initially had
the limited understanding, for example, that squares have at least two angles and
that circles have at least an arch of 180 degrees, the possibility that there might
be square circles would be quite difficult to conceive. If we then came to
understand the full four angle (and no arch) quality of squares and the full
360 degree arch (and no angle) quality of circles, we would then find the notion
of square circles utterly inconceivable, as well as logically impossible in this case.
The situation is much the same when considering the idea of the nature of reality
in itself. The more we understand the experience of it, the more we see that it
always involves a relation of experiencing with being-experienced, in short it
always involves experience. Bear in mind nonetheless that the argument does not
entail the particular psychical realist division of reality specified earlier, though
it does succeed in offering a plausible basis for rendering reality experiential in
essence. Directing that important initial insight into an accommodating
metaphysical system will be our concern in the next chapter.
The principal distinction between the original Berkeleyan line and this
revision of it concerns the differing conceptions of the experiencing side or
subjective pole of experience. For Berkeley believed that it is an enduring 'spirit'
that attends to its 'ideas' whereas here it is rather the momentary act of
experiencing in relation to what is being experienced that is stressed, and
occasionally a collapsing of subjective with objective poles into an identity is
allowed and given an account. Indeed, the initially curious fact about experience
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as set out here is that it does not entail (nor provide evidence for) a self or ego
underlying the experiential act to constitute its being. There is the
experiencing/being-experienced relation alone, that is, an experience without
the further substantial backing of an experiencer. This calls to mind the analysis
of substance and events from the opening chapter, the further significance
of which is also to be developed in the next chapter in the examination of
experiential events in process philosophy. In both its early and revised forms
however, the idealist insight is to conceive of the physical world as a useful
construction that combines experience with some hypothetical completion of
experience.
We have come to the close of our conceptual considerations in light of the
main metaphysical alternatives, the agnostic options, and the relevant idealist
currents. The psychical realist picture befits the outcome of a line of idealist
thought, neglected by many contemporary philosophers, regarding the logically
possible options, and it benefits from the essential Berkeleyan idealistic insight.
Metaphysical proposals are best judged by considering what problems they help
solve better than other metaphysical possibilities, and the success the psychical
realist has in connecting and solving previously unrelated problems goes some
way in support of the case being made. To be sure, such matters as the
undermining of countering intuitions, the fusing of previously separate
metaphysical difficulties, the reasoned extension of logically possible positions,
and the conclusions drawn from basic perceptual and conceptual characteristics
are generally not answerable to the principles of direct empirical testing.
The idea that reality is psychical, if accepted, is done so on somewhat less than
certain grounds, and we do well to keep in mind exactly what that acceptance
does and does not mean. It does not imply a rejection of ordinary intuitions.
The picture as argued allows for the intuitively strong fact that most of our
experience appears to be of entities that seem unpsychical. Plants and planets
have no unified form of feeling beyond the sentience of the invisibly small parts
that constitute them. Indeed, much of what we experience is in this category.
It does not imply either a radical subjectivist world made exclusively of mind or
a radical positivist world excluding it outright. Yet it does imply a psychical
idealist perspective compatible with an epistemological realism. Memories and
perceptions - our bridges to reality ~ have both independent and dependent
aspects. 'To be (as past) is to be destined to be perceived.' Finally, it means the
existence of the physical remains intact, as our notion of psychical is compatible
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with, even requires, a version of physical reality. The psychical qualities of
experience constitute an ontology consistent with scientific facts and scientific
advances. The theory of psychical realism so understood is therefore a more
complete account of reality, and it is hoped a more compelling one.
PART FIVE
Argument along Genetic and Analogic Lines
Commentators on the doctrine tend to separate the argumentation in its
support into two kinds of treatments: the analogic and the genetic. The former
concerns how we develop our understanding of the natural world by extending
the analogy, however direct or dim, from our own experience to that which lies
beyond it. The latter concerns how in examining the genealogy of whatever
exists in present reality we come to appreciate the experiential suggestions that
effect the particular causal necessities entailed. Another related and noteworthy
distinction is that between psychical realist reasoning that requires specific
metaphysical or epistemological backing in order to make the doctrine
intelligible, and psychical reasoning that rather relies on more empirical findings
and inductive grounds.
Our examination has not adhered to these dividing lines thus far, and for the
following reasons. First, the analogic-genetic division is finally a superficial one
that can inhibit the force of points made plain and better expressed when
clustered. To fully recognise the significance of certain genetic factors we have to
employ a degree of analogy, and to fully extend analogous experience we must
bear in mind a degree of genetic detail. Second, the case for psychical realism is
more convincing if first presented independently (to whatever degree possible) of
metaphysical and epistemological commitments specific to a particular system.
A few commitments are finally unavoidable and have so been introduced,
clarified, argued along the way, many only to come to fruition in subsequent
discussion in the next chapter. Moreover, empirical and inductive support is
more intelligible and most effective when interpreted in conjunction with some
framework adequate to the task, whether it is at the time made categorically
clear. Integral to a good deal of what has already been established is an implicit
reliance on analogic reasoning. Hence in this, the final part of our investigation
of psychical realism, our focus will be primarily on the genetic argument, but
with whatever analogic emphasis that may bear on the issue here made explicit.
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§ Apes, Atoms, Abstraction, Analogy
We begin however with some preliminary remarks pertaining in the abstract
to all levels of the extension of experience as lived through by analogy, whether
it be done the better to sympathise with our near neighbours the apes, or to
advance technical comprehension of all but unimaginable atomic activity. It is
commonly accepted by all (that is by all but a few philosophers) that human
knowledge is not the measure of reality. It is accepted that enquiry comes to an
end far short of the vast reaches of the natural world. Yet, from our analysis of
experience we know that every concept, even a general one like the concept
of reality, must somehow be related to experience. Our most general ideas are
still ideas and at bottom, directly or indirectly, it is experience that gives them
their sense. So one initial point is that the proposal to extend our sense of
experience all the way out as it were, extended far enough to embrace concepts
as general as reality itself, is in the main something we are quite accustomed to
doing, and concepts like reality take on meaning by virtue of such extension
in one form or another. In utilising an argument from analogy our aim is to
ponder where in reality we can recognise forms of feeling and perceiving,
remembering and anticipating, attracting and averting, however primitive and
simple, however odd or strange they may seem in contrast to our own human
sentience. It is simply a special case of the sort of extension we rely on in all sorts
of more familiar situations.
A second point worth emphasising at the outset is one mentioned earlier, but
the ramifications of which are so often overlooked that we do well to detail it
once again. Namely that however inept we may be at extending the analogy from
our own experience to whatever lies beyond it, we do not and could not know of
a part of nature absolutely lacking in rudimentary aspects of experience, in a
basic level of activity, individuality, initiative, and purpose. It is simply
impossible for any conceivable observer utilising any conceivable means of
observation to detect the sheer absence of such feeling. We are just unable to
know what it would be like to experience the complete absence somewhere of
feeling, which may in fact be so utterly simple in comparison to our own.
We know what it is like to be human beings living through experiences because
we are such animate creatures doing just that, but we could never know what it
is like to be inanimate by being one of whatever that may be. Once the notion of
sentience is fully generalised, Hartshorne is quick to point out the relevant logic.
We are here discussing meanings, not contingent facts, rather necessary or
impossible combinations of basic ideas. From conceptual necessities we
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know that nothing positive could conflict with the presence of mind in
some form, that total insentience is strictly unknowable, and that sheerly
unknowable is a pseudo-concept.68
Thus generalised, experience is all that is required to answer to reality as
encountered in everyday living and in the probings of science; the idea of
generalised sentience completely covers the idea of actuality. Nothing need be
other than sentience when there are innumerable ways and degrees of
complexity, intensity, creativity, spatio-temporality, in which experience may
vary. Sentience is as various and protean as the reality it experiences.
Hartshorne, recalling Peirce's useful division of empirical science into the
efficient causal world of physics and the final causal world of 'psychics', made
the insightful remark that,
Just as physics generalises variables of movement so that they can apply not
only to a human hunter and his fleeing prey, but also to stars, planets,
atoms, and photons, so psychics needs to generalise such ideas as feeling,
perceiving, remembering, anticipating, intending, liking and disliking, so
that they can apply not only to animals, but even to the real individual
constituents of the vegetable and mineral portions of nature.69
The counterpoint in this instance is likewise illuminating for the argument
from analogy. For in the physical sciences as commonly conceived, in striving to
achieve universal explanatory principles, the analogous extension of sentience is
typically stipulated as an illegitimate means to furthering understanding. This is
because the subjective realm, as revealed in the preceding chapter, fails to
provide the sort of publicly verifiable data upon which science generally
depends. Hence there is a notable bias against any phenomena such as sentience
which remain mysterious for not yielding to physical explanation. But from
a psychical perspective the bias in such reasoning is exposed merely by turning it
around: if mentality proves mysterious for being physically unexplained, then
matter is just as mysterious for being mentally unexplained. And the two sides
are surely less than symmetrically divided, for the psychical account of the
structural undergirding of experience is consistent with the data and the ongoing
developments in the physical sciences, whereas adherents to physical reduction
(along with half-reducing dualists) appear to believe that from the sentient side
of reality we can only learn about sentient beings, but not about the basic gas,
solid, liquid entities of the physical sciences. This is evident in the strict
separation of physical science from the humanities, and in the reluctance to
68 C. Hartshorne, "Minds and Bodies," in Points of View. Forthcoming by Open Court, 1996.
69 C. Hartshorne, "Physics and Psychics: The Place of Mind in Nature," in Mind in Nature.
Wash.DC: Univ. Press of America, 1977 p.90.
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engage in what otherwise might be profitable dialogue. Note that if it is
conceivable that thinkers of this bent are wrong, they are being less than
scientific in their barring of the path of inquiry. The scientific community may
opt for an official line limiting their domain of endeavour to the behaviours of all
known physical activity. Nevertheless even the scientists unofficially
acknowledge, in themselves at least, such qualities as pleasure and pain,
sweetness and sourness, happiness and sorrow, love and hate. Any stipulated
refusal to extend anything generally - not specifically - like these traits to gain
insight in the very least into other entities in the biological sphere is merely
stubborn and anthropomorphically restricted.70
Obviously, the use of analogy in furthering the case for the doctrine of
psychical realism makes unusual demands on the imagination, which in part
could explain any scientific reluctance to entertain the notion. We are asked to
proceed from bodily feelings all the way down to atomic ones and then some. But
bear in mind that nowadays physicists claim that the structural aspects of atoms
are utterly unimaginable anyhow, though mathematically expressible. At what
point does this ground of objection begin to lose its validity? True, the range of
what can be imagined varies across individuals, but there does not seem to be
any reason in principle that denies the extension of sentience at a point
somewhere short of the actual world. Given the state of scientific advancement,
the charge against the psychical realist of committing a poetic fallacy appears all
too quick. Again, to address a widely mistaken critique in terms of scientific
procedure: extending the psychical analogy does not turn all stones into people
any more than determining their mass turns all people into stone. Hartshorne
proposes we counter the charge of poetic or pathetic fallacy by calling attention
to the contrary prosaic or apathetic one: that is, the mistake of supposing the
world to be as tame as our sluggish convention-ridden imaginations imply.
To contend that apart from us and beings like us there is nothing with intrinsic
feeling and value of any sort whatever, that our kind of being alone introduced
sentience into the natural world, "Is this not in a class with the idea that our
planet is at the centre of the universe?"71 Yet Hartshorne displays characteristic
empathy for the opposition.
70 Interestingly, physicists do sometimes speak - albeit in intended metaphor - of the 'excited' or
'satisfied' states of atoms.
71 C. Hartshorne, "Physics and Psychics: The Place of Mind in Nature," in Mind in Nature.
Wash.DC: Univ. Press of America, 1977, p.94.
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Nothing is easier than to understand the scepticism which many feel
toward any such view. What I call the 'prosaic' or 'apathetic' fallacy
is almost as naturally human as the poetic or pathetic fallacy. The world is
neither the fairyland of primitive cultures nor the great machine of early
modern science. Nor is it merely a vast but mindless organism. It is rather
a vast many-levelled 'society of societies'. Enormous imagination and
courage, combined with careful weighing of rather complicated chains of
evidence, are required if we are to arrive at much idea of this cosmic
society. There is no easy path, whether sentimental or cynical.72
These introductory remarks regarding the general nature of the psychical
analogy suffice to show that the real work is yet to come. We precede directly to
the task of application of the analogy, weighing what evidence there is, with the
requisite 'imagination and courage' should it be forthcoming.
§ The Standard Genetic Line
There is a genetic argument that lends support to psychical realism when the
analogic concerns are likewise implemented, but in order to put forth
a convincing account of it we must first examine the traditional form the
argument has taken. Here we find the reasoning insufficient and the standard
objections quite defensible. The typical form of the argument is based on
a principle of continuity which states that there could not have been a point in
the history of the world when there was no experience if at a later point there
was. To explain the emergence of mind-related qualities in the world one
contends that in fact experience at least in some basic form had been present all
along. The particular application of the principle commonly concerns biological
continuity whereby the various species of living things are held to differ solely in
degree but not in kind, for continuity dictates that the evolution of higher life
out of lower must work similarly in the evolution of life itself from inanimate
matter. Hence the higher forms of experience in humans and in animals is the
outcome of complex patterns evolving out of lower forms of experience pervasive
in reality, with the ultimate building materials of all of reality conceived as being
experiential in this manner.
There are two weighty objections to the argument in this form. First, as Paul
Edwards has made abundantly clear,73 the force of the argument comes from the
dubious scholastic principle that a cause must possess its effect in actuality in
order to pass it on as an effect of that cause. As the effect of cooling for instance
72 C. Hartshorne, "Physics and Psychics: The Place of Mind in Nature," in Mind in Nature.
Wash.DC: Univ. Press of America, 1977, p.94.
73 P. Edwards, "Panpsychism," in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. P. Edwards, ed. NY: Free
Press, 1967, Vol.6, pp.28-31.
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is thought to require a cool cause, so too does the presence of mind require
mentality in its cause. But the whole of evolutionary thought - biological,
cultural, cosmological, what have you - is witness to exceptions of this outmoded
notion. And there are countless counter-examples even in the realm of physical
science where one might consider it to have at least limited validity. The effect of
causing a shaft of light to pass through a clear prism is a spectrum of colour.
Chemicals routinely combine to create effects nowhere present in either of them
separately or in the procedures employed to cause their combination. What is
more, even in terms of the issue at hand the idea that causes possess their effects
in actuality seems wrong-headed. Any number of physical ailments - burns,
fractures, tumours - are known to cause corresponding mental effects.
Second, should we accept the scholastic principle, and so posit the presence of
sentience all the way down, it seems we still face a choice between two
undesirable outcomes. Either the problem merely shifts from the original issue of
experience as an effect arising from a cause without experience to the equally
problematic effect of high-level experience such as consciousness arising from
rudimentary sentience, or we allow the emergence of high levels from low and
then face the issue of why mentality itself cannot emerge from the non-mental.
Either way the problem remains unresolved.
Thomas Nagel, incidentally, has proposed a recent rendition of the argument
in something like this standard form.74 He outlines the reasoning in terms of
four plausible claims which when taken together unearth the plausibility of
a broadly panpsychist outlook. Nagel begins by stating that all living organisms
are made of matter because any material could be incorporated into an
organism's physical constitution if it were sufficiently broken down and
rearranged. Second, that psychical properties are not physical properties and are
not reducible to them because being of a separate logical type physical properties
are inapplicable to them. Third, that they are in fact properties of living
organisms all the same because they are properties of something and there are no
vitalist type souls as their owners. And finally, that there are no genuine
emergent properties because emergence where posited is merely a measure of
present limits to knowledge.
Nagel takes the first horn of the dilemma above and claims, perhaps
uncontroversially (but then perhaps unsatisfactorily too), that to side-step the
74 T. Nagel, "Panpsychism," in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1979, pp.181-195.
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issue of how high-level experience arises from low-level sentience one needs
only to consider the richness and complexity of the way rudimentary sentient
entities may combine. The idea is that present limitations in epistemic range fully
explain any illusion we might harbour of there being insufficient causal power.
Our current notions regarding seemingly emergent psychical properties simply
indicate that there are properties in the constituent entities of which we are not
aware. Owing to this analysis, Nagel suggests we must look to these constituent
parts to discover the intrinsic psychical properties from which psychical
experience as we know it would follow. Note that the force of the argument rests
finally on the discovery of any such evidence. We can accept each of the four
premises and also accept that the conclusion would follow, but still find the
argument less than convincing for the sheer absence of intrinsic psychical
properties presently on hand and the heavy reliance on forthcoming evidence
supposedly suggesting them. But it could be that the lack of any evidence is in
large part the result of insufficient conceptual understanding. Perhaps the lowest
conceivable biological sentience is not the lowest conceivable sentience, and that
it is possible to conceive something like sentience, derivative from our
experience, even on the lowest physical level known to science. Targeting the
issue of present psychical evidence and its relation to our conceptual limits is
precisely what the versions of analogic and genetic arguments that we shall
presently consider aim to do.
So we can acknowledge the force of the objections against the genetic
argument in its traditional form and yet, by distancing our rendition of it from
that form and in a direction supplementing Nagel's, at once retrieve the force of
the argument while offering an acceptable metaphysical framework for its more
plausible elements. And the way to begin is by looking carefully at the empirical
sciences themselves and asking whether psychical realism as hypothesis is readily
conceivable and consistent with the facts of science. For the sciences today in
many of their manifestations are no longer committed to viewing the elementary
units of nature in ways that imply an absolute absence of sentient activity. In fact
upon close scrutiny they often seem to suggest more than just the possibility of
sentience there. With present day empirical data and the license that data now
grants to metaphysical speculation, contemporary science likewise has no
commitment to conceiving the basic units of nature as devoid of intrinsic value
or internal relations or final causation either. That license is mainly derived from
the phenomenalist aspect of contemporary physics, for at the quantum level
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reality models are no longer provided but merely shadows or symbols for reality,
which any number of metaphysical interpretations may attempt to explain by
providing coherent and adequate pictures of a world to coincide with the facts
those symbols express. In addition, scientists no longer insist that the laws that
govern these units are eternal, that time is unreal for them, or that all natural
phenomena are just the result of their external interactions wholly governed by
the four (known) natural forces. Science in short, by undergoing a paradigm
shift away from reductionist mechanism and toward organistic holism, has come
to the aid of psychical realist metaphysics by offering new evidence for genetic
continuity amongst the entities known to be in existence. How is this so?
§ The Great Chain of Becoming
At the outset we must emphasise a point made time and again, that sentience
on the level of the basic units of nature need not entail a crude
anthropomorphism. Human beings are endowed with a kind of complex
sentience that includes self-consciousness, abstract thought, perception, and
modally differentiated sensations, which in turn require a capacity for language,
a brain and central nervous system, and sense organs. It would be wildly
implausible to suggest that something of the sort obtains even at the level of the
lowest known forms of life, let alone at the subatomic level; and as we have seen,
the case for psychical realism requires no such thing. The analogies to our own
psychical experience must be kept in sharp focus, both in terms of their
similitudes and in terms of their differences. Yet in order to focus and then fill
out our earlier general analogic argumentation with genetic evidence, we do
well to proceed step by step, first down through the scale of living organisms,
and then to individual existences below that scale, always cautious in extending
our basic analogy and careful to keep scientific fact in the foreground.
The sentient entities that make up complex human experience are not easy to
divide either empirically or metaphysically into their constituent parts. While the
next chapter involves an in-depth examination of the metaphysical breakdown
from a process perspective, our present considerations of analogic and genetic
argument will focus on the empirical evidence. Recall from previous discussion
how unity and purpose provided the key to recognising the most general
ingredients of all experience. It is of course quite easy to note these features in
the higher animals. (Likewise we identify the raw materials for complex
sentience - language, a brain and nervous system, sense organs - in many of
them, opening up the possibility that the nature of say ape or porpoise
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experience is not so unlike our own.) As we go down the scale of animal life we
do find elements of behaviour that imply both unity and purpose, though
extending the notion of complex sentience resulting in conscious purpose,
instructed by past experience and aiming toward more or less remote future
results, becomes increasingly more difficult. We might identify birdsong for
instance as a primitive and naive intention of short duration having to do with
mating or danger. The bird is in fact displaying a genuine if short-run purpose
despite singing instinctively and so lacking the awareness of any grammatical
backdrop or conceptual understanding of its own message. Presumably fish have
some degree of unified purposeful activity, directed for the most part by an
awareness that spans shorter stretches of memory and anticipation. There is
something it is like to be a bird, a fish, and surely a bat - but beyond a certain
point behavioural cues diminish to little more than guess work. Just 'how little' is
what is at issue here.
We also know from previous discussion that to shift further down the animal
scale simply requires further generalisations from our own experience because
influence from the past and concern for the future, fully generalised, offer an
enormous, indeed infinite range of application, a point rarely taken for its full
significance. Tune the detection of purpose to a tiny fraction of a second ahead
and even an amoebae has something like a generalised minimal desire.
(Indeed amoebae, often cited in such contexts, are a far from simple case.
They are generally independent, solitary, and move about in an apparently
aimless way. Yet, by way of offsetting the standard attribution of an absolute
absence of aim, consider that forty thousand identical and originally isolated
amoeboid cells can as it were unite when pressed for survival in a colony of slime
mould, succeed at getting together and deciding on a course of action, undergo
differentiation and a well-orchestrated division of labour, dedicate their joint
efforts in an extraordinarily altruistic way to the promotion of survival in
a chosen few of their number, who in effect become the occupants of a vessel
fashioned out of their dead fellows for travel to a more suitable habitat.) So, let
us now consider the lower animal forms. They have of course fewer kinds of
sense receptors and far more primitive central nervous systems. Most insects
have to make do with information from two or three sense doors and something
akin to basic series circuitry wiring in their nervous systems. Hence less
complexity is expected regarding their sensory and mental experiences. Still we
can conceive a tenable, if imperfect, generalisation with little difficulty: sensorily
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by closing our eyes and covering our ears, mentally perhaps by undergoing
hypnosis, taking mind-alterating drugs. We can then shift further to forms of life
where organs relating to particular sense and nerve activity are utterly absent.
But never have varying sense modalities and nervous systems been necessary
conditions for experience fully generalised. Bacteria have what amounts to
a crude form of memory and they make decisions based on it, paramecia swim
without motor nerves, protozoa digest without stomachs. The living cells in
plants are accepted by botanists as organised individuals, reacting to stimuli and
ordering internal activities accordingly.75 The physiological equipment humans
rely upon is specific to human experience alone. The idea therefore that such
low-grade individuals have some rudimentary form of experience is not nearly
that far-fetched.
There is evolutionary evidence incidentally, indicating that only in a very
recent chapter of natural history do we find psychical phenomena such as
sensory experience, mental representations, and other higher mental processes
arising in the course of human and animal development. In the first two billion
years of the earth's existence there were no such things. This warrants a slight
digression. The fact of a hierarchy of complexity spanning the animal kingdom
and coinciding with the course of evolution suggests that these phenomena must
have evolved through various stages. If one were to hold that varied sense
modalities and nervous systems and the like were necessary conditions for the
presence of sentience, the fact of evolution would widen the rift between those
who locate experiential variables in nature's basic ingredients and those who
posit a point of emergence. The reason is that the emergence theorist would not
only be committed to an inexplicable leap from insentient entities to sentient
ones in every instance of experiential reality occurring nowadays, but evolving
sensory organs and nervous systems would also commit the emergentist to the
dubious view that in the relatively not so distant past there was no sentience in
the world whatsoever.
Since we are now approaching the point down the scale at which life forms
are so diminutive as to typically require the sheltering environment of another
host organism, namely ourselves in many cases, we might digress further to
mention another and related issue that comes between emergentists and
75 Whitehead described a plant as a democracy, for its parts (living cells) demonstrate more
unified purpose than do those parts arranged to form a plant, despite the obvious fact that
there does appear to be some degree, however variable and less unified, of purpose present
both in some plants and, alas, in the odd democracy.
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psychical realists. We noted above how in human beings any number of physical
conditions have corresponding mental effects. Brain research continues to amass
findings that relate physiological processes to psychical phenomena.
Electric shocks and stimulations, psycho-active drugs, and brain wave activity
alterations are all known to cause corresponding changes in states of
consciousness. The fact that a clear and immediate correspondence to specific
mental images has yet to be achieved may be due to the sheer complexity of the
integrated physiological processes that go on in countless brain neurones. At any
rate, our psychical experience does depend on chemical and physical processes in
these neurones. When neurophysiological processes are altered, psychical
phenomena are also altered.
Given that correspondence, the psychical realist (like the materialist)
acknowledges the enticing assumption of an identity between them, for on the
face of it an identity appears the most simple of explanations. To explain the
correspondence on the basis of two separate and fundamentally different sorts of
entities, mind and body, would entail postulating innumerable special laws
which determine the specific connections between the many different qualities of
sensations and mental images and the corresponding physiological processes.
A psychical realist picture on the other hand has it that all the characteristics on
the physiological side of the divide - the so-called matter constituting cells,
molecules, atoms, elementary particles and energy processes - are psychical
characteristics, that is not psychical characteristics in addition to the physical
characteristics, but rather the very same characteristics. Such entities are from
the inside essentially psychical, while from the outside they continue to conform
completely to the abstract physical descriptions of science. The 'simple
explanation' that avoids a dualist model is adhered to but not in the direction
many would assume. In a sense what we have is the reciprocal of central state
materialism. What this means is that when already psychical sub-atomic particles
and energy processes unite to form an atom, new atomic psychical characteristics
arise in this new system, and when atoms become united in molecules new
chemical psychical characteristics arise. As the integration of these psychical
characteristics reaches higher levels, as in living neurone cells of the brain and
central nervous system, the development could lead to human-level psychical
phenomena such as sensations and mental images.
How does this picture square with the biological sciences? A fertilised human
egg and the subsequent cellular stages are known (from the outside) not to show
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any signs of psychical processes. It is only after the development of sense
receptors and a brain not long before birth that reactions in the foetus
(from the inside) begin to suggest the experience of sensations. An emergence
scenario has it that somewhere along this line an insertion occurs. Already
betraying something of a makeshift quality, this assumed insertion is also suspect
because there are specific psychical traits inherited by offspring, as anyone
spending time with twins is well aware. These characteristics must be
transmitted through the DNA molecules in the sperm and egg cells. Since such
molecules, the general structure of which are well known, are capable of
transferring psychical characteristics and guiding developmental processes that
later lead to neurones and brains in which physiological processes correspond to
psychical phenomena, it seems reasonable to assume that in general the
molecules and their atoms already possess something of a psychical nature,
a something from the inside. And again, that in complex neurone cells such
psychical characteristics are then integrated into the psychical phenomena of
conscious experience. A reasonable assumption, yes, but one to be made more
compelling with backing by a tenable conception of generalised sentience.
Coming back to that task, we already noted that in considering the lowest
forms of life on the evolutionary scale, we discover forms which do not have
specialised sense organs or nervous systems. There are any number of organisms,
so simple they are identified ambiguously as either zoological or botanical
entities, that consist of microscopic bits of undivided protoplasm. These
lowest-level organisms, devoid of sense organs or nervous systems, cannot of
course have distinct sensory experience originating in differing sensory modes.
They do nevertheless have discriminative behavioural responses known as
tropisms.76 A tropism works like a reflex but differs in that it is a reaction that
embraces the entire organism rather than a localised response involving a single
organ. Taking this reflexive activity found permeating the entire organism into
account, it appears that the simplest life forms do respond differently as a whole
to different stimuli, and so are capable of qualitatively differentiated sensation.
The qualities may however reduce with the descent from the simpler
multicellular to the unicellular forms to a fundamental dichotomy of attraction
and aversion.
76 Extending tropisms beyond living forms in support of panpsychism was first suggested by
C. Butler on the Process Philosophy Forum, Process-Philosophy@mailbase.ac.uk. The present
argument is derived from his, "Panpsychism: A Restatement of the Genetic Argument" in
Idealistic Studies, Vol.8(1), 1978, pp.33-39.
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Now since sensations mediate stimulus and response in the case of at least
some reflexes, we know that they are sometimes causally efficacious. An example
developed by Whitehead concerns bright light and blinking.77 On the one hand
there is the retina stimulated by the flash, on the other the blinking of the eye.
Between the two the qualitatively bright sensation serves as mediator, caused by
the former and causing the latter. Moreover, qualitatively differentiated
sensation is never known not to mediate stimulus and response. Reflexes which
occur without any conscious sensation such as in the workings of internal organs
are not known to be unaccompanied by sensation; it may be that one is
unconscious of sensation in the responding organ. This point recalls our analysis
of radical perception above. It may seem we are half-begging a good many
questions by introducing 'unconscious sensation', but understand that our main
argument concerns the descent down the scale toward the simplest sentient
individuals; in the fully developed account the assumed sensations in organs are
explained in terms of the constituent individuals involved. (The example serves
its limited purpose, given a generalised notion of sensation as implied say in
a physician's diagnosis, and other examples abound that make good the
assumption.) Hence there is some inductive grounds for supposing that
qualitatively differentiated sensation always mediates a stimulus and
discriminative response, both in the case of reflexes and tropisms. For we have no
empirical evidence that in a tropism stimulus and response are not mediated by
sensation, and the simpler view is that these phenomena act after the fashion of
the ones for which we do have some evidence.
To consider such sensation in more detail, enroute to establishing better
grounds for generalisation, we need to distinguish sensations specific to
particular sensory modes from sensory qualities common to all sensory modes.
Many of our differentiated sense qualities become painful upon reaching
a certain extreme of intensity. Since sensations originating in any sensory mode
can be painful (lights may blind, temperatures burn, sounds pierce, and so on),
and since painful sensations become hardly distinguishable as intensity increases
(extreme temperatures do not feel hot or cold finally, but just more painful), it is
possible to conceive a sensation of pain indistinguishable in sense modality
terms. Those unfortunate souls who have endured something of the sort, perhaps
as accident victims, carry a keen experiential sense of as much and require no
philosophical prodding here. The sensation mediating stimulus and response in
77 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, pp.174-175.
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the simplest forms of life may be akin to this sort of modally undifferentiated
pain sensation. Of course the intensity levels would be dramatically diminished
from those we must entertain regarding our senses in the way of grasping the
idea. In effect for a unicellular organism it would amount to no more than
a basic sense of aversion, and the mediation amount to the mere causing of the
response that removes the pain provoking stimulus. Note that the dichotomy
between attraction and aversion is maintained but in a simplified form. We can
interpret the lack of tropistic convulsion as a sense of pleasure or at least of
satisfaction, marked by the repetition of whatever activity that does not result in
an undifferentiated pain sensation. With this simplification attraction reduces to
settling for a lack of disturbance.
Prior to applying the notion of tropistic sensation to conceive a way to extend
a generalised sense of experience beyond that of even unicellular life forms we
need attend to a few preliminaries. For here we enter an area of investigation
marked by continually shifting tides of controversy. For since Aristotle the
division of reality into that which possesses souls and thereby lives and that
which does not has been as much a piece of common sense as it is a philosophical
doctrine. But science has come a long way since the time of the Greeks and today
the line between the living and the non-living is no longer easy to draw. On the
one hand cell biologists continue to make new discoveries regarding the
constituents and structures of living things, and in their ability to synthesise such
forms, causing the definition of life to require an increasingly wider range of
interpretation. On the other hand the discoveries particle physicists continue to
make regarding the properties of matter (mass, force, charge, valence, quantum
states, strangeness, charm, and so on) widen the range of interpretation that
defines the non-living world. Many believe these advances suggest that the
difference between lifeless matter and primitive life forms is merely one of
degree, and that ascertaining a particular point below which there could be no
sentience is impossible. Meanwhile, others claim these same advances point
exactly in the opposite direction, and still others hold fast to the ancient division
claiming that each side's advances cancel out those of the other side.
From the point of view of the present investigation, it is enough that all the
parties in the debate agree that the lines are not fixed but rather shifting with
the tides of discovery. This alone implies that what we know of the psychical and
the physical need not indicate mutually exclusive existences. One side of the
widening interpretation reveals that rudimentary psychical features, distantly
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related to those we know via experience, do not entail the altering of physical
facts. The other side shows that rudimentary physical features, given current
understanding of the equivalence of mass and energy, have lost their substantial
essence. And these interpretations need not run contrary to commonly held
suppositions. Specifically, we can challenge the argument that physical and
psychical phenomena differ fundamentally in that the multifariousness of the
former comes about largely through quantitative differences, while the latter is
multifarious due to the vast array of psychical qualities involved. True enough,
subatomic particles and energy processes unite to form more than a hundred
kinds of atoms which in turn unite to form innumerable kinds of molecules that
unite into differing minerals and into organic structures that compose the living
cells and tissues of plants and animals; while it is also true that psychical
phenomena are characterised by countless qualities which are experienced as
something primarily given and irreducible. But this difference is abated by the
fact that the quantitatively differing stages of integration of the physical can be
disintegrated as well as synthesised, whereas psychical phenomena (such as ours)
are only experienced at high levels of integration for which corresponding
disintegrations and syntheses are not experientially accessible. The fact of
a shifting division between the two realms, whatever the ultimate implications,
already allows the viewing of the genes of biochemistry as atoms and molecules
of extreme complexity, and ought likewise to warrant the viewing of atoms and
molecules as organisms of extreme simplicity.
We are now ready to apply the notion of tropistic sensation to conceive a way
to extend a generalised sense of experience to the pre-biological level. What then
would a sentience more basic than the tropistic be like, on a level below even
that of unicellular life forms? Not only would it be incapable of sensation
distinguished according to sense modality, but it would also be incapable of
sensation distinguished according to quality. That is to say, the notion
of attraction and aversion corresponding to external environmental differences
would itself collapse. Every entity exists in an environment with particular
structural and qualitative characteristics, and yet at molecular, atomic, and
subatomic levels presumably those characteristics would have to go unnoticed so
to speak. There would simply be no such distinctions.
Two counters to the idea arise at once. First, is such sentience conceivable? In
our experience we indeed encounter sensory input that is principally if not
entirely confused at times, though typically coming through one sense mode at
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a time. Think of the million particles making up the blinding fog, the countless
sounds contributing to the roar of deafening waves, the fleeting activity carrying
the charge of an electric shock. Despite being slightly less than completely
confused and always open to cross-sensory and cognitive illumination, these
experiences at least indicate the direction non-qualitatively distinguishable
sentience might take. It would be sufficient for present conceptual purposes at
any rate. Second, is such sentience distinguishable from no particular quality or
determination whatsoever? As we have seen, contrast effects are the foundation
of differentiated sensation. But just as eliminating separations between sense
modes did not imply an outright lack of sensation, so too eliminating separations
between what is and is not the feel of a particular quality does not imply an utter
absence of a quality. Hence such sentience would entail sensation having
a quality that is not externally and comparatively determined as being other than
something else, but that is a quality all the same.
It follows that we cannot apply the idea of an utterly confused and completely
undifferentiated sensation of pain, as we did with unicellular organisms. Trying
to conceive the sentience in this way implies a level slightly higher than the
lowest conceivable. But the disturbance of pain emerges at the biological level
and serves to guide the survival of an organism. Even should we allow the
possibility of a pain sensation completely devoid of biological purpose, it would
still be qualitatively differentiated from a prior state of pleasure or of
satisfaction, and consequently would not be sentience in its lowest
conceivable form. It is conceivable, on the other hand, that this most basic form
of sentience consists in a modally and qualitatively undifferentiated sensation of
mere satisfaction. In this case it would have to be of a low intensity
(hence 'satisfaction') for just as pain is correlated with sensation of high
intensity, when satisfaction tends toward intense pleasure it too may become
painful.
Take neutrons and photons as examples. We might conceive the sentience of
a free neutron to be painful by virtue of its being supported by an atomic
environment and eventually disintegrating outside of it. When the atomic
environmental conditions of the neutron's support are no longer there the
neutron would appear to harbour a sensation of pain. If those support conditions
were not restored the neutron would disintegrate. Pain in this case appears as the
experience of a supported entity deficient in support. Of course at this
pre-biological level entities in pain are incapable of responses which would
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restore their supportive environments. The satisfaction here is not experienced as
avoiding pain, nor as a means to restoring satisfaction if the pain is experienced
as satisfaction interrupted. Even so the endurance of such an individual particle
is a rudimentary social process in which each event is seen to arise in accordance
with its relations to prior events. Conversely, we may conceive a qualitatively
undifferentiated sensation of satisfaction exemplified in an isolated photon.
The case of a photon differs in that it is said to be stable even in an isolated or
free state. Hence it is not a supported entity and so on this analysis it would be
incapable of pain.
Admittedly, we press our conceivability concerns toward the limit here.
We reach a point where it may no longer be easy to think analogously of atomic
sentience, even in this entirely generalised sense. Bear in mind however that it is
no easier to think of the insentient content or quality of atomic reality.
The question of how other sentient entities go about experiencing is more than
enough of a mystery to contend with; no reason justifies the addition of a second
ontological mystery of supposedly insentient entities - a realm of vacuous
actuality. Recall that the psychical realist does allow for insentient entities of one
sort, namely crowds of individuals such as the rocks and trees in nature and the
spectators in sports arenas, but the assertion that these crowds as a whole are
insentient also in their constituent parts offers no further explanatory value.
What the above considerations amount to is the conceivability of
pre-biological sentience as far down the scale as the subatomic level. We have at
least detailed the possibility that the lowest conceivable levels of sentience could
exist on the lowest physical levels known to science. In establishing this much we
provide a conceptual base from which science can then proceed to the
painstaking project of discovering ways primitive biological sentience may have
emerged out of the pre-biological realm through a process of complexification.
The argument for psychical realism depends not so much on the particular
interpretation of subatomic sentience on offer here as on the assumption of
complexity of even the simplest conceivable biological sentience, and on the
additional assumption that complex, internally differentiated, organic wholes
initially emerge or evolve out of entities of a less complex nature, so that
experiential entities capable of feeling pain for instance evolve from simpler
pre-biological entities lacking this capacity, but not from entities absolutely
lacking sentience.
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§ The Critique of Pure Feeling
Empirical sciences, we hasten to add, cannot prove the truth of a metaphysical
position. Nevertheless they can discredit false ones, especially insofar as they are
based on earlier and less precise scientific investigation, and provide positive
support for a would-be true metaphysical position, perhaps as scientific points
raised above have done. For if it is the case that the world is comprised of
psychical entities, then we ought to expect science to tend more and more to
reveal this fact. But are the patterns of scientific development really providing
just this sort of evidence? To answer this question we next turn to examine the
scientific framework that delimits the conceptual backdrop relating to analogic
and genetic argumentation. We thereby expose the standard relevant mistakes,
exemplified here in an argument put forth by Karl Popper, purported to stand as
a general refutation of any form of psychicalism that assigns a foundational role
to the nature of elementary entities. This argument is particularly noteworthy as
it challenges any number of psychicalist strategies, and the conceptual basis
behind it, though unable to stand up to the scrutiny, has been a pervasive
hindrance to entertaining a psychical realist point of view.78
In addressing the argument Popper propounds in The Self and Its Brain, we
must first see that implicit in the analysis as presented thus far is a generalised
sense of the notion of memory. It is valid to consider memory a kind of primal
sentience out of which all others derive.79 From the point of view of human
experience, our ability to remember allows us to follow the rules that make all
other experiential operations possible. Without it logic, science, poetry would be
lost to the species, the ordering and apprehending of all thought and sensation
would be lost to each individual. We would be utterly cut off from any
knowledge of prior experience and the patterns constructed from it. If even
subatomic entities are conceived as sentient and thereby responsive to
environmental variables, they too must take account of or remember something
of that environment. For Popper recognises memory-like states as just this
minimal criteria. Thus the first part of his argument begins with the supposition
that a state or process is sentient - specified as an instance of consciousness or
awareness - only if it is, or if it is accompanied by memory. With this the
psychical realist is agreed, but Popper's wording here betrays incipient pitfalls in
78 The following analysis is derived from A. Bjeland's, "Popper's Critique of Panpsychism and
Proto-Mentalism" The Modern Schoolman, 59, 1982, pp.233-254.
79 Although perception is another primal aspect of experience, we classify it as a special form of
immediate impersonalmemory. See radical perceptual realm section above.
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his reasoning. He takes conscious awareness as exemplary support for the idea.
"After every memory loss (even upon waking up from deep sleep)," Popper notes,
"it takes some little time before we can, as it were, re-assemble ourselves and
become fully conscious."80 He then considers that if memory were atomised
incrementally in a particular way all conscious awareness would go. The reason
being that, given the required minimal span of continuity of memory, we can
imagine a thought experiment in which increments of memory loss are induced
with a frequency and duration that exceeds the time required to 're-assemble
ourselves' between them. Obviously in this scenario there would be no moments
of consciousness or awareness at all, and Popper's experiment is backed up by
current theories concerning the functioning of total anaesthetics.
One initial objection to this stage of the argument is that it is ambiguous.
Popper allows that there exists, "something that may be described as unconscious
memory - that is, memory of which we are not aware."81 Presumably
unconscious memory is a sort of sentience, and Popper must consider it differing
in degree alone but not in kind from the sort of extinguished memory that he
mentions may result from injuries, electric shocks or drugs. In many instances of
so-called extinguished memory there is recovery of the lost material, which could
only be the case if the two types were really one. And the business of
re-assembling ourselves also seems to imply there being a state that, although
less than fully conscious, is yet not devoid of sentience. Without guidelines to
clarify the relation of unconscious to extinguished memory, we cannot properly
evaluate the argument.
By far the more forceful objection however is that the argument has no direct
bearing upon psychical realism. We know the doctrine does not conceive the
sentience of elementary particles as states of conscious awareness, but of
radically diminished sentience, rudimentary and unconscious. Popper's thought
experiment of atomising memory only does away with forms of conscious
awareness. Yet he wrongly asserts that the conclusion of this first stage of the
argument,
speaks strongly against the theory of panpsychism according to which
atoms, or elementary particles, have something like an inside view... that
80 K. Popper and J.C. Eccles, The Selfand Its Brain. NY: Verlag, 1977, p.70.
81 K. Popper and J.C. Eccles, The Selfand Its Brain. NY: Verlag, 1977, p.69.
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constitutes the unit... out of which the consciousness of animals and men is
formed.82
In the second stage of the argument, Popper tries to firm up this claim with
data from contemporary physics to the effect that, "elementary particles have
emphatically no memory... are completely physically identical whatever their
past history."83 The required memory-like states are ascribed in this instance if
the entities differ in some dispositional capacity due to individual past influences
from other elementary entities. The scientific basis is the fact that present
physical theory does indicate that some elementary physical entities of the same
class, namely two isotopes of the same atom, despite whatever differences in their
past histories are physically completely identical in character and yet
extrinsically or positionally different, that is to say are not numerically one and
the same.
Popper concedes that at least some entities normally regarded as inanimate
occasionally display memory-like states. "Steel 'remembers' that it has been
magnetised. A growing crystal 'remembers' a fault in its structure."84 Ironically
both are problematic examples for the psychical realist in that they are not
clear-cut cases of unified individuals. At any rate, steel bars and growing crystals
may or may not show differing responses due to the effects of influence in their
histories persisting in their present internal states. The psychicalist answer would
reflect whether the individual sentient ingredients involved add up into a more
purposeful and unified individual displaying a higher degree of sentience. But it
is already consistent with Popper's memory-like criteria to allow a low-level
sentience in both of these cases. The fact, if it is one, that some objects commonly
considered inanimate occasionally display memory-like states commits Popper to
some sentience story or another. And he would no doubt opt for the low-level
atomistic version, given his resistance to the notion of emergent novelty, for that
version allows in the least. Again, Popper is ambiguous on this point.
Crucial to the argument is the manner and extent to which present physical
theory indicates that some elementary entities are completely physically identical
in character. What Popper has in mind is the way different isotopes of the same
atom work as 'mutually substituent variables' in the models and mathematical
formulations of contemporary physics. But such mutual substifuency is the
82 K. Popper and J.C. Eccles, The Selfand Its Brain. NY: Verlag, 1977, p.71.
83 K. Popper and J.C. Eccles, The Selfand Its Brain. NY: Verlag, 1977, p.71.
84 K. Popper and J.C. Eccles, The Selfand Its Brain. NY: Verlag, 1977, p.71.
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product of the external viewpoints and the consequent degree of quantitative
abstraction that science engages in, viewpoints manipulated in part by concerns
as to the limits on range of scientific interests and the aesthetics of simplicity.
Popper admits that, "what we call the laws of physics are the results of our
search for invariance,"85 and recognises that this search for invariance is
conducted within the context of restricted, more or less pragmatic, problem
situations. Thus the purported identity is but a function of current scientific
affairs, and any assertion of an absolute absence of differing dispositional
capacities is unfounded. It may be that present scientific acumen leave those
capacities undetected. Notice that the uncertainty relations used for
interpretation at the quantum mechanical level of analysis reveal the aprioristic
character of the suggested identity of separate elementary particles.
The probabilities are laid out in such manner that they simply cannot be falsified.
But But to infer an absolute identity from this present conceptual set up is surely
to confuse an epistemological claim with an ontological one.
Hence, contrary to Popper's assertions, it is not at all clear that memory is
entirely ruled out by the findings of contemporary science, and Popper's
argument fails to provide a general refutation of psychicalist theories which
assign a foundational role to the nature of elementary entities. The patterns of
scientific development regarding that nature do not in themselves deny this sort
of evidence but rather expose unwarranted conceptual limitations that impede
research possibilities.
§ The Feeling Idea: An After-Word
In this final section we come full circle by returning to the obstinate objection
that it remains inappropriate, despite the cluster of arguments already presented,
to ascribe various aspects of 'feeling' to the activities of the world's most minute
entities. It simply seems a misuse of language - 'words on metaphysical
holiday' - when so employed, for the analogy is being stretched too far to make
any sense. A proper response to address the point cannot help but touch upon
issues already made plain, but a separate summary attempt at first drawing out
the embedded phenomenological emphasis and then sharpening up the relevant
reasoning that undergirds the analogous use of 'feeling' may shed additional
metaphysical light.
85 K. Popper and J.C. Eccles, The Selfand Its Brain. NY: Verlag, 1977, p.14.
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An analogy (of any kind) only serves if a degree of understanding is there on
one of its two sides at the outset, to be reapplied to further that degree on the
other. Perhaps when it conies to the idea of feeling the trouble initially arises
with the would-be more informed side. Arguably the psychical realist and the
objector begin with respectively broader and narrower working knowledge of
what 'feeling' is understood to mean. It is important then to point out that
Whitehead's and Hartshorne's initial commitment to psychical realism, and the
ensuing rejection of materialism and dualism, were based on phenomenological
and psychological insights into the inseparability of sensory qualities from
a more simple sort of feeling quality.
In introspection, really retrospection, the direct datum is previous
human feeling; in sensation the datum is previous subhuman feeling.
This means that direct experience, even apart from behaviour, shows
that the word feeling applies more broadly than merely to mammals or
many-celled animals.86
Each philosopher independently discovered human sensation to be this form
of human awareness of subhuman feeling, disclosing the essential
'feeling of feelings' quality of immediate sensory experience. Hartshorne hints at
an inadequate experiential analysis in suggesting that, "those who fail to find
experience as itself a datum are those whose conscious attention is to the
data of previous perception rather than to the previous perceiving - and
remembering - itself."87 Careful phenomenological analysis rather reveals both
the experiencing and experienced object distinction and the temporal spread in
experience that supports that distinction. Hence Whitehead and Hartshorne can
also explain vague normal (as well as very intense special) forms of physical
pleasure as being a participation in their own 'bodily lives', that is in the feelings
of their cells, which presumably are remote from their own standard higher
feelings, but are shared in experience all the same. In this way they arrived at
a valid account of the emotive content of those sensations that are the only
directly perceived qualities (in the more than merely structural sense) of physical
reality, and found it quite natural to apply a generalised sense of 'feeling' to
describe the (relatively) independent activity of those sensations.
Thus far the suspicion is that this more informed phenomenological
standpoint, which was set out more fully when introducing prehension above,
leads to an easier - indeed less extended - use of analogy from experience, given
86 C. Hartshorne,. "Why Psychicalism?" Process StudiesVol.6,1, 1976, p.67.
87 C. Hartshorne, The Philosophy ofCharles Hartshorne. Chicago: Open Court, 1991, p.694.
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the ever-present reminder of experienced subhuman cellular feelings. But this is
only one outcome of that experiential emphasis. The argument from an
admittedly flawed analogy may be all that we have to go on (save for
metaphysical coherence factors), but it is well to recognise that the argument is
brought in to extend what we already have in a limited form from memory and
perception. Again, we know sentience from the inside from our own previous
psychical states somewhat distinctly in personal memory and from other previous
subhuman psychical states indistinctly in impersonal memory (perception),
or from one's own past psychical states and from psychical states of bodily
constituents. While not rendering behavioural cues that may suggest the
presence of 'feeling' unnecessary, it supplements those criteria with a more
direct criterion in a special case other than the introspective one. It remains true
that beyond this special case we only have the behavioural criteria, but this also
goes some way toward qualifying how 'feeling' is used analogously. Certainly
prehension in our own instance, that of participation or feeling of previous
feeling along with some sense of the future, that of dependence of actuality on
other actuality, is analogically available for general application from the
subatomic to the gods, for all these prehensive features are directly intuited in
immediate memories and in bodily experience.
In the previous section the conceptual exercise amounted to stretching the
analogy down to the level of particle physics. All the while we were careful to
show that the only sense in which psychical realism implies feeling in particles is
the extremely generalised sense that certainly does not imply anything as
complex as reproductive capacities, genetic codings, nervous systems and the
like - features that only occur in cellular and animal sentience. The warrant for
taking this procedure ultimately down to particle physics was the need to
unearth appropriate conceptual boundaries. "Early human societies had no clear
notion of mere dead, insentient matter," Hartshorne suggests, "It required an
incipient science of so-called inorganic nature to produce the concept. So one
appropriate way to argue against it is with the help of physicists."88 In the
process of extending the analogy both the criteria and the concept were fully
generalised. A variety of earlier investigations spelled out that the criteria
include self-initiated movement and activity, unity or integration of the
movements and activities, some degree of influence of the past and the immediate
environment, and some expression of anticipation, desire, purpose, satisfaction
88 C. Hartshorne, The PhilosophyofCharles Hartshorne. Chicago: Open Court, 1991, p.691.
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for the immediate present and future. It is rather a more scientific than
philosophical project to set out which are the final self-initiated and unified
individuals. As for past influence, our treatment of causality showed how
responsiveness to other things that in our experience appears as memory or
perception cannot be denied even to these final individuals, since causality
would then also be denied. As for purpose, valuation, satisfaction, it is important
to realise that among the differences which the idea of feeling can tolerate are
enormous contrasts in both space and time spans. Since physicists use ordinary
words like movement, mass, slow, fast, in ways that would not occur to anyone
not somewhat familiar to modern science, Hartshorne wonders if there is any
warrant for prohibiting psychology from using ordinary concepts like response,
stimulus, memory, preference behaviour and satisfaction, aversive behaviour and
dissatisfaction, in the interest of understanding the genuinely self-active
and unified individuals, the final units of nature.89
In addition, recall the simple logical truth that groups of imperceptibly minute
active individuals may not appear as active or sentient, merely because the
minute individuals comprising them are active. It is a fallacy to attribute
the apparent inertia of a group to its members. The 'matter' referred to by
physicists is best understood as referring to such groups, and meaning 'inactive
for our senses though comprised of active individuals' resulting in an unfeeling
whole whose minimally self-initiating components have no (or are no)
appreciably conscious feelings, and for which causal determinism seems to apply
all but universally. Hartshorne insists that psychical realism,
fully admits the reality of the entities referred to in physics... but asks
only, What are these individuals like? To the answer - They are as the
physicist describes them and that is all that can be said - [psychical
realism] replies that so far as all matters of detail are concerned this is
correct, since philosophy has no jurisdiction over questions of detail,
which belong entirely to the special sciences, but that there are some
questions of principle which in the present state of the special sciences
are likely to be forgotten. At present, at any rate, physics describes the
mere spatio-temporal outline of things, but says nothing about the
qualitative stuff by which there outlines are filled in to constitute
realities.90
Focusing his philosophical analysis on what the 'special sciences' leave to one
side, Hartshorne derives the following conclusions and consequent insight into
the standard scientific biases.
89 C. Hartshorne, "Why Psychicalism?" Process StudiesVol.G, 1, 1976, p.68.
90 C. Hartshorne, BeyondHumanism. Chicago: Willet, Clark, 1937, p.177.
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'Mind' and 'matter' are not two ultimately different sorts of entity but,
rather, two ways of describing a reality that has many levels of
organisation. The 'mind' way I take to be more final and inclusive, so
that my position is the opposite of materialism. However, I recognise that
the material mode of description is that part of the complete mode which
is capable of scientific precision and that, accordingly, 'methodological
materialism' or the restriction of attention to this mode, is a natural bias
among scientists.91
The fundamental assumption, perhaps not universally shared amongst
philosophers, but readily accepted by Whitehead and Hartshorne who both
emphasise prehension, is that we can and do know something of the fundamental
nature of things apart from and prior to the language and the categories we then
turn to for making reports concerning that knowledge. Accordingly psychical
realism does suggest a definite view about the ideal order of the sciences.
Only a completed comparative social psychology could ever hope to provide
complete empirical knowledge, of which physics would be the branch dealing
with the most widely distributed dynamic individuals - 'trivial puffs of existence'
- at the lowest levels of rudimentary feeling. Because of these limitations, of
course, physics would be the most severely behaviouristic branch of such
a psychology, a point reflecting the measure of our limited knowledge, not the
measure of reality.
Since Hartshorne generally insists that there can be no such thing as an
entirely negative fact - "But what would it be like to feel the total absence
somewhere of feeling other than one's own? I think that there is no way this
could be done."92 - supplementing physics with a 'psychics' that affords an
integrity and comprehensive completion to an otherwise depleted
(and problematic) account seems all the more warranted. Feeling a complete
absence of feeling would require experiencing something else that is
incompatible with feeling, which logically could not co-exist with feeling, which
we have previously shown to be inconceivable. In this light the concept of dead,
inanimate, inactive individuals underlying reality appears as an instance of the
unjustified scepticism that it really is, a more technical companion piece to the
scarcely genuine scepticism of other minds. Metaphysics in any case is concerned
with the generic features of feeling, not its specific or individual nuances.
Any problems arising from the privacy and the peculiarities of the latter in no
way prevents metaphysical generalisations of the former.
91 C. Hartshorne, The Logic ofPerfection. Chicago: Open Court, 1962, p.217.
92 C. Hartshorne, Existence andActuality. Chicago: Univ. Press, 1984, p.40.
158
This leads us to a few final points regarding metaphysical language. Certainly
metaphysical principles are more general than scientific ones, but are to be
understood as on a continuum with scientific principles (as scientific ones are on
a continuum with ordinary language principles) in that they are intended to
afford literal accurate information about the world. However Whitehead begins
his own monumental metaphysical treatise by owning up to the expected
difficulties in metaphysical endeavours.
Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first
principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in the
way inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a
generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of
language be stabilised as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely
appealing for an imaginative leap.93
From a perspective common amongst analytic philosophers, the upshot of the
charge of 'metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap' comes to
considering ultimate metaphysical claims such as the universal application of
'feeling' a utter misuse of language, reducing it to what is perhaps
philosophically worse than false: namely devoid of any meaning at all.
In conceiving the smallest and greatest psychical entities, "it is hardly surprising
that the meaning problem is here acute," Hartshorne likewise concedes, "We are
in this matter trying to conceive what is most unlike ourselves but superior, as in
dealing with atoms and particles, we are trying to conceive what is most unlike
ourselves but inferior. Difficulty is to be expected in both cases."94
Aware that language breaks down when it seeks explicit rendering of the final
generalities, Whitehead offers an alternative diagnosis. "Metaphysics deals with
those notions that are relevant to the most general aspects of experience.
Ordinary language was however made to deal with particulars..." and so
develops a more constructive proposal, "Philosophy must redesign language in
the same way that in physical science pre-existing appliances are redesigned." 93
Acknowledging that a precise language must await a completed metaphysical
knowledge, the metaphysician must make do meanwhile with whatever
tool-making capacities that are at hand. A balance must be struck between the
utmost pragmatic uses of words and their more suggestive powers. To err toward
the ordinary use results in the fallacy of holding to (thus limiting concerns to)
the myth of a perfect dictionary. "In fact language has been formed chiefly to
93 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.4.
94 C. Hartshorne, Existence andActuality. Chicago: Univ. Press, 1984, p.39.
95 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.ll.
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express such concepts. It is for this reason that language, in its ordinary uses,
penetrates but a short distance into the principles of metaphysics. "9G To err
toward the overly suggestive results not in deeper penetration but in unfounded
speculation and finally loss in meaning. To take the psychical realist example of
feeling, admittedly the issue is as remote from ordinary ways of thinking as some
issues in contemporary physics. But in considering a metaphysical issue, neither
physics nor ordinary language nor common sense exhaust the options worth
considering. Philosophers must recognise that neither the bounds of ordinary
language nor the programmes of contemporary science are necessarily definitive
for all time. Comparative psychology has already expanded substantially in our
time, as we have seen in discussing empirical issues related to the genetic
argument, and we have tried to make the logical mainstays and conceptual
advantages of feeling as a metaphysical category abundantly clear.
One of the uses of philosophy is to help future scientists to transcend
mere common sense, as Greek atomism and Platonic cosmology,
(but hardly Aristotle, with his common-sense physics) helped early
modern physicists. The inhibiting role akin to that of Aristotle is assumed
by many philosophers today. It is well that some of us should take
a different role.97
When we ponder the opening up of logical possibility, and the expanded
conceivability defended earlier, the genetic argument and the analogic prove to
be impressive companion pieces in advancing the case for psychical realism.
We have now defined and clarified our position, elaborated on the role
perception and reason may play in its affirmation, and examined the key
argument forms put forth on its behalf. The case becomes all the more
compelling, I submit, when accompanied by the most expansive metaphysical
system erected in our time, and shown to serve as centrepiece to that system and
as its most formidable support. We proceed forthwith to a detailed study of
process thought and the psychical realism involved in that thinking.
96 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.167.
97 C. Hartshorne, "Why Psychicalism7" Process Studies Vol.6,1, 1976, p.70.
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Metaphysics of Experience
"The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts
from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air
of imaginative generalisation; and it again lands for renewed observation
rendered acute by rational interpretation."
PART ONE
The Process Ancestry
The process philosophical interpretation of reality represents a formidably
high-flying and wide-reaching speculative endeavour, emblematic of a profound
shift in metaphysics this century. With an ontological and epistemical priority of
process over that which is in process, of what entities do over what they are, it
aims at approaching reality as an abundance of process instead of as a set of
things, of dynamic changes in lieu of static substances. On process reckoning,
change in its many manifestations is the pervasive, predominant, principal
feature of all that exists, and experiential events form the primary ontology.
Reality originates in process and is inexorably characterised by process and is
best understood in terms of process. The process philosopher also employs a
modified form of teleological explanation, part pluralistic and part monistic,
emphasising both the individuality of events and the internal relations that fuse
them. The continual creation of greater wholes of integrated purpose is
established, and an immanent pattern or principle of order is exhibited.
An accent on creativity shows how it is constitutive of all experiential events; an
accent on organicity displays how the division of psychical and physical or
subject and object is overcome; and an accent on temporality outlines the nature
of pervasive process at the core of the metaphysical system and basic to
understanding reality. Thus with a process orientation all major ontological
elements and categories are understood, all of reality's necessary features and the
general character of its contingent ones are explained, all its value is thereby
accounted for and its significance thereby indicated.
Pointing out its place as embedded in amongst a variety of significant
philosophers and philosophical movements helps put forth a rough and ready
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guide to the particulars of process thought. By and large, along with the rejection
of Aristotelian substance and acceptance of the reality of change as ontologically
fundamental, process thinkers tend to reject Cartesian certainty and accept
pragmatic meaning as epistemologically fundamental, and they tend to reject
Kantian transcendentalism and consider versions of immanent theism as
metaphysically fundamental. They likewise reject Spinoza's radical monism
as well as Hume's radical pluralism, and establish a reasonable mean of an
integrated pluralism between the two extremes. Hegel's and anybody else's
determinism, as well as Bradley's and anybody else's eternalism are also rejected
as extremes while common sense principles of freedom under constraint and the
reality of time are developed. Wittgenstein's, Husserl's, Heidegger's, and Sartre's
critiques of metaphysics, arising from linguistic analytical, reductive
phenomenal, wanting phenomenological, and radical existential outlooks, are
typically dismissed or ignored by process philosophers as attacks on outmoded
classical philosophical and theological models. These critiques have little in
common with a metaphysics based on careful considerations of logical and
coherent hypotheses, and their consequences in terms of applicability
and adequacy to the facts informing and clarifying experience.
Thus far mostly what is rejected in the work of great thinkers has been
mentioned, but the list of notable philosophers that in the main expound central
tenets of process thought - in some cases unwittingly - is a long one, beginning
perhaps with the Buddha and Heraclitus. Following these traces back to
antecedents deep in classical antiquity, the process persuasion as a major
philosophical tendency has had its adherents among eminent thinkers
throughout the history of thought, in addition to its adoption in various forms by
many of the great minds of our time. A definitive list of merely the main thinkers
would have to include much that can be found in the medieval Socinus and the
early modern Leibniz, in a host of modern philosophers down to the present
century including Hume and Hegel, Fechner and Marx, Peirce and James,
Nietzsche and Bergson, Alexander and Dewey, Mead and Montague, Berdyaev
and Chardin, and most explicitly, in the recent process metaphysics of Alfred
North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.1
1 See C. Hartshorne, "Ideas and Theses of Process Philosophers" in Two Process Philosophers:
Hartshorne's Encounter with Whitehead. Tallahassee: American Academy of Religion, 1973,
and Philosophers ofProcess, D. Browning ed. NY: Random House, 1965.
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Turning to recent movements in the history of ideas, six additional 'isms' come
to mind when locating the genesis of process thinking in that history. The first
two, mechanism and vitalism, are dismissed as characteristically extreme and
wrong-headed reactions to the advancement of science. In one direction the
quantification of reality by Galileo and Newton fostered over-ambitious
programmes of doing away with a class of superstitions whose range threatened
to include all life and all subjective experience. In the other direction, an overly
romantic reaction arose and gained some credence through dubious applications
of early evolutionary thinking. From around the turn of the century the work of
some process philosophers, notably Bergson, Peirce, James and Whitehead,
represents a number of middle-path manoeuvres, ways in which the richness of
subjective experience could be salvaged and given an account, but not at the
high cost of either undermining the facts of mechanics or misconstruing and
embellishing the discoveries of evolutionary biology. As to the four remaining
'isms', process philosophy does emphasise and apply aspects of Darwinism
(though speculative claims of evolutionary cosmology are qualified), idealism
(though neither in its transcendental nor subjective varieties), pragmatism
(though verification constraints on metaphysics are qualified), and realism
(though of a special critical variety based on an ontology of experience).
Thus Darwinist, idealist, pragmatist, and realist themes are all accepted in broad
outline though qualified and developed in terms of a metaphysical vision of
process. This vision of process is finally more illuminating than any list of
applicable 'isms', the real eye-opener (or mind-opener) being a shift of one's
attention from things to happenings as the basic bits of the real, and the
accompanying shift in emphasis on careful introspection for clarifying the
experiential events of all kinds, human and nonhuman, that compose the world.
The case for process philosophy rests as much on its adequacy to the facts of
experience as on its coherence, and that experience includes not only eidetic
investigation of one's one subjectivity but also the well-established teachings of
the physical sciences.
One last point regarding 'isms': perhaps the most appropriate one to apply to
this sort of philosophy is the phrase 'constructive postmodernism' coined by
David Ray Griffin.2 This is because process philosophers, as Griffin makes plain,
share with their deconstructive postmodern counterparts a recognition of the
2 D. R. Griffin, Founders ofConstructive Postmodern Philosophy. NY: Suny Press, 1993.
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need to deconstruct various notions that were basic to modern and in some cases
premodern world views. Yet they differ in that instead of recommending an
anti-world view, that is to say an overcoming of all attempts to characterise the
totality as a result of that deconstruction, process philosophers recognise
the necessity and possibility of constructing new cosmologies that might be
recommended as candidates for a more adequate world view.
More specifically, process thinkers recognise two fundamental flaws in
modern philosophy: an ontology based on a materialistic doctrine of nature and
an epistemology based on a sensationist doctrine of perception. The sensationist
doctrine claims not only that all knowledge is grounded on perception, but that
perception is to be equated solely with sense-perception, thereby eliminating
radical empirical means to uncover important sources of knowledge.
The materialist doctrine - either as a thoroughgoing eliminative materialism or as
a dualism between mind and nature - claims that the ultimate units of nature are
dead, inanimate actualities, completely devoid of experience, spontaneity or
self-movement. Deconstructive postmodernists exploit these ideas, attacking the
rationality, empirical givenness, and truth as correspondence they rely upon and
the problematic outcomes they result in, and thereby reinforce the impossibility
of constructing, or even holding, a comprehensive world view. The constructive
postmodernist response to modernity's mistaken doctrines is rather to rework
these flawed premises so as to make the construction of self-consistent, adequate
cosmologies possible. Process philosophy is then perhaps more genuinely
postmodern in pressing its criticisms into revision and not simply carrying those
premises of modernity through to their logical conclusions. Through a return to
an experiential organicism (indeed a psychical realism) and an acceptance of
nonsensory perception (one outcome of psychical realism), it opens itself to the
recovery of truths and values in a creative synthesis of both modern and
premodern viewpoints, not only providing a positive meaning for the notions of
the human self, historical meaning, and truth as correspondence, but also
providing new possibilities for premodern notions of a divine reality, cosmic
meaning, and an enchanted nature.
Although in our time 'process philosophy' has come to signify the elaborate
and influential doctrines of Alfred North Whitehead, and further developments
along Whiteheadian lines by Charles Hartshorne and other followers, and
although the focus of the present investigation is on specifically Whiteheadian
themes, bear in mind that any philosophy of process ought more broadly to
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circumscribe a theory rather than a thinker, with issues worked out as pertaining
primarily to a philosophical position more so than to any of its particular
expositions. Thus, by way of introduction, a few of the more pivotal
developments for the shaping of Whitehead's ideas through history stand out as
worthy of more than a passing mention. We have already been pointed out for
instance that the Buddha and Heraclitus are recognised as the earliest known
proponents of a philosophy based on the primacy of process or change. Neither
saw the world as a great aggregate of static things, but found that all things arise
and pass away (the Buddha) and that everything flows (Heraclitus).
Their general outlook on the nature of reality ran counter to commonly held
views of their day, both in the eternalist religious views dominant in Eastern
antiquity and Parmenidean absolutist and Democratean atomist views prevalent
in Western antiquity. As such the Buddha and Heraclitus may accordingly be
seen as the founding fathers of process philosophy. Perhaps Plato as well can
be seen as an early ancestor of the doctrine. In many of his dialogues, most
notably in the Theaetetus and the Timaeus, Plato argues that the world available
to perception is forever undergoing change. And in the later dialogues he
suggested that all things are ensouled, and that the soul is self-moved and so the
source of all change, which again implies the universal presence of process or
change. "Then the philosopher... cannot possibly accept the notion of those who
say that the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms."3 Yet Plato believed
that such a thoroughly dynamic reality was ill-equipped for providing the stable,
ordered backdrop required for rational understanding, description, and
explanation. Thus he restricted the Heraclitean doctrine of flux to the world
of changing perceptible particulars, while positing above this world another one
of unchanging imperceptible universals ('ideas') to back rational intelligibility.
The first clearly articulated form of a process system in modern philosophy is
found in the writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. He discovered two crucial
ideas taken up subsequently in every significant statement of a process
metaphysics. First Leibniz believed that one's own present process of
experiencing or active subjectivity is the only genuine individual encountered
directly and distinctly in reality. And second he saw that the only hope of
comprehending nature, therefore, is by conceiving it as a vast society of such
active individuals, each somewhat analogous to one's own experiential state as a
3 Plato, "The Sophist," in The Dialogues of Plato, Vol.HI, B. Jowett, trans. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1953,p.402.
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sentient entity. All else that figures in experience is mere phenomena, not really
unified or individual at all, but much of it appearing as inactive continuous stuff
due to being composed of active individuals far too similar and insignificant
individually to register distinctly in sensory perception. From these ideas Leibniz
conceived a world consisting not of things but solely of minute units of process
called monads which are 'centres of force' endowed with an inner drive or
'appetition' akin to that felt in experience. A monad's internally programmed
drive, Leibniz's thought, provokes its continual change as the course of its life
history as one long process unfolds, in accordance with its integration in a vast
co-ordinated totality made up not of things but solely of monadic processes.
We might bear in mind, however, that due to the fact that these unfolding
processes are programmed and 'windowless' in response to their surroundings,
Leibniz did treat them as a kind of substantial backing to the world.
The next great thinker to propound process metaphysical claims and
substantially advance a set of foundations to accommodate them was Charles
Sanders Peirce. Peirce thought and wrote on a wide range of topics, aspired to
write an overarching general theory of the cosmos, but fell short in the end of
the 'cosmogonic philosophy' that he envisioned, leaving behind instead a set of
papers (later collected in eight volumes) that he himself dismissed as 'a mere
table of contents, so abstract, a very snarl of twine'. From these writings it is
clear that the basic metaphysical backing to his many views on the nature of
reality revolve around the notion of a world in continuous change and
evolutionary development. He postulated a pervasive degree of cosmic evolution
displaying itself through fortuitous variation (tychism), through mechanical
necessity (anancism), and, in its most climactic and synthesising mode, through
creative love (agapism). From these evolutionary principles Peirce identified in
the experiential universe the attributes of firstness (tychism as a sign of the
objective reality of chance or spontaneity), secondness (anancism as a sign of
the objective reality of brute force, the direct impress of reality), and thirdness
(agapism as a sign of the objective reality of love, the power of ideas to attract
otherwise opposing actions). As these concepts indicate, Peircean metaphysics
accepted a principle, adopted by subsequent process thinkers, that the essential
or indubitable character of our own processes and habits in experience are also
characteristic of the reality with which we are in relationship.
Peirce recognised that the dynamic evolving of reality affected everything,
including our efforts at understanding. Hence even truth and reality were
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construed to be pragmatically dynamic in accordance with the changing utility
of cognitive resources. Note the stress on activity in Peirce's insistence that,
"Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free
ourselves and pass into a state of belief."4 Another key feature of investigation
involves the process of interpretation, which Peirce construes in regards to the
topic of interpreting signs or semiotics. Here again the emphasis is on process as
semiotics means, "an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a co-operation of
three subjects, such as a sign, its object and its interpretant."9 Semiosis, a
singularly important tool in the Peircean system, is invariably a relational activity
involving three entities.
Peirce also felt that even the laws of nature were merely long-standing habits,
and that even the bits of matter purportedly comprising reality's basic
constituents were a kind of 'habit ridden mind' in a dynamic world.
These basic constituents, suggestive of psychical realism, are ultimately engaged
in working out their evolutionary development along teleological lines.
"The so-called immutable laws of nature... are not ultimate, but are the
expression and indeed the outcome of tendencies, associations and habits which
spread and grow."9 Nature, and all that is in it, was seen to be fundamentally
continuous, spontaneous and alive in its selective evolving processes, guided by
an interplay of a general, pervasive tendency toward order as against a persisting
primordial element of pure chance.
William James is another formidable figure in recent philosophy who
introduced many of the early process insights. In his extensive writings on
philosophy, psychology, and religion, and in essays on popular topics, James was
forever breaking away from old categories and forging new ones, and many of
his innovative ideas promoted process orientations. Along with Bergson and
Whitehead, for example, James relied on arguments along the lines of Zeno's
paradoxes to show that static concepts are inadequate to the task of
characterising the ever-changing flux that composes experience and reality.
James believed that the world and that experience amounted to a sea of activity
whose constituents were a multitude of changes that melt and fuse into each
4 C.S. Peirce, CollectedPapers ofCharles Sanders Peirce, Sfol.V. C. Hartshorne and P. Weirs eds.
Cambridge: Harvard Univ, Press, 1931-58, p.371.
G C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers ofCharles Sanders Peirce, Vol.V. C. Hartshorne and P. Weirs eds.
Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1931-58, p.484.
6 As quoted in J.E. Smith, Purpose and Thought: The Meaning ofPragmatism. New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press, 1978, p.141.
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other in processes without absolute boundaries because, "each experience runs
by cognitive transition into the next one... We live, as it were, upon the front
edge of an advancing wave-crest."7 In his mature metaphysical works he was
preoccupied with the trying question of how to relate time and the dynamic
experiential realities that take place through time to the fixed conceptual
accounts so commonly accepted. He knew that, "We assume for certain purposes
one 'objective' time..." but was all too aware that, "we don't livingly believe in or
realise any such equally-flowing time."8
As with Peirce and Leibniz, the guiding principle behind the fluctuating
nature implied in James' ontological outlook was derived from the nature of
human experience itself. He recognised human minds as complex arrangements
of active process, that provide a paradigm case of the process-imbued, psychical
nature of all things. The initial 'blooming buzzing confusion' of physical
processes confronting us preconceptually and the ensuing streams of
consciousness constituted an exhaustive set of ingredients for a comprehensive
metaphysical picture. And James qualified the 'physical' in his rejection of
substantive philosophies that contend that the final real units of reality are
enduring substances. He believed for example that, "the phenomena of habit in
living beings are due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which their
bodies are composed,"9 a point expanded later to apply universally, given his
psychical realist orientation. In developing his radical empiricism, James rejected
the widely held doctrine that all direct or perceptual knowledge of the world is
derived from sensory experience, and thereby rejected, in league with later
process philosophers, the resultant psychical-physical dualist or physical monist
ontologies. The first generally represented the predominant ontological outlook
of the earlier modern philosophers such as Descartes while the second generally
represented the outlook of more recent modern philosophical psychologists such
as Wundt, but both outlooks depleted a phenomenological terrain in which James
discovered that sensory perception comprises only a fraction of what is given
directly in experience. He believed that the most fundamental entities in reality
were in fact 'drops of experience' or momentary experiential events, a view
taken up and developed extensively by Whitehead and Hartshorne, and one that
marks James as a proto-process psychical realist.
7 W. James, "A World of Pure Experience" in Essays In Radical Empiricism. NY: Longmans,
Green, 1912, p.69.
8 W.James, Pragmatism. NY: Longmans, Green, 1907, p.93.
9 W. James, The Principles ofPsychology, Vol.1. NY: Dover, 1890, p.104.
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Two further themes in James that are developed by his process heirs are his
pragmatism, which uncovered the dynamic character of knowledge and truth as
it did in Peirce, and the recognition of creative novelty in the world, which
appears as merely 'so much chance' from an outsider's perspective, but as
'free creative activity' from the inside. Following the lead from Peirce, James
presented a version of pragmatism which likewise implied the prominence of
dynamic process, with knowledge and truth not so much found as made through
dynamic, directed, cognitive activity. "The truth of an idea is not a stagnant
property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true
by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process."10 Also clearly emphasising
process, James noted that novelty, "doesn't arrive by jumps and jolts, it leaks in
insensibly, for adjacents in experience are always interfused, the smallest real
datum being both a coming and a going."11
Perhaps more than any of his predecessors, Henri Bergson held process, as
indicated through the temporal spread of lived experience, to be the singularly
significant aspect for understanding reality. Not only is all of nature pervaded by
the inherently temporal principles of dynamic process, but the human realm of
life and consciousness is particularly infused with them. "Time is just the stuff
[consciousness] is made of" and "...the material universe itself, defined as a
totality of images, is a kind of consciousness," and each of its qualities,
"consists of a succession of elementary movements."12 Here we once again see
evidence of a psychical realist persuasion. The flow of life for Bergson became
the prime datum, one that is falsified by mechanistic and scientific philosophies.
Like Peirce and James, Bergson imported into the theory of evolution a
metaphysical dimension of creative process, of freedom, of novelty, of force - an
elan vital to supplement accepted materialist, mechanistic interpretations.
In Bergson's case, the key to that addition was the significance of the discovery of
'duration' and its role in setting out the 'dynamism' he developed, centring on
the continuous nature of experience and the artificial nature of the divisions the
intellect imposes upon it.
Being the matrix of experience, Bergson considered time to be the
fundamental embodiment of reality in nature. Reality is equated with 'pure time'
10 W. James, Pragmatism. NY: Longmans, Green, 1907, p.201.
" W. James, A Pluralistic Universe. NY: Longmans, Green, 1909, p. 153.
12 H. Bergson,Matter andMind. London: Macmillan, 1913, p.313.
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or duration, and duration is equated with process or change. Bergson saw that
Zeno's paradoxes depend upon an untenable division of the flow into discrete
units, and consequently recognised that mathematics could not capture the
essence of flow, the active melting process of pure time or duration. With James,
Bergson felt that conceptual thought, and indeed the so-called exacting sciences
it fosters, merely abstract and approximate, substituting apprehended statics in
lieu of understanding the dynamics of reality. Yet, despite that duration is of
signal importance, it is elusive, for we experience events in time but not time as
such. He turned instead to inspect the immediate data of consciousness, where he
discovered, "pure unadulterated inner continuity, continuity which was neither
unity nor multiplicity, and which did not fit into any of our categories of
thought."'3 In analysing duration Bergson determined that it is an authentic
processive existence, both creative and qualitative as experience reveals, as well
as cumulative and continuous. It accumulates in the continuity that is
represented by Bergson's notion of memory. His view of memory, consistent with
later process philosophers, included recognising a metaphysical function
alongside its biological and psychological ones, that of retaining the whole of the
past in the present. Bergson's rendition of a process philosophy achieved a wide
following in the early twentieth century, but suffered in the end due to its
wholesale distrust of science and reason and its sole reliance upon intuition of
the immediate experience of duration. Here his process philosophical followers
were to make important amends.
The combined contributions of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles
Hartshorne toward establishing and unfolding a fully coherent and
comprehensive metaphysics in light of the pervasive and supreme reality of
process are truly the most remarkable to date. Whitehead's ambitious
achievement amounted to setting out a systematic attempt at developing a
philosophy adequate to keen experiential sensibilities on the one hand, and
accurate to the many key features of recent discoveries and revisions in logic,
mathematics, and the natural sciences on the other.
It must be one of the motives of a complete cosmology to construct a system
of ideas which brings the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into
relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural
science."
13 H. Bergson, The Creative Mind. NY: Philosophical Library, 1946, p.12.
14 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.xii.
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The resultant metaphysical interpretation of reality ranks as one of this century's
great intellectual accomplishments. The bare statement of Whitehead's concept of
process, apart from any elaboration in his masterwork Process andReality, comes
to thirty-six principles, twenty-seven categories of explanation, and nine
categorical obligations. Recognising his one-time colleague's work as a tough act
to follow, Hartshorne unabashedly accepted Whitehead's categories for
metaphysical thinking, many of which he arrived at independently or through
reflections on Peirce's philosophy. Inspired by Whitehead's lead, Hartshorne rose
to the occasion of furthering process thought by contributing clear and
broadening explications, rigorous revisions, insightful comparisons, and novel
and provocative applications and extensions of Whitehead's principles, most
notably in the philosophical analysis of religion and rational reflection, in
psychology, in aesthetics, and even in ornithology. Among his many
accomplishments, Hartshorne's writings on religious issues have led to the
founding of a prominent school of process theologians, and his clear
argumentation for basic process principles (often absent in Whitehead) and his
astute situating of process thought in its philosophical context (often inaccurate
in Whitehead), has promoted the continuing study and growing appreciation of
Whitehead in philosophical quarters. Together the philosophies of Whitehead
and Hartshorne represent the mainstays of a process philosophical movement in
our time.
While the many adherents of the process movement share a common theme,
there clearly are some internal variations as we have already seen, turning
especially on which are taken as the paramount and paradigmatic sorts
of processes. Although three separate kinds imply psychical realism,
Whitehead for example generally takes the physical, Bergson the biological, and
James the psychological as the preferred process for metaphysical purposes.
Also, varying styles and emphases disclose orientations that range from the
logical and scientific (Peirce and Whitehead), through the affective and intuitive
(James and Bergson), to the religious (Hartshorne). In the choosing of points of
elaboration and emphasis to establish a process metaphysical picture streamlined
for more universal appeal, we inevitably neglect some of the overall aspects
while overly accenting others. This is unavoidable in conveying the general spirit
of the process enterprise, for keeping hold of the predominant ideas would
otherwise require the making of many unlikely alliances. How far afield for
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instance is Whitehead's respect for science from Bergson's, Peirce's reliance on
logic from James', Leibniz's rendition of acts of God from Hartshorne's?
Since the central tenets of Whitehead's metaphysics are the most thorough and
systematic philosophical work to integrate the core process doctrines, these are
adopted as foundational and are the focus of the present approach. In the attempt
to streamline Whitehead's ideas, however, it is hoped that the spirit of his
process forebears and followers remains in sight, particularly of the many
sympathetic to psychical realism. The literature pertaining to Whitehead's
metaphysics tends toward exclusive discourse among Whiteheadian 'insiders' so
to speak. This is due to a number of needlessly obscure or misleading terms
introduced by Whitehead, that add to the already demanding intricacies of an
elaborate metaphysical vision, that grew out of logical, mathematical, and
scientific concerns of a man well-versed in these specialised methods
and subjects. Here we employ alternative wording that befits a broader process
public whenever feasible without loss of meaning. The one singularly important
and altogether novel idea introduced in the last chapter and expressed as
'prehension' has been retained, but otherwise quite ordinary language suffices in
phrases such as 'entities' and 'events', 'influence' and 'perception' and 'memory',
'creativity' and 'potentiality', 'reception' and 'integration' and 'satisfaction' that
are adopted here." It is also hoped that the psychical realist angle of the present
exposition goes some way toward elevating discussion to more open and
universal philosophical concerns. Hence the phrase 'Whiteheadian' as
occasionally used here refers in the main to the spirit of his seminal ideas while
for the most part leaving to one side questions regarding 1) the precise issue of
how, when, and where Whitehead first stated those ideas, 2) the development of
Whitehead's thought over a number of first mathematical, then scientific, and
finally metaphysical writings and 3) the critical interpretation, assessment and
alteration of those ideas in subsequent literature. As to the first two categories,
the works of Victor Lowe and Lewis Ford remain fundamental references. As to
the third, although Whitehead's writings have inspired a rich and varied
response that continues to this day, Charles Hartshorne's voluminous output
(which also continues, in this his 98th year) is eminent both in its depth of
15 Admittedly success is not always achieved, and though the project is warranted, Whitehead's
own warning is justifiably noted. "A copious use of simple literary forms can thus provide
a philosophy delightful to read, easy to understand, and entirely fallacious." Adventures of
Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1933, p.210.
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appreciation and appraisal, and in its scope of creative, synthetic elaboration.16
We turn now to an introduction of the central tenets of Whitehead's
philosophical work.
PART TWO
Process in Eight Passages
In presenting a process primer - in eight passages from Whitehead's Process
andReality - the central tenets are laid out first in terms of a number of guiding
principles introduced via the first seven passages, and then in terms of the
functioning of the formative elements called to mind in the last passage, elements
forever under the sway of those principles.
§ The Illuminating of Experience
We experience more than we can analyse. For we experience the universe,
and we analyse in our consciousness a minute selection of its details, (p.89)
Process philosophers recognise that the proper place to begin a metaphysics of
experience is with the whole of experience itself, and from within that whole
with whatever it is that is common to all experience, in as much as it can be
determined. There are two key reasons for such an orientation: the overcoming of
the bifurcation of nature into its psychical and physical categories, in the main
by uncovering a psychical aspect at the core of all reality; and the attempt to
employ that part of reality that we know most intimately, namely our own
experience, as the most revelatory clue to the nature of all reality. An appropriate
focus is then the careful analysis and the sifting through of the components of
whatever we encounter experientially.
At first glance it may appear, and indeed does appear in the sights of several
philosophers, that since what we know best is our own experience, we must
therefore begin with human conscious experience in any attempt to derive
an experiential metaphysics. But the process philosopher proceeds to
more careful considerations of experience as such. The initial insight is that
while consciousness is always experience, experience need not always be
conscious. In fact, even within conscious experience there is quite a lot of
variance - whether conscious activity is rational or not, it always carries some
16 See especially V. Lowe, Understanding Whitehead and A.N. Whitehead: The Man and His
Work, Vol.1: 1861-1910, Vol.11: 1910-1947. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, 1985
and 1990; L. Ford, The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics: 1925-1929. Albany NY:
Suny Press, 1984; C. Ilartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method and The
Philosophy ofCharles Hartshorne, L. Hahn ed. Chicago: Open Court, 1970 and 1991.
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emotional tone - which gestures toward the presence of something underlying
conscious experience. Nowadays these are well-documented psychological and
physiological facts, but aside from any scientific evidence it is clearly the case
that sometimes we experience in our sleep. Otherwise there would be no cause to
believe that we occasionally undergo drafts or dreams or the onset of disease in
sleep. A further insight is that those experiential elements that lie beyond the
overlap with conscious experience, in being ever-present experientially, are all
the more illuminating for philosophical penetration.
The task of isolating these more basic elements, and then of determining their
illuminating nature, is somewhat confounded by the importance consciousness
plays in our everyday experiential reality. But under a constraint to conscious
experience philosophers have had little success in getting beyond their
immediate epistemic situation and on to an awareness of ontological facts.
If conscious subjective experience alone is kept in focus, then human beings are
severed from all other beings, and the problem of overcoming that division
arises. But Whiteheadians contend that we are not separated from the rest of
reality by an absolute rift based on distinct subjective difference. We participate
in the reality we are trying to understand, and the common ground we share
with it obviously does not consist in a species of human consciousness which
only obtains in a vanishingly small portion of the total. Conscious experience
heightens awareness of but a fraction of reality, and for beings of our own ilk
alone; far from being a basic category, its endurance is variable even within the
realm of human experience. In developing an adequate metaphysical picture, we
must discover the primitive experiential elements shared by humans, other
animals, lower life forms, and inorganic material and put them to use. And it is
here, in cancelling the equating of consciousness with experience, that the initial
impetus toward a psychical realist component to process metaphysics first begins
to appear. One of the keys to process philosophy is the delving beneath those
aspects of experience unique to consciousness in order to discover what we share
in common with the rest of reality, for it is these more subtle aspects of our own
experience that provide the clues for understanding the metaphysical structure
of the world.
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§ The Sentience of Events
The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe consists of
elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects, (p. 166)
Process philosophers maintain that the final real ingredients of reality are its
momentary events and that these events are experiential. They are conceived as
the existing happenings, the real occurrences, the 'actual occasions' or 'actual
entities' that take place. Such entities are 'the final real things of which the
world is made up' according to Whitehead, 'entities' again being employed in
a broad, somewhat vague fashion gesturing between things and processes.
These basic ingredients of reality are also described as complex, interdependent
'drops of experience' and the class of them ranges from God all the way down to
the 'tiniest puff of existence'. They are both ontologically primitive as the sole
units comprising the world (the 'sentient entities' of the psychical realist), and of
paramount importance as displaying the rich character basic experience
possesses.
One need only introspect to get an initial feel for their nature, for isolating
and considering one moment in the series of momentary experiential events as
lived through provides a keen indicator of the idea. As with many of their
process forebears, the experience of embodied existence is the paradigm
of exemplification for Whitehead and Hartshorne. No momentary event in
a person's life exists in complete isolation. In this case the aspect of
interdependence is apparent in the present influences from previous momentary
events and from anticipations toward potential future ones. And the aspect of
complexity is shown in the accepting, ordering, and responding entailed by the
ongoing assessment of influence, enjoyment of feeling, and aim of anticipation
involved in experience. This implies a further feature of momentary events,
namely their temporality. Any one moment of experience seems to exist as an
event at a present time for a mere split second. There was another such event just
prior to it, and following swiftly upon it will come yet another. Although these
experiential events seem to flow into each other, the phenomenological evidence
suggests that each has its individual moment of awakening as it were into the
present. Whitehead believed that this flash of being-present represented an
indivisible 'quanta' of experience, happening 'all at once' with its internal span
of duration amounting to an undivided now. The length of the duration of
experiential events is of course very short-lived, generally only spanning
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a fraction of a second, but the fact that it has some dimension of temporal spread
as verified through introspection is of signal importance for process philosophy.
The proper way to conceive of experiential events as being constitutive of the
world is by noting the psychical feature of the present moment for every sort of
existent entity. "All final individual actualities have the metaphysical character
of occasions of experience."17 While one's own conscious momentary experience
serves as an exemplar, the idea is that every animal's experience, every living
cell, every elementary particle is likewise endowed with some level of momentary
temporal spread, extraordinarily short in most instances. Yet, despite that the
same basic principles direct the existence of experiential events into the same
basic metaphysical structure throughout the world, and despite that physicists
likewise study a world pervaded throughout by vanishingly short event durations
that share a basic structure, the experiential events or actual entities that are
metaphysical primitives of process philosophy are not to be identified with
scientific notions of particle physics. The latter may prove suggestive of the
presence of the former, but the two are not one. Process philosophy holds that
experience, human or nonhuman, is co-extensive with reality, but that the data
of science refer to abstractions from current observational know-how while the
metaphysical hypotheses bring rational reflection to bear on necessities displayed
in experiential realities.
§ The Reality of Becomings
How an entity becomes constitutes what that entity is... Its 'being'
is constituted by its 'becoming'. This is the principle of process, (p.23)
As discussed in the opening chapter, process philosophers reject the
substantive philosophical view of a world composed ultimately of substances
with changing properties. In contrast, Whitehead and Hartshorne locate the
ultimate actualities in the processes of becoming. The experiential event of an
actual entity's coming into existence is the only being it possesses, and these
becomings are more fundamental than the beings that their activity seems to
bring about or imply. Indeed becoming includes being: change, process, and
event define substance, product, and stasis.
Reality then is not composed of a static aggregate of substantial beings, but is
rather experientially alive, involved in the ceaseless activity of reacting to
17 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978,p.l66.
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influence from what has already become, and acting on what might next come to
be. The world is therefore dynamic and creative through and through.
Whitehead and Hartshorne understand the process of reality as concerning
The becoming, the being, and the relatedness' of nothing but its actual
experiential occasions. There is nothing beyond these becoming experiential
events, apart from them, "there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare
nothingness."18 Thus the distinction between one experience and a world is one
primarily of number: the becoming of a one and the becoming of a many.
Both are completely accounted for in an exhaustive survey of processes of
becoming.
Once the activity of an experiential event ceases, once an occasion of
experience is no longer becoming, it 'perishes' into the past to be superseded by
further present becomings. While its 'subjective immediacy' exists no longer, its
'objective immortality' continues as influence in subsequent becomings.
The existence of an experiential event, indeed the actuality of every experiential
event, is thus logged as 'stubborn fact' inherited by whatever follows, for these
facts can neither be altered nor avoided by their experiential heirs. Thus a
universal form of memory, as givenness of the past, is basic to reality.
The process of becoming is first the process of accepting the being of past
becomings, second the process of integrating that being with its own contributed
becoming, and finally the process of casting its new integration onto the stock of
stubborn fact of being in subsequent becomings. Once again introspection
verifies this processive nature in the case of our own experience. In present
experiential events one has to take into account previous ones, and what
transpires in living through the present event becomes a 'real component in
other living immediacies of becoming'. Whether a moment ago one decided to
climb a tree, recite a poem, or ride a bike, being enthralled in the midst of that
activity in the present requires accepting and integrating that past decision into
the present experiential process. And should one then initiate a fall to the
ground, an ad-lib of the lines, a turn into approaching traffic, the ensuing
experience would naturally have to reckon with implications of those decisions.
18 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.167.
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§ The Ultimate of Creativity
Creativity is the ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by forms, and
conditioned by its creatures, (p.20)
The notion of creativity is of singular importance for process metaphysics.
Depending on how it is interpreted, it represents either one or two of the four
formative elements in the process system, along with worldly experience and
worldly potential and (on one interpretation) a partly worldly God. Creativity is
the dynamic principle intrinsic to every event in the world and to the world at
large. It signifies the most general trait that all the world's events have in
common, how in every event 'the many become one'. "No entity can be divorced
from the notion of creativity," Whitehead contends for it is, "the universal of
universals characterising ultimate matter of fact."1" The fact that every
experiential event is creative gives rise to the pervasive feature of process in the
world. But though it is the ultimate principle, it must always be instantiated in
specific and real events; it is not somehow more real than those events, for it has
no independent reality of its own. Only in virtue of its embodiment in
experiential events does creativity have any actuality. The same is true in the
other direction as well: actual events cannot exist except as instances of
creativity. They cannot be meaningfully separated from the ultimate
metaphysical principle. The ultimacy of creativity and the ultimacy of
self-creative acts of becoming coincide, implying that every experiential event is
a self-creative one.
This leads on to another characteristic of process creativity: the most
fundamental feature of the world is its 'creative advance into novelty'. The idea
of creativity characterising actuality must be balanced against the idea of
actuality characterising creativity. It is both the ground of individual processes
of becoming and a receptacle for determinate outcomes of all processes of
becoming, a set of distinctions developed in the third part of the present chapter.
In this manner creativity accounts for the organic unity and ongoing temporal
order in the world at large. As to the first, Whitehead sees the process of creation
as 'the form of unity of the universe' whereby all creative activity constitutes one
process connecting all actuality together. As to the second, 'the throbbing
emotion of the past' is seen as creativity 'hurling itself' into factual status for
subsequent events. In addition to how within each event 'the many become one',
19 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.31.
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from each event the ongoing temporal world is 'increased by one'.20 Creativity for
a creature becomes creativity with the creature as it passes into another phase of
itself, to then be the creativity for a new creature. Implied is another
characteristic regarding the overall nature of the universe. It is plain that the
reality and role of creativity means that causal determinism is not absolute in the
world. There are guiding causal conditions in the form of somewhat evolving
laws of nature, due to the rigours of the habit patterns that past becomings
instantiate. But these contributing factors are never absolute, for there is always
at least an iota of creative activity in each present experiential event.
It is clear that creativity plays a comprehensive role in the system, one which
cannot be expressed as a function of the roles played by any of the more limited
elements. This led Whitehead himself to admit in Process and Reality that it is
ultimately impossible to define creativity or to explain it according to more
specific concepts. It is a terminal concept, the point at which explanation must
cease. Yet Whitehead and Hartshorne agree that creativity alone is not sufficient
for establishing a world that fits the description of the one we inhabit, for a mere
system of mutually influencing events is compatible, for instance, with a static
timeless world, a concept wholly rejected as clashing with central process
convictions. There must be a further higher principle of order of one sort or
another as well. Here again, psychical realist ideas are introduced, but at a more
cosmic level. Given the ultimacy of creativity, it is interesting to note that if the
idea of a God is introduced here, the system requires that God too is in process,
that God is influenced by the creatures, and that even for God the future is really
open or partly indeterminate. The reason for these unique departures from more
standard theological lines becomes clear when the process ontological principle
is elucidated.
§ The Ontological Principle
The search for a reason is always the search for an actual fact which is the
vehicle of the reason, (p.40)
In the second chapter we clarified that manner in which Whitehead brought
his rational prowess into line with an empirical emphasis. His commitment to
strong empirical criteria in doing speculative philosophy, 'applicable and
adequate' to the facts, is spelled out in stating his ontological principle in the
20 A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.32; Adventures of Ideas.
Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1933, p.227.
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preface to Process and Reality. In offering metaphysical answers, none are to be
accepted if they do not refer in one way or another to something actual, to
something that exists. This follows directly from the recognition that experience
in its many diverse forms is co-extensive with reality. We must appeal to the
actual experiences we undergo if understanding and explanation are to be
grounded in the empirical facts of experience. And that grounding is essential,
for Whitehead believes that, "there is nothing which floats into the world from
nowhere."21 The ontological principle applies even to universals and other
abstractions, which on this view are only real in concrete actualities, with a
special form of actuality introduced, as we shall see, in such cases of seemingly
unactualised possibilities. This is particularly crucial in the kind of
hypothesis-test speculative endeavours which process philosophers promote.
The better to disassociate their work from over-speculative and thus ill-fated
classical metaphysical models, Whitehead and Hartshorne try to keep to methods
that partly mirror those of theoretical science, while supplementing empirical
experience with the results of rational reflection beyond scientific scope
occasionally. Even so, 'no actual entity, then no reason' essentially sums up the
ontological principle of process philosophers.
§ The Relativity Principle
Every item of the universe, including all the other actual entities,
is a constituent in the constitution of any one actual entity, (p. 148)
We noted earlier how the becoming of actuality involves a taking account of
other past becomings. No experiential events could exist in utter isolation, for
they possess other experience, the 'stubborn facts of past becomings' as
component parts of their present existence. Thus experience and reality are
pervaded by asymmetric yet social relations, external at one end but internal at
the other, instantiating both dependence and independence among experiential
events that are 'each suffused with modal presences of others'. Every present
experiential event (becoming) is essentially relative to its internal world of past
experience (being), it is a 'feeling of feelings'. "It belongs to the nature of a
'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming'."22 Subsequent becomings
depend on prior beings while the prior beings are independent of subsequent
becomings. Whitehead derives this idea of the fundamental relativity and
interdependence of all reality from his conviction that the world is best
21 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.244.
22 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.22.
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understood as more akin to organisms than to mechanisms. Mechanical devices
are composed of essentially independent parts organised along mechanically
functional lines, with relations between the parts imposed from the outside,
whereas organisms are made up of essentially interdependent parts organised
organically, with relations between parts creating unified wholes themselves.
It follows that, as organisms, we can again look to our own experience as the
paradigm for the relativity of relatedness in the world. We direct attention to
objects of experience, and our felt concern reflects degrees of attraction and
aversion regarding the influence of those objects, and these are internal to our
present experience of them. The direct impersonal memory introduced in
our discussion of 'prehension' in the last chapter, for example, displays how
one's own immediate past is often intense and always intimate, and the
consequent influence quite large. Accordingly the 'primary principle' for
understanding the orders of actuality established by the relatedness that holds
among the individuals in reality is the interest of 'experience in other
experience' or of 'subjects in other subjects'.
Some of the ramifications of the principle of relativity include the notion that
since all experience is a kind of sharing in previous experience, the most basic
kind of activity is a kind of sympathy, albeit most often with intimately related
past experience. This suggests that self-interest is not the principle of motivation
in our actions, nor the chief justification for altruistic activity. Other-directed
experience is at least as natural as self-directedness on process grounds. Another
ramification is that since all experience involves felt concerns made up of
attractions and aversions to other previous feeling, aesthetic values are real and
primary features of reality. And since the present experience involves a creative
integration of all past experience, the relativity principle implies that some
altogether genuine values are inevitably incompatible, that is to say there exist
mutually exclusive yet real values in the world. Finally, though the ontological
principle implies that the 'being present in another entity' entails the presence of
every last whiff of past existence in present experience, it need not counter
intuitions necessarily. We accept scientific constructs for instance, that entail
that we are under the gravitational pull of every distant celestial sphere. By the
same token we may 'allow for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance'
in entertaining how every past event has its pull in present ones.
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§ The God Principle
It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in
quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of
a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules nor is it unmoved, (p.343)
It is primarily from the notion of value that the idea of God initially enters
into the process model. First from a religious perspective, there is the need for
the belief that the values achieved in the world are not simply lost as they fade
from human memory and record. There are determinate truths, some good and
some not so good, about what has taken place and what is taking place in the
universe. And God is in one sense conceived as the storehouse of all that achieved
value thus far, and in another sense the provider of a 'lure' for the future
achievement of any additional value. As Whitehead puts it, "The truth itself is
nothing else than how the things of the world obtain adequate representation in
the divine nature," for God is, "the ideal companion who transmutes what has
been lost into a living fact within his own nature."" To be sure, affirming God's
existence in response to this religious sentiment may not help determine what in
fact is true, but it can help determine what truth itself is and how it can exist.
What is true on process reckoning is that which is known in the perfect memory
of God. For when we consider our thoughts as true, we presuppose some
structure to which our formulations more or less adequately approximate, and if
we are thinking of the world in its entirety, we presuppose that structure that
answers to the description of God's perfect tallying of all fact. Undeniably this
position on truth does raise some doubts, even within theological circles, and we
address some of them in terms of creativity and temporarity below.
Another aspect of value that is related to the God principle in process
philosophy concerns the 'forms of definiteness' or the unactualised potentiality
that helps complete the becoming of experiential events. The influence from
stubborn facts left by the mark of past becoming events does not exhaust the
material available to present events. Along with these past possibilities that have
become actual there are also potential possibilities that have not been actualised.
To keep to the ontological principle, these potentialities cannot 'float into the
world from nowhere' and so God is understood as entertaining all of them in
present divine experience. The term 'potentiality' adopted here is somewhat
analogous to 'universal' or 'form' ('eternal object' in Whitehead), but is meant to
draw attention to the presence in them of an urge toward actuality.
23 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.12.
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That emphasis becomes important when an option to subvert functional aspects
of God solely to dipolar creative process is explored in the more in-depth
treatment of creativity that follows. Hence from a religious point of view - in as
much as religious, moral, and aesthetic values can loosely be grouped
together - God provides both a standard and a source for the achieving and
retaining of all value.
Secondly from a scientific perspective, an analysis of the world into partially
self-determining events requires some principle of order and novelty that cannot
simply be identified with the multiplicity of creative experiential events
themselves. In the picture of a world of process as outlined, there are events that
exist for a moment and then perish, thereby obliging their successors to take
some account of them. Then there is creativity as the ultimate underlying
metaphysical principle of the universe, the sheer ongoingness of nature. Neither
of these factors singly or in combination seem capable of explaining the concrete
particularity of what in fact becomes. In a world comprised exhaustively of
partially free experiences, order can be made intelligible only through the idea
of an all-inclusive ordering principle, whose purposes order the world through
becoming internalised in creative activities, somewhat as our purposes order our
bodies through becoming internalised by our bodily parts. Reflect again on
experience: the present momentary experience as lived through is never simply
the product of past experiences, important and determinative as these are. If so,
experience would simply be part of the world machine, and no alternative
responses to situations or creative decisions would be possible. Yet the opposite is
not the case either, for if so chaos would ensue. We do have constraints on what
we do, we are compelled toward certain acts and away from others. Although we
cannot but be affected by the past, just how we interpret it and value it and
transmit it to the future is decided in the present experiential moment. And these
moments, the only existing entities in a world of process, require some principle
of order and novelty, of limitation and potentiality. For Whitehead and
Hartshorne that principle is God, while for some subsequent process
philosophers (addressed in our discussion on creativity below) that principle is
the evaluative aspect of the two-fold nature of an ultimate creative advance.
These are only two (rather cryptic) presentations of a whole cluster of reasons
a process God is often postulated, a topic to which we return in the final chapter.
Insofar as these reasons constitute an argument at all, from the scientific
perspective as outlined it is primarily the traditional cosmological one from the
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order of the universe to a ground of order, and from the religious perspective as
outlined it is the traditional teleological one offering a framework of value
retention from which to derive direction for a meaning of life. Neither of these
on their own of course go unchallenged in the relevant philosophical literature.
And yet, as to the former cosmological impetus, the heyday of refutation occurred
when, after 18th century theists and scientists alike wedded themselves to a view
of the complex machine and its maker scenario, a particular vulnerability arose
when a century later evolutionary processes focusing on natural selection
became the dominant paradigm. But the new understanding of nature did not,
any better than the old, explain the order of nature. The emergence of the living
from the inorganic may be viewed as a random variation, but Whitehead was
quick to point out that it certainly has nothing to do with the survival of the
fittest. A stone he argued is far more capable of survival than a plant or an
animal.24 In the present century, with support from that new evolutionary
thinking and from Whiteheadian psychical realism, process thinkers give up the
previous understanding of the inorganic as wholly inactive, inanimate lumps of
matter and set aside the image of the purely material machine, and find that the
problem of explaining the orderliness of things reappears with intensified force.
The problem of order recurs however we understand the nature of the world, for
some other force besides variation or survival seems to be at work. Order is
indisputably there and we can view it either as entirely imposed or as arising out
of the nature of things themselves or as a bit of both. God and psychical realism
in process thought represents one version of the 'both' option. And as to the
latter teleological impetus for postulating God, if the adequacy of a philosophical
scheme be tested against coherence and adequacy in explaining all experience,
then the somewhat exceptional elements in conscious experience roughly classed
together as religious and moral intuitions must be given an account just as much
as the findings of natural science. The God of process is one such account.
But with these motivational and conceptual developments, and a host of more
refined alterations that lie outside our present range of concerns, the opportunity
is open in process thought for conceiving God as on the one hand something of a
philosophical principle, hardly echoing the 'unmoved mover' and even less the
'imperial ruler' or 'ruthless moralist' imagery of old; but on the other hand as
something that 'dwells upon the tender elements' providing the wherewithal that
24 A.N. Whitehead, The Function ofReason. NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1929.
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gestures toward greater and more integrated value through sympathetic
participating and inspirational luring in the world. As such the evaluation of
'the God principle' may very well turn finally as much on one's temperament as
on one's reason. At its leanest, the concept is perhaps best understood as simply
a storehouse of and a drive toward what is conceived to be of absolute
value - a changing absolute as it were, one accruing new value ceaselessly and
adjusting accordingly, and an absolute that is accessible to the atheist and to the
religious devotee alike, intelligible at any rate to all who can understand the idea
and can recognise the presence of value.
§ Ingredients and Recipes
The metaphysical first principles can never fail of exemplification. We can
never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway. (p.4)
With a thumbnail sketch of the general ideas at hand, there is yet one final
aspect of the process model to be drawn out and explained. It is how the four key
ingredients of reality - simply put, its events, its potentialities, its creativity and
its value ~ how these formative first principles actually proceed through the
integrated phases of 'their sway' as the process of reality. But a few qualifications
are in order at the outset. First, the four general terms chosen here are meant to
allude to more specialised phrases particular to the formative elements in
Whitehead's scheme. We inevitably lose a degree of subtlety in doing so, but we
establish a broad, more accessible process base, drawing on work from a wider
range of relevant thinkers, and alienating fewer of those approaching process
thought from other philosophical and even non-philosophical standpoints.
Second, Whitehead was emphatic in his insistence that the expounding of
metaphysical ingredients and cosmological recipes does not indicate 'dogmatic
statements of the obvious' but rather 'tentative formulations of the ultimate
generalities'. Process philosophers, owing perhaps to the dynamic core of the
doctrine, are forthright in acknowledging how any speculative endeavours aimed
at framing 'coherent, logical, necessary systems of general ideas' for the
interpretation of 'every element of our experience' are bound to be wanting in
any number of ways. This is especially so in a case as enterprising as Whitehead's
in which a monumental process vision is applied, "to construct a system of ideas
which brings the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those
concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science.""
23 A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.xii.
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In accounting for every element in experience the process metaphysician is most
certainly in the business of offering (hopefully) more and more discriminating
hypotheses, but surely these eventually require much in the way of testing.
Whitehead likened the procedure of interpreting the facts of experience to the
flight of an aeroplane. Interpretation involves examining these facts, disclosing
the more general patterns that underlie them, and noting how these patterns may
predict still further experiential facts. Hence there is a movement from the
particular to the universal and then back to the particular. Just so with
philosophical schemes: taking off from experience, to be formulated in the
'stratosphere' of abstraction, and then returning to experience for the
verification of predictions. Not only does the landing verify the abstract theories,
but it also reveals otherwise unnoticed elements in the facts initially observed
from the ground, where the view is more selective because features irrelevant to
practical down-to-earth concerns are overlooked. Thus a metaphysical system
begins not with a set of 'clear and distinct' ideas, but rather with a vague, artistic
sort of grasp wherein 'imaginative rationalisation' fills in the gaps of direct
observation, even entertaining inconsistencies in the hope of happening upon
inspiring new theories. It is only afterwards, in the testing of these speculative
hypotheses, that applicable and adequate metaphysical formulations are targeted.
Having adequately represented the reasonable humility accompanying process
speculative endeavours, we can sketch the manner in which the key
metaphysical ingredients work together in the system as follows. An experiential
event arises out of its actual world of past events by a process whereby the
objectivity of that past influence is gradually transformed into the present event's
subjectivity. This process involves the integration of three separate components:
the past objective influence, the present subjective creativity, and the relevant
potential values. The first conformal prehensive step in this process of becoming
is characterised by receptivity, re-enactment, and reiteration of what is mainly
felt objective influence. The second conceptual step is characterised by
appreciation, evaluation, and enjoyment as the felt influence is integrated with
the potential values that arise in response to it. Responsive emotional tone and
purposive factors transform the objective influence into a subjectively
appropriated form, creatively adjusting it to the event's particular order of
interests by intensifying and inhibiting aspects of that influence. Depending on
the complexity involved, the experiential event displays varying degrees of
novelty in response, ranging from the mere ratification of past experience in
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a new subjective re-enactment of objectivity to a reactive refusal of the objective
influence resulting in greater novelty in the creative synthesis with potential
values. In the final comparative step, when the present experience has exhausted
the possibilities of comparing, ordering, integrating, synthesising, the becoming
reaches its being, settling into the satisfaction of a fully determinate drop of
novel experience, the completed becoming now only existing as provocative
influential being to be prehended in further becoming experience. Thus, as laid
out in the scheme of categories in Process and Reality., 'the many' of past
influences momentarily becomes 'a one' in the present experience, is then
'increased by one' in creative synthesis, to return as 'one of many' influences
provoking the creative activity of further experience. With this rough and ready
guide to the central tenets of process philosophy at hand, we turn presently to
examine the nature of creativity, organicity, and temporality more closely.
Our focus will be in terms of the psychical realist component in the development
of these key process concepts, as demonstrated through the interplay of the
transitional and integrative aspects of experience.
PART THREE
Process Creativity
One significant way in which the work of recent philosophers in the process
tradition stands apart from previous traditions and individuals is in
the metaphysical importance it places on the idea of creativity. Specifically, the
recognition of creativity as a principle so fundamental that it applies to all
existence is a notion particular to process thinkers in the present century.
Already apparent is the fact that the pervasiveness of process that Whitehead
stressed entails a world intelligible solely in terms of a multitude of processes, so
that 'each ultimate individual fact must be describable as process' due to process
being fundamental to actuality. Process thinkers hold creativity to be the first
feature of these fundamental processes. Hartshorne's most ambitious volume,
Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, opens with "A Philosophy of Shared
Creative Experience" pointing out that although philosophers have spoken of
divine creation of the world and of artistic creation within the world, to date
creativity as such has not held a position similar to that of substance or matter or
being in philosophy. Whitehead knew that 'in all philosophic theory there is an
ultimate' but not until the advent of process thought has creativity taken this
position of a first principle. The process perspective does not posit any basic
existent entities devoid of creativity underlying the creative advance of a world
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pervaded by process; that advance is supported instead by the workings of
a multitude of creative existents.
§ The Fact of Creative Advance
Regarding the concept of creativity and its psychical realist component in
process philosophy, the initial task is to establish the fact of creativity. In order to
be creative, processes or events or entities ~ existents of whatever sort - must be
unpredictable to some degree, which is to say that the activity involved must not
be fullydetermined by the combination of causal conditions that impinge upon it
and the laws of nature that apply to it. Hence a creative act on the process view
adds novelty to the stock of already definite reality in existence, adds a novel
element not entirely anticipated. As Hartshorne puts forth this unique process
view, 'to be is to create' because every existent creates at least itself and, as
existing, cannot fail to do so. Existence is synonymous with self-realisation and to
be self-realising is conceived as a purely creative activity.
The candid psychical realist quality of the process persuasion is clear in the
manner of substantiating the claim that all processes are creative. For one must
initially look to experience. The process of experience is made up of any number
of influences ranging from a multitude of causal connections in the form of
perceptual input ('immediate impersonal memory') from a variety of conscious
and unconscious sensory mechanisms, as well as from a vast array of recent to
distant 'personal memory' input from relevant previous experience. All these
factors flow together to form one single experiential unity in a present moment,
becoming one sensory, emotional, intellectual whole. Clearly the fact that there
are a number of causes for every experience already displays the presence of
creativity, because an experience is 'a one' and not 'a many' and therefore cannot
simply be a chronicle of the causes alone. The manner of their integration is also
involved, endowing those causes with all sorts of perspectival, gestalt, and
valuational accents. In addition, as Hartshorne's opening essay makes clear, even
direct links between these further integration traits and the initial causes would
not cover the unity of a present experience. For the values each component
obtains in the relational structure of that novel 'togetherness' would be absent,
even if the integration itself were dictated exhaustively by the nature of the
causes, which seems quite implausible. Causes are always pluralisticmanyswhile
experiences are always monistic ones, and arising in the route from the many
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previous causes to the one new experience of the causes is a free creative shift of
self-realisation.
In an experiential process all four requisite conditions for the presence of
a degree of creative freedom are at hand: an element of liberty among external
constraints, an ability to engage in self-initiated behaviour, an element of
alternatives from which to choose, and an ability to choose from among those
alternatives. To deny the fact of creativity in the case of experience would
require limiting experience to behavioural response alone, and then arguing that
behaviour is in principle absolutely predictable. But as we have seen in the
previous chapter, science no longer holds such a claim even for inorganic
systems. Once an experience has taken place, as Hartshorne has it, 'not all the
words in all the languages' could describe it precisely, and surely what cannot be
said even afterwards cannot be said in advance. The final, specific, and unique
character of a novel experiential entity undergoing its self-creative activity is
that which distinguishes it from all similar ones, and it cannot be completely
captured by a set of universal concepts, no matter how elaborate they may be.
By definition creative novelty cannot be completely characterised with concepts
already commonly understood, for otherwise it would not be new. Only the
known features that have already been encountered, or some combination of
them, can be positively characterised. It is easy to overlook this pervasive creative
quality of experience because creativity as such is typically construed solely in
terms of the more innovative, artistic, inventive forms setting it off from normal
experience. But clearly the complete absence of creativity would imply the
complete absence of experience which in turn would imply on process psychical
realist grounds the complete absence of reality.
One trouble with isolating creativity in process metaphysics arises from the
differing viewpoints of investigation adopted for the task. This is by and large
the very trouble alluded to in the treatment of subjectivity in light of objective
conceptions of science in the second chapter. An attempt to focus on the force of
influence that past events have on present ones from the partial perspective of an
external frame of reference only reveals the completed results of the process,
which amounts to an analysis of becoming in the past tense. These external,
transitional, and temporally retrospective accounts only yield causal description
of an apparently passive growing together of received influence. "Science can
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find no aim in nature: science can find no creativity in nature; it finds mere rules
of succession."26 Whereas from the internal, integrative frame of reference of an
experience itself, with its complete perspective of subjective immediacy and real
subjective agency, the creativity involved in the active reception, integration, and
responsiveness to received influence is obvious. The subjective outlook conveys
how apparent and how profoundly important the creative agency is in deciding
the future to some degree as a complement to an objective outlook predicting it.
As to the would-be closed objective system suggested in the physical sciences,
the appeal of the extravagant hypothesis that even physical activity obviously
initiated through conscious subjective agency, such as trajectories through space
of pizza delivery orders, are as predictable as physical phenomena lacking
initiating conscious agency, such as future lunar eclipses, holds less weight
nowadays, even in terms of a crude materialism supposing inert subatomic
entities alone to be of fundamental importance. For even these so-called hard
sciences, as previously shown, are approached and advance by way of the
conscious interests, values, measures, and decisions pertinent to the scientific
community. Moreover, as to the persistent difficulty of how psychical agency
produces physical effects without defying the laws understood to govern physical
reality, current science is already reinterpreting the stature of such laws in ways
more open to introducing creativity - if not an outright psychical realism - to
physical theory. Note the remarkable departure from past scientific practices
revealed in the current division of physical laws. There are the more strictly
universal ones such as gravitation, conservation, electro-magnetic force on the
one hand, where violation is hardly conceivable; but also the less strict
statistical ones such as those obeyed by crowds of individual entities like gases
and thermodynamic systems, and those governing quantum phenomena
(oddly unintelligible from traditional guidelines of physical theory) on the other
hand, where interference on the part of psychical input may very well take place.
There are compelling reasons nonetheless, Einstein reminds us, that prevent any
rash extrapolation from the 'sheer black magic' of quantum and systemic
indeterminacies to the outlawing of a robust determinacy, for these developments
do not in themselves refute the view that 'God does not play dice' with the world.
But a wide domain of phenomena may remain for which the future is for all
practical purposes robustly predictable while the same is not assumed for other
26 A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought. NY: Free Press, 1968, p.211.
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physical domains. At any rate, there seems no reason, dictated by contemporary
science, to doubt the psychical intuition conveyed in experience that, far from
merely registering predetermined sequences of thoughts and decisions,
experience is pervaded by genuine self-created purposes and volitions, that in
short, creativity is a fact of existence.
§ The Ultimate of Ultimates
Despite its pervasive existence as the unique, autonomous, self-realising of all
actuality, and despite that its conception was partly derived from physics,
biology, and evolutionary principles, creativity in process philosophy cannot be
understood as a scientific concept, but must be recognised as a supremely
metaphysical principle. And even as a metaphysical principle creativity cannot be
understood as synonymous with either ancient or medieval renditions of the
concept. Its nearest relation in antiquity, that of 'generation', is far from
analogous, and it is hardly related at all to the 'creation' as conceived by
medieval theologians. As an altogether novel idea process creativity is not an easy
one to pin down. Whitehead offers no clear-cut definition despite any number of
sweeping suggestive references. In the end he admits that, "These ultimate
notions of 'production of novelty' and of 'concrete togetherness' are inexplicable
either in terms of the higher universals or in terms of the components
participating..." plainly aware that, "The analysis of the components abstracts
from the [creative process]. The sole appeal is to intuition."27 The appeal to
intuition intimates an appeal to the actual influences and their varying felt
significances in experience. Here the psychical realist strand in process
philosophy is accented again in the insight that process creativity is in the
becoming of experience. As made abundantly clear, the idea of process forms
the basic intuition which Whitehead uses to elucidate his system, and he intends
to appeal to that intuition - drawn from human psychical experience - to convey
the inherent creativity in all worldly process. It is evident that from the sole
experiential reality of transitional and experiential synthesis, the plurality, the
unity, and the ongoing character of the world in its entirety are to be given
a comprehensive account. And creativity is the principle that ultimately explains
the existence of the world as dynamic and unified.
Notwithstanding its inexplicable nature, a good many things can be said by
way of honing in on creativity, at least as an ultimate metaphysical principle.
27 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, pp.21-22.
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Note first that it is the concept that accounts for the perpetual creative advance
into novelty, 'the principle of novelty' at the pinnacle of process thought.
A singularly key concept which together with the one and the many forms the
zenith of the metaphysical system. We must see it as the complete generality
pervading every type of existence whatsoever, the feature all actual events have
in common. But creativity is not a higher level entity, but rather a higher level
activity which is instantiated in the more limited self-realising activities of
individual events. The events come and go but creativity as the underlying
activity of the world process never ceases, and in this sense is an ultimate on
a par with the Aristotelian ultimate of 'primary substance', a reference drawn by
Whitehead himself.28 Creativity may be analogous to Aristotle's prime matter, but
a significant disanalogy arises in that prime matter is passive with respect to
receiving the actuality of the forms whereas creativity is pure activity integral
to actuality - the 'ultimate of ultimates' thus constituting a novel departure from
all past first principles in a philosophical scheme.
The question of the ontological wherewithal of creativity as construed in
process thought presents something of a problem. It is one of the few issues on
which Whitehead and Hartshorne part company, with the former accentuating
his Platonic leanings and the latter his nominalist ones. The better to explicate
and universalise the doctrine, here we shall pursue a compromise position
between the two. Creativity is certainly not an outright external agency putting
forth its own obscure and autonomous purposes; it is not extrinsic but intrinsic
to reality. Yet it may appear to transcend individual worldly events given that the
world in its own right amounts to being a unified psychical-real totality of
creative experience in process. It is not to be understood as a form of existence in
any ordinary sense of the word, because to exist is to be self-realising and
determinate and creativity is rather the ground of all self-realised determinacy.
Nor is it to be understood as a form of possibility, because creativity also grounds
all possibility. It is held to have no being whatsoever apart from the plurality of
actualising events, but within the plurality it is held to exist as their most basic
feature or essential character. Everything described in the process metaphysical
system is one of the modal differentiations of creativity. It serves as an ultimate
explanation backing the bounds of the ontological principle.
28
A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, pp.21.
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Creativity then should be seen as having more than a merely formal role as
a category in process philosophy. It functions as a real general activity, meaning
a pervasive and perpetual feature encompassing all reality, yet only in a dynamic
manner with 'real' not existing without the 'realities' or outside these 'realities'.
It also functions as an explanatory principle - 'the reason for the origin of that
occasion of experience' - meaning the reason or ground for the source of an
unending flow of actual experiential events. As a metaphysical principle, though
it is not an event itself, it is an eternally real and inexhaustible metaphysical
energy at the base of all existent events presupposed by their every becoming and
revealed in their every being
§ The Process Metaphysical Rhythm
In order to comprehend creativity as ultimate explanation we must elucidate
the manner of its metaphysical function. There is a telling passage in Whitehead
outlining the rhythm of process in his system, through which that function is
made plain.
The world expands through recurrent unifications of itself, each, by the
addition of itself, automatically recreating the multiplicity anew... The
novel entity is at once the togetherness of the 'many' which it finds, and
also it is one among the disjunctive 'many' which it leaves; it is a novel
entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it synthesises. The
many become one, and are increased by one.29
The idea is that creativity, as the pure activity underlying the ongoing nature of
an expanding universe, functions as an urge toward differentiation and
unification, that is toward the individuation of itself into the many experiential
events, and toward the growing together of these events into new unities.
Creativity is both integral to each novel event and transitional between each and
the totality of them all. Note that the one and the many are more than mere
mathematical notions based on number, but indicate the bare ideas of
'conjunctive singularity' and 'disjunctive diversity' in a metaphysical sense. Also
note that it is a universe of a one and a many, and not a one or a many. There are
always two syntheses to speak of in an ongoing world of process: the many into
one and then the one into many. The many may be composed ofa multiplicity of
events but it is not constitutedby them. Each event constitutes the world for itself
as a unique manyness, for only within the coming together of each singular
event does the manifold achieve conjunction. The one is necessary if there is to
29 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.21.
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be a many, but the principle is such that though there are 'many actuals' there
can never be an 'actual many'. This is the root of the dynamic rhythm of process
pluralism. Both the microscopic integration and the macroscopic transition are
complementary aspects of creativity as the ultimate principle of universal
process. Events cannot be reduced to inferior modes of an ultimate creativity, for
creative process and individual experience require each other. Creativity is
needed to bring events into concrete existence, while events are needed to give
form and definiteness to the shapeless flow of creative activity. The rhythmic
interplay of the two are also required to give an account for the rational
structure and the non-rational process found in experience.30
By viewing in (slightly artificial) isolation the two modes of creativity - that
integral to each event and that transitional between them - the prominent role of
psychical realism in both modes is made apparent. Creativity in its integral mode
is illuminated by way of consulting experience to understand what it is and why
it ought to be held as a fundamental property of reality. Whitehead appreciated
that, "subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situation which is
presented to metaphysics for analysis,"31 and the key ingredient of subjective
experiencing is its self-caused and creative reception, integration, and response.
Whitehead refers to creative self-causation as an, "active power indeterminate as
to its exercise, capable of choosing arbitrarily" from among the presented
prehensive influences to be synthesised. From that analysis he goes on to surmise
that, "the freedom inherent in the universe is constituted by this element of
self-causation."32 To see how this opinion fits into other ideas regarding
creativity in its transitional mode, recognise that creative self-causation is
perhaps the primary ontological concept, for it is this activity that connects
process with an essential natural teleology based in creativity itself.
The self-realising activity of fusing the multiplicity into a concrete unity of
value - the eternal urge that 'all shall be one' - represents a creativity immanent
to the participatory elements in an event that thereby renders it into an organic
event, into an organism. This subjective deciding that takes place through the
stages of an experience shows that experiences are not simply combinations of
inherited final teleological direction and automatic mechanical integrative
direction. The creativity itself within an experiential event applies exclusively to
30 See also remarks concerning the 'rhythm of process' in D. Sherburne's A Whiteheadian
Aesthetic, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961, pp.240-247.
31 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.160.
32 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.88.
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the radically novel decisions steeped in a rather free teleological
self-determination in the subjective experience of the event's specific becoming.
This more 'individualised' final causality in the decisions of each event
complements the efficient causality inherent in transitional creativity.
Thus causality is considered a complex process in which many influences are
interwoven. Every new experience is in part the product of efficient causality,
which refers to the influence of previous experience on it in the form
of objective past data to which it must partly conform. There is also the element
of self-causality or self-realisation, which refers to the manner of unification of
that data from the unique perspective of the new experience. Every event
contributes something of its own in the way it appropriates its past, relates to
various potentialities, and produces a novel synthesis not strictly entailed by its
past. And that creative selection occurs in terms of the alternative potentialities
residually available for aims and goals which form an individualised
final causality. The 'ultimate' in ultimate explanation refers then to how it is that
creativity in experiential events exhibits all three sorts of causal influence,
making it possible for events themselves to be cited as 'reasons' under the
ontological principle in virtue of present responses (self-cause) to past
experience (efficient cause) in terms of potentialities grasped (final cause).
As for creativity in the transitional mode, it too can be clarified in terms of
psychical realism. The transitional side of creativity is nowhere explained in
process philosophy other than in the twin claims that each subjective becoming
is also an objective being for subsequent subjectivity and that this is apparent in
the act of becoming. "It is inherent in the constitution of the immediate, present
actuality that a future will supersede it." While the notion of unification
commands enormous elucidation, the counterpart of differentiation seems to be
something of a primitive, given little or no treatment, despite that the two sides
together form the dual creative advance. But essentially the reason for so much
description of the world unifying into a one and little of it diversifying into
a many is that process philosophy is everywhere emblematic of what is
encountered in experience. The calibre of experience encountered at the human
level is such that in any present moment, there is a great amount of receptivity,
re-enactment, reiteration of mainly past objective influence, alongside
substantial appreciation, evaluation, enjoyment as that material is integrated into
a present subjectivity. Aspects of future anticipation undoubtedly intervene in
the process, but since the present is actual and the past was actual, they
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command a greater experiential allegiance and are available for greater
experiential scrutiny than vague anticipation of process yet to be actual.
The psychical reality as lived through gives experiential synthesis in the present
its temporal arrow toward the future, but an arrow at hand is easier to examine
than the many future targets toward which it may point. The metaphysical
analysis is understandably skewed to accessible experiential ingredients, that is,
in elucidation efforts but not in ontological postulates. This need not call the
reality of the transitional mode of creativity into question. What is more, should
the system be envisioned as implying a world that stacks up into one
psychical-realist whole, a scenario addressed in the following sections,
presumably the nature of that cosmic experience, however unimaginable from
a human perspective, would mean a far higher degree of anticipatory certainty
endowing its present activity. Alas, the metaphysician makes do with
a vanishingly small fraction of existent experiential revelation.
A second factor of transitional creativity, leading on from its scant treatment,
concerns how its subtle monistic aspect relates to the more pluralistic integral
creativity. Since, "the passage of nature is only another name for the creative
force of existence,"33 and since creativity is, "the one underlying activity of
realisation individualising itself in an interlocked plurality of modes,"34 the
transitional mode suggests a more transcendent, monistic side to creativity.
This unified and partly transcendent aspect removes any arbitrary disconnection
between the one and the many, by virtue of being one universal activity giving
rise to the plurality of creative episodic events. They are inextricably connected
in that the monistic creative activity of cosmic advance requires pluralistic
differentiation for its ongoing being. "Nature is never complete. It is always
passing beyond itself. This is the creative advance of nature." Creativity is still
a one in virtue of being this activity, but this by no means implies it being so in
a substantial manner. It is located in the transcending of settled, determinate,
actual events by new events aimed toward new anticipations. The plurality of
these events 'conditions', 'qualifies', and 'characterises' transitional and in one
sense transcendent creativity, while the reciprocal processes between the two
modes affords the ultimate explanation for the ongoingness of the world.
Ongoingness is explained through the extension of creativity as a continuous
unity from the past to the present, through its leading into the future, through its
33 A.N. Whitehead, The Concept ofNature. Cambridge: Univ. Press, p.22.
34 A.N. Whitehead, Science and theModern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p.70.
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ever-active driving on of change, and through its inexhaustible and imperishable
instantiation in the plurality of self-creative events. Without a transitional level
transcending any ongoing manifestation in experiential events, experience would
not include anticipation of either a general future nor the specific features of
endurance present experience possesses in subsequent objective functioning.
This is clearly so in present psychical life at the human level, wherein all activity
presupposes never more than partly apparent outcomes. The assumption of
psychical existence pervading the world generalises anticipation to show that
everything to some degree points to a future. Hence, anticipation reveals
the transitional mode of creativity eternally transcending its ongoing
manifestations.
§ The Process Psychical Interpretative Spread
In outlining creativity in terms of its two modes, certain interpretations of key
principles not altogether clearly stated in the canon of process writings
have been allowed in the hope of achieving a more streamlined system.
Clearly Whitehead acknowledged that creativity can and does take on a range of
interpretations depending on viewpoint and purpose of analysis.
If we stress the role of the environment, this process is causation. If we
stress the role of my immediate pattern of active enjoyment, this process
is self-creation. If we stress the role of the conceptual anticipation of the
future whose existence is a necessity in the nature of the present, this
process is the teleological aim at some ideal in the future.39
Consequently one expects and indeed finds a spread in interpretations of this
central tenet among commentators on and innovators of process thought.
They range for instance from creativity being conceived as utterly pluralistic
(Christian, Leclerc) to conceptions of dual-nature creativity with monistic and
pluralistic elements (Garland, Hartshorne, Van der Veken) to creativity being
conceived as utterly monistic (Nobo, Wilcox). There is also a range that spans
a high degree and influence of the presence of the past in present creative
activity (Frankenberry), a high degree and influence of the presence of the future
in present creative activity (Allan, Ford), and a high degree and influence of both
the past and the future in present creative activity (Neville, Nobo). To delve into
the specifics of their interpretative and innovative projects is beyond our present
A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought. NY: Free Press, 1968, p.228.
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scope, but the main positions basically depict a recognisable pluralist-monist
spectrum.36
William Christian and Ivor Leclerc, at one end of the spectrum, have argued
for an utterly pluralistic creativity in Whitehead. Christian sees creativity as
solely indicating the self-realisation or self-determination of internally free
events. The self-caused creative subjective feeling at the heart of all existence
points to the general fact that the world consists of self-creative experiential
events. Leclerc sees 'creativity' as merely indicating the general activity
conceived in abstraction from any individual instantiations of that activity.
There are becoming events, and basic to them is the activity of self-creation.
The fallacy of misplaced concreteness occurs when the abstraction is taken as
actual itself or even more real that its embodiments, a fallacy resulting in a
monism contrary to the pluralistic essence of process thought.
Yet in order for a completely pluralistic creativity to actively drive the world
as opposed to merely underlying it, as passive matter presumably would do, there
must be some means for it to give rise to new events, some manner by which it
precedes those events. The problem with radically pluralistic positions according
to Hartshorne, Garland, Van der Veken, among others is that creativity
continually springs forth throughout the world as a primordial many without an
existent reason or unifying source.
Charles Hartshorne makes do by accepting and elaborating the Whiteheadian
role of God in the system, and that role is examined in the final chapter. William
Garland identifies in Whitehead the suggestion that over and against all entities
there stands a dynamic creative activity, one irreduced to any set of these entities.
So Garland posits the presence of a creative 'receptacle' storing past and guiding
present creative activity. Taking the receptacle notion further, Jan Van der Veken
conceives creativity as first and foremost a properly substantial as well as
a universal activity, something more than in a formal sense, a 'legitimate form of
agency or active principle' with a general and all-encompassing function, for
which experiential events are understood as its modes or instantiations.
36 For references and descriptions of key writings by these and other process philosophers, the
best annotated bibliography to date is found in G. Lucas', A Genesis of Modern Process
Thought: An Historical Outline with Bibliography. London: Scarecrow Press, 1983; see also
L. Ford's, "A Sampling of Other Interpretations" in Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy
NY: Fordham University Press, 1983, and the reference section of the present study.
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At the far end of the spectrum, Jorge Nobo believes that individual instances of
creativity are manifestations of 'the one ultimate creativity of the universe',
a position also shared by Wilcox. Nobo, the more monistic of the two, argues for
a mutual or reciprocal immanence that implies each experiential event's
presence in every other experience. Every experiential event, in a complete
description, includes not only its own subjectivity but also its subsequent
influence on other subjective experience. This one creativity at the base of all
existence is 'eternally real' as 'an inexhaustible metaphysical energy', and
without this eternal creativity no experiential events could ever hope to become.
Nobo's 'solidarity thesis' entails that creativity and the extensive continuum and
the receptacle all designate an ultimate reality which is extensive as well as
creative, that constitutes an eternal matrix as the ultimate metaphysical ground
for becoming and being and the solidarity understood to connect all experience.
Although it is not straightforwardly the case that those of more monistic
persuasion also highlight their adherence to the doctrine of psychical realism, it
appears that psychical realism does offer a form of unity-in-activity to complete
the system.
§ Creativity and its Complements
This final section on creativity concerns the place creativity occupies in
connection with process potentiality and with a process God. The first point to
make is that creativity requires potentiality as its complement. Since creativity is
a ceaseless self-realising activity (on both pluralistic and monistic
interpretations), it requires a degree of unactualised potential to maintain a
genuine degree of novelty. If potentiality existed in an already fixed order, then
the sum of experiential events would include all potential in either one of two
ways. If it were eternally and exhaustively actualised, then both the absence of
any unactualised potential or any actuality coming into being would follow, such
as in the necessary existence scenario of a Spinoza. If it included some events
actually coming into being, but only in as much as they followed an eternally
fixed order of potential that determined the manner of each becoming, then at
most a spurious contingency would follow, such as in the sufficient reason
scenario of a Leibniz. Creativity cannot be maintained in either case, because the
notion of novelty is lost in the former and the notion of free self-creation is lost
in the latter.
It is also the case that potentiality requires creativity as its complement.
In order for there to be a degree of potential, the actualised events must not
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exhaust the potential order. But only an infinite multiplicity of them could ever
do so. Any particular ordering of potential in experience and any combination of
such orderings in experience by definition cannot exhaust unordered
potentiality. But given the possibility of infinite events, events have to be aligned
into a ceaseless flow of creative self-realisation, if potentiality is to be
maintained. Some degree of creativity is needed, (spreading temporally here)
otherwise the entire realm of potentiality would be exhausted and no
unactualised potential would remain.
The ways in which creativity and God may complement each other introduces
a range of possible interpretations to process philosophy. Indeed, the range is
implicit in the growth of Whitehead's own thought. In Science and the Modern
World and in Religion in the Making there are clearly the two distinct ultimates
of God and creativity, but in Process and Reality an ambiguity is introduced, in
which God may be seen as subordinate to an ultimate creative principle."
Here creativity is cast as a final metaphysical category or absolute, in the form of
an activity rather than as an entity - and as an activity it may also serve as the
underlying nature of God, the ground of divine being as well as the ground of
finite being. If creativity is viewed not merely as a formal principle but as really
active, then it is no longer necessary to interpret God as the highest existent, as
an event over against all others. God on this view could simply be a dimension of
creativity, namely its first limitation.
Now if creativity in the system is taken as universal and all-encompassing
activity which must somehow be limited, it is not necessary to conceive of this
initial limitation of creativity as a distinct entity, in the form of Whitehead's God.
Rather the limitation itself could be conceived to be as ultimate as creativity, and
no single entity conceived as having the same philosophically ultimate meaning.
Additionally, the historical route of changes undergone in the first limitation
with its interaction with worldly process could serve as the upholder of past
worldly facts, a point we return to in discussing temporality below. Then the
question of whether the first limitation of creativity is God amounts to asking
the religious question, 'Does the drive and the support which are at work in the
world reveal the characteristics that the religious person generally ascribes to
57 For an analysis of these developments see L. Ford, The Emergence of Whitehead's
Metaphysics: 1925-1929. Albany, NY: Suny Press, 1984.
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God?' Therefore it can be taken as a matter of temperament whether God and
creativity are to be separated out into distinct ontological features of the system.
Varying opinions on the nature of teleological drive may make all the
difference. Creativity ensures that reality necessarily involves qualitative flux,
that it has an essentially dynamic character, that the future is open, and that the
present alone is where the valuational possibilities inherent in that openness are
actualised or forever lost. On its own creativity implies neither optimism nor
pessimism about the long-range likelihood of value being diminished or
enhanced as events succeed events over the course of time. But given that
creativity is universally active and efficacious in all events, and that any value
inherited from past events is retained in the primordial limitation of every
process of becoming which co-ordinates those values from within, creativity in
this valuational guise allows in a metaphysical interpretation consisting of just
the three formative elements of experience, potentiality, and creativity. Provided
one uncovers an optimistic trend in the accumulative momentum of altogether
free teleological activity in creative worldly events, one could still adopt a God
principle operative in creativity that answers to the religious temperament.
The option is then open to having either an immanent creative urge or an
immanent God and creativity in each event. In the first case psychical realism
can hold a more prominent and less disputable place in the system, the fact
(if it is one) of accumulative momentum at the cosmic level depicted as
mirroring the enrichment of experience. Psychical realism is also employed in
the second case, wherein God is then a religious name believers intuitively use
for the all-encompassing process on the basis of evidence in particular
experiences - thus showing God to be a category of meaning and not just
a category of being.
Finally, since creativity and its first limitation, construed either way, are
devoid of antecedent explanation or 'without why' according to Whitehead, the
question arises as to how to distinguish it from the traditional and, in
contemporary circles, the altogether, "easy assumption that there is an ultimate
reality [the Absolute, Brahma, the Order of Heaven, God] which, in some
unexplained way, is to be appealed to for the removal of perplexity," and as such
is simply another case of, "...the great refusal of rationality to assert its rights."38
Again, due to its psychical realist core, process philosophy responds by not
38 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p.115.
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confining creativity to a theoretical concept, but by linking it to immediate
experience, hence giving it a preconceptual intuitive meaning. Whitehead
consistently reproaches theoretical science for studying only 'half the evidence
provided by human experience', and especially in considering ultimate issues
such as creativity the answers he insists are to be had 'by fusing life with nature'
whereby theoretical constructs are identified with 'the emotional intensity
entertained in life'.39 Creativity is as explanatory and removes as much perplexity
as immediate experience does, no more and no less.
PART FOUR
Process Organicity
Process philosophers recognise creativity as the ultimate feature of reality, the
feature that drives experiential events onward toward greater and more
integrated value, and this creative component indicates a prominent role played
by psychical realism in the metaphysics of experience. Another significant
feature of reality highlighted in the process metaphysical system is its organicity,
which in part follows on from this creative feature. Organicity channels
creativity, thereby serving the crucial role of fashioning organic order out of
creative chaos. In fact Whitehead refers to his work as a 'philosophy of organism'
throughout Process and Reality and borrowed insights from biology in
formulating it and organic metaphors for explaining it. The initial sketch above
made plain how process metaphysics centres on four ideas organically entwined:
the prehensive activity of experiential events, the supervenient availability of
further event potentialities, the underlying activity of creativity, and the lure
toward higher integration of value. "What is indefinable in one such notion
cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions."" Whitehead also
saw how order in the world was due to the nature of its ordered parts, each best
understood as organic, unified, purposive wholes. Central to his philosophy then
is organicity, worked out at four essential levels: how events could be organic
experiential wholes, how events could interact organically with other events,
how the world itself could amount to one organic experiential whole, and finally,
how the basic ideas in the system could fit together organically. While all four
levels point toward the prominence of its psychical realist feature and are best
understood in terms of it, Whitehead tends to focus on the psychical side of the
first two.
39 A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought. NY: Free Press, 1968, pp.231-232.
40 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.5.
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In the philosophy of organism... the notion of 'organism' has two meanings...
The microscopic meaning is concerned with the formal constitution of
a process of realising an individual unity of experience. The macroscopic
meaning is concerned with the givenness of the actual world, considered as
the stubborn fact which at once limits and provides opportunity for the actual
occasion."
This passage conveys the distinction between these two main types of organic
relations. In discussing the receptivity, integration, and synthesis of an
experience above, in terms of integrative creativity and final causality,
organic relations within an experience were drawn out. Our present concern is
the manner in which 'the community of actual things is an organism' as shown
through organic relations between experiences developed via transition.
Since Whitehead suggested that his philosophy of organism was a 'cell' theory
of actuality, it is well to be clear on why and where the analogy holds. Certainly
the manner in which prehensive influences make up an experience, as we have
seen, is analogous to how parts of a cell are organised. The way parts of a cell are
related to the whole cell however, and the way two cells are related to each
other, are not entirely analogous to the way experiences are related to each
other. This is because the relations governing cellular activity are not normally
understood as having the assymmetrical temporal element that necessarily
governs the relations between experiences. Likewise, and for the same reasons,
the relations between two cells as functioning in one multicellular organism are
not entirely analogous to the relations between two experiences. Experiences do
not work as one for the functioning of a higher level experience of which they
may be a part, as cells sometimes do for organisms. The analogy breaks down not
only temporally, but also at the final cosmological level, in that unlike all other
organisms the world itself conceived as one organic entity has neither an
external environment in which to operate nor a single dominant pattern
necessarily persisting through all the possible epochs it may undergo. Yet the
interconnections that mark the temporal strands of experiential inheritance do
qualify experiences as constituting a kind of organic order that is partly
analogous to cellular activity. Strands of experience add up so to speak into
various forms of unity (the 'concrete enduring entities' to be examined presently)
and these strands suggest a world somewhat analogous to an organism, composed
of several subordinate organisms. And ultimately, a psychical component is there
at each level no matter how simple or how complex, to guide all experience via
41 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, Pp.128-129.
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that organic structure. Accepting the asymmetrical, the temporal, and the
cosmological qualifications, the organicity of structured wholes of parts
organised for particular ends still remains. Hence making it true that,
"a complete organism in the organic theory is what corresponds to a bit of
material on the materialistic theory," entailing psychical input in such fashion
that, "...this doctrine involves the abandonment of the traditional scientific
materialism, and the substitution of an alternative doctrine of organism."'12
§ Societies and Selves and Simple Things
Now, in virtue of the relativity principle in process thought, all experience
and all that is commonly encountered in experience and all the experiential
world at large constitutes a variety of connected unities, revealed in analysis of
the relations among their members. There is a 'general metaphysical obligation
of mutual immanence' pervading all existent entities that connects and unifies
them. These several unities are termed 'societies' by Whitehead, and the world is
composed of, "a series of societies of increasing width of prevalence, the more
special societies being included in the wider societies."" The word aptly depicts
the fact that in societal unities the members themselves are the reason for the
togetherness that obtains, a society being 'its own reason' due to some common
defining character the members all share, despite whatever differences.
Analysing the various types of society shows how organic relations introduce
enough order into the world of experience to allow for its many enduring
entities.
The all-inclusive outermost society is one of mere unqualified extension.
It functions as 'the first determination of order' - the limitation arising out of the
general character of the world that each generation of experiential events,
whatever its more particular features of order happen to be, at least exhibits the
general properties of 'extensive connection' and of 'whole and part'. It 'underlies
the whole world, past, present, and future' being more basic than 'spatialisation
and temporalisation'. It amounts to, "that general scheme of relationships
providing the capacity that many objects can be welded into the real unity of one
experience."44 All past circumstances somewhat restrict present potentiality, and
any given state of the world imposes restrictions on any experience arising out of
42 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p.99.
43 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.92.
44 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.62.
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that world. To guarantee a togetherness of experiential events available for
co-ordination by further experiential events, this general extensive uniformity is
required. "This ultimate, vast society constitutes the whole environment within
which our epoch is set, so far as systematic characteristics are discernible by us
in our present stage of development."" The theoretical pure dimensionality and
the four-dimensionality of the presently discernible space-time continuum
presuppose this society of mere unqualified extension. The space-time
continuum embeds a society of operative geometrical axioms which in turn
embeds a society of operative natural laws and so on down to the most particular
societal arrangements. But the most general discernible society is what connects
all experiential events in their basic space-time relatedness. All experience that is
happening and all that has happened and all that will happen takes place as
novel drops of actualised space-time within a four-dimensional continuum.
Organicity, however, is displayed more readily in the 'bewildering complexity'
of competing and accommodating societies embedded in the unqualified
extension. "The most general examples of such societies are the regular trains of
waves, individual electrons, protons, individual molecules, societies of molecules
such as inorganic bodies, living cells, and societies of cells such as vegetable and
animal bodies."" The universe is co-ordinated into a vast array of these 'societies
of societies, and into societies of societies of societies' as Whitehead emphasises.
Additional examples are offered to sketch societal orders in a descending
direction,
An army is a society of regiments, and regiments are societies of men, and
men are societies of cells, and of blood, and of bones, together with the
dominant society of personal human experience, and cells are societies of
smaller physical entities such as protons, and so on, and so on.47
The analysis of experiential events has focused on individually receptive and
self-creative activity in the abstract, outlining the general character and relations
events possess. We have now to address the world of enduring yet changing,
concrete objects known through human experience. Their ultimate foundations
are disclosed in both spatially and temporally extended societies established via
the amount of order relative to disorder achieved in the relevant givenness from
past experience. Any present set of experiential events exhibits the dominant
orders relative to them, after the fashion of moral orders pertaining to given
45 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.97.
46 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.98.
47 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1933, p.264.
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cultures. These societal orders are a special case of the organic interfusion that
marks all experience. Here experiential entities reinforce the mutually connected
togetherness of members of societies which share common characteristics in their
manner of mediating and canalising prehensive influence.
Similarly canalised prehensions mean that every society requires a 'social
background' of which it is itself a constituent part. Reality thus presents itself as
a complex layering of societal environments, a 'hierarchy of societies' that
provides more and more complex orders via mediation patterns of influence for
included members. The layers must not be seen as similar to boxes within boxes
however. Unlike this spatial model, the embedded layers are not merely
externally related to their environments, but societal layers pervade each other in
such a way that an experience prehends influence from the members of all
embedding and embedded societies. Members of any included society are
members of the wider societal layers as well, and far from repudiating the order
of the wider layers, they depend on these more general characters as the base for
their greater specialisation. Consider a cell in a kidney for instance. It has
specialised features pertaining to its inclusion in the bodily organ that are not
shared by other cells in the body. Yet in addition to being a kidney cell it is also a
bodily cell sharing certain general features with all other bodily cells. The more
general features support the more specialised ones, making the cell's social
environment both the kidney and the body.
Yet unlike the normal perception of cells, the description thus far of societal
order as the inheritance and display and propagation of a defining characteristic
in a connected unity of experiences is strictly applicable only to intermittent
flashes of existence, manifesting no temporal continuity of inheritance relations.
To add temporal endurance to the account requires a further specification of
'society' that transforms merely social order into personal order. Here members
of a societal unity are arranged in an asymmetric series of linear transitional
propagations of the defining characteristic. Each experiential event arises out of
and sums up its own history in a particularly intimate manner, and is provoked
by both that history and the present social order support to reiterate its past
character in the present. What appears as an enduring entity through time is not
an experiential event but the defining characteristic reiterated in a strand or
thread of events that enables each to sum up its 'personal' past in an intimate
way. "The real actual things that endure are all societies," in some cases
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involving, "a mere thread of temporal transition from occasion to occasion,"
while in others an organically ordered multitude of them.48
At one end of the spectrum then are enduring objects that consist of a single
strand of experiential events aligned serially, each succeeding the previous and
then succeeded by the next over time. Any one of these events individually
displays the defining characteristic inherited in transition directly from the
contiguous event before it and indirectly from all other events before it
(less remotely from those within the strand, more remotely from those outside it)
and transmits the character to subsequent events both within and outside that
strand. The life history of all animals are personally ordered societies, and thus
are examples of enduring objects of this strictly temporal variety. Human selves
live through experiences that are threaded serially through time, but although
strictly they are personally ordered societies, they require the sustaining organic
support of interactions with the several intertwined societies that make up the
immediate bodily environment and the less immediate (though crucial)
surrounding environment of other embedded societies. These latter societies
represent enduring objects at the other end of the spectrum, those that consist of
both temporally and spatially extended strands of experience, that is to say, all
entities commonly understood as physical objects. For example bodies and plants
and diamonds can all be broken down into their constituent minerals, molecules,
atoms, particles; each available for analysis as differing strands of enduring
objects, and each ordered organically through its spatial and temporal
co-ordination as dictated by the asymmetrical temporal relations of the relevant
prehensions.
Although there are the two forms of living and non-living enduring objects,
the line that separates complex forms of non-living things and simple forms of
living things is difficult to fix. "Living bodies can be pursued down to the edge of
lifelessness. Also the functionings of inorganic matter remain intact amid the
functionings of living matter."49 The two most obvious distinctions are the
generally higher amount of novelty and vulnerability introduced in living
societies as compared to generally repetitive but durable non-living societies.
Some degree of teleological structure, in the sense of co-ordinated persistence of
activity, is fundamental at every level of actuality. However selves have a
48 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1933, pp.262, 259.
This section is the clearest statement of these organic relations.
49 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1933, p.266.
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comparably higher degree of freedom than simple things, though selves do not
last as long as stones. Two further points follow which help to convey the essence
of the organicity that arises as a result of societal order. Since alongside however
much conformation to past objective fact, "the essence of life is the teleological
introduction of novelty," Whitehead reasons that, "it is evident that according to
this definition no single occasion can be called living."50 Life is identified rather
as the co-ordination of the self-creative spontaneities across societal stretches.
Therefore on this view the ambiguity about the boundaries of living organisms is
to be expected. And living bodies are not to be equated with personally ordered
societies either. "There is no necessary connection between 'life' and
'personality'. A 'personal' society need not be 'living', in the general sense of the
term; and a 'living' society need not be 'personal'.'"" But neither of these points
indicate that there is no effect from the organic relations of the parts in societal
wholes, as Whitehead explains in the following passage.
The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that the plan of the whole
influences the very characters of the subordinate organisms which enter into
it. In the case of an animal, the mental states enter into the plan of the total
organism and thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms
until the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached.52
The temporal indicators 'successive' and 'until' allude to the asymmetric causal
links that necessarily qualify how any 'plan of the whole' conveys influence to its
ordered parts. It may be less intense and less innovative, but lower level
experience is just as individual as higher level experience, and to have an effect
the organic configurations must work around a pervasive psychical
independence. Although 'by reason of the plan of the body' an electron may
differ in differing organic relations, "the electron blindly runs either within or
without the body; but it runs within the body in accordance with its character
within the body."53 Influence is only possible along temporal threads, but the
differing threads of historical routes of experiential events interact with one
another. An earlier experience in one personally ordered strand primarily effects
that strand but also secondarily effects others. Strictly speaking, the intensity of
experience that obtains at higher levels in favourable circumstances - living,
conscious, ecstatic, and so on - is due entirely to conducive organic structures of
historical threads of experiential events. The order of societal routes supervenes
50 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1933, p.266.
51 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1933, p.264.
52 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p.98.
53 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p.99.
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on the interplay of 'stubborn fact and creative advance' with organicity resulting
in this, "substantial activity expressing itself in individual embodiments and
evolving in achievements of organism.""
To get an idea of how that 'activity' terminates ultimately in a world of
societies, selves, and simple things, we need only to introspect. Indeed, in the end
it is the one place the idea can be fully appreciated. "The only strictly personal
society of which we have direct discriminative intuition is the society of our own
personal experiences..." Whitehead reflects and, refining this basic insight of his
process forebears, Leibniz and Bergson, he goes on to suggest that, "We also have
a direct, though vaguer, intuition of our derivation of experience from the
antecedent functioning of our bodies, and a still vaguer intuition of our bodily
derivation from external nature."53 In order to see the general idea of process
metaphysics as an organic system of things whose essence consists of its
prehensions plus its 'real internal constitution' we must look to the psychical
reality as lived through to get a glimpse of that essence. Integral to our
personally ordered and society sustained experience are rhythmic reiterations of
patterns, each consisting of some uniformity and some novelty. Organisms are
revealed as structures continuing over time in rhythmic patterns most from the
standpoint of teleologically endowed, high-level, one-many syntheses in this
ongoing process. Insight into organic relatedness of the process sort, one
supported by a creative psychical real component at every level, is quite easily
confused with another related and popular set of ideas to which we now turn.
§ Organicity in Systems
The notion of organic holism has been the object of considerable attention in
recent years, having undergone a conceptual change from basically descriptive
functions in the life sciences to emblematic status in an ongoing paradigm shift
away from mechanistic, materialist world pictures. Nowadays organic holistic
thinking in its more romantic renditions often serves a somewhat notorious role
as a panacea for any number of contemporary scientific and cultural problems.
But surely many of these opinions and applications are oversimplified.
Academically respectable work has been done in the area nonetheless, much of it
taking place since Whitehead and Hartshorne first formulated their organic
metaphysical doctrines. Perhaps the most fruitful developments are located in
54 A.N. Whitehead, Science and theModern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p. 152.
55 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1933, p.265.
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what is now commonly referred to as systems cybernetics. Comparing and
contrasting these developments with process organicity will help explicate the
latter and extrapolate the importance of its psychical realist component.
General systems theory amounts to a framework for understanding complex
processes in any experiential domain. This framework arose as a consequence of
recent discoveries in the field of dynamic interaction and wholeness in the life
sciences, notably in the influential writings - both within and beyond their
respective fields - of the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy and the anthropologist
Gregory Bateson.96 Parallel developments in the new technological sciences of
cybernetics and information theory by Norbert Wiener, John von Newman,
W. Ross Ashby, and Ervin Laszlo among others,97 have contributed along with
general systems theory to establishing an expansive, multi-disciplinary paradigm
with fittingly eclectic methods of application. This amalgamation of views and
general orientations on the nature of reality and their implementation in various
intellectual and practical endeavours are commonly referred to as 'the systems
approach' or simply as 'cybernetics'.
Like the process metaphysician, the cybernetist has much to say regarding the
nature of process, and by and large shares a fundamental commitment to
a philosophy that accentuates the changing flux of processes over the stability of
things. Also, both orientations identify organic organisation in the world as of
singular importance for metaphysical understanding, and use it in rejecting any
bifurcation of reality along physical and psychical lines. The main bone of
contention between the two views however arises in terms of the position taken
on psychical realism. The organicity of the world for process thinkers is the
outcome of the activity of experiential events that pervade reality, while for
the systems approach there seems to be nothing but that organicity merely being
suggestive of psychical traits at its more complex levels. Subjective becoming
process is at the source of all existence for the former while objective
being-in-process accounts for all existence for the latter. While cybernetics is a
powerful heuristic device for explaining several salient features of reality,
56 L. Bertalanffy, General System Theory. NY: George Braziller, 1978, and G. Bateson, Steps to
an Ecology ofMind. NY: Randon House, 1972, and MindandNature. NY: Fontana, 1980.
57 For survey essays see, W.J. Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics. NY: John Wiley and Sons,
1961; and E. Lazslo, The Systems View of the World. NY: George Braziller, 1972.
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arguably psychical realism must be introduced at some level to complete the
metaphysical model.
The basic tenets of cybernetics relevant to the purpose of showing why this is
so include the following. Communication for the cybernetist is the influence of
information on the behaviour or structure of an organically ordered system
receiving it, or on what amounts to being an experiential event in the process
terms adopted here. The concept of information is not limited to the semantic
form of communicated content commonly cast in verbal and symbolic discourse,
but it is rather the broad notion of the effectiveness or influence of
a communication process regardless of the content of the message material.
Information under this interpretation is always related to a set of possibilities set
out by the nature of the receiving system. Incoming message material does not
enter as it is, but is coded by the system; the material that falls within its
particular discrimination is thus transformed, while the portion which falls
outside its discrimination is thereby eliminated. These receiving systems consist
in parts of a whole which are held together by their organically complex
interactions. The activity of any particular part is related to a set of possible states
which it might assume, and parts are constrained however indirectly to the
prevailing demands of the system as a whole. In such manner a hierarchy of
meaningfulness is established within the bits of information regarding the nature
of response, whereby the operations of threshold and constraint in the parts
account for the pervasive order and consistency we find in the whole, resulting
in the formal patterns, arrangements, and complexities that obtain. All systemic
properties of a whole could be understood as restrictions upon possibility, as
present digital codings or quantities of past analogic influences or qualities, that
give rise to specific configurations of mutually constraining elements.
Most notable for present concerns, the cybernetist claims that the systemic
arrangement of material parts into wholes can anchor the notion of psychical
process. Since information is defined solely in terms of communicative influence
regardless of the form or content of the message material, only difference as
detected by the constraints of the relevant threshold becomes information, and
difference cannot be localised in space or in time in the manner that message
material can. Things that fail to happen are just as likely to make a difference
and so become information as things that do happen. The influence of
information may or may not be in the form of a quantity or in the form of
energy; it may or may not have dimensions. Hence the perceiving of difference
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can be regarded as the marking of events with meaning, the cybernetist argues, it
can be viewed as a basic psychical operation. Psychical entities are then nothing
more than special sorts of systemic wholes displaying operations of this type.
They consist of any aggregate of parts that make up a whole, organised into
circular chains of determination interacting by virtue of coded versions of
preceding events (information), for which the parts respond by further coding.
Descriptions of these responses disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent in
the phenomena. Of course the parts under consideration are physical not
psychical entities, but it is their responsiveness to difference that the cybernetist
uses to distinguish their functioning as psychical and to identify aggregates of
parts organised into wholes of this sort as rudimentary psychical entities.
These criteria not only fit a number of complex entities that are commonly
called organisms, but they also apply to parts of organisms that maintain a
degree of autonomy in their self-regulation and functioning such as organs or
individual living cells. They likewise apply to the much wider range of those
complex systems consisting of multiple organisms (schools of fish) or systems in
which some of the parts are living and some are not (city traffic) or even to
systems in which there are no living parts (internal combustion engines).
Anything that can receive information, and through the self-regulation made
possible by circular trains of causation, maintain the truth of certain propositions
about itself, is involved in psychical processing on cybernetic reckoning.
The conceptual ground shared with process societies of experiential events is
obvious, particularly in the transcending of ordinary conceptions of an organism.
Now in order to demonstrate the limitations involved in a metaphysical
picture made up solely of systemically ordered activity, this primer of cybernetic
organisation can be modelled on the systems that obtain in and around
a kitchen refrigerator. Here the essential parts or systemic features include
(in the very least) a thermostat, a switch, and a motor. The slow increase of
temperature within the refrigerator represents the quantity of influence that
provides the analogic territory from which the thermostat receives and
discriminates information and responds by coding it. In turn this coded
information provides the territory from which the switch receives information
and then responds in kind with its coding. The motor then responds in similar
fashion to the territory presented by the switch to provide new analogic territory
in the form of decreasing temperature for mapping once again by the thermostat.
By virtue of the differing constraints imposed by the parts of the systemic whole,
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outlining minimal and maximal levels of information, the whole establishes a
stable though dynamic state consisting of an internal equilibrium and an
internal/external one, both held in systemic relations by circular causal links.
With little effort other systemic relations can be attached to this basic model to
incorporate all the types of systems mentioned above. Live lobsters could be
added to the contents of the fridge for instance, and the slow increase of
temperature could be hastened with hungry people opening its door. Here we are
incorporating living organisms into both the internal equilibrium of the
refrigerator system and into the internal/external equilibrium of the refrigerator
system and the house, the former raising the temperature slightly through the
lobster's body heat within the refrigerator and the latter raising it swiftly
through human appetite. Introducing organisms into the picture shows that the
interplay of physical and psychical elements does not effect cybernetic principles
in any exceptional way. Obviously other inorganic components could likewise be
added to both systems: a burning candle added to the system inside the
refrigerator perhaps or the house's heating system turned up outside of it. Indeed
it is on peril of over-simplification that any organic or inorganic components
whatsoever are left out of systemic description. As descriptive acumen increases,
so too does the extent of cybernetic linkage. The model also shows the
hierarchical structure of information in the varying thresholds of difference
detection of the system's components. With increases in complexity, an order of
conceptual levels or logical types of abstraction obtains between the systems and
sub-systems. The differences that make a difference to the thermostat within the
refrigerator may fail to make a difference to the thermostat of the heating system
of the whole house, though the initial set of differences do play some part.
The former thermostat is subordinate to the latter which maps a more inclusive
territory as differences combine into systems of differences. The thermostat
example also makes it clear that the hierarchical structure of the information is a
function of logical typing and psychical process, not of the actual nature of the
system components. Both thermostats code increments of temperature in the
same manner - they may in fact be duplicate mechanisms reacting in identical
ways to duplicate territory - but the psychical meaning of the difference is
determined by its position in the system, by the process context.
Cybernetics obviously provides a valuable, expansive framework for
understanding complex processes in any experiential domain. But upon
examination it appears that the experiential component is not given a complete
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account, but is merely pigeon-holed and left to one side in a rather
pseudo-psychical scheme. Despite its heuristic potential, there are good reasons
to reject the idea that the processes involved in any 'cybernetic realism' could
ever capture the essence of processes in a 'psychical realism'. Is it plausible for
instance that cybernetic understanding of psychical processes of rudimentary
sentient entities would, through increasing the layers of complexity in the
manner as outlined, ever allow in a degree that addresses what it is like to be an
experiential entity? If the question is cast in terms of levels of complexity then, to
defend cybernetic realism, hierarchies of organisation do indeed allow in
something like psychical process, at least in the form of granting contextual
meaning to particular events, and this sort of meaning no doubt could be
arranged into patterns representing self-reflexive monitoring and arguably other
complicated aspects of experience even as complex as those human consciousness
displays. Computers now manage self-referential terms like 'here' and 'now', 'I'
and 'mine' somewhat the way we do, while parallel distribution processing
systems seem to suggest a variety of purposeful manoeuvres involved in the
process of establishing equilibrium. What is missing may not be easily
identifiable in terms of considering the psychical component to be a higher order
affair. At any rate, the debate would never be resolved in this way, for new
technological developments would forever present themselves for further
consideration.
On the other hand, we know that there is an answer to the question, what is it
like to be an experiential event, largely if not solely due to our own experience,
and the debate is best cast in terms of that psychical component. Whatever
cybernetic nets we may be under, persons are well-unified and purposive
wholes. We get hungry and so we eat, we feel tired and so we rest. There is no
getting around the fact that at the level of human consciousness a sense of
purpose is apparent in the bulk of activity undertaken and events experienced.
All wholes are not purposive to be sure, but all well-unified wholes such as
human beings are purposive. And as the case for psychical realism confirmed, all
wholes whatsoever both involve and are involved in purposive wholes. If a whole
has less unity than its more unified parts, then it is not purposive, though its
more unified parts are purposive, as are other more unified wholes of which the
whole itself is a part. These last two remarks begin to sound as much like another
construal of cybernetic linkage of the sort sketched in our refrigerator example
as they do an account of how process societal relatedness, taking a bonafide
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psychical component on board, might differ. Yet in not neglecting key details the
distinction is made plain. And the distinction is perhaps what led Whitehead to
adopt a change in terminology from an ontology of 'events' in his earlier natural
science writings to one of 'occasions of experience' and 'actual entities' in his
later metaphysical works.
The distinction is made plain in case of human beings. Persons making up a
crowd, as previously pointed out, do not constitute a purposive whole. All we can
show is that a person, like a molecule in a gas or an ant in a hill, acts differently
according to its social environment or surrounding crowd. But the crowd does
not act in a manner more unified than the actions of the persons involved.
When a person is in deep sleep, however, what goes on in the body may indeed
be little more than the mere crowd-like action of the person's (at that time) more
unified cells. Likewise should one of those cells die, what happens in its remains
will no longer be what it is doing, but what the molecules that constitute it are
doing. A person's nervous system is a special group of cells whose function is to
restore on a multicellular level the unity of action and reaction that a single cell
already possesses on a more primitive level, and a molecule on a still more
primitive one. Unlike a tree or an eco-system in its entirety in which no such
special system of cells reacts to the world with any comparable integrity. The key
feature is that of freely and purposely acting as one, concerning which any being
living through conscious experiential events is an expert indeed. Persons are not
just complicated systems of low-grade parts but rather single high-grade systems
with a unity of purpose, sentient entities that act on their parts and affect their
actions on each other. And though we consist of parts like eyes and hands, these
are but organised groups of perceiving cells, not purposive individuals in their
own right. It is this fact that grounds our sense of there being something it is like
to be us, and that the something is to be regarded as in some sense real.
Cybernetically organised systems fit this description to a degree that falls far
short of the mark, no matter how complex the system under consideration.
The refrigerator example does display how a systems approach delivers an
overarching concept of wholes of wide explanatory potential, but finally fails
within that archway to make the distinction of purpose outlined here. And the
related notion of subjectivity in cybernetics is at best over-simplified and at worst
all but ignored. The components may be organised, differences coded and passed
on, circular causal chains realised leading to self-regulation, but the idea of the
system as a whole having an experience still fails to make sense. These systems
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are comprised of circular causal chains in which all the complex relations of
parts-to-whole can be explained fully by an appeal to the transitional efficient
causality between the individual parts alone. There are merely events organised
thus and so that tally-up into what appear to be unified wholes, with no further
purpose required. Indeed, the very idea of a further purpose somehow beyond
those obtaining via the events of the causal chains involved runs contrary to
cybernetic explanation. The fact that the captive lobster and hungry homeowners
behave (somewhat) according to systems principles in no way entails an absolute
reduction of their independently purposive natures to a cybernetically
predictable outcome. Furthermore, the cybernetist may claim that through the
hierarchical structuring of systems, events come to represent several subordinate
events. But from the viewpoint of human experience, psychical events are not
simply events that just happen to be enjoying a bit of status as it were for being
organised into the right place at the right time. Integrative psychical experience
is not an event on a par with subordinate cybernetically connected and
transitional, efficiently caused events at all.
An objection may be raised that explanations in terms of purpose, teleological
explanations, have been discredited in recent science and philosophy. But all
such explanation could not possibly be discredited, for knowledge and life
themselves rely on purposeful activity in countless ways. Only some forms of
teleology have actually been so discredited. There hasn't been much in the notion
of a single absolute world-plan, complete in every detail from all eternity, and
executed with omnipotence and omniscience since Hume's Dialogues showed
how such a planner would thereby be made the irresponsible author of evil and,
what is worse, thereby be made redundant. But there is still room in process
philosophy to argue for other sorts of teleological explanation registered in
organically ordered experiential events. The Aristotelian sense of a 'fixed end'
final causality is replaced in process thought by an 'end in view' final
causality - a teleology immanent in the experiential event which organises the
data presented to it by the other experiences making up the rest of its world, in
the accomplishing of its own organic process of self-realisation. The systems
approach, though outlining one level of organicity prevalent in the world, in the
end fails to develop a picture of reality that captures what it is like to be us, and
others we can imagine that are like us. Experiential beings have ends in view,




By examining temporality we complete a triad, with creativity and organicity,
of the most salient features of process philosophy, and once again we find the
psychical realist component accentuated. Whitehead beckons philosophers to
Hake time seriously' and Hartshorne laments a characteristic Hove of symmetry'
that keeps them from doing so. The result commonly points philosophy in either
of two misconceived directions: toward various experientially supported but
outmoded classical attempts to substantiate time, or toward various experientially
unsupported yet rational eternalist attempts to deny time. Process philosophy on
the other hand retains both the experiential evidence and the rational coherence
by taking temporal asymmetry for what it is, namely by considering the world in
essence to be coming into being and perishing out of it, after the fashion of our
every experience.
The theory can be summarised in few words, but fully understood only in
reference to its modal logical underpinnings and the relativity of space and time.
Temporality is recognised as being incremental, asymmetrical, and objectively
modal. The past as consisting of actual fixed facts, the future of potentiality for
further facts, the present of occasions of experiential change that convert
potential to actual. These alone are the essentials of the process account and,
small wonder for the psychical realist, they constitute the essential
pre-philosophical account of time as given in experience. That is to say the
concept is derived in the end from a psychical realist vision of a multiplicity of
the sort of integral and transitional experiences that we live through. Time from
this perspective is therefore held not to be illusory nor to be a shifting of
awareness across present occasions eternally there. It is rather the outcome of the
sum total first of processes of experience achieving their novel particular
additions to actuality by integration of prehensions and potentialities, and then of
processes of experience contributing prehensive influence in transition enroute
to their subsequent loss of actuality.
§ Relativising Absolutes
The point of departure for gaining a full grasp of process temporality is to see
that experience is more fundamental than time, that in a sense to be explained
presently, experience is in fact prior to time.
In the act of experience we perceive a whole formed of related
differentiated parts. The relations between these parts possess certain
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characteristics, and time and space are the expressions of some of the
characteristics of these relations.58
So the concepts of space and time and space-time are derived without the
introduction of other factors beyond those present in experience and utilised in
framing all other concepts of the physical world. This outlook differs markedly
from commonplace viewpoints on temporality.59 Kant held that we encounter the
a priori necessity of space and time as conditions for the possibility of experience.
It had been customary, in Kant's day, to consider time as an ordered set of empty
temporal containers ready and waiting for events to occur in them, just as it had
been customary to consider space as an ordered set of empty spatial containers
ready and waiting for things to occupy them.
The Newtonian cosmology emphasised the 'receptacle' theory... Thus bits of
space and time were conceived as being as actual as anything else, and as
being 'occupied' by other actualities which were the bits of matter. This is
the Newtonian 'absolute' theory of space-time.80
This model presented time under the same abstraction as space. The containers
into which temporal events were inserted formed an unbroken, undifferentiated
continuum of separate, externally connected events, enabling them to be placed
in an absolute system of 'before and after' or 'contemporaneous' relations.
Similarly, spatial objects were conceived as forming another unbroken
continuum of enduring existence. But the emergence of relativity physics and
quantum mechanics called these conceptions into question. However well these
notions of time, temporal sequence, space, and spatial relations functioned in the
pragmatic world of everyday experience, they failed to give an adequate
framework in which to interpret events observed on the more remote
microscopic and macroscopic levels of reality. Here, it became apparent that both
space and time must be considered as relative to the systems in which the
measurements are being made. And these scientific insights of space-time are
intimately connected to the process notion of experiential events.
The concern with the relativity of space and time comes in initially as
a corrective for the common analysis of the fact that the world as we observe it
involves both temporal process and spatial extension. To take the widely held
58 A.N. Whitehead, The Aims ofEducation. London: Benn Limited, 1959, p.234.
59 For a comprehensive survey on how views on space and time have evolved consult M. Capek,
"Temporal Order and Spatial Order: Their Differences and Relations" in Mind and Nature.
Wash. DC: Univ. Press of America, 1977, pp.51-59.
89 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.70.
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view of identifying process with serial time absolutely and extension with space
absolutely is to neglect the fact that there is spatial extension to time itself. It is
consistent with both process thought and relativity theory to conceive of any
ultimate concrete fact as in a sense an extended process. When either process or
extension are left out of description, a level of abstraction is introduced; and such
abstractions are made variously and to varying effect. Depending on the
circumstances, we affix different meanings to the notion of space and different
meanings to the correlative notion of time. In respect to abstracting solely in
spatial dimensions the paradox is easily overlooked, but it does appear
paradoxical to contend that the serial processes we apprehend as time locally
may differ profoundly from the serial processes an observer moving at the speed
of light apprehends as time. Yet relativity theory has it that in affixing the
varying meanings one can introduce mathematical formulae expressing
spatio-temporal measurements which at one sweep explain a whole multitude
of perplexing scientific observations. Thus relativity provides a more
comprehensive account of the cosmos by showing how space by itself and time
by itself are only shadows cast by a more substantial and fundamental
space-time.
From the period of the earlier works in natural science through to the later
metaphysical writings, Whitehead was aware that the uniformity of space-time is
an abstraction from the more concrete constituents of the world we experience.
He knew all too well that absolute space and absolute time were stumbling blocks
in philosophy, instances of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Instead he set
out to show how the concept of physical time could be derived from the concepts
of integrative and transitional experience. Relativity thinking implies
a relatedness pervading all things. Just as every physical object is subject to some
minimal degree of gravitational sway from distant heavenly bodies, all
experiential events are subject to some degree of relatedness to all other
experience. It is all but unimaginable in terms of conventional thinking of space
and time, "But if you think of it in terms of our naive experience, it is a mere
transcript of the obvious facts."61 The reason for this experiential focus could be
attributed to another important thought developed over the course of
Whitehead's work in natural science. It is the idea that the world consists partly
of contingent facts and relations, and partly of 'systematic relatedness' and that
61 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1932, p.128.
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any definiteness of character, "is gained through the relatedness and not the
relatedness through the character."62 Therefore the notion of the relativity of all
things is applied to the very idea of being. The being of an entity is its
potentiality for being an element in a becoming, that is, for being felt in
experiential events. "There is nothing in the real world which is merely an inert
fact. Every reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt."63
This insight applies even to the reality of spatio-temporal relations, and was
incorporated into basic process metaphysical principles. We see it reaching
fruition in the concept of the 'first order of determination' of mere unqualified
extension and in all the subsequent organic societal orders that arise. The notion
also leads in the full-fledged process relativity principle to understanding time as
being in experience instead of experience as being in time. Again, space-time is
not a fact prior to process but a feature of process, that of an abstract system of
experiential perspectives derived by systematic abstraction from the succession
of events. This is evident in the warping of space and time in keeping to
a constant (the speed of light) that defines contemporaneity; they are not
absolute but liable to distortions based on activity. "Nature presents itself to us as
essentially a becoming." Whitehead observes, "...I do not mean a bare portion of
space-time. Such a concept is a further abstraction. I mean a part of the
becomingness of nature, coloured with all the hues of its content."64 The final
upshot of these reflections is not only that concrete experience is primordial
while abstracted time is residual, and not only that relatedness is prior to the
things related, but also that if something is not experiencing then it cannot be in
time, a view reminiscent of the arguments from causality and from space and
time for establishing psychical realism presented in the last chapter.
§ Epochal Drops of Becoming
Misapplying basic metaphysical principles regarding process temporality
results in a good deal of confusion. Since time is an abstraction from events it is
inappropriate to expect process philosophers to stipulate the time-span of an
experiential event, even in the present cosmic epoch. The theory is rather
a general way of thinking about the plurality of processes constituting the
universe - it suggests basic universal concepts but does not automatically apply
them to worldly particulars. Recognising the psychical realist component to
62 A.N. Whitehead, Principle ofRelativity. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1922 p. 19.
63 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.472.
64 A.N. Whitehead, Principle ofRelativity. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1922 p.21.
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process thought we have rightly kept the 'specious present' of human experience
under focus as perhaps our best discernible sample. But Whitehead himself
mused that even atomic activity may perhaps be composed of 'a whole shower' of
such experiential events.65
Another related misunderstanding involves the fact that the manner of
distinguishing individual prehensions within an experiential event is always
somewhat arbitrary, because an analysis of them into phases is 'only intellectual'
in Whitehead's understanding. Careful noting of the difference between the
transitional process of being and the integral process of becoming helps
introduce the epochal temporal theory. The philosopher's habit of accepting
theoretical constructs regarding temporality at the outset (past-present-future,
earlier-now-later, morning-noon-night, four-dimensional space-time, an eternal
present) and working toward conceptual coherence is rejected in process
philosophy. Instead the features of time commonly encountered in experience
(coming into being, coming to an end, endurance, succession, simultaneity) are
noted and the conceptual scheme drawn up to explain them. Becoming and
ending are principally dealt with in terms of the concept of experience, and the
others are derivative notions understood in terms of these. The problem arises
when the scheme for transition is applied in equal measure to the scheme for
integration.
In the process of experiential integration three successive phases
(however arbitrarily stipulated) do take place: conformal prehensive feeling,
conceptual prehensive feeling, and comparative prehensive feeling. Yet, there is
no transition, that is none of the earlier prehensions are succeeded by later
prehensions. No prehension comes to an end in the integrative process of
becoming the way experiential events in the transitional process between them
come to an end. As an integration develops, more and more complex prehensions
supervene until a single complex prehensive unity is established, until the
satisfaction of its subjective final-causal aim is achieved. The simpler prehensions
are not superseded by these increasingly complex ones. They are carried along,
combined, and co-ordinated throughout the one integrative process. The evolving
of an experience, "from phase to phase is not in physical time..." Whitehead
insists, "It can be put shortly by saying, that physical time expresses some
65 As recounted by Victor Lowe in, Alfred North Whitehead: The Man and His Work, Vol. II:
1910-1947. J.B. Schneewind ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, p.268.
221
features of the growth, but not the growth of the features." He continues, "Each
phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum, and so does each
feeling in each phase. The subjective unity dominating the process forbids the
division."66 The process culminates in a structured quantum of space-time, but is
not itself either temporal or spatial. Again, such dimensions are abstract schemes
of mutual relatedness concerning the determinate completed events. Whitehead
looks to William James for help in elucidating these quantums of integrative
experience, "Your acquaintance with reality grows literally by buds or drops of
perception. Intellectually and on reflection you can divide these into components,
but as immediately given, they come totally or not at all."67 The image of an
'epochal drop' is fitting in that we can note the growing build-up of dew for
instance hanging from a branch, but cannot identify a falling dew drop until the
process is complete. Just so, relative to a successor phase within a becoming, a
predecessor phase is not past. It is a real constituent of the successor phase along
with any other prehensions originating in reaction to it. As the phases of
integration develop there are prehensions and then prehensions of those
prehensions, the latter more complex ones ultimately eventuating in the single
complex prehension of the satisfied being.
The resultant epochal integration, appearing all at once though endowed with
a beginning and an end, thereby provides an answer to puzzles concerning
temporal continuity that stem from as far back as Zeno. If temporal spans have
no smallest units, it is impossible for them to be built up. This is because in as
much as any given duration is divisible into similarly divisible durations within
it ad infinitum, each one must be traversed sequentially, from the smallest to the
largest. So unless there is a smallest indivisible episode, 'an epoch, an arrest',
a temporal sequence can never actually begin. This also recalls another
commonplace view of temporality, arrived at for reasons of tidy analysis
consonant with Newton's system. Spatial things and temporal events - the 'bits of
space and time' - have been viewed as composed ultimately of volumeless points
and durationless instants. The epochal process view escapes another consequent
difficulty regarding the ontological status of the present. The problem of then
having all of time divided into the two groups of a past which 'is no more' and
a future which 'is not yet' as first spelled out in Aristotle. But Whitehead clearly
saw that, "It needs very little reflection to convince us that a point in time is no
U6 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.283.
G7 W. James, Some Problems ofPhilosophy. NY: Longmans, Green, 1919, p.l 55.
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direct deliverance of experience. We live in durations, and not in points."68
Therefore the points and instants so theoretically useful in science are finally
unsatisfactory. "But this way of conceiving the world of physical science, as
composed of hypothetical objects, leaves it as a mere fairy tale. What is really
actual are the immediate experiences."69
Essentially, the trouble in grasping the epochal theory goes back to our
predisposition to conceive time as an absolute framework, as a uniform
succession of durationless moments, prior to and independent of the actual
occurrence of experience. So we tend to think that transitions between events
and integral prehensions within them must be understood to occur in this same
uniform flow of time. But if prehensions are conceived as leaving other
prehensions behind within an experience, then the process of integration is
much the same as the process of transition. This would break down the
distinction between external transition between events and internal integration
within them, and force any notion of epochal drops then out of the picture.
§ The Modal Temporal Flow
The process recognition of the Temporal thickness' of present epochal drops
also allows in the objective modality feature of temporality. We intuitively grasp
the passage of time as continually undergoing an asymmetric forward movement.
The past is determinate and thus unalterable, the present is in the making and
thus being altered, and the future is indeterminate and thus a spectrum of
alternatives. The modal division arises from the constrast between an
unconditionally definite past and a conditioned indefinite future. The present is
unique in being the most recent part of a class of accumulating past events
internally related to it. As the present sheds its actuality in becoming past, its
individual character is preserved with all others in the subsequent presents.
These past events are neither spread out externally to each other nor nonexistent,
but ordered with the more remote included within the more recent past, the
present the most inclusive in the series. Time, then, has two very different sorts
of being given its modal relations: as actuality in the present-past
(its integration) and as potentiality in the future (its transition).
68 A.N. Whitehead, The Aims ofEducation. London: Benn Limited, 1959, p.237.
69 A.N. Whitehead, TheAims ofEducation. London: Benn Limited, 1959, p.242.
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We find a useful though not unproblematic analogy in the ripples spreading
out in a still pond when a pebble is tossed into its centre.70 Imagine each wave as
an epochal temporal drop, and together with those it contains as an ordered
spreading temporal duration. The waves are not isolated or externally related or
'simply located' as in classical depictions of time. The ripples rather increase in
content as they extend, overlapping in such a way that later durations are
inclusive of earlier ones. Each as a whole exhibits the pattern of ripples, as do its
included parts, with the outermost ripple (the 'wave crest' of the present)
creating novel actual movements out of still potential waters. And though each
ripple is conceptually divisible into crests and troughs, it is not run through
sequentially but forms a whole composed of its organic, internally related parts.
Each wave represents 'an arrest' in the temporal process, a further display of the
developing pattern, achieved only in the stretch from crest to crest, and retained
even when superseded by subsequently encircling waves. Like experiences, the
waves clearly divide into integrating individuals, but the transition between
them is continuous and internal to the outermost wave, wherein discrete changes
in the spreading wave pattern are given. The model does break down, however,
at a certain point, for each wave is not created all at once in the manner of the
creation of an experiential event.
Indications of the centrality of the objective modal nature of time come from
the fact of relativity and from the nature of memory. The theory of relativity of
space and time maintains that no region of space (or duration of time) has any
meaning apart from its spatial relations of distance and direction to other regions
(or apart from its relation of before and after to other durations). The space-time
situating of our present experience invests it with a role in the evolving
reverberations of reality. As active participants in integrative organic processes,
as creative agents affecting the content of experience through volition, we shape
the present and essentially contribute to the modal temporal flow of time in
doing so. The present anticipates existences beyond itself in that its
achievements, retained in further experience, will furnish value and offer
direction for the future. Experience directs, emerges, and evolves from the
synthesis of its various past parts. And it is through memory that we locate
the course of our conditional decisions in that evolution. The modal asymmetry of
time is evident in the traces given in memory of a definite past but nothing akin
70 The analogy originally suggested in E. Kraus, The Metaphysics of Experience. NY: Fordham
Univ. Press, 1979, pp.24-25.
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to those traces given of even an incipient future. Memory is simply not of a piece
with expectation. And if the occasions of experience that compose our psychical
states provide a modal sense of direction as a stream of events moving forward,
then we ought to take these direct intuitions as paradigmatic of the psychical
nature of reality.
Interpreting time in this manner, with our given intuitive grasp of it as
experienced and with the coming into being and perishing out of being taken
as serious verification of the way things really are, leaves little room for
reasoning along (perhaps) more conceptually tidy symmetrical lines. Views that
take past, present, and future to be on equal footing and temporal flow to be
largely illusory are forced to trade phenomenological facts for some sort
of abiding transcendental. But in such scenarios it is not only the facts of
experience that are lost, the sense of the importance of the present, the modal
fulcrum in the experiential flux, also loses its special significance. Instead of
maintaining truths about the past, as process thought allows, symmetry entails
that truths about both the past and the future must be maintained. Modal
temporality shows how truth about the world is forever unfolding as potentiality
is continually being fixed in actuality in present moments. The fact that past
truth is unchanging need not imply that there is an unchanging truth about the
future. What is surely rejected by the primacy of process is the notion that
the future can exist as determinate moments beyond the present.
§ Status of the Past
We have seen how in a sense the future (however indeterminately) inhabits
the present. We must now raise the issue of in what sense determinate moments
that are beyond the present in the other direction, that is truths about the past,
can do likewise. The first problem that arises is one of evidence. The tenets of
process thought typically rely on empirical as well as rational backing, but on the
face of it the idea that all past experience is retained in present experiencing
seems quite extraordinary. Experience certainly does not convey an entire
overwhelming history of past events somehow There' in each present one.
But the peculiarity diminishes by noting that there is neither a problem of
internal consistency nor experiential accord once the view is fully detailed.
As for consistency, on process reckoning no experiential event can 'bear' its
entire universe, if that is taken to mean carrying it explicitly or synthesising it
without repressing and discarding ('negatively prehending') a good deal of that
influence. Whitehead allowed that negative prehensions merely 'leave a mark' in
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that which is being integrated. Therefore the entire past is not there in the sense
of being simply available, only in the sense that a different past in any slight
respect would have made the subsequent events slightly different. As for
according with experience, although conscious memory may not convey the
totality of the past, we do have access to much that can be conscious but which at
any given present is being stored in other sentient events below conscious levels.
Vivid dreams often recall distant memories far more distinctly than any conscious
effort. Moreover, consciousness is only the tip of the experiential iceberg.
Whitehead was inspired metaphysically by the fact that psychical realism implies
our feeling continuous with the whole of reality, and that most of our activities
which involve the confident going forth into the world testify to this felt
continuity. Thus no single present event bears the whole burden of explaining
how the past is held in existence. Events collectively, however, in a psychical real
world are a good explanation of how this happens. The initial incredulity of
having every single event totally responsible for upholding the world's past is
qualified by noting the various social, community, solidarity orders that obtain
organically which uphold the fullness of the past to varying degrees of conscious
intent. Most of the events in nature are retained in fact by repetition in such a
massive amount of reiteration that orders in nature do arise, which process
metaphysics undertakes to explain. The actual incorporation of past events is not
in the sense of everything from the past being inhaled by a ballooning present,
but in the sense that present events increasingly spread out, tentacle-like, into
the other temporal modes.
Another problem concerns the ontological status of the past as consisting of
part of the present. Specifically, how we are to distinguish a repetition of past
experience in present experience from simply another present experience?
If there is no difference at all, it seems that we cannot. Any past material in
present experience must be different in some way to represent it as past. Yet, if
any change takes place in the conversion, in the going from its own subjective
immediacy to objective fact in later subjectivity, then it seems that the past has
not been preserved untainted, and that any claims about past events fail then to
have anything substantiating them absolutely. Moreover the problem persists
with the common process theological strategy of employing transcendental
backing in answering it. For even if godly experiences, by being
all-encompassing, do not lose any negatively prehended past material, it still
seems that an infallible God needs something to be infallible about in those
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experiences. Memory, be it mere mortal or immortal, cannot just be the past, but
must be the past as it is in the present."
One way around the problem is to recognise that in differing time modes
events have differing external relations. Hartshorne highlights how the
additional relations amass over time, and hence how it is possible to make
the distinctions.
The past must then still exist in the depths of the present; but this does not
contradict the past's distinction from the present. For a constituent of
a whole is not identical with the whole. 'When the past event was present'
means... when the event was a whole which nothing possessed as a part;
that the event is 'no longer present but past' means that now a new and
more inclusive whole possesses it as part."
If we do not rely entirely on the concept of representation or repetition, but rely
instead on the idea of retention of the past in the present, we can reject the
suggestion that in becoming part of the present the past must change. The past is
represented or repeated to a degree of course, but retention also serves in
conjunction with new synthesised relations to keep the past from merely being
'the same' and at the same time being distinguishable. Past subjective forms are
added to the initial receptive, conformal phase in experience, but that does not
mean that all the component comparisons and constrasts in the conformal
feelings are in toto different. For if they were wholly different, then there would
be no causal inheritance, and not only is the status of the past and future thereby
jeopardised, but the present too begins to slip into an isolated solipsism of solely
external relations. This is emphatically opposed to the relativity principle of
a process plurality.
On the contrary, the 'same thing' is present wherever and to whatever extent
its component contrasts are anticipated by or incorporated into other experiential
events. This entails real penetration felt between the events rather than strange
relations that merely 'gloss on' past entities and future occurrences.
We ontologise time by turning pastness into an ontological mode, when all that is
required is the accumulating of dynamic new relations. Things can be temporally
passing without being labelled radically past in a sense which locates them
existentially elsewhere than in any given present, and the same holds for the
future, though admittedly there are other disanalogies in this latter case.
71 T.L.S. Sprigge raises this difficulty in, "Ilartshorne's Conception of the Past," The Philosophy
ofCharlesHartshorne. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991, pp.397-414.
72 C. Hartshorne, TheDivine Relativity. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964, p.69.
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In addition Whitehead draws attention to a phenomenological distinction that
is manifest in the difference between 'first-handed' and 'second-handed' levels in
experience, whereby objective influence is separated from that influence once
infused with subjective immediacy. A storehouse of isolated objective facts,
unrelated to present subjective experience, lacks 'immediacy' and so is merely
'repetition'.
But 'process' is the rush of feelings whereby second-handedness attains
subjective immediacy; in this way, subjective form overwhelms repetition,
and transforms it into immediately felt satisfaction; objectivity is absorbed
into subjectivity."
By 'feeling' and 'satisfaction' are meant the phenomenological evidence of the
appropriation of past moments of experience by the present. The distinction
between repetition and this objectivity as absorbed in subjectivity is discerned
phenomenologically in the distinction between something that is given over to
us, 'second-hand' as it were, from the world and that which is immediate and
formed first-handedly in the present. This is the very dichotomy, incidentally,
that we are forever confronting as one aspect of the paradox of endurance as
related to change.
Another tactic for solving the problems outlined regarding the status of the
past is to challenge the notion of substantiating claims about past truths
absolutely. On the face of it, truth as certainty seems the only acceptable concept
of truth, and some sound verification story the required conditions for
maintaining it. But in practice verificationist standards have proved to be ideals
that are notoriously unattainable. From a process standpoint on the other hand
the issue of what sort of truth we are looking for regarding the past genuinely
arises. Truth as certainty is acknowledged as possible only by a past which
amounts to being a sea of 'simply located' entities at best only masquerading as
experiential events of the process variety. But if absolute certitude is jettisoned,
the notion of modulated truthfulness of the sort Whitehead examines at the end
of Adventures of Ideas comes to the fore. Of course the question of how much
modulation is allowable is all important, but it perhaps presents fewer
difficulties than the unavoidable metaphysical problems verificationist certainty
introduces.
73 a.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. ny: Free Press, 1978, p.234-235.
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Proust wrote volumes to set the past straight, but recognised in doing so that
every time a memory was taken out he changed it by feeling it in a new place
and time. He saw that we impregnate history with our present ideas and
activities, while at the same time history impregnates us with whatever we retain
from it. To be sure, cosmologists do not remember the big bang. They extrapolate
it from events perceived in present observation, but nevertheless (increasingly?)
accept it as true. And in principle all other truths concerning the past may finally
come down to fitting together cracked fragments of influence bearing down
however Proustian on the present. Whitehead concurs that upon completion an
experience is thereafter available for 'pragmatic use' by subsequent experience.
The 'immortality' attained by the past is in the conformation it inspires in later
experience, capturing a 'remembrance of things past' albeit subject to ongoing
revision.74 Process philosophers contend that this level of 'true past' (as it actually
impacts on the present) may be the best truth on offer.
There are surely good and bad renditions of the relativity thesis as so applied.
At first glance a glaring inadequacy of relinquishing absolute truth about past
facts for whatever trace scenario available in present evidence is easily identified.
It does not square with experience, indeed it seems absurd, to contend that
particular feelings felt yesterday, for example, will change given the mediation of
modified contextual cues at a later point in time. But we might legitimately
wonder if the past fact is truly beyond the affects of mediation if absolutely all
context cues change through the course of further process. Feelings of yesterday
are obviously 'experienced' via the complex series of relations obtaining through
integrative present experience. What we might refer to as 'bad relativism' is the
upshot that anything goes for such past facts, as opposed to facts being
dynamically mediated relative to fixed patterns of process. Bad relativism is
rejected not because past events necessarily support truth in some transcendental
way (perhaps unknowable in principle), but because facts are remembered and
mediated in the world so that they can observably and demonstrably support
truth. Past facts may be logged solely in the flow of experience but not in an
arbitrary and incomprehensible flow.
Process thinkers allow that the present traces, being all we ever have to go on,
are sufficient for fixing enough relative past truth for practical affairs.
So whether there are further past existences unconnected with present and
74 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.82.
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potentially present traces thereby comes under question. A process event
ontology keeps metaphysics from connecting to something absolutely beyond the
activities and potential activities in the world, but it connects metaphysics to the
task of formulating a comprehensive systematic interpretation of our activities
and the world as we know it through that activity. Of course metaphysics is
particularly engaging when it interprets what we do and what takes place in the
world in ways which in part direct the change in everyday practices, instead of
simply reducing everything to (current) practice. What makes that engaging is
the realised value of what is produced beyond and perhaps despite what we do,
but nonetheless this 'practical transcendence of practice' is grounded not in
transcendentals but in actual activities. A transcendental storehouse of past facts
is by definition excluded from making any difference, and doing away with it
need not lead to bad relativism if mediating processes in the real world can be
trusted somewhat. This is easy for the classical mechanical determinist, of course,
since the total state of affairs at any one point in time plus allegedly unchanging
laws of nature will contain all the information needed to derive the total state of
affairs at any other point in time, thus doing away with the need for an extra
storehouse, since then the world itself is one. But to follow the process line in
giving metaphysical validity to our strong intuitive notions that creativity,
organicity, and temporality are real and important aspects of a thoroughly
becoming world, means that it cannot be quite that simple. But again, if we
consider the truth of the past to be mediated by processes which are not
completely determined, this doesn't require the assumption that the mediation is
arbitrary: it follows patterns which may vary and evolve but which we may
nonetheless learn to handle and understand to an increasing degree. True, that
this implies that we live in a world digesting and interpreting its own past so
that an 'absolute sameness' cannot be secured, simply because the questions
about the past fail to mean the same as time passes. But we must not overlook the
extent and the legitimacy 'modulated truthfulness' delivers. What for example
happens to questions about location if the dimensionality of space changes?
Patterns of very stable order give us practical sameness enough to give a well
defined sense, at least within spans of thousands of years, to questions with even
incredibly remote practical applications, whether or not we know how to look
for the relevant traces. Bad relativism would only arise in practical affairs if we
believed that our judgements of truth could be obscured by arbitrary mediations
in an unavoidable way, regardless of the presence of transcendental support.
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In sum, the process account of positive and negative prehensions, and of the
connection between rationality and the creative, organic, temporal patterns of
order, offers an attempt at overcoming this kind of bad relativism which is
needed with or without assuming the existence of a transcendental storehouse of
past facts. We can accept that claims about the past may change in certain
respects, as facts are recombined into new patterns and perhaps wider deeper
truths amplified by subsequent experiential processes. They cannot and do not
change arbitrarily, given that there is reliable and understandable organic
ordering imposed on the course of all mediation. The question in the end
connects with another difficult one of whether truth is a passive,
context-independent representation. Real creativity, organic relationality, and
time taken seriously call into question the existence of truth thus conceived.
Like the process thinkers Hegel, Peirce, and James before him, Whitehead in a
sense looks forward to truth, for the good mediation of the truth of the past and
the production of better and deeper truths are in many ways one and the same.
Finally, the theme in the foreground of our treatments of creativity, organicity,
and temporality in process thought has been the spread from transitional to
integrative phases in experience, and psychical realism has featured in the
generalising of this dual aspect in experience to all existence. Creativity was
analysed into its efficient transitional aspect and its final integrative one,
organicity into lines of transitional inheritance and integrative subjective
contributions to order, temporality into integrations of actual past events and
transitional directives toward potential future ones. By way of drawing all three
of these discussions to a common close and gesturing toward the essence of
process metaphysics, we do well to qualify the extent to which these two aspects
in the case of temporality are separate individual features. As the essential
relativity of the nature of time has shown, any firm distinction separating the
two ought to be eliminated. The status of the past in the present and the pointers
into the future in the present form a more seamless whole perhaps than the
conceptual analysis concerning the parts of the present suggests. There has
generally been a process preoccupation with the final causality side of creative
experience, with the self-realising side of organic ordering, and with the
anticipatory side of the temporal present. But there is also a perfectly robust
process doctrine representing the other half of all these pairs. The influences of
accumulating pasts are clearly recognisable on process grounds (the causal past
is really causal) once an inadvertent highlighting of final causality and subjective
ordering as the be-all and end-all in present becomings is overcome. And yet this
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does not point toward a strong distinction between the two forms of causality in
order to preserve the neglected in light of the emphasised either. The idea is
rather that since in general there is a conceptual inadequacy in the division, we
ought not conflate or collapse the two aspects but preserve their distinct
functions while supplementing their conceptual separation. Thus the reality of
process is best envisioned in the end as a unification in a single form of intensive
experience, pervasive throughout the various levels and types of existent entities,
and undergoing the creative, organic, temporal activities infused by their
respective dual aspects, in the present as elucidated here. And in a psychical
realist world of intensive experience, as elucidated over the course of all our
reflections, the process philosopher is well aware that, "The present contains all
that there is. It is holy ground; for it is the past, and it is the future."79




"The besetting sin of philosophers is that, being merely men,
they endeavour to survey the universe from the standpoint of gods."
In these final reflections our concern is the role psychical realism may play in
the full metaphysical sweep of speculative endeavours aiming to complete
a process cosmology. The hope of expounding any such ultimate ontological and
cosmological scenario calls for unabashedly speculative applications of a process
experiential vision, and a great degree of faith in the rational principles utilised
thus far in its support. The case can hardly rest on 'shallow, puny, and imperfect'
efforts at 'sounding the depths' from empirical evidence, derived in a mere
moment of cosmic time from a small corner of the cosmos. "There is nothing here
in the nature of proof," Whitehead insists, "There is merely the confrontation of
the theoretic system with a certain rendering of the facts... and the system is
confessedly inadequate."1 It is not surprising therefore that in these matters
process philosophers vary far more in their opinions. Nevertheless the all but
universal acceptance of a psychical realist orientation among them affords the
opportunity to at least clarify the more prominent of cosmic process options in
terms of that orientation.
§ Possible Gods
The concept of God remains a primary principle implemented to complete the
final process model. Yet from origins in Whitehead, that culminate in mere
cryptic aphorisms at the end of working out otherwise elaborate metaphysical
detail, and through to contemporary process theological projects, the process
concept of God has typically been quite a departure from commonplace
Judeo-Christian renditions.2 In process philosophical work, thinkers rather tend
to envision one or another of a host of gods-in-the-making, that answer to both
the confines and capacities of a world utterly infused with experiential process.
1 A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.343.
2 Some Christian natural theologies have been developed along process philosophical lines, most
notably by J. Cobb Jr. See his, A Christian Natural Theology. London: Lutterworth Press, 1966.
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For example, Whitehead created God in experience's own image so to speak.
"God is not to be treated as an exception," thought Whitehead, "to all
metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief
exemplification."3 Since the world is composed solely of experiential events, God
must also be one of these, only much more grand than those we live through
and those we observe. God is one everlasting occasion of experience, in
'unison of becoming' with all worldly occasions. The synchronicity of God and
the world implies a form of 'panentheism' meaning the world in God in
Whitehead's philosophy, as distinct from the related 'pantheism' meaning the
world and God as one. As mentioned earlier, this one great experience at
the cosmic level has a dipolar nature: it first provides a lure of influence for all
worldly experience for their unfolding becoming, and then takes in and
integrates all influence from worldly experiences in an ultimate unity once the
becoming of worldly experiences is completed. The necessary lure is the one
infinite and eternal, complete and entirely conceptual experience of all
potentiality primordial to the world (God's primordial or conceptual nature),
while the contingent final unity is the many finite and everlasting, incomplete
and physical experiences of all actuality derived from the world
(God's consequent or physical nature).
But since any experiential event is still in the process of becoming determinate
and therefore not yet a something at all, it is hard to see how Whitehead's God as
one of these could provide a primordial lure of influence for other such events.
Equally problematic is the influence in the other direction. If God is also forever
becoming determinate there is as of yet no divine reality whatsoever, and so no
divine integration of achieved value of past and present worldly experience.
Whitehead's ontological and relativity principles dictate that no two experiences
occurring at once, coming to be at the same time, divine or otherwise, can
influence each other in any way. Whitehead reportedly recognised these
difficulties, admitting candidly that, "This is a genuine problem. I have not
attempted to solve it."4
Hartshorne envisions the God of process somewhat differently from
Whitehead, partly in an attempt to solve this problem. His deity is a personally
ordered society of divine occasions of experience, not just one great cosmic
3 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.343.
4 A.H. Johnson, "Some Conversations with Whitehead Concerning God and Creativity" in
Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy. NY: Fordham Univ. Press, 1983, p.10.
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everlasting one. The dipolar element is retained and is in fact amplified, with
Hartshorne achieving the first full articulation of the philosophical implications
and religious availability of God's primordial and consequent natures in his
philosophical and theological writings.5 As a temporal society of experiential
events, Hartshorne conceives God by analogy with the human soul, and hence
analogous to a living person, only in this case as a person whose body is the
entire universe, both past and present. In such manner God can alternate
between being the subject taking on influence from the world, and being the
object that influences the world. So the unified experience of the entire universe
at any moment is but one slice in the series of personally ordered experiences
that make up the being of God. Interestingly, this view allows one to believe or to
disbelieve in the manner that one accepts or rejects the reality of enduring
entities of any sort. The relevant question is whether a present experiential event,
embedded in the context of what for instance we commonly refer to as a person,
has anything to do with any other prior events or with events to come, as
outlined in terms of organicity in the last chapter. If so, then personalities are
real and, extending the logic, God exists.
But we do well to ask whether Hartshorne's revision is satisfactory. Upon
reflection there seem insuperable difficulties vexing the God-world
synchronisation required by the position. As the creative advance of the world
unfolds, the cosmic temporal front as it were, before which God must act as a
subject being influenced and then as an object offering influence, must be as
short as the shortest experiential event in existence at any one time. God must be
capable of absorbing the creativity of all worldly events in order to be an
all-knowing being; and God must be capable of offering influence to all worldly
events in order to uphold the cosmic creative role of an omniscient, omnipotent,
omnibenevolent being (strictly speaking rather an 'omni-becoming event' on
process grounds). So presuming that worldly experiential events differ in
duration - human conscious ones typically coming in split-second increments
and surely not in phase with millions of subatomic events taking place each
moment - the temporal span of each divine experiential event must be
vanishingly thin. If not striking a cord of cosmic blasphemy, this view is at least
5 From among his many discussions, see especially, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of
God. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 19G4; Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism.
Ilamden, CN: Archon, 1964; A Natural Theology for our Time. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1967.
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odd in that it makes the experiences of mere mortals relatively more extensive
than the experiences of God.
Perhaps the problem could be solved by having God turn up every once in
a while, say once every human occasion of experience and so only once every
million subatomic ones. Could God then adequately guide the world? On the face
of it this may appear analogous to how the mind-body relation might work.
If every second a person lives through but one conscious experiential event
whereas the living cells in the brain undergo thousands of them, the more
influential conscious experience may be enough to provide tolerable guidance to
the body. This seems reasonable enough and answers to a certain intuition
arising from the looseness of the mind-body relation as felt introspectively.
But here again, this option would surely fail to portray God as the greatest
conceivable being. In a world of events of varying magnitude, God would not
only have to be far more temporally slender than most, but a God who allows
thousands of cellular experiences and millions of subatomic ones to slip by
without responding knows the world less perfectly and provides less intimate
guidance than one conceived as doing so. Yet the strength of these objections
hinges on how strictly one adheres to traditional theological conceptions, ideas
that tend to receive radical re-interpretations if not outright dismissals by many
process philosophers.6
However, even if a thin God occasionally on holiday is allowed, a far more
insuperable difficulty arises nonetheless. Hartshorne, the world's pre-eminent
process theist, seems unable to reconcile the God of process - either his own
rendition or Whitehead's - with current cosmological understanding as conveyed
through relativity physics. After several treatments of the difficulties involved in
various publications, he has gone down on record identifying this issue as,
a problem, even the problem, for me: how God as prehending, caring
for, sensitive to, the creatures is to be conceived, given the current
non-Newtonian idea of physical relativity, according to which there is
apparently no unique cosmic present or unambiguous simultaneity.7
A crucial fact about relativity physics is that it assumes that no causal influence
can be transmitted faster than the speed of light. This assumption creates
a 'light cone' of potential influence which contains an indefinite number of
e This brief depiction of the central temporal God problem is derived from discussions with
L. Ford on the process internet forum (process-philosophy@Mailbase.ac.uk), and the
attempted solutions from D.R. Griffin's paper, cited below.
7 C. Hartshorne, The PhilosophyofCharles Hartshorne. Chicago: Open Court, 1991,p.616.
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events that are contemporaries with any given event. Thus any experiential
events that take place on the sun for instance for about sixteen minutes are said
to be contemporaneous with the present moment of experience taking place on
earth. Putting it at its most quixotic, from the present perspective of a solar
event, what happened here on earth sixteen minutes ago is contemporaneous
with what is happening on earth now, as measured in terms of capacity to
influence the solar event.
So the problem arises from the fact that process theism seems to presuppose
a cosmic 'now' while relativity physics seems to entail that no such 'now' exists;
that there is physically no unique meaning for simultaneity in the case of
causally separate events on the one hand and that the process God requires the
existence of a world-wide 'now' on the other. This problem, incidentally, is not
merely an internal difficulty for the process theological system, but in fact exists
for all forms of temporalistic theism. Moreover, if the direction of the solution
should not point toward revising that notion of God, but rather adjusting
relativity theory itself, it might have significance beyond that of understanding
how temporal Gods of whatever bent might interact with the world. For these
reasons, to 'relativise relativity' itself is a direction David Ray Griffin has recently
suggested may finally be more fruitful than working further on process
gods-in-the-making.8
But before turning from religious deities to scientific theories, a few other
divine modifications that Griffin has investigated are worth mentioning. If God's
divine individuality were to be given up, the absence of a cosmic 'now' would no
longer present a problem. Since there is a localised 'now' associated with every
experiential event, given the fact of its subjectivity and the relevant light cone of
possible causal influence that physics suggests, perhaps God is then best
conceived as simply dipping into reality to take on and offer influence wherever
and whenever an experience reaches its completion. This idea has been
introduced, after all, as part of the integral side of process creativity.
As Hartshorne describes it, instead of speaking simply of God, one would then
speak of God-IIere-Now. But giving up God's divine individuality implies the
drastic suggestion that God-Here-Now is not the same concrete unit of reality as
God-Somewhere-Else-Now, thereby doing away with the simple analogy with
human consciousness as a single linear succession of conscious states.
8 D.R. Griffin, "Hartshorne, God, and Relativity Physics" Process Studies 21,2 1992, pp.85-112.
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The collapse of the analogy may not be all that radical however: surely
deconstructive postmodernists have questioned identity notions that ground the
personhood associated with human consciousness in single linear successions of
conscious states. The identity of God could conceivably undergo a similar
treatment. Such a development might even be seen as a bridge-building gesture
between hopeful constructive and nihilistic deconstructive postmodern camps.
A more diversified, perhaps even fragmentary, deity is somewhat appealing also
in that the idea may with some imagination bring fresh process insights to an
otherwise problematic traditional take on the nature of angels, a topic to which
we shall return. Yet such a move would be unappealing at least for philosophers
of Hartshorne's ilk. To begin with, the emphasis placed on the personality of God
as a central feature of his theistic revisions would be lost. God would instead
become the 'chief exemplification' of the multiple personality syndrome.9
Moreover, coming from an adamant psychical realist persuasion, Hartshorne has
insisted that experiential unity is the unity in which everything is initially found,
and all other concrete unities, God included, must be understood as abstracted
from or by analogy with this unity. Not only would the notion of God be
rendered problematic, but each and every unity other than that known through
present experience would likewise have to go.
Another alternative turns on what God - and only God - is conceived as
knowing. One might suppose that even on the basis of an experiential
event ontology, operating under relativistic constraints, all events are in fact
unambiguously related either as precedent to, subsequent to, or
contemporaneous with each other. A temporally well-ordered situation would
then apply to space-like separated events, despite that no non-divine observer
but only God would be able to know, even in principle, which set of events is
which. To return to the sixteen minute stretch of causal ambiguity marking
earthly and solar events: on this scenario the clear temporal spread on earth
would be known by God to exist and to be geared in a definite temporal order
with what takes place on the sun. But the problem with this proposal is that it
supposes that the temporal relations of precedence and subsequence have
meaning apart from causal influence, and that supposition runs counter to both
Whitehead and Einstein's views. For them, to say that one event precedes another
means that the earlier exerts causal influence on the latter.
9 There has been, incidentally, a curious increase in the number of those afflicted with multiple
personality syndrome to parallel the advent of deconstructive postmodernism.
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Finally, a related possibility is to suppose that the causal influence that
establishes what set of events is unambiguously in the past is exerted solely on
God, directed onto a divine occasion of experience alone; that some relations of
precedence and subsequence that do not exist in space-like separated worldly
experience would exist in an all-knowing divine experience. At first glance it
might seem that because no unambiguous cosmic 'now' obtains within the set of
worldly occasions that are contemporaneous with a divine one, this proposal
would not really solve the original problem. But this is to neglect the fact that the
only real 'now' that is needed is a divine one. The two-fold divine role required
by God-world synchronicity can be fulfilled without establishing a 'now' that
also discriminates every worldly experiential event from every other one.
But Griffin rightly calls attention to the fact that an understanding of a series of
cosmic 'nows' that does not depend upon a concept of God for its very meaning,
if at all possible, will have a greater chance of being perceived as relevant to
contemporary concerns by physicists and philosophers of science.10 And even
theologically it seems preferable to think of God as simply knowing the truth
about the cosmic 'nows' rather than having them depend for their very existence
upon divine experience of them. With these concerns in mind we proceed to the
possible departures from standard scientific understanding proposed above.
Although Hartshorne hasn't taken up the idea, the relativising relativity
solution can be introduced with an inquiry he himself initiated. "There is the
haunting question," Hartshorne reflects, "can physics, judging reality from the
standpoint of localised observers, give us the deep truth about time as it would
appear to a non-localised observer?"11 What is 'haunting' seems to be the
suggestion that the deeper truth about time might be discernible only by God.
For us then, the question is whether we, from our standpoint as localised
observers, can see some way in which a non-localised omniscient observer,
knowing the universe absolutely, would know it to have a universal 'now'. If so,
we could challenge the assumption that time as defined by relativity physics
should be accepted as the ultimate truth about time, even in the present cosmic
epoch.
Relativity physics is concerned with influences as limited by maximum signal
speed, that of light. But this aspect of physics can also be interpreted as simply
not speaking to the issue of whether supraluminal influences occur. That is, such
10 D.R. Griffin, "Hartshorne, God, and Relativity Physics" Process Studies 21,2 1992, p. 106.
11 C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis andPhilosophicMethod IL: Open Court, 1970, pp.124-125.
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supraluminal influence might not involve faster~than~light signals at all ~ the
influence might be different in kind from that involved in signals. Whitehead at
times refers to the world as a 'transmitting medium' and a kind of influence
between remote occasions of experience that is not transmitted through
contiguous ones.12 In any given temporal span of experiences, Whitehead
contends that a fourth experience feels the influence from previous first, second,
and third experiences, all of which accordingly lie in the actual influential world
of the fourth one. But the first and second may lie in the actual world of third
experience as well, and the third is then influenced by them too. So the third
experience brings an influence to the fourth experience of the first and second as
felt through the third's mediation. Also, the second experience brings influence
to the fourth of the first experience through the second's mediation. Hence the
fourth experience has the first one presented to it as influence from three
distinct sources: 1) directly via contiguous influence from the first experience
itself, 2) indirectly via the mediation of the second experience, 3) and indirectly
via the mediation of the third experience. Three sources of influence exist, the
first directly, the first through the second, and the first through the third. Insofar
as spatial as well as temporal distance is involved, there would be no reason to
suppose that this direct influence at a distance (the 'first directly' in this
example) would require the same time as that needed for influence transmitted
through a sequence of contiguous occasions. There at least is no reason to
disallow those direct influences being instantaneous. Whitehead offers the
following qualification to the proposal.
Provided that physical science maintains its denial of 'action at a distance,' the
safer guess is that direct objectification is practically negligible except for
contiguous occasions; but that this practical negligibility is a characteristic of
the present cosmic epoch, without any metaphysical generality.13
This suggests that what is entailed by the idea is almost entirely metaphysical,
having little if any significance for science. Because this type of influence would
be 'practically negligible' ~ assuming that science continues to find no evidence
for it ~ scientists can practically ignore it. Yet the idea might at least have one
implication regarding the status of physical cosmology insofar as it embodies the
theory of relativity: that is, the present cosmology with its understanding of time
might not be assumed to be definitive for the ultimate nature of time.
12 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, pp.116-129, 284-291.
13 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.308.
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To challenge physical theory in such manner may not be all that far-fetched.
In the first place, current scientific understanding already includes theoretical
and empirical projects that appear independently to point in the direction of
supraluminal influences. J.S. Bell, Louis deBroglie, John von Neumann, and the
early Werner Ileisenberg all entertained the idea of underlying 'hidden variables'
that suggested such influence as an explanation for otherwise paradoxical
behaviour in quantum mechanics. More recently, other influential physicists
such as David Bohm and Henry Stapp have put forth overarching theories to
explain certain quantum peculiarities in terms of supraluminal influence, while
experiments done by Stuart Freedman and John Clauser have provisionally
confirmed the apparent violation of local causality in quantum phenomena that
Bell's Theorem predicts.14 It is true that Arthur Koestler and Rupert Sheldrake,
among others, were greeted with hostility in espousing more speculatively
flamboyant theories that entail simultaneous influence at a distance, but the
aforementioned theories and studies, perhaps for being more keenly aware of the
physical grounding involved, have been far more favourably received, or at least
not held to be as outlandish as the latter.
Secondly, scientists are often compelled to take abstractions about some
actuality that are focused on by some particular science, due to its limited
interests and practical purposes, for a complete description of the total concrete
actuality - what Whitehead calls the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'.
Experienced time in this case provides a characteristic example. Given that
science abstracts from the fact that individual experiential events take some
account of the past and anticipate the future, it has difficulty affirming the
reality of time in the physical world. Accordingly scientific accounts have
generally regarded the 'arrow of time' to have emerged only at that point in the
history of the universe in which aggregates of atoms subject to entropy appeared.
Time as we understand it experientially, as an asymmetrical, irreversible process,
is all but thought to be an illusion, or at best to have emerged only with the
appearance of life. But process philosophers, by overcoming the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness involved in materialistic conceptions of molecules, atoms,
and subatomic particles, can affirm that asymmetrical, irreversible time exists all
the way down so to speak, as laid out in the last chapter. What Griffin suggests is
that with respect to the relativistic view of time a similar situation may exist.
14 For an overview of these developments in relation to process thought see, G. Lucas, The
Rehabilitation of Whitehead. NY: Suny Press, 1989, pp.180-199.
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That is, the relativistic view could be said to result from that form of the fallacy
that involves equating, at least implicitly, the causal influence on an occasion of
experience with that aspect of causal influence resulting solely from contiguous
experience. Accepting that abstraction as the complete concrete reality would
entail that no causal relation of any kind exceeds the speed of light, and that
current physical theory states a metaphysical truth, or at least an ultimate
cosmological one. On the alternative hypothesis, hinted at in Whitehead and
pondered by Iiartshorne as shown above, a post-relativistic universe in which all
experiences are unambiguously either in the past of, in the future of, or
contemporary with all others would obtain. While the physical causality
operating at the speed of light or slower would still imply differing assessments
of simultaneity by worldly observers, the instantaneous action at a distance of
supraluminal influence would maintain one universal simultaneity, and so the
needed cosmic 'now' of process and other temporalistic theisms would as it were
have its time.
Finally, bearing in mind the psychical realist reliance on experiential cues to
reveal metaphysical insights, it is relevant to mention that it is generally assumed
in para-psychological circles that paranormal influence typically occurs
instantaneously. "This conclusion has some empirical support," even Whitehead
notes in passing, "both from the evidence for peculiar instances of telepathy, and
from the instinctive apprehension of a tone of feeling in ordinary social
discourse."13 Whatever opinions one holds regarding the para-normal, the sense
of feeling tone of a location, especially in hostile or otherwise unusual
environments is a widely admitted phenomena, and the defiance of normal
chains of causal influence has, since the time of James' Principles ofPsychology,
preoccupied researchers in the field.
§ Angels and Changing Absolutes
The proposal to relativise relativity theory itself highlights a useful distinction
between cosmological and metaphysical speculations. While the present physical
epoch has been shown to be dominated by the speed of light as one of the
physical cosmological constants, in this case supposedly dictating absolute
limitations on all causal influence, it need not (though it might) be a final
metaphysical truth as well. Indeed the speed of light seems something of an
ad hoc figure when considering the incredible dimensions now known to
15 A.N. Whitehead, Process andReality. NY: Free Press, 1978, p.308.
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characterise the universe at large. Just as reality need not be dominated by the
four known fundamental forces of physical science - electromagnetic, weak and
strong nuclear, gravitational - reality need not be constrained causally to the
speed of light. These are discoveries of empirical investigation, not findings from
a priori modes of inquiry; contingent facts and not necessary truths.
To be sure, the difficulty in keeping these distinctions straight increases when
it comes to issues, such as in the above proposal, that involve time. For process
philosophers tend to make use of what Peirce and then Hartshorne referred to as
the 'objectivity modality of time' in discriminating cosmological contingencies
from metaphysical necessities.16 On a view as old as Aristotle, and one consistent
with the creative, organic, temporal world of process metaphysics, contingency
and necessity are primarily ontological features of time or process and only
derivatively linguistic or logical features pertaining to thought. "That is
necessarily which is always; that happens of necessity which never fails to
happen;" according to Aristotle and, "that exists or happens contingently which
exists or happens only at, during, or after, a particular or limited time."17
Simply put, the eternal and the necessary are equivalent expressions, on a
process interpretation of the passage, and contingency is manifest only in time
and only as a character of some future. It is easy to see that if the eternal were
what could not have failed to exist and what could not ever cease to exist, then
the eternal means the necessary, defined modally as the 'not possibly not'.
Hence, the three separate temporal modes relating to metaphysical truth are
eternity consisting of abstract necessity and possibility, past consisting of settled
concrete necessity, and future consisting of some combination of settled concrete
necessity and abstract possibility conditioned by that necessity. Necessary truths
can then be defined as that which has always been part of the settled future and
thus has never been and will never be an open contingent possibility.
At any rate, on this view it is all the more tempting to see long-standing
contingencies as eternal necessities, a classic example being that of Aristotle
himself, who wrongly thought he saw in the regularity of the heavens empirical
proof of metaphysical truth. The metaphysician seeks to formulate necessary
16 C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce, C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss eds. Cambridge,
Harvard Univ. Press, 1930-1958, Vol.6, p.32; C. Hartshorne, "The Neglect of Relative
Predicates in Modern Philosophy," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.14, No.4, 1977,
pp.309-318.
17 Paraphrased by C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. IL: Open Court,
1970, p.133.
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truths regarding existence, truths that no conceivable state of affairs could
invalidate. Examples Hartshorne identifies through process metaphysics include:
necessarily something exists, necessarily experience occurs, necessarily creative
synthesis involving internally and externally related actuality occurs and - one to
sum up the others - necessarily divine infallible experience, having fallible
experiences among its objects, also occurs.18 These differ in kind from
cosmological notions such as the speed of light constant and the four
fundamental forces mentioned above, which could conceivably be otherwise.
While the metaphysician's task may involve a good many cosmological
considerations - Whitehead did subtitle Process and Reality 'an essay in
cosmology' and sought therein to fuse the great cosmological schemes of Plato's
Timaeus and Newton's Scholium ~ the aim of those considerations is primarily
one of providing 'applicable and adequate' working out of details that address
the 'coherent logical' metaphysical structures thus embodied. Often a confusing
overlap is unavoidable, such as when cosmological theories imply an expanding
universe alongside metaphysical truths that entail an increasingly complex
integration of all existence. And often cosmological options are curiously
neglected despite blending in both with current scientific understanding and
metaphysical conviction.
Nevertheless there is a certain amount of cosmological elbow room within
process metaphysical boundaries, to rival the metaphysical elbow room insisted
upon in the proposal of relativising the cosmological theory of relativity above.
One might criticise process philosophy for its apparent preoccupation, in a world
spanning billions of light years across, with a select set of its relatively negligible
entities. An adherence to present scientific data obliges 'empirical rationalist'
process thinkers to maintain that the purposive unities in existence include
subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, cells, animals, and (provisionally) the
universe at large. The stark imbalance toward the small and the local - relative to
the size of the universe ~ merely reflects constraints based on current scientific
knowledge. But nothing cosmological or metaphysical in any way precludes the
possibility of greater sentient centres of purposive activity. In fact, arguably
ourpresent grasp of the monumental size of the universe points toward
a statistical plausibility of that being possible.
18 C. Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis andPhilosophicMethod. IL: Open Court, 1970, PP.13-15.
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Perhaps star clusters, given a wide enough space-time scope of evidence,
would display the unified purposive activity required to make good the analogy
to sentient entities such as persons and other animals. Perhaps these sentient star
clusters in turn would appear to be merely akin to atoms in greater sentient
galaxies, and galaxies merely like molecules in greater sentient galaxy clusters,
and these cosmic clusters merely cells in a final universe-wide sentience.
Gustav Fechner and then Josiah Royce and F.C.S. Schiller expounded positions
along these lines (planets being characteristic examples in each) but erred in
reasoning that the specious present of such cosmic moments of experience, by
fluctuating relative to the size of the entity and hence being Very vastly slow' in
heavenly bodies, would put all evidence of unified purposive response beyond
our observational grasp. The error was not in postulating a lack of evidence in
principle (in a metaphysical sense), which is clearly not so in this standard
cosmological issue, but rather in suggesting that all entities of whatever shape or
size were best understood as being sentient. This leads to the idle metaphysical
claim that all entities behave in the manner of their 'natures' implying for
instance that 'stones take account of other stones' precisely by following the laws
of nature that bear upon their physical interactions. Besides being an empty
doctrine that changes nothing beyond verbal designation of already identified
physical processes, it closes off potential sources of evidence set in the distinct
arrangements of pluralistic experiential events. Specifically, the hierarchical
manner by which levels of sentience are embedded into one another, and
the nature of the internal and external relations involved, could make all the
difference in the nature of the entities and in the internal environments thereby
established. What are cosmological absolutes as ordering principles at one level
may change at higher experiential levels.
True, there is no evidence beyond vaguely suggestive statistics as to the reality
of cosmic experience at the exalted rank of star and galaxy clusters. But suppose
experiential events at a cosmic level far above human experience yet below the
universe at large did exist and roughly followed the patterns we (partly) discern
in mind-body interactions between human and cellular experience. We influence
our cells to some degree and our cells influence us. And even without direction
from over-riding subjectivity, cells as we have seen, along with all other
existents, come under the influence of the systemic connections that enmesh
them. There is however the notable difference between the two sorts of influence
outlined previously. Cosmic subjective influence may very well be analogous to
that subtle yet effectual difference that separates the subjective and the systemic
245
influences guiding human and cellular experience, a distinction known
primarily, if not exclusively, in the case of our own experience from the inside.
The philosophical and religious availability of the idea may help to further the
case for a streamlined process psychical perspective. First, the theological
component is still there for the taking, as the possibility of an absolute sentient
whole embodying the changing cosmological absolutes remains open. Here a
process theology, conceived along the lines of a Hartshornian psychical deity
operating under (as of yet) partly undisclosed metaphysical truths regarding
time, would still serve in one universal God-world synchronicity. Second, here
also a spectrum of deconstructed deity options - the angels if you
will - pertaining to the cosmic ordering principles of individual cosmic epochs
alluded to above, in what Hartshorne called the 'Gods-Here-Now' scenario,
would likewise be a conceptual possibility. The notion may be filled out in terms
of cosmic habit patterns such as the four fundamental forces and the speed of
light constant operating in the present epoch, and any number of stories told as
to how each grand cosmological state of affairs would (or would not) tally up
these changing absolutes into one final divine process whole. Finally, the process
agnostic or process atheist has here enough in the way of scientific
understanding to leave the more speculative ventures to one side and still
maintain a coherent process orientation focusing on the fact of creativity as set
out in the last chapter. Psychical process would still provide a reasonably
intelligible ordering principle solely based on bottom-up varieties of the theme.
§ Process and the Perpetual Rebirth of Wonder
The earliest recorded musings as to the nature of reality amount to a crude
precursor of the psychical realist and process philosophical ideas explored in the
present study. It is of interest to note, in closing, the treatment these ideas have
undergone throughout the history of thought. Human beings adhered to a sense
of a process psychical animism prior to and independent of any support of either
logic or science. The process quality of psychical experience within was
universally applied throughout nature, an application that in time ushered in
a pantheon of gods corresponding to the recognised features of experience.
Greek reasoning maintained an allegiance to psychical intuitions, but cultivated
both materialist views separating it off to cosmic ideal levels, and dualist views
that did little but mask an agnostic stance toward those intuitions. In either case
an insentient and static dimension was added to the sentient dynamic sphere,
from which arose the problematic relations between physical and psychical
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existence. The temporality of process as known in experience was not captured
adequately in ideal Platonic forms nor in Aristotelian prime matter.
Medieval thinkers emphasised the eternal divine reality at the expense of the
temporal mortal one, thus furthering anti-process and anti-psychical rational
tendencies. It was never consistently worked out how the two realms could
interact, nor how matter, if not cast as psychically real, could be the outcome of a
psychical divinity that lacked matter. The mechanism and materialism that later
came to govern scientific practices were already present in these great divides
established as separating a free divinity from a fated mortality and the creative
psychical from the determined physical. Curiously, modern philosophy for a time
all but universally retained its allegiance to the psychical attributes of deity while
accepting that science hadproven the natural world to operate under invariant,
mechanical forces.
Still more curious, after a frank atheism gained a wider audience, were
subsequently attempted exclusions of psychical reality even from our own
experiential confines within that natural world, this notwithstanding the advent
of various evolutionary explanations. But while the gods may succumb to
positivist science projects, we ourselves could hardly hope to come entirely under
the spell of scientific conceptual frameworks that deny the genuine reality of our
own psychical experience, that is the genuine, dynamic, creative characteristics
of the psychical that run contrary to static, mechanical details thought to govern
dead inert physical matter.
Nowadays even the static mechanical details in natural processes operating at
the elementary level have been all but given up, to be replaced by statistical
counterparts accurate at best for current measurement purposes. From rational
puzzles in antiquity down to philosophical psychology in current debate, the
conceptual backdrop alluding to details of this sort has always represented the
only direct counter to the view that the world is both psychically real and
pervaded by process through and through. It has been argued that an assumed
existence of static and mechanical, rigorous and utterly regular reality never was
a good argument for an absolute absence of dynamic creative experience, first by
reasoning on grounds that it could never conceivably be proven, and second on
grounds that even assuming its truth would mean either the absurd absence of
our own process psychical reality or its absurd exemption from the universally
rigorous laws of determined mechanical detail. The bearing that recent
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discoveries implying an uncertainty principle in scientific ultimates will finally
have on ontological issues remains partly unresolved, but clearly the seeds for
questioning anti-process and anti-psychical assumptions have been planted.
We are accustomed to seeing our scientists, as well as our philosophers and
our artists, advance by bringing greater accuracy and lucid definition to
unbridled exaggeration and lack of clarity. By and large our present
understandings amount to refined and elaborated reworkings of originally
inherited ideas, as novel insights are grafted onto the stockpile of already
unfolding developments of first principles. Ultimate interpretations, to follow
along these natural lines of advance, ought to be the outcome of the initially
striking ideas intuited by our ancestors. The earliest known musings as to the
way things are - that reality is made up entirely of experiencing entities of some
sort and that there are gods of all sorts - may accordingly fail us in countless
details and intermediary principles. But assuming our philosophical forebears
were not utterly mad, I for one am willing to submit that the only really
primordial notions regarding experience and reality are notions worth
wondering about. ...And in the present reflections I have tried to go some way
in that direction. But alas, there is always more wonder to be done.
"Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophic thought has
done its best, the wonder remains." - Alfred North Whitehead.
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